FOI Disclosure Log Entries

Number of Requests below: 98

Types: zip (1) — 1 file
Main files: lex7939.zip

FOI Request LEX7939 sought detailed statistics on "designated electors" under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, including future numbers, new declarations over recent financial years (2022/23-2024/25), declaration authority, and review outcomes. The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) response indicated no available future-dated geographical breakdown of electors but provided new declaration figures: 37 in 2022/23, 1 in 2023/24, and 211 to date in 2024/25, all made by a delegate. Internal review applications totalled 4 in 2022/23 (all confirmed) and 4 in 2024/25 (3 confirmed, 1 set aside). Notably, there were zero applications to the Administrative Review Tribunal and zero declarations ceasing effect under s 202AH(3) within the specified periods.

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Main files: lex7743-schedule.pdf

The FOI request sought access to the document "Client Details - AEC - Transparency Website," which was found to be publicly available with no relevant exemptions, resulting in the granting of access.

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The Norfolk Island Chamber of Commerce (NICC) and Cherri Buffett initiated an FOI request to challenge the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) requirement for indigenous Norfolk Islanders to vote in Australian federal elections. The NICC asserts Norfolk Island is a distinct, separate colony established by Queen Victoria in 1856, never legally annexed to Australia, and its indigenous inhabitants are not Australian citizens, rendering Australian electoral laws invalid there. They sought specific documentation proving Australia's legal claim, including annexation records to NSW and then to the Commonwealth, and relevant Imperial Legislation. The AEC, in response, stated its statutory obligation to enforce the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, which extends to Norfolk Island, affirming compulsory enrolment and voting based on High Court rulings, while advising the NICC to address constitutional and territorial claims to other government departments as it does not hold the requested historical documents.

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The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) sought information via an FOI request regarding its engagement with major online platforms—Google/YouTube, Meta (Facebook/Instagram), Microsoft/LinkedIn, and TikTok—to safeguard electoral integrity ahead of the 2025 Federal Election (FE25). The released documents reveal extensive interactions, including meeting invitations, email correspondence, and formal letters, detailing how these platforms are collaborating with the AEC's Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT) and Defending Democracy Unit (DDU). Key themes include countering misinformation and disinformation, managing AI-generated content (AIGC) like deepfakes through detection, labeling, and provenance initiatives, applying lessons from global elections, streamlining referral and escalation pathways for problematic content, and supporting media literacy campaigns. Each platform is actively preparing for FE25 by updating policies (e.g., AI content disclosure), offering cybersecurity tools, establishing dedicated working groups, and facilitating direct communication channels with the AEC to ensure a secure and credible information environment.

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Main files: lex6475.zip

The FOI request documents were blank, preventing any summary from being generated.

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The provided document excerpt is insufficient to determine the main purpose or specific content of the FOI request; it only indicates the full release of a single document titled "Exemption" without further details.

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This FOI request summary addresses concerns regarding the Police Association of South Australia (PASA) Branch President election (E2024/78), primarily focusing on alleged improper lobbying practices by board members and significant issues with ballot paper distribution. Released documents, including internal and external emails and formal complaints to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), detail allegations of PASA board members using personal email accounts to lobby voters, which raised questions about potential breaches of s190 of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act. The AEC initially indicated that personal account use might not constitute a breach of organisational resources. Concurrently, numerous members complained about not receiving ballot papers or being excluded from the voter roll, with the AEC consistently advising on replacement procedures, though many issues were raised after the ballot period had closed, making resolution impossible.

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This FOI request pertains to the planning, cost estimates, and financial communications for an advertising or public information campaign, likely related to an electoral event, between May and July 2024. Released documents, primarily emails between a government body and advertising agency BMF, are often partially or fully withheld due to commercial-in-confidence, deliberative processes, or personal/irrelevant information exemptions. The core content details BMF's requests for formal approval of initial campaign cost estimates (including retainer, digital, and social media services, with TVC costs pending), discussions on financial administration and payment terms, and extensive queries regarding media recommendations, specific asset requirements (e.g., TVC length, social formats, OOH variations), and production considerations, alongside efforts to establish regular Work In Progress meetings.

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Main files: lex6205.zip

FOI-2024-00055 sought the total number of individuals removed from the UK between January 1 and April 1, 2024, with a country of origin breakdown. The Home Office responded on May 6, 2024, refusing the request under Section 21 of the FOIA, as the information is accessible via other means. They stated that such immigration statistics are published quarterly on GOV.UK, and the specific data for the requested period would be made available in August 2024 as part of the 'Immigration statistics, year ending June 2024' release, providing a direct link to the statistics collection and informing the applicant of their right to an internal review.

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The FOI request sought information on non-voters in the 2023 Canberra division referendum, leading to the release of two partially disclosed documents under Section 22: "Search results: response to penalty notices" and "Statistics on non-voters who provided a valid reason." The released content details categorized responses of non-voters, including those who paid the $20 administrative penalty (PP), provided a valid reason (VS), or did not respond to the first notice (NR), alongside broader statistics on non-voters who offered a valid reason for their non-participation.

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This FOI request concerned the legal costs and expenditure related to the case "Australian Electoral Commission v Craig Kelly" (NSD375/2022). The 79 released documents, spanning over 100 heavily redacted pages, primarily detail the financial management of the proceedings, focusing on Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) fee estimates and disbursements. Initial expenditure approvals were for $20,000, with a significant AGS estimate of $174,840.05 provided in March 2023, which was subsequently increased to a total estimated expenditure of $254,444.73 by July 2023. The documents include detailed disbursement schedules covering items like transcript costs, travel, and barristers' fees (e.g., Christopher Tran), along with itemised AGS bills and correspondence discussing fee approvals and case updates. Most documents were released in part due to exemptions including legal professional privilege, personal information, and deliberative processes.

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An FOI request sought specific official documents related to individual nominations and qualifications for April 15, 2019, and April 13, 2022. The four identified responsive documents—signed Nomination Forms and Qualification Checklists for both dates—were all deemed subject to exemption under section 47F(1) for personal information. Consequently, the decision for all documents was "Release in part," meaning the forms were provided with sensitive personal details redacted.

