FOI Request LEX1060

Date: 2022

FOI Request Summary: AEC Twitter Policy and Identity

This summary details the request made under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, the documents released in response, and the relevant content pertaining to the FOI request.

Main Purpose of the FOI Request

The FOI request, submitted by James Daniels (LEX1060), sought information regarding the 'AEC Twitter policy and identity of the person behind the AEC Twitter handle'.

Documents from the FOI Request

The document retrieved and released in response to the request is:

Media and Digital Engagement Plan – 2021/2022 federal election, dated 01/07/2021.

Main Content from the Documents (relating to the FOI Request)

The Media and Digital Engagement Plan 2021/2022 federal election outlines the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) strategy for media and digital engagement, including its approach to social media platforms like Twitter, and details the structure and procedures for managing these channels.

AEC Twitter Policy/Approach:

The plan integrates social media management as part of the broader AEC Reputation Management Framework, guided by six principles focused on building a positive reputation, open communication, positioning the AEC as an expert, judicious use of language/tone/timing, backing public statements with operational delivery, and active monitoring/risk management.

Specifically for social media operations (including Twitter), the plan outlines the following engagement approach during the federal election:

Proactive Content: Regularly provide relevant, informative, and engaging content, anticipating potential criticism.
Responsiveness: Be responsive to questions and criticisms, subject to swift review of claims.
Timeliness: Ensure timely responses, including the use of holding lines.
Accuracy: Rely on facts and concentrate on content accuracy.
Tone: Employ a tone that demonstrates real people are responding and are helpful, while maintaining professionalism. Selectively use a firm tone to debunk procedural myths.
Visuals: Use visual accompaniments to provide context wherever possible.
Monitoring: Actively monitor content both on and outside of AEC channels.
Approval Workflow: Reactive content on social media accounts follows the same considerations and processes as the media enquiry handling process, with immediate ramifications for speed of spread being a key decision factor.

Identity of the Person Behind the AEC Twitter Handle:

The document does not identify a single 'person' behind the AEC Twitter handle but rather details a structured team and process responsible for all corporate social media accounts, including Twitter.

Administration: The administration of all AEC social media accounts is undertaken entirely by the Media and Digital Engagement Section in National Office. This centralisation is due to social media's close links to issues management and the need for connection to media monitoring and operational updates.
Social Media Operations Group (SMOG): For the election period, a dedicated Social Media Operations Group (SMOG) comprising approximately ten labour hire staff is stood up. SMOG staff monitor incoming mentions, triage, respond to basic queries, monitor external traffic (via keyword listening), and escalate content. They work in shifts from 5 am to 10 pm.
Supervision and Escalation:
- Senior SMOG staff (AEC staff from non-election business areas) provide the first layer of immediate supervision.
- The entire SMOG operation is overseen by the Digital and Social Media Officer within the Media and Digital Engagement Section. This officer is responsible for pre-populating social media responses in the management tool (Falcon), setting up monitoring briefs, onboarding and training SMOG staff, and initial escalation of complex/sensitive content.
- The Digital and Social Media Manager and Principal Media Advisor are the senior points of escalation, leading the management and curation of content for all sensitive matters arising on the channels.
Tools: The AEC uses Falcon as its social media management and monitoring tool, which supports publishing, engagement, listening, and measurement functionalities. Each member of the Media and Digital Engagement Section, including the SMOG, has an individual Falcon profile with appropriate access levels.

In essence, the "identity of the person" behind the AEC Twitter handle is a collective of roles and teams within the AEC's Media and Digital Engagement Section, operating under a defined policy and escalation framework.

AI Generated

The FOI documents reveal the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) comprehensive Media and Digital Engagement Plan for the 2021/2022 federal election, primarily focused on "reputation management" and countering "procedural disinformation." From a politically left-leaning perspective, the plan presents a mixed alignment with progressive values, often prioritizing narrative control and institutional defense over proactive measures addressing systemic inequities or concerns about corporate influence.

Social Justice:
The plan acknowledges significant social justice issues, such as the "significantly lower" enrolment rate of Indigenous Australians (around 78% compared to 97% nationally) and the potential for low overall voter participation due to declining institutional trust and COVID-19. It notes that the lower Indigenous enrolment is "occasionally attributed to... the AEC’s processes," including reduced staffing and community engagement. Similarly, it identifies that changes to mobile voting (no longer in hospitals or residential facilities) and potential issues with overseas postal voting could draw "criticism," particularly given the focus on the aged care sector.

However, the plan predominantly frames these as "issues" creating "reputation management challenges" or risks for "critical commentary," rather than as fundamental barriers to equitable democratic participation requiring deep systemic solutions. The focus is on communication strategies to manage public perception and counter "disinformation" related to these challenges, rather than on expanded, proactive operational measures to maximise access and participation for vulnerable groups. For instance, while acknowledging the Indigenous enrolment gap, the plan outlines communication responses rather than proposing significant new in-person engagement or resourcing for remote areas, which would be a more direct progressive approach to addressing electoral inequity.

