FOI Request LEX2846

Date: 2022

The FOI request (No. LEX2846) sought comprehensive documentation related to the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) response to the COVID-19 pandemic concerning electoral processes. Specifically, it requested:
* Drafts of legislation, explanatory material, policy papers, and briefs related to the development of the COVID Enfranchisement Bill and Regulations.
* Advice provided to AEC social media and call-centre staff on assisting COVID-positive voters.
* Policy documents concerning the use of postal voting for COVID-positive voters.
* A list of files from the AEC's record management systems containing "COVID", "COVID-19", "coronavirus", or "pandemic".

The released documents include:
* An Australian Electoral Commission submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) from November 2020.
* Draft Commonwealth Electoral (COVID Enfranchisement) Regulations 2022.
* A "Customer Journey" draft (version 7) outlining a proposed voting experience for COVID-isolating customers, dated March 2022.
* Various internal documents providing talking points, key messages, and contact centre scripts for AEC staff regarding secure telephone voting for COVID-19 affected voters, dated between March and May 2022.
* The AEC's Postal Voting policy, dated February 2022.
* A list of relevant files from the AEC's record management system.

Main Content from FOI Request Documents:

1. COVID Enfranchisement Legislation & Telephone Voting:
* The Commonwealth Electoral (COVID Enfranchisement) Regulations 2022 were drafted to establish a secure telephone voting method for "coronavirus affected individuals." This measure was proposed for federal elections, allowing voters who test positive for COVID-19 and are directed to self-isolate/quarantine to cast their vote by phone if they cannot attend a polling place.
* Eligibility requires an individual to be registered, on an approved electoral roll, not have already voted, and to have become COVID-affected within a specific narrow timeframe (e.g., from 6:01 pm four days before polling day) under a public health order preventing their attendance at a polling place.
* The Customer Journey draft details a two-step process: Registration, where voters register online or by phone providing personal details and evidence of their positive test (e.g., reference/serial number from a health authority) to receive a unique registration number and PIN; and Voting, where they call a dedicated line, quote their registration number and PIN (for anonymity), and verbally instruct an operator on how to mark their ballot.
* The Staff Talking Points and Contact Centre Scripts emphasize that this is an "emergency measure only" and anticipate "long wait times." They provide guidance on proof of COVID-19 status, registration and voting hours, and strongly encourage voters to view ballot paper images online beforehand to expedite calls.

2. Postal Voting for COVID-Positive Voters:
* The Postal Voting policy (February 2022) outlines the general framework for postal votes, which can be utilized by individuals unable to attend a polling place due to serious illness or infirmity, a category that can include COVID-positive voters.
* A note within the policy confirms that "mobile polling facilities may not be provided" to nursing homes and hospitals due to the COVID-19 pandemic, suggesting increased reliance on postal voting for these vulnerable groups.
* Staff Talking Points advised COVID-positive individuals who tested positive earlier than the telephone voting eligibility cut-off to apply for a postal vote, also addressing concerns like securing a witness while isolating.

3. General Election Administration & COVID Impact:
* The JSCEM Submission (November 2020) highlights the AEC's need for greater legislative flexibility (amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) to manage elections during emergencies. This includes granting the Electoral Commissioner powers to determine electoral processes and to adjourn or suspend polling.
* The submission outlines significant logistical and financial impacts of conducting elections during the pandemic, drawing lessons from the Eden-Monaro by-election (2020). These include:
* Nearly doubling the cost of the by-election due to COVID-19 prevention measures.
* Estimating a 30% increase in polling staff and over $30 million in additional costs for a federal election due to hygiene, social distancing, and PPE.
* Challenges with staffing availability, supply chains for materials (e.g., PPE), and managing voter turnout.
* Changes in voting trends, with a significant increase in postal and pre-poll votes.
* The Staff Talking Points and Contact Centre Scripts detail the COVID-Safe measures implemented at in-person polling places, such as controlling venue capacity, providing hand sanitiser, regular cleaning of surfaces, managing queues, appointing hygiene officers, and encouraging voters to bring their own pencils.
* For transparency and integrity, all AEC staff involved in the telephone voting service are required to be Australian Public Service employees and sign political neutrality declarations. Scrutineers are permitted to observe the process (with voter consent for call listening), and stringent ballot paper handling and reconciliation procedures are maintained. The AEC also provides an email for complaints related to the phone voting service.
* The List of Files indicates the broad scope of internal AEC documentation and planning in response to the pandemic, covering operational, policy, and safety aspects.