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This FOI request details the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) internal processes for verifying Australian citizenship to establish electoral enrolment eligibility, outlined in policies like "Roll Why" and "Roll How." The comprehensive verification method involves initial internal database searches (GENESIS, RMANS), issuing a "Citizenship Questionnaire," and escalating to formal "Citizenship Check" requests with the Department of Home Affairs. Eligibility criteria extend to Australian citizens (by birth or grant) and "Eligible British Subjects" under historical provisions. The AEC also facilitates provisional enrolment via Sections 99A and 99B of the Commonwealth Electoral Act for individuals awaiting citizenship. The documents further specify extensive Evidence of Identity (EOI) guidelines, including acceptable documents and their verification via the Document Verification System (DVS) or an enrolled elector (PCI), alongside outlining internal system operations, such as applying "Citizenship notations" (AX, AC, AV, BS, NN) and managing various "Status" types in their databases to ensure data integrity.

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An FOI request sought statistical data on how 9,110 non-voters in the electoral division of Lingiari responded to penalty notices issued for the 2023 referendum. Partially released documents revealed that 588 individuals provided a valid reason for not voting, 865 paid the $20 administrative penalty, and 5,592 did not respond to the initial notice.

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The FOI request successfully obtained the Victorian Socialists' Constitution (Version 1.1), a document adopted in 2018 and revised in 2019. This foundational text outlines the party's dedication to democratic socialism, aiming to eliminate poverty, inequality, and exploitation, while advocating for specific policies such as a living wage and public ownership. It details the party's governance structure, including defined roles for officers (President, Secretary, Treasurer), an Executive Committee, a Governing Council, and designates Party Conferences as the supreme decision-making body. Additionally, the Constitution covers membership rules, election procedures, financial management, a grievance process, and imposes specific obligations on elected members, such as adherence to party policy and donating any salary exceeding the average worker's wage.

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This FOI request sought internal Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) documents on procurement and contract management, leading to the release of comprehensive procedures, various forms/templates, and travel guidelines, many with redactions. The released "AEC Procurement and Contract Management Procedures (October 2020)" detail the agency's governance framework for acquiring goods and services, emphasizing "Value for Money" in adherence to the PGPA Act and Commonwealth Procurement Rules. This includes guidelines on risk management, Indigenous Procurement Policy, leveraging existing arrangements, record-keeping, financial delegate responsibilities, ethics, political neutrality, and specific policies like the Black Economy Procurement Connected Policy. Accompanying forms, such as the Contract Management Plan and Procurement and Contract Risk Assessment, illustrate the AEC's structured approach to managing agreements and accountability. Additionally, the "ETG Travel Guidelines" outline rules for official travel, prioritizing "Lowest Practical Fare" and detailing expense claim procedures for both APS and labour-hire staff.

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This FOI request sought documents from a 2023 Town Hall meeting concerning internal discussions on public service ethics and accountability. Released documents included a partially redacted Town Hall transcript and a full transcript of questions, revealing significant discussion around the "Robodebt" scandal. An anonymous question specifically requested an independent ethics adviser for the AEC, citing concerns about Robodebt. In response, AEC leadership, including the Moderator and Electoral Commissioner, disavowed any similar systemic issues within the AEC's history and directed staff to existing ethics resources like the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC), noting future integrity work by the APS following Robodebt's findings.

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The FOI request sought an "OpenAI Platform brief," which was largely withheld under Section 22, but "Attachment B: Additional OpenAI information" was released. This attachment detailed potential risks of OpenAI platforms like ChatGPT and DALL-E, particularly concerning elections. Identified risks included AI models misrepresenting Australian electoral processes or the AEC, generating deliberate misinformation or deceptive political images, and users mistakenly accepting AI-generated "hallucinated" responses as factual due to the advanced nature of the technology.

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This FOI request obtained partially released documents, including Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT) Board Meeting Minutes and daily operational records from January to June 2022, detailing the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) and EIAT's efforts to ensure the integrity of the 2022 federal election. The documents reveal a chronological overview of activities: initial taskforce establishment and "mobilise" phase, significant electronic enrolment surges, candidate nomination updates, managing a threefold increase in postal vote applications and high pre-poll uptake, successful implementation of Secure Telephone Voting, extensive ballot paper distribution, and the impact of the AEC's "Stop and Consider" disinformation campaign. It further outlines the successful recruitment of over 100,000 temporary staff, seamless polling day operations, and the steady progress of vote counting, which completed House of Representatives counts and neared Senate completion by June 2022, with high voter turnout.

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The FOI request sought documents regarding the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) assessment and communication of the 2022 Federal Election's integrity and security, particularly concerning advice from the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT). Released documents include AEC media releases and their drafts, extensive internal emails discussing and clearing these statements, EIAT Board meeting records (agendas, minutes, talking points), and formal EIAT advice to the Electoral Commissioner. These materials illustrate the AEC's process of assuring public confidence in election integrity, highlight EIAT's central role in informing public messaging, and detail internal review and clearance procedures for public statements. Notably, some withheld documents point to inter-agency input, including from intelligence agencies, and exemptions like "damage to the security of the Commonwealth" (Section 33(a)(i)) were applied to certain email chains, indicating sensitive discussions related to election security.

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This FOI request sought daily "Postal Vote CSV file for upload" documents, resulting in the full release of an index of these files spanning from September 22, 2023, to October 11, 2023, with no exemptions applied.

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The FOI request aimed to understand the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) electoral roll management, focusing on its integrity and processes, especially for removing deceased electors. Released documents confirm the AEC employs a robust, multi-faceted "Roll Integrity Assurance System" utilising high-trust data sources from various government agencies and intricate human and system checks to ensure accuracy, identify anomalies, and manage the roll. A key focus is the "robust process" for removing deceased electors, with approximately 150,000 such deletions annually, primarily driven by Births, Deaths and Marriages data. The documents highlight the AEC's continuous efforts, processing thousands of daily transactions and maintaining ongoing oversight through internal and external reviews, to ensure a highly current and accurate electoral roll.

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An FOI request sought information regarding the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) policy on assessing vote formality for the upcoming referendum, specifically addressing perceived inconsistencies. Released documents reveal a letter from Peter Dutton and Michaelia Cash expressing "serious concerns" that the AEC's approach is "fundamentally lopsided": a tick counts as a formal 'yes' vote, but a cross is deemed ambiguous and informal, which they argue artificially skews results towards the 'yes' case. The letter demands consistency, stating that if a tick counts for 'yes', then a cross should similarly count for 'no' to ensure fairness and impartiality. It also requests the release of the legal advice from the Attorney-General's Department that the AEC has reportedly relied upon, urging the Commission to reconsider its policy to uphold the integrity of the referendum process.

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The FOI request sought a copy of the 2023 Referendum Writ, for which a single document, the "Copy of referendum writ," was identified and released in full with no exemptions applied. The document was noted as being publicly available at writ-for-2023-referendum.pdf on the aec.gov.au website.