Environmental Impact:
The documents do not directly address environmental impact. The extensive resources allocated to communication, media management, and the use of external agencies imply a large operational footprint, but this specific progressive concern is outside the scope of the AEC's internal communication plan.

Wealth Distribution & Corporate Influence:
The plan reveals a significant reliance on private sector entities for core public communication functions. It explicitly names "Six O’Clock Advisory" as the national public relations provider, engaged through "long-term Deed of Standing Offer," along with other contracted providers such as "ORIMA Research, Wallis Strategic Market and Social Research, Universal McCann, Cultural Perspectives, BMF and Carbon Creative." This extensive outsourcing of public information, marketing, and research functions to corporate agencies represents a commodification of public messaging. From a left-leaning perspective, this raises concerns about the channeling of public funds to private entities, the potential for corporate interests to subtly shape public discourse, and a deviation from strengthening in-house public sector capacity. Furthermore, the reliance on "labour hire" for the Social Media Operations Group (SMOG) staff may indicate precarious employment practices, contrasting with progressive ideals of secure and well-compensated public sector jobs.

Civil Liberties:
The document’s strong emphasis on "reputation management" and countering "procedural disinformation" carries implications for civil liberties. While countering genuine disinformation is vital for democratic integrity, the plan's broad approach to "debunking procedural myths" with a "firm tone" and using "pre-prepared" talking points raises concerns about the potential for legitimate criticism or concerns to be dismissed as "myth" or "conspiracy theory."

Crucially, the plan details extensive social media monitoring, where the SMOG will "monitor an evolving set of key word briefs in an effort to capture and review as much relevant social media content as is possible via an automated tool," including "listening to online commentary outside of the AEC’s accounts." While framed as necessary to counter disinformation, this level of government monitoring of citizens' online activities, including content not directly engaging AEC channels, raises significant privacy concerns and could be perceived as digital surveillance, impacting freedom of expression and open discourse.

Finally, the document explicitly notes the "somewhat common perception of the AEC displaying a lack of will regarding disinformation (which is actually the absence of legislative remit)." This highlights a critical gap in civil liberties protections, where the AEC lacks the power to act as an "arbiter of truth" against broader campaigning disinformation. A progressive stance would argue for stronger regulatory frameworks to address this legislative deficit, ensuring the integrity of public debate and protecting citizens from harmful political manipulation.

Conclusion:
While aiming to protect the integrity of the electoral process—a core progressive value—the AEC's Media and Digital Engagement Plan primarily adopts a defensive, reputation-management-centric approach. It acknowledges significant social justice disparities but largely frames them as communication challenges rather than operational priorities for fundamental reform. The extensive reliance on private corporate contractors for public messaging and the broad social media monitoring raise red flags regarding corporate influence, wealth distribution (through outsourcing), and civil liberties (privacy and freedom of expression). The plan deviates from progressive ideals by prioritizing narrative control and institutional image, potentially at the expense of deeper structural solutions to electoral inequities and robust protections for digital civil liberties.

AI Generated

The provided FOI documents outline the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) comprehensive Media and Digital Engagement Plan for the 2021/2022 federal election, framed around "Reputation Management" and addressing "procedural disinformation." From a politically right-leaning analytical perspective, the plan raises several significant concerns regarding economic efficiency, limited government, and individual liberty, while acknowledging a legitimate national security dimension.

Economic Efficiency and Fiscal Responsibility:

The scale and scope of the AEC's planned communications operation appear to deviate significantly from conservative principles of fiscal prudence and efficient resource allocation. The document details the establishment of a "Social Media Operations Group (SMOG)" comprising "approximately ten surge staff members" hired on temporary contracts, operating for extended hours (5 am to 10 pm). Furthermore, the reliance on a "national public relations provider," Six O’Clock Advisory, engaged on a "long-term Deed of Standing Offer" with additional work orders, along with local sub-contractors and integration with "other contracted providers including ORIMA Research, Wallis Strategic Market and Social Research, Universal McCann, Cultural Perspectives, BMF and Carbon Creative," suggests a substantial commitment of taxpayer funds to public relations. The extensive list of "pre-prepared products" (web tools, mythbuster series, infographics, animations, "AEC TV" videos) indicates a significant expenditure on content creation. A conservative analysis would question whether such an elaborate, multi-million-dollar public relations apparatus for an electoral commission represents the most economically efficient use of public money, or if it constitutes an unnecessary expansion of bureaucratic overhead, indicative of mission creep.