AI Generated

These FOI documents reveal the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) efforts to navigate the complexities of conducting federal elections during the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting both commendable actions to uphold democratic participation and areas where systemic limitations or policy choices diverge from progressive values.

Social Justice and Civil Liberties (Voting Access):
The AEC demonstrated a commitment to enfranchisement, which aligns with progressive values of universal suffrage. The core "COVID Enfranchisement Regulations" and associated policies were emergency measures designed to allow COVID-positive individuals to vote, primarily through a secure telephone voting service. This expanded access, alongside provisions for postal voting and mobile polling (initially suspended then adapted for aged care), aimed to prevent widespread disenfranchisement due to public health orders. Positive steps include the provision of assistance for voters with disabilities (e.g., blind/low vision telephone voting), the inclusion of telephone interpreter services, and communication materials available in 33 languages, demonstrating an intent to reach diverse communities. The commitment to allowing voters still in the phone queue at closing time to cast their vote also aligns with preventing arbitrary exclusion.

However, several deviations from progressive ideals of equitable access are evident. The telephone voting service, while crucial, was narrow in scope, limited to those diagnosed with COVID-19 after a specific cutoff, excluding close contacts or those with symptoms who might still be hesitant to vote in person. The reliance on voters to register online for phone voting and to view ballot paper images digitally introduces a digital literacy and access barrier. The requirement for voters to provide "evidence" of their COVID-positive status, including retaining reference/serial numbers for tests for 40 days, places an administrative burden on individuals who are ill or otherwise vulnerable. The continued emphasis on compulsory voting, even for ill individuals, shifts the onus onto sick citizens to justify non-voting, rather than ensuring frictionless access. Furthermore, the explicit rejection of broader online voting for federal elections, regardless of personal circumstances, represents a missed opportunity for modernizing and permanently enhancing accessibility, contrasting with calls for more flexible and secure digital democratic participation. Significant barriers also remained for overseas electors, with low postal vote admission rates highlighted in the Eden-Monaro by-election.

Environmental Impact:
The documents implicitly reveal a deviation from environmental sustainability. The implementation of COVID-safe election practices necessitated a substantial increase in single-use items, including "130,000 single-use half-size pencils," "disinfectant wipes," and "disposable gloves" for the Eden-Monaro by-election alone. Extrapolated to a federal election, this would lead to millions of additional waste items, conflicting with progressive environmental goals of waste reduction and sustainable resource use.

Wealth Distribution and Corporate Influence:
The documents show a significant financial impact of conducting elections during a pandemic. The Eden-Monaro by-election costs almost doubled to $3.954 million, with an estimated "30 per cent increase in polling staff required, costing approximately an additional $13 million" and over "$30 million" for PPE and other prevention materials for a full federal election. This reallocation of public funds, while necessary for health safety, points to the economic strain of maintaining democratic processes under crisis conditions.

A key concern from a progressive standpoint is the reliance on private contractors for critical electoral infrastructure. "Computershare (CCS)" is explicitly named as the AEC's "PVA scanning and PVP mail house services contractor," handling postal vote applications and dispatch. While the AEC mentions "strict business and quality rules," the outsourcing of such fundamental components of election administration to a private corporation raises questions about potential corporate influence, transparency, and accountability, as well as the potential for profiteering from a public service. The document also notes that the cost of "normal election materials is impacted by the pandemic, where either the materials themselves, or components to make them are often sourced overseas," highlighting global supply chain vulnerabilities and a lack of domestic production for essential electoral supplies, further intertwining corporate interests with the democratic process.

Overall Alignment/Deviation:
The AEC's actions, as revealed in these documents, largely represent a reactive and temporary response to a crisis, prioritizing the immediate maintenance of the electoral process under duress. While efforts to ensure enfranchisement for COVID-affected individuals align with core social justice values, the solutions often create new administrative burdens or highlight existing systemic rigidities (e.g., legislative constraints preventing more agile or comprehensive digital voting options). The significant cost increases and reliance on private contractors for core services, coupled with the environmental impact of single-use items, deviate from progressive aspirations for efficient, publicly-controlled, and environmentally sustainable democratic systems. The temporary nature of the "COVID Enfranchisement Regulations" (repealed end of 2022) suggests a reluctance to embed these emergency innovations as permanent, more broadly accessible civil liberties.