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This FOI request released documents detailing the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) communication with the Yes23 campaign concerning compliance with electoral authorisation requirements for their referendum communications. The materials, primarily emails and letters, focus on a specific interaction in July 2023 where the AEC identified non-compliance with Yes23's digital advertisements, stating that the text "Yes23.com.au" was not sufficiently clear as a URL for authorisation. Yes23 subsequently agreed to modify their authorisation to "www.Yes23.com.au" and underline it, a solution accepted by the AEC as achieving compliance.

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This FOI request summary outlines documents from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) related to a "breach notice" issued to "Advance Australia" for failing to properly authorise "referendum matter" on their "Referendum News" Facebook page. The released records, including the breach letter and an email chain, reveal the AEC's engagement with "Advance Australia," providing specific guidance on authorisation requirements for digital communications under the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984. This guidance included extending compliance deadlines and detailing required particulars (entity name, town, responsible person). "Advance Australia" confirmed their amendments, with the AEC later offering further clarification on the precise format for digital authorisations, stressing the "when in doubt, authorise it" principle.

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This FOI request sought information concerning the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) guidelines, media advice, and internal legal deliberations regarding ballot paper formality and the treatment of "ticks" and "crosses" for the Referendum, reflecting significant public interest. The released documents, including detailed schedules, internal communications, and extensive legal advice (some historical) from the AGS/AGD, reveal the AEC's internal discussions and public messaging on formal votes. A central theme is the interpretation of the Referendum Act 1984, especially "savings provisions" like Section 93(8) which allows for non-standard marks if voter intent is clear. The materials also highlight the AEC's active media engagement and established internal procedures, such as formality guidelines and the "Scrutineers Handbook," despite numerous redactions.

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FOI request LEX4616 yielded the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) internal guidelines for its communication and visual identity, designed to ensure a consistent, clear, and professional public image. The "AEC Writing Style" document outlines comprehensive rules for written communications, focusing on clarity, conciseness, appropriate tone, and inclusive language, including specific guidance for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, gender-neutral terms, and person-first language for disability, alongside grammar and formatting standards. Complementing this, the "AEC Visual Identity Guide (Brand Guidelines)" dictates strict standards for the AEC's visual presentation, covering core brand elements like the mandatory AEC logo (specifying its distinctive purple, minimum size, and usage rules), the required URL on all external communications, a WCAG-compliant color palette, specified typography, and guidelines for visual content and digital presence, with provisions for limited branding exceptions.

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The FOI request illuminated extensive engagement between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), particularly its Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT), and major social media platforms (Meta, Google, TikTok, Twitter/X, Microsoft/LinkedIn) to safeguard electoral integrity and combat misinformation/disinformation, specifically concerning the Australian Referendum and recent by-elections. Released documents, primarily emails and formal notices, reveal the AEC's active collaboration to streamline processes for identifying, reporting, and potentially removing content that violates electoral law or platform terms of service, with a key focus on misinformation about the referendum process itself. Engagement included Twitter/X content removal requests, Meta communications, Google/YouTube "Trusted Flagger" program discussions, TikTok "Safety Enforcement Tool" onboarding, and Microsoft/LinkedIn information sharing, all aimed at establishing secure referral pathways. While the breadth of collaboration is evident, many specific details are withheld due to exemptions protecting privacy, ongoing investigations, operational methods, and commercially sensitive information.

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An FOI request primarily seeking access to the electoral roll resulted in the release of an edited copy only, with specific exemptions (s 47F) applied to justify the redactions. The process involved an initial email discussing access, a signed deed for the roll, and a formal decision outlining the partial release of information.

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The FOI request sought the document "Authority to Institute Proceedings – FE22," which was identified and released with "Access in Part" due to exemptions applied under sections S 47F and S 22 of the relevant legislation.

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The FOI request aimed to uncover the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) media strategy for an upcoming referendum, particularly its proposed use of TikTok. Released documents, including internal minutes and emails, reveal the AEC's collaboration with Universal McCann to inform the public and ensure voter participation. While TikTok was identified as a valuable channel to reach younger demographics (17-24/18-24), significant concerns were raised regarding its use, including its ban on government devices, brand safety issues, and an ongoing Department of Finance review. Despite an initial recommendation to remove TikTok due to high risks, it was ultimately retained in the media plans for budgeting purposes, with the rationale that it is "very easy to pull out of plans later, harder to add back." Its inclusion remains conditional on ongoing consultation with the Defending Democracy Unit and Department of Finance, and explicit government approval. The AEC also prepared a cautious public statement, denying current TikTok trials or plans while confirming ongoing media channel mix development.

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The FOI request details the 2018 procurement and operational requirements for the Australian Electoral Commission's "Senate Scanning Solution," primarily through its "Statement of Requirements" and "Work Order." The "Statement of Requirements" mandates a highly secure and accurate system for scanning Senate ballot papers, critical for democratic processes. It specifies comprehensive security protocols aligned with Australian Government frameworks (PSPF, ISM), including secure physical zones with CCTV and access controls, and strict handling procedures for varied ballot papers with AEC pre-sorting and vendor restrictions. The solution also requires high data capture accuracy compliant with the Electoral Act and readiness for rapid electoral support. The Work Order formally established the contractual engagement, integrating the "Statement of Requirements" as a core component of the sensitive "CAPTURE AND DIGITAL INFORMATION SERVICES" agreement.

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Cory Harding's FOI request LEX3715 sought access to the AEC's "finalised estimates briefing pack for the 2023 February Supplementary Budget Estimates," specifically from the Deputy Electoral Commissioner, Electoral Integrity and Operations, and Service Delivery. Of 36 documents listed, only one was fully released, 23 were edited and provided, and 12 were refused entirely. The released content highlights the AEC's preparedness for a potential First Nations Voice Referendum, detailing substantial funding allocations and procurement plans, alongside insights into its fluctuating financial model and increased travel post-election. Documents also covered evolving electoral processes, including the significant rise in early and postal voting, COVID-safe measures during the 2022 federal election, and adjustments to overseas/mobile polling. Further insights emerged regarding efforts to boost Indigenous enrolment (reaching 84.5%), the adoption of new polling place technology and software like "EasyCount" for Senate preferences, and the AEC's position on voter identification as a parliamentary matter. The released information additionally addressed post-election administrative reviews, such as an error in Cowper, the denial of a Gilmore recount, and responses to public concerns about discarded ballots and misinformation, underscoring the AEC's extensive public information campaigns and commitment to environmental sustainability in procurements.