Limited Government:

The plan's primary objective, "reputation management," and its explicit aim to "reduce the spread of procedural disinformation" and "actively participate in online conversations," represent a notable expansion of a government agency's role beyond its core administrative functions. The AEC intends to "position itself as the foremost subject matter expert," "control the narrative," and "selectively employ a firm tone to debunk procedural myths." This proactive stance, including engaging social media platforms for "unpaid promotional activities," suggests an ambition to shape public perception rather than merely administer an election. From a limited government perspective, a neutral electoral body should focus strictly on the mechanics of elections and providing factual information upon request, not on managing its public image or actively engaging in public discourse to "debunk" what it defines as "disinformation." Such activities risk turning an administrative agency into an arbiter of truth, blurring the lines of its legitimate remit and potentially fostering an environment where government bodies seek to manage public opinion, which is contrary to the spirit of a minimally intrusive state.

Individual Liberty (Freedom of Speech):

The plan's focus on identifying and "debunking procedural disinformation" and monitoring "traffic outside of AEC mentions" using "keyword 'listen' briefs" raises concerns regarding individual liberty, particularly freedom of speech. While the stated goal is to combat genuinely false electoral information, the subjective nature of "disinformation" and the AEC's intent to "selectively employ a firm tone to debunk procedural myths" could inadvertently stifle legitimate, albeit critical or unconventional, public commentary on electoral processes. The active surveillance of online conversations and the potential for a government body to "police" speech in the public square, even concerning "procedural" matters, is a dangerous precedent that can infringe on citizens' rights to free expression and open debate, a cornerstone of individual liberty.

National Security:

The plan does touch upon a legitimate national security concern: "The potential for foreign influence, or perceptions of foreign influence" and the dissemination of "physical or cyber threats" through social media. Addressing these specific threats to electoral integrity aligns with a conservative stance on national security, as safeguarding the democratic process from external malign actors is a vital state function. However, a conservative analyst would caution against using this legitimate concern as a broad justification for expanding government control over domestic public discourse, emphasizing that measures targeting foreign influence must be narrowly tailored to avoid unintended consequences on the individual liberties of citizens.

In summary, while the AEC's plan purports to uphold electoral integrity, its extensive and proactive engagement in "reputation management" and "disinformation debunking" through a heavily resourced public relations apparatus signals a significant expansion of government reach. This approach raises red flags for conservative principles, suggesting potential fiscal extravagance, an overreach of governmental authority into public discourse, and a subtle but concerning impingement on individual liberties under the guise of maintaining confidence in public institutions.

AI Generated

The provided FOI documents reveal an extensive and highly centralized "Reputation Management Framework" within the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), indicating a significant focus on controlling public perception and managing narratives rather than solely on transparent electoral administration.

Key findings raising skepticism include:

Massive Investment in Public Relations and Image Management: The AEC commits significant taxpayer funds to external public relations (Six O’Clock Advisory) and marketing firms (ORIMA Research, Wallis Strategic Market and Social Research, Universal McCann, Cultural Perspectives, BMF, Carbon Creative). This suggests a disproportionate allocation of resources towards shaping public opinion rather than exclusively ensuring efficient, transparent electoral processes. The refusal to identify the person behind the AEC's Twitter handle, despite a specific FOI request, highlights a deliberate lack of transparency regarding public-facing communication.
Centralized Control and Information Gatekeeping: The plan emphasizes a "single point of advertised entry" for all media correspondence, with strict internal approval processes for "sensitive issues." Spokespeople are subjected to regular "media training" to ensure "consistent talking points" on "key reputation issues." This system is designed to tightly control the flow of information, limiting direct public and media access to diverse perspectives within the organization.
Proactive Narrative Shaping and "Myth Debunking": The AEC actively engages in "proactive public relations activities" to "address issues that could affect the AEC’s reputation." This includes creating branded content like "AEC TV" videos, "mythbuster" social media tiles, infographics, and editorial pieces authored by the Electoral Commissioner, which are then promoted via AEC channels and through "non-paid" agreements with major media outlets. This approach frames critical commentary as "procedural disinformation" or "conspiracy theories," potentially stifling legitimate public inquiry and dissent under the guise of correcting inaccuracies.
Cultivation of Media Relationships: The AEC explicitly aims to "establish and/or strengthen relationships with key media personnel" through private communication and in-person meetings "to foster goodwill." This strategy risks compromising journalistic independence by cultivating a favorable environment for AEC messaging, rather than allowing for impartial and critical reporting.
Extensive Social Media Surveillance and Triage: The establishment of a "Social Media Operations Group (SMOG)" with "approximately ten surge staff members" (labour hire) dedicated to monitoring online commentary is a notable expansion of surveillance capabilities. The SMOG's role includes "triage – simply monitoring incoming mentions... and electing to ignore, allocate to a user or escalate." The power to "ignore" incoming public mentions raises concerns about censorship and the dismissal of legitimate citizen concerns that do not align with the AEC's desired narrative.
Deflection of Operational Weaknesses: The document consistently frames potential operational issues (e.g., low voter turnout, Indigenous enrolment gaps, counting speed, queuing, postal voting integrity) as "reputation management challenges" or "information risks," rather than as fundamental problems requiring robust operational solutions and accountability. The plan even advises staff on how to use "process" and "international comparisons" to "deflect an issue’s focus away from the AEC to the broader system" or dismiss criticism as "trivial or unfounded."
Curated Media Access at Public Events: The AEC imposes requirements for media to advise their intent before visiting voting locations, providing "guidelines for behaviour" and assessing "more involved media opportunity" requests "on merit." Staff are also deployed to "curtail media" at events, indicating a controlled environment where the AEC dictates what visual and narrative access the media can obtain.