AI Generated

The Freedom of Information (FOI) documents reveal significant government actions and policy adjustments during the COVID-19 pandemic that present both alignments with and deviations from conservative principles, particularly concerning economic efficiency, individual liberty, fiscal responsibility, and limited government.

Economic Efficiency:
The documents highlight a substantial decline in economic efficiency in election administration due to pandemic-related measures. The Eden-Monaro by-election saw its cost almost double to $3.954 million, attributed to additional polling locations, increased staffing for sanitization and queue control, personal protective equipment (PPE), and new communication and training packages. Projections for a federal election indicated an estimated 30% increase in polling staff ($13 million additional cost) and over $30 million for specialized COVID-19 prevention materials. Operational efficiency also suffered, with vote issuing processes taking 46% longer. The establishment of a large-scale telephone voting service, while aiming for enfranchisement, inherently introduces logistical complexities and acknowledged "long wait times," indicating an inefficient use of resources and voter time, even with a projected 7,000 operators. These measures represent a significant deviation from principles of economic efficiency, driven by an expansion of services under emergency conditions.

Individual Liberty:
The documents show a complex relationship with individual liberty. On one hand, efforts were made to ensure all eligible citizens could exercise their right to vote, including those in isolation, by introducing secure telephone voting and expanding postal voting options. This supports the fundamental liberty of democratic participation. However, the implementation introduces new restrictions and burdens. Telephone voting eligibility was narrow, requiring individuals to have tested positive after a specific cutoff time and to provide health authority reference numbers for their positive tests. This collection of personal health data and the requirement for specific declarations, backed by penalties for false information, can be viewed as an increased encroachment on individual privacy and a bureaucratic burden. The continued enforcement of compulsory voting, even with the added complexities of pandemic-era voting methods and potential long wait times, subtly prioritizes state mandate over ease of individual choice, leading to a tension with the principle of individual liberty.

National Security:
The documents implicitly touch on national security through the emphasis on maintaining the integrity and public confidence in federal elections, even during an emergency. The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) explicitly states its commitment to "safeguard democracy" and deliver "high integrity elections." The introduction of secure telephone voting, with measures like PINs, registration numbers, and scrutineer oversight (with an option for voters to opt-out of observation), aims to protect the secrecy and validity of the vote. However, the shift away from traditional in-person voting to a system relying on remote operators and digital registration, even with safeguards, could raise long-term concerns about system vulnerability and public trust in the electoral process, which are critical to national stability and security.

Fiscal Responsibility:
The extensive costs detailed for adapting election processes to the pandemic explicitly demonstrate a significant deviation from fiscal responsibility. The doubling of by-election costs and multi-million dollar projections for a federal election underline a readiness to incur substantial taxpayer expense to maintain voting access during a crisis. The allowance for "reasonable and practicable" alternative postal vote delivery methods at a cost of up to $100 per elector, while ensuring enfranchisement, points to a willingness to expand spending without strict adherence to cost-effectiveness. This reflects a reactive rather than a fiscally conservative approach to unforeseen circumstances.

Limited Government:
The documents reveal a marked expansion of government power and reach. The AEC's submission explicitly requests broader powers for the Electoral Commissioner, including the ability to determine how electoral processes are undertaken, and to adjourn or suspend polling and other election requirements. While framed as necessary "flexibility" for emergency situations, this grant of discretionary authority to an unelected official represents a notable deviation from the principle of limited government and separation of powers. The rapid establishment of a large-scale, government-run telephone voting operation (utilizing other Commonwealth department call centres and thousands of government employees) for a "temporary" emergency measure further illustrates an expansion of bureaucratic footprint and direct government intervention in civic processes. The Minister's power to specify additional matters for telephone voting eligibility also concentrates power, potentially allowing for political considerations to influence what should be an impartial administrative process.

AI Generated

The FOI documents reveal a government electoral body, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), that embraced a reactive and exceptionally costly approach to managing elections during the COVID-19 pandemic, raising significant questions about fiscal responsibility, transparency, and the integrity of the voting process.