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An FOI request unveiled details of a sophisticated spear phishing campaign (INC11744) that targeted eight Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) Indigenous Electoral Participation Program (IEPP) mailboxes in November 2022. The attack, identified as an account harvesting attempt using a falsified support@aec.gov.au address, was successfully contained without compromising AEC systems due to prompt staff reporting and internal response, with the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) engaged. Internal AEC discussions deemed the highly targeted incident potentially related to the proposed referendum, prompting briefings to internal committees (EIC, EIAT) and inter-agency dialogue with the National Indigenous Australians Agency (NIAA), reinforcing the message of a significant ongoing cyber threat environment for the referendum.

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Main files: lex3556.zip

This FOI request sought information from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) regarding its assessment of potential disclosure entities, particularly the Real Estate Institute of Australia (REIA), and comprehensive compliance data for various financial disclosure entities from 2015-16 up to the 2019 Federal Election. The released documents reveal the AEC identified REIA as a "Potential Third Party" discloser in May 2019 but ultimately determined there was insufficient evidence to pursue them, concluding they were unlikely to have exceeded disclosure thresholds based on internal review of public information. The request also yielded extensive data on compliance status, including lodged returns and outstanding obligations for political parties, third parties, donors, and candidates, as well as "no obligation letters" issued to third parties across the specified financial years.

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FOI NO. LEX3479 sought meeting minutes from the Electoral Integrity and Assurance Taskforce (April-November 2022) regarding Electoral Act breaches, specifically authorisation and misleading/deceptive conduct. The released documents include a schedule and 24 heavily redacted 'Record of meeting' documents from May 2-25, 2022. Unredacted portions consistently reveal discussions of "Unauthorised Candidate Corflutes" in Hughes, MacKellar, and Warringah (NSW), categorised as a "Breach of CEA." For this recurring issue, records repeatedly indicate "Nil updates" and a "Watching Brief" as the taskforce's action, with extensive redactions preventing insight into other potential breaches or broader electoral integrity discussions.

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Main files: lex3470-lex3489.zip

An FOI request sought access to the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) internal briefing documents prepared for its November 2022 appearances before the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) and Estimates Committee. The released materials comprise a structured compilation including executive summaries, detailed sections for each hearing, various statistical and operational summaries (e.g., fast facts, infographics), and extensive "Group briefs"—often designated as Ministerial hot issue or back pocket briefs—from various AEC branches. These documents collectively provide a comprehensive overview of the AEC's operations, performance, and key issues, primarily in the context of the 2022 federal election and preparedness for a potential referendum. Key content areas covered include parliamentary engagement, financial matters, electoral operations and service delivery (e.g., diverse voting methods, roll management), electoral integrity and security (e.g., misinformation, foreign interference), regulatory functions (e.g., donations, redistributions), workforce and technology, and overall performance statistics.

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FOI Request No. LEX3437 sought Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) policies governing staff adherence to APS Values, Employment Principles, and Code of Conduct, limitations on staff telephone communication with the public, and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the Australian Federal Police (AFP). The released documents primarily address staff conduct and public engagement, providing details on formal breach procedures, mandatory obligation acknowledgements at staff engagement emphasizing commitment to APS Values, Code of Conduct, and political neutrality, and comprehensive induction programs covering ethical behavior, values, security, privacy, and conflict of interest. Additionally, documents outline specific rules for public telephone communication, including not transferring marketing calls or confirming staff details, taking messages for senior executives, and guidelines for service standards and referral protocols for complex inquiries. No documents pertaining to MOUs with the AFP were provided.

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This FOI request (LEX3422) sought information from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) concerning policies for privacy complaints, online electoral roll management and disclosure, suspicious access detection, and electoral roll access data. The main document provided was the "Complaints Management Procedures" (February 2015), which outlines the AEC's general framework for managing all external complaints, including those related to privacy breaches, by detailing the process flow and referring to specific, specialized policies for detailed privacy complaint management. Crucially, this document did not contain information regarding online electoral roll management, detection or prevention of unlawful disclosures, measures for suspicious access detection, or specific electoral roll access data from IP addresses, addressing only the general procedural handling of complaints.

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An FOI request sought minutes from Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) meetings held between March 2, 2021, and October 19, 2022, resulting in the release of seven sets of endorsed, edited minutes. These documents primarily detail the Commission's decisions and discussions concerning political party registration, deregistration, and name changes, alongside the evolving methodology for verifying party membership, particularly in response to legislative amendments increasing the minimum member requirement from 500 to 1,500. Key discussions included seeking Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) advice on membership testing, and specific rulings on party names (e.g., "The New Liberals," "Liberal Democratic Party"), deregistration (e.g., "Australian People’s Party," "VOTEFLUX.ORG"), and re-registration (e.g., "Seniors United Party of Australia").

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This FOI request sought documents on the Australian Bureau of Statistics' (ABS) methodology for sampling and testing political party membership lists, specifically concerning the deregistration review of VoteFlux.Org | Upgrade Democracy! The released documents, including advice from the ABS Chief Methodologist, clarified that for statistically valid conclusions about an entire list, samples must be drawn randomly from the whole list, not merely a sub-list. It emphasized that larger lists require proportionately larger sample sizes (e.g., 564 for 4,680 members) to maintain desired confidence levels and control false rejection risks (below 6%). The methodology is designed as a practical and fair system encouraging accurate record-keeping, noting that filtering names improves list quality and reduces false rejection likelihood, and warning that using an incorrect sample size for larger lists increases the probability of false rejection.

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The FOI request concerned the deregistration of the political party VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy! (VFUD) by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) for failing to meet the mandatory 1,500-member threshold. This decision stemmed from VFUD's submitted membership lists failing the AEC's statistical testing methodology, which the party contended was fundamentally flawed, particularly after a procedural error saw the delegate non-randomly test only 1,650 names from a larger 4,680-member list. During the subsequent internal review, the AEC Commission affirmed the deregistration, critically acknowledging that the delegate's non-random testing of the second list was a "departure from the methodology" and placed "no weight" on its results. However, the deregistration was upheld based on the definitive failure of VFUD's first membership test and the party's subsequent failure to provide a properly testable list within the AEC's established, resource-constrained methodology.

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Main files: lex3308-schedule.pdf

The FOI request sought all communications between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) within 12 months of initial contact regarding advice on "party membership testing." Five documents were released, detailing a consultative process where the ABS provided detailed methodologies and advice for membership verification. This input directly informed the AEC's internal approval of a "methodology policy," demonstrating the ABS's significant advisory role in the AEC's development of its approach to verifying political party membership.