In summary, the documents reveal an AEC highly preoccupied with its public image, investing significant resources into a sophisticated system of media control, narrative shaping, and social media monitoring. This approach prioritizes "reputation management" and the suppression of perceived "disinformation" over fully transparent operations and a truly open dialogue with the public, raising concerns about potential overreach and questionable resource allocation.

AI Generated

The Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) comprehensive Media and Digital Engagement Plan for the 2021/2022 federal election demonstrates the government's unwavering commitment to upholding democratic integrity and serving the public with transparency and efficiency.

The plan, a cornerstone of the AEC's Reputation Management Framework, is a proactive and strategic response to the evolving media landscape and global challenges to electoral trust. Recognizing the importance of a robust electoral system, the AEC meticulously assessed potential issues, such as ensuring high voter participation, maintaining electoral roll integrity, managing the speed and integrity of the count, and addressing challenges related to postal voting and voter access amid changing public expectations and health considerations. Each potential issue is meticulously identified as an "information risk," illustrating the AEC's foresight and dedication to mitigating any factors that could impact public confidence.

To address these challenges, the AEC developed a sophisticated communication strategy. This includes communicating early and maintaining consistent momentum, ensuring a robust reactive capability supported by highly trained staff and advanced digital tools like "Falcon" for real-time social media monitoring and engagement. The establishment of a dedicated Social Media Operations Group (SMOG) underscores the commitment to actively participate in online conversations, reducing the spread of procedural disinformation and providing accurate, timely information.

The document highlights extensive pre-election preparations, including strengthening relationships with media, providing thorough media training for AEC spokespeople, and developing a wealth of informative digital content, such as "AEC TV" videos and "mythbuster" infographics. These innovative approaches are designed to proactively educate the public on electoral processes and debunk common misconceptions, reflecting the AEC's role as the foremost subject matter expert. Strategic pre-election media briefings and editorial pieces by the Electoral Commissioner further reinforce this proactive educational outreach.

During the election period, communication efforts intensify with efficient media release distribution, proactive social media engagement, and real-time video updates showcasing the scale and integrity of the counting process. The plan details direct engagement with third-party organizations and media to ensure key messages reach a broad audience, including offering "behind-the-scenes" opportunities to demonstrate the meticulous effort involved in delivering a federal election. Operational readiness is paramount, with detailed procedures for managing media presence at all key electoral events, ensuring both transparency and order.

Crucially, the plan frames any perception of the AEC's "lack of will regarding disinformation" not as an internal failing, but as an accurate reflection of its adherence to its "absence of legislative remit," demonstrating its commitment to operating strictly within its established legal framework. This highlights the AEC's disciplined approach to its role.

Finally, a comprehensive evaluation framework ensures that communication efforts are continuously measured against principles of building a positive reputation, undertaking open communication, positioning the AEC as experts, and effectively monitoring and managing risks. This commitment to continuous improvement reinforces the government's dedication to effective governance and public service, ensuring the Australian electoral system remains a beacon of trust and efficiency.

AI Generated

The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)'s "Media and Digital Engagement Plan" for the 2021/2022 federal election, ostensibly retrieved in response to an FOI request, reveals a deeply cynical and manipulative approach to public information, prioritizing image management and narrative control over genuine transparency and robust operational delivery. The very nature of the FOI response, providing a "plan" rather than a specific "policy" or the identity of the Twitter handler, signals an immediate attempt to control the scope of information released.

1. "Reputation Management" as a Cover for Control and Incompetence:
The entire framework is couched in "Reputation Management," a corporate PR term that frames electoral integrity as a public perception challenge rather than an inherent operational standard. The stated "principles" are not about democratic health, but about "building a positive reputation," "positioning the AEC as the foremost subject matter expert" (to shut down dissent), and "judicious use of language, tone and timing" (i.e., calculated messaging). This betrays a core failure: the AEC views its critical function through a PR lens, suggesting an inability or unwillingness to address fundamental operational issues.