Central to these concerns is the "COVID Enfranchisement Bill and Regulations" which introduced a "secure telephone voting" method. While framed as an emergency measure (and indeed set to be repealed at the end of 2022), its implementation demonstrates a severe lack of foresight and a concerning shift in control. The regulations grant the Electoral Commissioner broad powers to "determine how certain electoral processes and activities may be undertaken" and "adjourn or suspend polling," effectively allowing for a top-down modification of established electoral law without direct parliamentary oversight for each decision.

The telephone voting system, in particular, stands out as a questionable expenditure and a potential compromise to voting integrity:
* Massive Cost & Inefficiency: Despite being billed as an "emergency measure," the AEC projected an "estimated 30 per cent increase in polling staff required, costing approximately an additional $13 million," purely for staffing due to COVID-19 measures. Furthermore, procuring specialized PPE alone was estimated to "raise the cost of running a federal election by in excess of $30 million." The system required "approximately 7000 operators" for a service the AEC admitted would likely result in "long wait times." This suggests a colossal outlay of taxpayer money for a service acknowledged to be cumbersome and potentially frustrating for voters.
* Questionable Integrity & Lack of Transparency: The "Customer Journey" document reveals a system where a call center operator "records the voter’s preference on the ballot papers." This removes the physical act of voting from the elector, introducing a third-party intermediary into the casting of a secret ballot. Critically, while "scrutineers" (party observers) could "listen to a call between a voter and a call centre operator," the regulations explicitly state that "An audio recording must not be made of a request to vote by a secure telephone vote or of a vote by a secure telephone vote." This deliberate omission of audio records, even when observers are present, is a glaring red flag for accountability and independent verification of vote accuracy. Additionally, the limitation that scrutineers cannot exceed the number of operators further restricts oversight.
* Arbitrary and Shifting Eligibility: The eligibility for telephone voting was tightly restricted – only for those testing positive after a specific date (initially 6pm Tuesday 17 May, then expanded to Friday 13 May) and unable to attend a polling place. The social media guidance highlights the reactive nature of these changes, stating "If this changes today there will be public communications to advise the detail." This last-minute policy shift likely caused confusion and potentially disenfranchised voters who tested positive earlier or whose isolation dates didn't perfectly align. The AEC's own communications acknowledge, "No online voting for federal elections is available, regardless of personal circumstances," making the operator-mediated phone system appear as an unnecessary, costly, and less secure substitute for a more direct digital solution if one were genuinely needed.

The Eden-Monaro by-election serves as a stark precursor to these nationwide issues. The AEC's submission indicates the by-election's cost "almost doubling the total cost, to $3.954 million" from an average of $2 million, primarily due to "additional polling locations... additional staff required for sanitising, queue control and vote issuing and counting; PPE and other hygiene materials and services." Yet, turnout only saw a "slight drop" from 93.31% to 89.13%, raising the question of whether such a disproportionate financial outlay was genuinely necessary or efficient for maintaining participation. The AEC's internal data modeling for queue times also suggests that "even in times of emergency and crisis," their preference is for "evidence-based staffing estimations that prioritise safety and the efficient flow of voters," implying that the staffing increases were a planned response to a perceived (rather than empirically proven) need for additional staff to manage COVID-related process slowdowns.

Finally, the Postal Voting policy reveals a subtle shift in responsibility and accessibility for vulnerable groups. It notes that "mobile polling facilities may not be provided during the election period" for locations like "nursing homes, hospitals, high-care facilities, mining camps, prisons," directing these vulnerable populations to postal voting instead. This offloads the burden of access onto these individuals, potentially leading to further disenfranchisement, especially given the complexities and delays associated with postal votes during a pandemic.

In summary, the documents paint a picture of an AEC given expanded emergency powers, which it then used to implement a highly expensive, complex, and potentially opaque telephone voting system. This system, while intended to address pandemic-related voting challenges, appears to have prioritized a heavily staffed, operator-driven approach over more transparent or cost-effective digital alternatives, all while quietly shifting the burden of accessibility onto vulnerable voters and undermining public trust through a lack of critical audit trails.