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The FOI request sought minutes from Commission meetings held between March 1 and September 19, 2022, pertaining to electoral process integrity, specifically mentioning the party register (including membership testing), physical security, and counting algorithms. The released document, "Endorsed minutes for Commission Meeting No. 278, held on 29 March 2022," primarily detailed the Commission's review and affirmation of the deregistration of the ‘Australian People’s Party’ due to its failure to meet the 1,500-member requirement under s 137(6) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, directly addressing the requester's interest in the integrity of the party register and membership testing.

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An FOI request (LEX3263) sought data on Australian federal election voting processes in New Zealand over the last four general elections, specifically covering in-person and postal declaration votes at the Wellington High Commission and Auckland Consulate-General, postal votes returned directly to the AEC from NZ addresses, and briefing documents for the decision not to offer in-person voting in Wellington in 2022. Released documents provided this quantitative data and a DFAT minute, revealing Wellington had 0 in-person votes in 2022 (resulting in a significant increase in its postal votes), while Auckland continued in-person voting but also saw a substantial rise in postal votes. Direct AEC postal returns from NZ significantly decreased in 2022. The DFAT minute confirmed the Wellington decision stemmed from a redacted risk analysis and recommendations for overseas voting.

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The FOI request sought information on the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) process for verifying political party membership, specifically concerning VOTEFLUX.ORG's eligibility to retain federal registration, which requires at least 1500 members. Documents reveal the AEC reviews supplied membership lists by sampling and directly contacting individuals to confirm their status. An "AEC Membership Testing – Realtime Report" for VOTEFLUX.ORG as of March 10, 2022, detailed results from a 66-person sample: 29 confirmed membership, 17 denied, 4 were neutral, and 16 were non-contactable.

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This FOI request (LEX3177) sought documents supporting the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) conclusion that its membership testing methodology was "rational, fair and practical." The primary released document, the "Commission Paper – Review of the delegate’s decision to deregister the Senior United Party of Australia" (17 Nov 2021), details the AEC's methodology, developed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and re-endorsed in 2017, as the foundation for its appropriateness. The paper outlines three membership testing rounds for the Seniors United Party of Australia (SUPA), with initial tests in October 2020 and February 2021 failing to meet the 500-member threshold, leading to deregistration. However, a September 2021 test, conducted during an internal review, successfully verified SUPA's membership, leading to the party's re-registration. The paper also systematically addresses SUPA's claims of unfairness (e.g., due to demographics, alleged errors, lack of scrutineers), asserting the methodology's consistent application, impartiality, and focus on formal membership, thus demonstrating its adherence to the principles of rationality, fairness, and practicality.

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An FOI request (No. LEX3172) sought ABS advice to the AEC on membership testing methodology, specifically the earliest and most recent. The released documents, all from 1996, detail the "oldest advice" and illustrate a collaborative process where the ABS provided expert guidance and detailed information, influencing the AEC's internal approval of its membership testing methodology policy that year. No documents pertaining to the "most recent advice" were provided.

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FOI Request No. LEX3141 sought "PowerPoint slides, notes and any materials relating to the AEC graduate program's orientation sessions given to new staff from the beginning of this year's graduate program to date." In response, the AEC released the 2022 Graduate Induction PowerPoint and schedule, a screenshot of compulsory courses, and an email to graduates containing useful links and attachments (including an SDD PowerPoint, mouse settings, and workstation setup guides). These documents collectively provide a comprehensive overview of the Australian Electoral Commission's role, the structure and requirements of its 2022 Graduate Program (including rotations, APSC program, and APS 5 advancement criteria), performance expectations, roles and responsibilities, administrative information, security and conduct guidelines (emphasizing political neutrality), available support systems, and practical immediate steps for new staff.

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The FOI request sought Axiom Associates' audit report on the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) 2022 Senate scanning and digitisation accuracy. The released draft documents from July 2022, including a detailed report and a collation of exceptions, outline an external statistical assurance process for Senate ballot papers, ensuring electronic data accurately reflects physical records as per legislation. Based on a 10,103-ballot paper sample, Stage 1 identified 7 instances where scanned images did not exactly replicate physical papers, while Stage 2 found 33 discrepancies between physical ballots and electronic preference data/interpretations in the AEC's system, often due to inconsistent rule application or unclear voter markings, with a national sample exception rate of 0.45%. The detailed report estimates 3.2 to 5.8 exceptions per 1,000 ballot papers nationally with 95% confidence, noting no political bias in the exceptions, which typically arose from interpreting voter intent. The collation document further provides detailed examples and visual illustrations of these Stage 2 discrepancies.

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The FOI request sought "all communications" from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) Commissioner or a delegate regarding their evaluation of VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy!'s February 13, 2022, appeal against potential deregistration, specifically concerning their membership validity claims. Documents released included a March 2, 2022, email chain where Assistant Commissioner Joanne Reid instructed the testing of the Party's new 4,680-name membership list (top 1,650 names) to verify their claims, following an earlier failed membership test. A subsequent March 21, 2022, Minute confirmed this assessment was undertaken using ABS methodology, concluding that VOTEFLUX.ORG failed to demonstrate the requisite 1,500 members, and recommended their deregistration based on these findings.

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The FOI request (LEX3070) sought applications made to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) under s 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 during early 2022, concerning reviews of party registration and deregistration decisions. The released documents, primarily communications and a detailed statistical analysis, reveal a strong theme of challenges to the AEC's administrative processes. Key content includes multiple parties (e.g., Democratic Labour Party, Flux, Health Australia Party) arguing that the AEC's party membership verification methodology is statistically flawed, unfair, and results in arbitrary deregistration outcomes, with Flux providing extensive analysis asserting the method is "rigged." Additional challenges include the Australian Progressives alleging a clerical error in their deregistration, an objection to the registration of the David Pocock party based on candidate eligibility and name consistency, and an objection to the Australian Federation Party's logo for potential voter confusion.

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FOI Request LEX3047 obtained Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) documents concerning complaints made primarily in April and May 2019 about electoral advertisements lacking authorisation or being misleading. The released materials include public email complaints and the AEC's responses to various entities like "Our Vote Our Community" and "Bass Deserves Better" Facebook pages, "RiteOn!" website, and other media. The complaints predominantly highlighted the absence of required authorisation details on political advertising across digital and print platforms, with some also raising concerns about misleading "community group" portrayals or unauthorised paid ads. In response, the AEC consistently clarified 'electoral matter' and authorisation requirements under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, requested subjects to add necessary authorisations, cease distribution of non-compliant materials, and advised on potential penalties up to $25,200 for non-compliance, as well as obligations for "disclosure entities."