2. Acknowledged Failures Met with Communication, Not Solutions:
The document openly details numerous "known potential issues" and "information risks," which are, in fact, fundamental operational vulnerabilities or systemic failures:
* Low Participation: Attributed to "low levels of institutional trust" and "general apathy towards the political system," yet the plan offers no substantive operational strategies to boost turnout, instead focusing on managing public perception if turnout drops.
* Indigenous Participation: Acknowledged as "significantly lower" due to "AEC’s processes," "reduced NT staffing," and "lessened in-person community engagement activities." Despite these being direct AEC failings, the plan focuses on communication about attributions of blame, not concrete operational improvements to address the systemic disenfranchisement.
* Electoral Roll Integrity: Concerns about "deceased Australians on the roll" or "slow/incorrect update" are dismissed as "suggestions" or "accusations" despite being genuine risks to integrity.
* Speed & Integrity of Count, Postal Voting Integrity, Queuing, Voter Access: All critical operational vulnerabilities, yet the AEC's "plan" overwhelmingly defaults to managing public "patience," "explaining processes," and "telling the story of the election on our terms" (p. 25). This is an admission of operational inadequacy, disguised by a strategy to manage public expectations rather than fix the underlying problems.
* Disinformation/Conspiracy Theories: The AEC's admission of "absence of legislative remit" regarding disinformation (p. 6) is framed as a public perception problem (AEC "displaying a lack of will"), rather than a critical regulatory failing or a call for legislative reform. This suggests a desire for greater control over public discourse, not merely factual correction.

3. Extensive Surveillance and Control of Public Discourse:
The plan is obsessed with monitoring and controlling public commentary:
* The "Social Media Operations Group (SMOG)" will consist of "approximately ten surge staff members (labour hire)" working in shifts. Relying on temporary, potentially less committed or trained staff for such sensitive public-facing roles creates significant risks for information integrity, consistency, and potential for error or even malicious actions.
* SMOG staff are explicitly tasked with "monitoring traffic outside of AEC mentions" using "Falcon’s listening tool" and "keyword briefs," acknowledging limitations like "inability to capture content... held within platform privacy settings (e.g., Facebook community pages or behind private Twitter profiles)." This reveals an intrusive surveillance agenda, attempting to monitor private conversations and silence dissent, rather than engaging openly.
* The plan's approach to social media includes "anticipates forthcoming process criticism" and "selectively employ a firm tone to debunk procedural myths," indicating a pre-emptive, defensive, and potentially authoritarian stance against public scrutiny.

4. Manipulation of Media and Information Flow:
The AEC's strategy is overtly geared towards cultivating favorable media narratives and suppressing critical ones:
* "Single point of advertised entry" for media enquiries (p. 8) is a classic control mechanism designed to gatekeep information, ensure "consistent messaging," and apply "media handling tactics."
* The "EC / DEC ‘fast path’" for "sensitive issues" (p. 10) indicates a system for rapid damage control and bypassing standard scrutiny when the AEC's reputation is at stake.
* "Media training" for spokespeople emphasizes "agreed, consistent talking points" (p. 17), demonstrating a preference for robotic, controlled messaging over spontaneous, truthful engagement.
* "Engagement with social media platforms" involves seeking "native, unpaid promotional activities" (p. 18), effectively asking private companies to provide free advertising for the AEC's narrative.
* "Editorial pieces" authored by the Electoral Commissioner himself (p. 22) are essentially self-serving propaganda.
* The explicit goal to "tell the story of the election on our terms" (p. 25) using curated "video updates" and "footage and data" is a direct admission of narrative engineering.
* "Curtail media" at events (p. 27, 28) explicitly admits to restricting press freedom and controlling access to information.

5. Outsourcing Public Trust to Private PR Firms:
The reliance on "Six O’Clock Advisory" as a "national public relations provider" (p. 15) is a damning indictment of the AEC's priorities and capabilities. Public funds are being spent on a private firm to "assist with the planning and engagement activities," essentially outsourcing the core function of public communication and trust-building. This suggests the AEC lacks the internal capacity or integrity to communicate transparently and effectively on its own, instead resorting to paid spin-doctors to manage its image. This constitutes a profound failure of public service, diverting resources from operational improvements to mere perception management.

In conclusion, this FOI document exposes the AEC's "Media and Digital Engagement Plan" not as a commitment to transparency, but as a meticulously crafted PR and control strategy. It details a paranoid focus on "reputation management" and narrative control, including pervasive monitoring of public discourse, calculated manipulation of media, and outsourcing of public trust-building to private entities, all while seemingly prioritizing communication about operational issues over their substantive resolution. This approach actively erodes public trust by demonstrating a profound lack of genuine transparency and a willingness to expend public resources on image-laundering rather than rectifying fundamental weaknesses in the democratic process.