AI Generated

The released FOI documents highlight the Australian government's exemplary commitment to upholding democratic principles and serving the public good, even amidst the unprecedented challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. These documents demonstrate a proactive, adaptive, and transparent approach to ensuring accessible, secure, and safe electoral processes.

Key efforts and outcomes include:

Proactive Legislative Adaptation and Emergency Preparedness: Recognizing the inherent difficulties in administering elections during emergencies, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) proactively advised the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) on necessary legislative amendments. The proposed changes, now formalized in the Commonwealth Electoral (COVID Enfranchisement) Regulations 2022, provide the Electoral Commissioner with essential flexibility to manage electoral processes (e.g., expanding postal or electronic voting, adjusting polling hours) while prioritizing voter and staff safety and maintaining public confidence. These regulations are designed as temporary measures, demonstrating a responsible and targeted response to the emergency, with safeguards like parliamentary scrutiny.
Successful Piloting and Learning from Experience: The Eden-Monaro by-election served as a crucial test case, showcasing the AEC's agility and professionalism in a dual-emergency environment (bushfires and COVID-19). Post-election surveys revealed high voter and staff satisfaction with safety measures, validating the government's adaptive strategies. Key learnings from this event, such as the necessity of extensive inter-agency consultation (with Chief Medical Officers, police, health authorities) and the impact of health measures on operational costs, directly informed the planning for the federal election, ensuring continuous improvement and robust readiness.
Enhanced Accessibility and Voter Enfranchisement: To ensure all eligible citizens could exercise their right to vote, the government implemented a multi-faceted approach. This included expanding the availability of pre-poll voting centres, dedicating teams to support vulnerable populations in aged care and hospitals, and, critically, introducing a secure telephone voting service for COVID-19 positive individuals unable to attend polling places. This service, clearly outlined in the "Customer Journey" document and the regulations, ensured anonymity while maintaining the integrity of the vote through stringent registration and verification processes. Measures for non-English speakers and those with disabilities were also prioritized, reflecting a commitment to inclusive participation.
Robust Communication and Transparency: The government deployed comprehensive public information campaigns and clear communication strategies to inform voters about their options, new safety measures, and potential operational adjustments (e.g., longer wait times for emergency services). Detailed talking points and call centre scripts illustrate a consistent and reassuring message, designed to reduce voter anxiety and guide citizens through new processes, including how to provide proof of COVID-19 status for telephone voting. This proactive communication minimized confusion and maximized public awareness.
Unwavering Commitment to Electoral Integrity and Safety: At every step, stringent measures were implemented to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process. This included real-time checks to prevent double voting, a two-step registration and voting process for telephone votes to ensure anonymity, and robust ballot paper handling and reconciliation procedures. Increased staffing at polling places, alongside the provision of PPE and enhanced hygiene protocols, underscored a paramount focus on public health. While these measures incurred additional costs (e.g., $30 million for PPE, increased staffing), they were deemed essential investments to protect lives and maintain trust in the democratic process, distinguishing Australia's approach from less successful international examples.
Comprehensive Operational Planning: The extensive list of COVID-related files demonstrates the sheer breadth and depth of the government's planning, covering strategic management, occupational health and safety, communications, staffing, training, and technological development. The detailed Postal Voting policy further illustrates a meticulously planned approach to one of the most widely used alternative voting methods, including provisions for secure processing, timely delivery, and handling of special cases like silent electors.

In summary, these documents provide compelling evidence of the government's diligent, adaptable, and public-focused response to an unprecedented crisis, ensuring the fundamental right to vote was protected with integrity and safety for all Australians.

AI Generated

The following summary adopts a highly critical stance, meticulously dissecting the provided FOI documents to expose systemic failures, incompetence, and potential malice in the government's handling of electoral processes during the COVID-19 pandemic.