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FOI Request LEX3041 sought a list of "foreign objects" (non-ballots) found in ballot boxes and the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) response procedures. The AEC released the Election Procedures Handbook, Prematurely Opened Ballot Box Policy, and Prematurely Opened Ballot Box SOP. These documents reveal that the AEC's primary response to "foreign objects" (like personal items) is non-retrieval, as opening a box to retrieve such items would compromise electoral integrity, and no procedures or forms for listing or describing non-ballot foreign objects exist. While the "Prematurely Opened" documents detail handling for ballot boxes opened prematurely due to issues like seal discrepancies or damage, their focus is on managing the integrity and inclusion/exclusion of ballots and declaration vote envelopes, not on cataloging non-ballot items, consistently prioritizing the "integrity of the result."

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An FOI request (LEX3037) revealed correspondence from early 2022 between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and major tech companies, including Meta, Twitter, Google, Microsoft, and TikTok, regarding compliance with electoral law and the 2022 federal election. The released documents, featuring an "Electoral Communications Escalation Scenarios" guide and extensive communication, detail the AEC's proactive engagement—primarily through its Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce—with these platforms. This collaboration focused on identifying, monitoring, and addressing electoral misinformation, disinformation, and non-compliant content through direct communication channels and content referrals, thereby safeguarding election integrity.

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This FOI request sought information concerning the accuracy, methodology, and identified issues with the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) Senate election counting algorithm and associated scrutiny processes. While early independent tests (2016-2017) found no issues replicating the AEC's 2013 WA Senate count, a subsequent 2021 report by Conway and Teague identified significant discrepancies. This report detailed that the AEC's software used tie-breaking rules inconsistent with the Electoral Act, noted the non-implementation of bulk exclusions (which can alter outcomes), and highlighted ambiguities in the Electoral Act concerning the count's termination. The report proposed various legislative and procedural recommendations, including publishing the AEC's code, correcting tie-breaking, and clarifying statutory definitions, to which the AEC subsequently responded.

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The FOI request disclosed documents detailing the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) investigation into Andrew Laming MP's Facebook pages for compliance with federal electoral authorisation laws. This inquiry was triggered by public complaints and media reports, notably from The Guardian, alleging Laming used numerous pages (e.g., "Redland Bay Bulletin," "Redlands Institute") disguised as community or news groups to promote political content and attack opponents without mandatory disclosures. The AEC confirmed an active investigation, noting 2018 Electoral Act amendments broadened social media authorisation, and issued formal notices to Laming for detailed information and to third parties (like Facebook) for data, with Facebook confirming its cooperation. Findings revealed some pages were removed or updated with authorisation, while others remained active and unauthorised.

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FOI request LEX2979 specifically sought the Australian Bureau of Statistics' (ABS) methodology for sampling Senate ballot papers to audit their processing accuracy. The released document, "ABS Advice to AEC on sampling methodology," details the statistical approach recommended to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to assure high confidence in the accuracy of ballot scanning and data extraction, primarily targeting "Stage 2 errors." It specifies varying sampling rates per state/territory (e.g., 1 in 3,000 in NSW, 1 in 120 in NT), aiming for 99% confidence that the national error rate is low (e.g., less than 6.5 errors per 1,000 ballot papers). The methodology, deemed more efficient than previous approaches, uses a "clustered sampling" technique, selecting bundles of ballots and then individual ballots within them, and provides guidance for calculating the national error rate while also discussing alternative options considered.

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The FOI request LEX2846 illuminated the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) extensive preparations for conducting federal elections amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Released documents detailed the Commonwealth Electoral (COVID Enfranchisement) Regulations 2022, establishing a secure telephone voting system for eligible self-isolating voters diagnosed close to polling day, supported by detailed "Customer Journey" plans and staff scripts. The AEC also adapted its postal voting policy for COVID-positive individuals and noted reduced mobile polling. Revealed were significant logistical and financial challenges, including projected cost increases and staffing difficulties, prompting the AEC to seek greater legislative flexibility for emergency election management. The AEC ensured COVID-safe measures at polling places and maintained the integrity of new voting methods through staff neutrality, scrutineer observation, and robust complaint mechanisms.

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FOI request LEX2088 sought PDF copies of the five formally declared Federal Election 2022 candidate nominations for the division of Cook, identifying Catherine Elizabeth Dyson, Jacqueline Guinane, Simon Roger Earle, Scott John Morrison, and Gaye Cameron. The released documents primarily consist of a "SCHEDULE OF PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS" listing the relevant AECEF060, AEC060-a, and AEC060-b nomination forms, alongside extensive pages detailing the "REDACTION CODES" applied. While confirming the existence and types of these documents, the actual content of the nomination forms is heavily redacted to withhold personal information (e.g., name, address, signature, citizenship), business information, and other exempt categories such as legal professional communication or electoral roll material, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 1982.

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This FOI request (No. LEX1785) concerned Mr. Max Kaye's 14 April 2022 application to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) under s141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, seeking a review of the decision to deregister "VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy!" (Flux). Kaye, a former Flux officer, contended that the AEC's methodology for testing party membership eligibility was fundamentally flawed, using detailed statistical analysis to demonstrate an extremely high probability of false negatives (over 99.99% for a hypothetical eligible party) and arguing that the test was "rigged" and a "farce." His critique highlighted issues such as sampling bias (only A-G names sampled for Flux), an artificially limited sample size (1,650 names maximum allowed for submission regardless of actual membership), and a method that could become less reliable as a party gained members. Kaye asserted that the AEC's policies systematically disadvantaged non-parliamentary parties, enabling the entrenchment of existing political power.

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The FOI request LEX1697 sought Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) correspondence with major social media platforms (Meta, Twitter, Google, LinkedIn, ByteDance/TikTok) from May 2019, specifically concerning Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 compliance and 2022 Federal election preparations. The released documents, primarily emails, illustrate the AEC's Electoral Integrity and Communications Branch (including the Electoral Interference Taskforce) extensively collaborating with these platforms, particularly TikTok, Google, Twitter, and Meta. This ongoing engagement focused on developing "Electoral communications escalation scenarios," establishing clear communication channels, and implementing protocols to combat misinformation and disinformation in anticipation of the 2022 Federal election, including discussions on TikTok's public service announcements and fact-checking partnerships, and Meta's new reporting portal.