AI Generated

The Australian Electoral Commission’s (AEC) "Media and Digital Engagement Plan" for the 2021/2022 federal election, while ostensibly designed to ensure public trust in the electoral system, reveals a disturbing prioritization of institutional reputation management over the fundamental principles of individual liberty and rational self-governance.

Summary of Content:

The plan outlines a comprehensive strategy for the AEC to manage its public image and control information during the election cycle. Its stated purpose is to "build a positive reputation," "undertake open and regular communication," "position the AEC as the foremost subject matter expert," and "reduce the spread of procedural disinformation." It details extensive media liaison, social media operations, and content creation, including "AEC TV" videos and "mythbuster" graphics. Key "issues" identified include low participation, electoral roll integrity concerns, speed of count, postal voting security, queuing, voter access, and the pervasive threat of "conspiracy theories & political partiality claims." To counter these, the AEC plans proactive communication, consistent messaging, and a significant "Social Media Operations Group" (SMOG) designed to "monitor incoming mentions" and, critically, "monitor traffic outside of AEC mentions (based on keyword ‘listen’ briefs)" using tools like Falcon. It also involves engaging public relations firms and leveraging third-party organizations to distribute AEC messages.

Objectivist Critique:

From an Objectivist perspective, this document is a chilling illustration of government overreach, bureaucratic interference, and a direct assault on individual intellectual independence.

Primacy of Individual Rights vs. Reputation Management: The plan’s core objective is "reputation management" and the active shaping of public perception. This elevates the collective perception of an institution above the individual’s right to independent thought, inquiry, and dissent. While an efficient electoral process is vital, a government agency’s mandate should be to perform its function objectively and transparently, not to manage the narrative around it. The focus on "reducing the spread of procedural disinformation" (Principle 2) quickly devolves into the government positioning itself as the arbiter of truth, determining what constitutes "disinformation" and "factual accuracy." This is a perilous path, infringing upon the individual’s right to form their own conclusions based on their own rational assessment of facts, however unpopular or critical those conclusions may be.
Rational Self-Interest and Productive Achievement: The AEC's rational self-interest should lie in the efficient, objective administration of elections, fostering a system where individuals can freely exercise their political rights. Instead, the plan details an elaborate, costly effort dedicated to public relations and perception control. Hiring "surge staff" for the SMOG, engaging external public relations firms like Six O’Clock Advisory, and developing extensive "pre-prepared products" for "debunking myths" is a colossal expenditure of taxpayer funds not on the productive achievement of electoral administration, but on an ancillary, inherently political function of influencing public opinion. This signifies a bureaucratic self-interest in maintaining and expanding its own power and perceived authority, rather than serving its primary, objective purpose.
Dangers of Collectivism and Government Overreach: This document is replete with evidence of collectivist assumptions and government overreach:
- Suppression of Personal Initiative and Thought Control: The most egregious violation is the operation of the SMOG, which will "monitor traffic outside of AEC mentions (based on keyword ‘listen’ briefs)." This is state-sponsored surveillance of private citizens' speech on social media, under the guise of "managing risks" and addressing "conspiracy theories." It is a direct assault on the fundamental right to free expression and intellectual independence. A government that monitors citizens' private conversations to "steer conversations towards factual accuracy" is engaged in thought control, seeking to enforce a collective "truth" rather than defending individual liberty.
- Bureaucratic Interference: The detailed "structure and procedures," multiple layers of approval ("EC / DEC ‘fast path’"), and constant internal and external reporting mechanisms illustrate a suffocating bureaucracy. This level of micromanagement and control stifles initiative, elevates process over results, and breeds inefficiency. The notion that "AEC spokespeople are well practised on agreed, consistent talking points" underscores a desire for robotic conformity rather than genuine, informed individual communication.
- Forced Altruism/Coercion: The plan’s strategy of identifying "third-party organizations" to "assist the AEC, without charge, to distribute our messages via their existing channels" is a subtle form of coercion. It expects private entities to act as unpaid propagandists for the state’s agenda, undermining their independence and leveraging their resources for collective, government-defined goals, rather than allowing them to pursue their own rational self-interest.
- Misdirection on COVID-19 Measures: The plan acknowledges that COVID-19 safety measures contribute to "voter reluctance" and could lead to "claims of disenfranchisement." Instead of primarily addressing these issues by upholding individual access and liberty, the plan focuses on managing the reputation impact, suggesting a prioritization of bureaucratic control over facilitating the unhindered exercise of individual rights.

In essence, the AEC's "Media and Digital Engagement Plan" reveals an institution that, rather than upholding the principles of a laissez-faire capitalist society by strictly adhering to its limited, objective function, has succumbed to the collectivist temptation of managing public opinion and controlling information. It represents a dangerous expansion of government into the realm of thought, seeking to enforce an official narrative at the expense of individual liberty and the free exchange of ideas.