I. Systemic Failure & Gross Incompetence in Emergency Preparedness (AEC Submission to JSCEM, November 2020):

Profound Lack of Foresight: Despite acknowledging federal elections as Australia's "biggest peacetime logistical event," the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) was catastrophically unprepared for a foreseeable pandemic. Their November 2020 submission, almost a year into the global crisis, is a desperate plea for legislative changes that should have been proactively sought years prior, or at minimum, immediately after the pandemic's onset.
Blame Shifting and Evasion of Responsibility: The AEC consistently externalizes blame, citing a "complex environment" and reliance on "ministers and senior officials across governments." This abdication of leadership demonstrates a failure to secure autonomy or assert the criticality of electoral functions within government.
Pre-existing Failures Amplified: The document admits "existing challenges" like difficulty recruiting temporary staff, supply chain vulnerabilities, limited premises, and inadequate access for disabled, overseas, regional, homeless, and Indigenous voters were merely "exacerbated" by COVID-19. This is a damning confession that fundamental electoral integrity and accessibility were compromised before the pandemic, with COVID-19 simply revealing the depth of these long-standing systemic inequities.
Legislative Inflexibility & Delayed Action: The AEC's belated request for powers to "extend reasons electors can postal or pre-poll vote," "conduct an election solely by postal vote," or "expand categories of electors who may utilise the electronic (telephone) voting method" is a stark admission of its own reactive, rather than proactive, stance. The existing powers (Sections 240A, 241, 242) for suspending polling were deemed insufficient, highlighting a stunning lack of comprehensive legislative review or foresight in preparing for emergencies beyond simple "anthrax scares." Their inability to leverage broader existing powers (Section 286) due to internal constraints further underscores their organizational paralysis.

II. Disenfranchisement, Financial Mismanagement, and Operational Chaos (Eden-Monaro By-election Analysis, AEC Submission):

Disenfranchisement of Vulnerable Voters: The "decision not to conduct mobile polling for the event," forcing aged care facilities and hospitals onto postal voting, is a direct act of disenfranchisement. The abysmal "9 per cent of postal votes sent to overseas electors were admitted to the count" (compared to 33% previously) is irrefutable evidence of a catastrophic failure to ensure access for a specific, often geographically isolated, demographic.
Explosive Cost Overruns: The by-election's cost "almost doubling to $3.954 million" due to "additional polling locations... additional staff... PPE and other hygiene materials" exposes gross financial mismanagement stemming from reactive, inefficient planning. The pre-emptive warning that the "likely impact on the federal election budget is clear" and that "specialised materials... raise the cost... in excess of $30 million" forebodes continued taxpayer waste.
Spin Over Substance: The claim that the AEC "aimed to reduce voter anxiety... by showing the AEC was prepared" is a transparent attempt at public relations spin to mask fundamental unpreparedness. "Awareness of the environmental context was key to the campaign’s success" prioritizes perception over actual operational effectiveness.
Rushed & Inadequate Training: The need to "adapt quickly to develop and deliver appropriate and relevant training" in "only three weeks" highlights a last-minute scramble, suggesting the training was likely superficial and insufficient, compromising the integrity of the process.
Inefficient Operations & Unacceptable Wait Times: Data revealing the "ordinary vote issuing process took 16.5 seconds (or 46 per cent) longer" points to severe inefficiency. The queue modelling exposing potential "maximum queue" times of "55.42 minutes" reveals an electoral system utterly incapable of maintaining acceptable service levels without exorbitant increases in staffing and resources, which itself incurs "an estimated 30 per cent increase in polling staff required, costing approximately an additional $13 million."
Fundamental Logistical Failures: Admissions of "procurement lead times," "supply chain risks," and "significant challenges for bulk storage availability" reveal a complete lack of basic logistical foresight and planning for essential election materials.