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The FOI request LEX1501 sought documents regarding Australian Electoral Commissioner Tom Rogers' involvement in the Sky News documentary "The Campaign Uncovered," revealing four email chains from January-February 2022. These documents show Sky News requested an interview with Rogers for a "behind-the-scenes" federal election special hosted by Peta Credlin, which the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and Rogers enthusiastically supported, offering filming locations and archival footage. The interview was scheduled for February 14, 2022, in the AEC's command centre. Crucially, the day before, Rogers was briefed by AEC staff regarding Credlin's past focus on "multiple voting" and "fears of ballot rigging," with a warning that she might pose "pointed questions about integrity matters," which Rogers acknowledged as "incredibly useful."

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An FOI request sought documents related to the membership testing of "VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy!". The retrieved documents included a March 24, 2022, minute recommending the party's deregistration and a March 18, 2022, report detailing membership testing outcomes. The minute outlined that following an initial review and the party's submission of a membership list, further testing of 1,650 names confirmed the party failed to meet the statutory requirement of at least 1,500 members. Consequently, the minute recommended the deregistration of "VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy!" under sections 137(6) and 138A of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, which would also invalidate any pending applications from the party.

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FOI Request LEX1499 sought documents pertaining to objections against David Pocock's application for registration as a non-Parliamentary political party, with the key document being a "Minute" dated 18 March 2022 detailing the final determination. Objectors argued that David Pocock's foreign citizenship potentially rendered him ineligible under s 44 of the Constitution, and that a single person's name like "David Pocock" could not constitute a "party" under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, possibly leading to ballot confusion. In response, the party asserted that candidate eligibility is distinct from party registration requirements and that the Act does not mandate party names to inherently convey a "party" concept. After reviewing the objections and the party's rebuttals, the AEC concluded there were no valid grounds to refuse the application, subsequently approving its registration.

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FOI request LEX1396 sought and obtained agreements detailing the strict conditions under which Equifax and illion access and use electoral roll information, primarily for identity verification purposes mandated by the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 and the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006. These agreements mandate stringent data security measures, including compliance with the Privacy Act 1988, prohibition of offshore data storage, and encryption. Access is restricted to authorised personnel who must sign Deed Polls and undergo training, while data must be securely destroyed within six months of receipt, evidenced by a certificate. Companies are required to provide annual compliance assurances, undergo triennial independent audits, and face AEC inspections, with severe penalties under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 and Criminal Code Act 1995 for any misuse, and agreements being subject to AEC termination.

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FOI Request LEX1320 sought documents from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) related to 2016 Federal Election House of Representatives candidates, specifically requesting general nomination forms and information, alongside all documents concerning Timothy Robert Wilson's nomination for Goldstein and his deposit refund. Retrieved materials included "Candidates Handbooks," a "Nomination Guide," various blank nomination forms, and for Mr. Wilson, a bulk nomination form (AECEF060-a) from the Liberal Party and a deposit payment receipt, both dated June 6, 2016. These documents collectively detail candidate eligibility, disqualifications, the nomination process, and the $1,000 deposit with its refund conditions; however, no specific receipt explicitly detailing the refund of Mr. Wilson's deposit was provided among the retrieved items.

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FOI request LEX1147 sought correspondence between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and major social media platforms (Meta, Twitter, Google, LinkedIn, ByteDance) from 2019 to 2022, focusing on compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act and preparations for the 2022 Federal Election. The retrieved documents, primarily emails and attachments from TikTok, Google, and Twitter, reveal proactive, ongoing collaboration between the AEC's Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT) and these platforms. Key discussions involved TikTok's proposed in-app Election Hub, Google's political advertising transparency program and extensive anti-disinformation strategies (including "How Google Fights Disinformation"), and Twitter's policies, notably its ban on political ads and establishment of direct AEC contacts for breaches. The AEC also shared an "Electoral Communications Escalation Scenarios" document, outlining potential electoral law infringements for platforms to monitor, demonstrating a comprehensive effort to safeguard electoral integrity and combat misinformation.

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Paul Farrell's FOI request sought "The supplemental report authored by Michael Turner," referenced in an AEC party registration determination, to understand its relevance to the decision. The released document, "Turner Report 300621_Redacted" (30/06/2021), details the methodology of a voter research survey commissioned to assess whether the party name "The New Liberals" would confuse voters regarding identification of their intended party or its relationship with others. The study employed an online, computer-assisted survey of 2,036 Australian voters (n=1,863 effective after weighting), conducted March 6-9, 2021, using an experimental design with four mock ballot papers (Ballot A-D) to vary the prominence of "The New Liberals" relative to the Liberal Party. A crucial follow-up question (Q24) after providing factual information allowed for direct measurement of voter misidentification. While the report thoroughly outlines the research design, methodology, and Dr. Turner's expert opinion on its appropriateness, the actual survey findings and statistical results remain almost entirely redacted.

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The FOI request by James Daniels (LEX1060) sought information on the AEC's Twitter policy and the identity of the person managing the account, resulting in the release of the "Media and Digital Engagement Plan – 2021/2022 federal election." This plan details the AEC's social media strategy, including principles for proactive content, responsiveness, accuracy, and tone on platforms like Twitter, along with an approval workflow. It clarifies that no single person is behind the AEC Twitter handle; instead, it's managed by the Media and Digital Engagement Section in National Office, supported by a dedicated Social Media Operations Group (SMOG) during elections. This team, utilizing the Falcon management tool, handles monitoring, triaging, and responding to queries, with multiple layers of supervision and escalation involving various digital and media officers, emphasizing a collective, structured approach to managing the AEC's online presence.

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Peter Chiam (LEX890) submitted an FOI request for the 'Exchange of Information Agreement with the New South Wales Electoral Commission', resulting in the identification and retrieval of the 'AEC-NSWEC Exchange of Information Agreement 2020-23' dated 03/02/2020. Although the specific document was located, the provided pages (2-12) confirmed its description and date but did not include the agreement's actual content, primarily serving as a record of the FOI request and the scheduled document for release.

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Vanessa Teague's FOI request [LEX540] sought documents related to 'IBM Outputs' from 2016, yielding 106 "IBM Batch Report" PDF files dated June 8, 10, and 15, 2016, categorized by Vote Collection Point and Batch Number. These detailed reports provide insights into ballot processing, including batch metadata, electoral event context, and specific ballot-level checks for formality, initials, marks, and preferences (ATL/BTL). While most entries indicate "OK" for successful processing, various checks, notably UnusualMarkings Checked, Verification Action, Formality Reason Checked, ATL Mismatches, and BTL Mismatches, frequently show "HAS ISSUES" entries, often accompanied by alphanumeric codes (e.g., D2, Y9, M1, U1), signifying specific anomalies or exceptions in the ballot processing.