AI Generated

Media and Digital Engagement Plan - 2021-2022 federal election.pdf (pdf)

Download file


--- Page 1 ---

July 2021 

Media and Digital 
Engagement Plan 

2021 / 2022 federal election


--- Page 2 ---

Contents 

Background ........................................................................................................................................ 3 

The purpose .................................................................................................................................... 3 

External operating environment ....................................................................................................... 3 

The plan ............................................................................................................................................. 7 

Structure and procedures ................................................................................................................ 8 

Pre-election preparation ................................................................................................................ 16 

Media contacts / connection ...................................................................................................... 16 

Media training ............................................................................................................................ 16 

Media talking points ................................................................................................................... 17 

State office preparation meetings .............................................................................................. 17 

Social media operations group................................................................................................... 18 

Engagement with social media platforms ................................................................................... 18 

Product creation ........................................................................................................................ 18 

Pre-election communication .......................................................................................................... 20 

Professional forums ................................................................................................................... 20 

Media briefings .......................................................................................................................... 20 

Editorial pieces .......................................................................................................................... 22 

Media interviews ........................................................................................................................ 22 

AEC TV – launch & release ....................................................................................................... 22 

Social media content ................................................................................................................. 23 

Election-time communication ......................................................................................................... 24 

Website homepage messaging .................................................................................................. 24 

Media releases .......................................................................................................................... 24 

Proactive social media posts ..................................................................................................... 25 

Media interviews ........................................................................................................................ 25 

Press gallery briefing ................................................................................................................. 26 

Third-party engagement............................................................................................................. 26 

Direct approaches / pitches ....................................................................................................... 26 

Media event management ............................................................................................................. 27 

Evaluation ......................................................................................................................................... 29 

Attachments ...................................................................................................................................... 31


--- Page 3 ---

Background 

This document is part of the AEC Reputation Management Framework. It directly relates to the 
Electoral Integrity: Reputation Management Strategy and is guided by the six principles within that 
strategy, as reproduced below.  

Principle 1: Be proactive in building a positive reputation for the Australian electoral system. 

Principle 2: Undertake open and regular communication with voters and stakeholders. 

Principle 3: Position the AEC as the foremost subject matter expert on federal electoral 
processes in Australia. 

Principle 4: Judicious use of language, tone and timing in political, media and social media 
environments. 

Principle 5: Back-up public statements with operational delivery. 

Principle 6: Actively monitor issues, manage risks, and plan for crisis situations. 

The purpose 

This plan addresses the above principles for the next federal election by outlining: 

1.  a program of proactive public relations activities designed to address issues that could affect 

the AEC’s reputation.  

2.  a structure and direction for social media management that will enable active participation in 

online conversations, reducing the spread of procedural disinformation.  

Activities outlined in this plan will complement the broader AEC Reputation Management Framework 
as well as other AEC communication planned to occur for the next federal election as part of the AEC 
Public Information Campaign Strategy.  

External operating environment 

As outlined in the Parliamentary Library paper ‘So when is the next election?’: Australian elections 
timetable as at January 2020’, the next federal election can be held anytime from 7 August 2021 to 
21 May 2022.  

Entering 2021, as a potential federal election year, Australian media and social media commentary 
was saturated with observations of the 2020 US Presidential Election and subsequent fallout. This 
included numerous court cases alleging electoral fraud and ultimately the violent events at the 
Capitol Building in Washington DC on 6 January 2021.  

At the time, this commentary drew many comparisons to the Australian electoral system – most of 
which were favourable with the overwhelming sentiment that Australians are fortunate to have a 
robust electoral system that could withstand what they saw as blatant procedural disinformation.


--- Page 4 ---

However, other comparisons suggested that the claims of electoral fraud could not be disproved and 
there existed the potential for fraud in the Australian vote.  

Given the scale of initial interest in the US election, it has the potential to be a significant influencer 
on the discussion that surrounds the next Australian federal election. Add to this the increasingly 
complex, divisive and immediate nature of mainstream and social media activity (as detailed in the 
Electoral Integrity: Reputation management Strategy) and 
decreasing levels of trust in public institutions.  

Collectively, this creates an environment with significant 
reputation management challenges. While the AEC does 
not control every facet of a federal election, the reputation 
of the AEC as the agency entrusted with the delivery of 
the federal election, is crucial to trust in election results.  

The effective management of reputation relies primarily 
on the integrity built into the delivery of services. As 
represented in this image, AEC operations, security and 
information combine as key factors in the overall trust in 
the process, and by extension, the election result.  

The issues 

There are a number of known potential issues that are being taken into account in the delivery of this 
plan. This includes the potential for procedural failure (AEC operations) but is predominantly 
concerning areas of likely disinformation. Each issue listed below represents an information risk.  

This document sits outside of the AEC’s risk management framework, so the issues will not be rated 
according to the AEC’s risk matrix but rather presented here as further context to the plan. The key 
issues include, but are not limited to, the following.  