III. Bureaucratic Hurdles & Undermined Secrecy in Telephone Voting (Customer Journey, Regulations, Call Centre Scripts):

Delayed, Restrictive, & Arbitrary Access: The "DRAFT v7" of the "Customer Journey" in March 2022, just months before the election, indicates a protracted and incompetent development process. The "Commonwealth Electoral (COVID Enfranchisement) Regulations 2022," undated in the final version but appearing in 2022, were clearly a last-minute legislative scramble.
- The narrow eligibility window for telephone voting – "after 6pm Tuesday 17 May" then abruptly changed to "after 6pm Friday 13 May" days before the election – created deliberate confusion and limited access for genuinely sick voters.
- The requirement for sick voters to provide highly specific proof ("test centre location, date, time, and ref # from your health authority" or "RAT brand and serial number") placed an unreasonable and discriminatory burden on individuals already suffering from illness.
- The Ministerial power to "specify matters" for eligibility introduces political influence into what should be an independent electoral process.
Legalized Disenfranchisement & Self-Protection: Regulation 7(1) explicitly states that the AEC is only required to provide telephone voting "to the extent feasible," and Crucially, 7(4) declares "Any failure to provide a telephone voting method... does not invalidate the result of a general election." This is a cynical legal shield designed to insulate the government and AEC from accountability for systemic failures and voter disenfranchisement.
Erosion of Secret Ballot & Voter Agency: The telephone voting process, where a "Service Officer records the voter’s preference on the ballot papers," fundamentally compromises the secret ballot and removes direct voter agency. The reliance on a third-party transcriber introduces potential for error, bias, or even malicious manipulation, with only a weak "read back" safeguard. The declaration that "it is irrelevant that the voter did not complete the ballot paper personally" (Reg. 24(2)(c)) legalizes this profound breach of democratic principle.
Misleading Public Statements: The "Key Messaging" and "Call Centre Scripts" falsely claim, "The AEC voting assistant will not know the voter’s name and address" and "Phone operators are not given your name, address, or phone number. They are only given registration numbers, to protect your privacy." This directly contradicts Regulation 23(1)(a), which requires the Divisional Returning Officer to "find the name of the voter that corresponds to the registration number on the envelope" for scrutiny. This deliberate obfuscation of the process demonstrates a willingness to mislead the public about the true extent of anonymity.
Inadequate Capacity & Blame-Shifting for Delays: The call centre scripts repeatedly justify "lengthy wait times" by stating "it’s busy" and "This is an emergency service, and it’s busy." This is an admission of woefully inadequate resourcing for a compulsory voting system. The passive aggressive suggestion that voters "should be prepared for potentially long wait times" places the burden of inconvenience and potential disenfranchisement directly onto the sick citizen.
Punishing the Ill & Helpers: The regulations create an "offence for false or misleading declaration" (Reg. 26), effectively criminalizing honest mistakes by sick individuals. Furthermore, the penalty for an individual who "assists the voter" without the voter explicitly stating they "require another individual’s assistance" (Reg. 15(2)) actively deters much-needed support for vulnerable voters. The "strict liability" offense for voting more than once (Reg. 27(3)) further criminalizes potentially confused or disoriented sick individuals.
Flawed Scrutiny and Lack of Transparency: Regulations limiting scrutineers to the "number of call centre operators" (Reg. 20(2)) and criminalizing communication not "reasonably necessary" (Reg. 20(6)) severely curtail effective oversight. The contradictory statement that "An audio recording must not be made... of a vote" (Reg. 16(8)) undermines any claim of transparency or the ability for scrutineers to verify vote accuracy.
Abrupt Service Closures & Lack of Cohesion: The internal memos show critical changes to registration eligibility and online portal closures happening just days before the election, indicative of a chaotic and uncoordinated rollout that actively hindered voter access.

In conclusion, these documents paint a damning picture of a government and its electoral body exhibiting systemic unpreparedness, reactive and incompetent decision-making, and a callous disregard for voter accessibility, particularly for vulnerable populations during a public health crisis. The measures implemented were often too late, too limited, unnecessarily burdensome, and characterized by a disturbing lack of transparency and a focus on legal self-preservation over democratic integrity. The financial implications highlight significant waste due to these fundamental failures in foresight and execution.

AI Generated

The provided documents reveal a disturbing expansion of government control and a clear disregard for individual liberty under the guise of "emergency measures." From an Objectivist perspective, this represents a dangerous slide towards collectivism, eroding the primacy of individual rights, rational self-interest, and productive achievement.

Primacy of Individual Rights and Individual Liberty:
The most flagrant violation of individual rights is the explicit and repeatedly stated policy of compulsory voting. The state compels individuals to participate in an activity under threat of penalty, regardless of their personal values, rational assessment of candidates, or desire to abstain. This is forced altruism, demanding a "duty" to the collective that supersedes individual choice.

Furthermore, the "COVID Enfranchisement" regulations impose egregious infringements on personal autonomy. To vote by telephone, individuals are forced to disclose private medical information (positive COVID-19 test results, isolation directives, and associated reference numbers) to a government agency (AEC) as a prerequisite for exercising their right to vote. They are even required to "keep records" of this private health data for 40 days. This is a blatant overreach into an individual's private life, treating personal health status as a public commodity to be monitored and controlled by the state. The arbitrary and constantly shifting eligibility timelines for telephone voting (e.g., "tested positive after 6pm Tuesday 17 May") further demonstrate bureaucratic caprice, restricting rather than facilitating genuine individual choice.