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FOI Request LEX452 sought documents related to Zi Chun Wang's donations for the 2013/2014 financial year. The released documents, a schedule of three communications from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to Zi Wang, confirm the AEC's process of ensuring compliance with donor disclosure requirements. These communications include an initial notification to Zi Wang regarding his obligation to complete a Donor to Political Party Disclosure Return for 2013/2014, a subsequent reminder, and finally, an acknowledgement from the AEC confirming receipt of his submitted Individual Donor Return for that period, thereby fulfilling his disclosure obligation.

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FOI request LEX359 sought detailed timestamp metadata for an email titled "Objection - The New Liberals," sent by Andrew Hirst of the Liberal Party to fad@aec.gov.au, previously published as a redacted document. The sole released document, "Metadata retrieved in respect of the email dated 19 March 2021 8:45 AM from Andrew Hirst, Federal Director, Liberal Party of Australia," contained the full email headers. These headers revealed the email originated from the Liberal Party's internal server at Fri, 19 Mar 2021 08:45:21 +1100 (AEDT) and was ultimately received by the AEC's internal mail server at Fri, 19 Mar 2021 08:48:38 +1100 (AEDT), indicating a transit time of approximately 3 minutes and 17 seconds. The headers also confirmed the email contained attachments.

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FOI request LS7888 sought documents from 2018-2019 concerning the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) new methodology for its Indigenous Electoral Participation Program (IEPP), specifically regarding its planning, implementation, outcomes, Indigenous involvement, and costs. The released documents reveal the AEC transitioned to a more direct method for estimating Indigenous electoral enrolment rates, primarily by utilising self-identified Indigeneity data from Centrelink. This shift, driven by the availability of new Centrelink data, significantly increased estimated Indigenous enrolment rates from approximately 58% (under the old 2014 methodology) to 76.4% by June 2018 and 76.6% by June 2019. The documents detail the new methodology, its impact, and efforts to track enrolment stimulation, including identifying over 72,000 potentially unenrolled Indigenous Australians in mid-2018 and subsequent enrolment events. However, the released content did not explicitly detail the number of Indigenous people involved in the methodology's development or its final costs and dedicated AEC staffing.

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FOI Request LS7791 sought unredacted copies of approximately 30 objections lodged with the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) against the registration of "The Women's Party." The released documents, comprising 15 third-party emails sent between January and February 2019, consistently raised concerns that the party's name was misleading, particularly given its international association with Radical Feminism. A central objection was that the party's registered officer, Divvi de Vendre, identified as a transgender individual born male, made the party's name "misleading and offensive" and excluded biological women. Objectors also framed the registration as an act of political sabotage against grassroots feminist work, an attempt to mislead voters with "anti-woman propaganda," and cited various sections of the Electoral Act.

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FOI request LS7759 sought documents regarding the 'Stop Selling Australia' party's attempted registration, specifically focusing on the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) "member checking phase." The released documents detail the AEC's process, including the party's application, electoral roll matching (which found 503 eligible members), and crucial direct membership testing. Despite initial compliance on roll numbers, a required sample of 26 members for direct contact allowed for a maximum of one denial of membership. However, out of 52 members contacted, two individuals denied their membership (one confirmed via phone call), exceeding the permissible limit. Consequently, the 'Stop Selling Australia' party "FAILED" the membership testing, leading the AEC to recommend refusal of their application under section 131 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, while offering the party an opportunity to vary their application to avoid outright refusal.

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FOI request LS7708 sought correspondence between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and major US technology companies (Facebook, Google, and Twitter) regarding compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 during the 2019 federal elections. Document No. 42 (Tranche 6), dated May 17, 2019, provides screenshots of "unauthorised electoral advertising on Facebook" from pages including "No Greens Facebook" (promoting Labour, authorised by J. Williams), "Agents in their Community," and "Women of Murray" (also authorised by J. Williams), directly illustrating the types of compliance issues that were the subject of the requested correspondence.

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FOI request LS7540 sought all Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) records concerning the Australian Democrats' 5 December 2018 application to register as a non-Parliamentary political party and its subsequent approval. The released documents, comprising 49 distinct types, detail the entire registration journey: from the initial application submission with constitution, membership list, and logo; through the thorough membership validation process where 541 members were confirmed and a sample of 47 passed verification; the assessment and successful re-submission of the party's logo; the public notification phase which led to an objection, the Australian Democrats' response, and subsequent redactions for privacy; and finally, the internal recommendation and official approval of the party's registration on April 7, 2019, despite the party's expressed concerns about delays impacting election participation.

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FOI Request LS7344 sought all correspondence between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and US tech companies (Facebook, Twitter) since July 2017 concerning compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. The released documents, specifically from August 2018, detail the AEC's engagement with Twitter Inc. (Facebook correspondence was not included) to establish a clear process for managing electoral communication compliance on the platform. Key content includes the AEC proposing scenarios for Twitter's assistance in addressing non-compliant content, such as removing or blocking unauthorised paid advertisements or anonymous electoral communications, or providing information about responsible parties. The AEC also outlined potential legal recourse, including injunctions under Section 383 of the Electoral Act, should Twitter be unable to comply, and provided background on the Act's authorisation requirements.

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Main files: LS6541-schedule.pdf

FOI request LS6541 sought internal AEC communications regarding the appropriateness and potential misinterpretation of the newly named Division of Cox (formerly Corangamite). The released documents consist of 11 emails from February to April 2018 between various AEC staff, including the National Redistributions Manager and Assistant Director of Media. While early emails discuss general name options, later communications, particularly in late March and April and involving the media team, focus on "May Cox para" and "Picture – May Cox," strongly indicating internal discussions addressing public perception and the potential for the name to be misinterpreted or joked about, directly aligning with the FOI's specific inquiry. Some S47F redactions are also present.

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Main files: LS6374-schedule.pdf

FOI Request LS6374 sought all correspondence and detailed records between Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) officers and Democratic Labour Party (DLP) representatives concerning the DLP's representations for a review of its de-registration decision, covering April 23, 2015, to March 1, 2016. The released documents, comprising edited emails, letters, and file notes of conversations, detail interactions between various AEC officers (e.g., Tom Rogers, Paul Pirani) and DLP representatives (e.g., Michael Byrne). Key content includes the AEC's formal de-registration notification to the DLP on May 19, 2015, the DLP's subsequent explicit requests for an extension and a formal "Request for Review under s. 141(2)," and the AEC's detailed responses regarding the review submission process, with a concentrated period of communication from May through early June 2015.

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