The limitation of scrutineers at call centres to "one per call centre operator" significantly curtails the transparency essential for a free and fair electoral process. This undermines the individual's right to observe, fostering an environment where government actions can occur with reduced public oversight.

Rational Self-Interest and Productive Achievement:
The "emergency measures" detailed in the documents lead directly to inefficiency and a suppression of productive achievement. The AEC's admission of "potentially long wait times" for telephone voting and the acknowledgment of "frustration" for callers highlight the inefficiency of a centrally planned, government-mandated service. Rational individuals seek to minimize wasted time and effort; these policies compel the opposite.

The significant financial burden imposed on taxpayers is another direct assault on rational self-interest. The Eden-Monaro by-election cost nearly double previous averages due to COVID measures, and federal election estimates include an additional $13 million for polling staff and over $30 million for PPE. These are costs extracted from the productive members of society to fund an inefficient, bureaucratic apparatus. This massive expenditure for "safety" measures, such as "sneeze shields," single-use pencils, and "Hygiene Officers," is a gross misallocation of resources that productive individuals could have invested more wisely for their own benefit.

The general reluctance to embrace readily available, efficient technologies, such as secure online voting, signifies a suppression of personal initiative and a preference for archaic, bureaucratically controlled methods. Despite public demand and the availability of technology, the AEC insists that "no online voting for federal elections is available, regardless of personal circumstances," forcing citizens into less efficient, state-approved channels.

Dangers of Collectivism and Government Overreach:
The entire "COVID Enfranchisement Bill and Regulations" package is a prime example of collectivist thought in action. The justification for these measures consistently revolves around ensuring "confidence and trust in elections," "the safety of voters and electoral officials," and the "legitimacy of the result"—all collective values prioritized over individual freedom and autonomy.

The proposed legislative amendments, such as enabling the Electoral Commissioner to "determine how certain electoral processes...may be undertaken" and to "adjourn or suspend polling, or provide for the temporary suspension or adjournment of other events," centralize immense power in the hands of a single bureaucratic entity. This is textbook government overreach, allowing an unelected official to dictate fundamental aspects of the electoral process, including "close of rolls, nominations, early voting or scrutiny," thereby eroding the rule of law and individual control over political participation.

The pervasive coordination with "Commonwealth, state or territory government agencies" and the emphasis on "conforming with federal and local health advice" illustrate a government that views individuals as components of a collective to be managed, rather than sovereign entities. The detailed micromanagement of polling places, including mandates on queue control, hand sanitizer usage, and even the type of pencil used, exemplifies a "nanny state" mentality that dictates even the most trivial aspects of individual conduct.

In summary, these FOI documents lay bare an electoral system that has, under the pretext of a public health emergency, aggressively expanded its bureaucratic interference, compelled citizen action, and imposed arbitrary restrictions on individual liberty. The emphasis on collective "safety" and "integrity" has come at the expense of rational self-interest, productive achievement, and the fundamental right of individuals to live free from unwarranted government intrusion. This represents a dangerous and un-Objectivist trajectory where the state assumes ever-greater power over the lives of its citizens.

AI Generated

AEC FOI Disclosure Log Archive

FOI Request LEX2846

Main Content from FOI Request Documents:

FOI Request LEX2846, Schedule of Released Documents [PDF 125KB] (pdf)

LEX2846 documents [ZIP 2.82MB] (zip)

ZIP Contents

Doc 01 - IS20-0000009_ JSCEM Submission No. 17.pdf (pdf)

Doc 02 - Customer Journey for AEC Covid Voting DRAFT v7.pdf (pdf)

Doc 14 - COVID Enfranchisement Regulations.PDF (pdf)

Document No. 1.pdf (pdf)

Document No. 2.pdf (pdf)

Document Summary and Relevance to FOI Request LEX2846

Document No. 3.pdf (pdf)

Document No. 4.pdf (pdf)

Document No. 5.pdf (pdf)

Document No. 6.pdf (pdf)