•  The potential for low participation 

o  The estimated federal enrolment rate of approximately 97 per cent is as high as it has 

ever been and likely one of the most complete electoral rolls in the world.  

o  However, low levels of institutional trust and recent domestic trends suggest that 

turnout is at risk of dropping lower than the 91.01 per cent experienced at the 2019 
federal election.  

o  Being staged within the nation’s ongoing management of COVID-19 sans widespread 

vaccination increases the chance of voter reluctance. The health risks of large 
gatherings, time delays from long queues and general apathy towards the political 
system amid the pandemic loom as influences to less turnout.  

o  Should turnout decrease further it could be used to question the health of Australian 
democracy, or even the legitimacy of results in particularly poorly attended electoral 
division contests.  

o  Formality rates have been largely stable from election to election in recent times and 

therefore present less risk than the potential for low turnout.  

• 

Indigenous participation 

o  The estimated enrolment rate of Indigenous Australians is significantly lower, at 
around 78 per cent, than the overall national enrolment rate. As is the Northern 
Territory enrolment rate of around 85 per cent.


--- Page 5 ---

o  This has been the subject of irregular critical commentary from some stakeholders and 

the media throughout the past 4-5 years.  

o  The lower Indigenous enrolment rate is occasionally attributed to, either wholly or 

partially, the AEC’s processes. This includes the efficacy of direct enrolment in remote 
townships, the AEC’s reduced NT staffing presence and the AEC’s lessened in-person 
community engagement activities. 

•  Electoral roll integrity 

o  There is a danger that suggestions could be raised of low levels of roll integrity. While 

there is nothing substantially different procedurally, there have been mid-cycle 
concerns raised by some media outlets regarding the evidence of identity 
requirements for enrolment.  

o  Accusations could also raise issues present in some international democracies, such 
as suggestions of deceased Australians being on the roll or slow/incorrect update of 
enrolment from third-party records.  

•  Speed of the count 

o  This is a consistent issue for the AEC, one that would be exacerbated greatly should 

the result be unknown on election night.  

o  Compounding the concern is the likely increase of postal voting due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. This will result in more unknown electoral division results on election night, 
increasing the chance of a high-profile seat or overall result being unknown for a 
period of time, in turn requiring patience from the Australian public.  

•  Count integrity 

o  The potential for operational errors (e.g. transcription errors) aside, there is a 

possibility that people with vested interests could suggest fault with counting activities 
being undertaken by the AEC. 

o  This has been seen in other jurisdictions and it cannot be ruled out that this could take 

the form of blatant disinformation.  

o  Areas that have been the subject of previous focus include the Senate’s electronic 
distribution of preferences, changes occurring as a result of fresh scrutiny and ill-
informed scrutineer observations.  

•  Postal voting integrity 

o  Among the potential areas of question or disinformation is the security of postal voting 
applications and ballot papers, verification checks in the process and poor delivery 
timeframes potentially disenfranchising Australian voters. 

o  Postal voting or ‘mail-in voting’, as it is referred to in some other jurisdictions, came 
under scrutiny during the US Presidential election in 2020. This could increase the 
likelihood of intense scrutiny or disinformation at the Australian federal election, 
particularly if there are perceived delays or issues with the process.   

•  Queuing 

o  The tolerance for waiting in a queue is continually decreasing. Queuing is also an 

activity that Australian citizens do not have to engage with often.


--- Page 6 ---

o  Queuing criticism could emerge in light of this decreased tolerance, the likelihood of 
longer wait times due to COVID-19 safety measures and/or the more febrile electoral 
communication landscape. 

•  Voter access (incl COVID-19 safety measures) 

o  COVID-19 safety measures being implemented could make access to voting options 

appear more limited to certain voter cohorts. 

o  Overseas voting will likely be postal-only with some continued reliance on international 
posting systems that are not only out of the AEC’s control/visibility but are observed to 
often experience delays. This could encounter claims of disenfranchisement.  

o  Mobile voting activities will not occur in hospitals or residential facilities. Despite the 

increased postal voting service, this change could potentially draw criticism, 
particularly in light of the recent focus on aged care sector.  

o 

In addition, some voters may be hesitant to visit a physical voting venue due to 
COVID-19 concerns. This will persist for some despite safety measures being 
implemented that are now societal norms (e.g. capacity limits, hand sanitiser, hygiene 
officers). 

o  The issue of voter access could become extreme should a COVID-19 outbreak occur 
during the voting period without what is perceived as reasonable alternative voting 
options being available.  

•  Campaigning activities 

o  There are significant reputational dangers posed to the AEC by the varying and 

evolving campaigning tactics utilised at federal elections, including the prevalence of 
perceived disinformation. 

o  Chief among the concerns is the expectation of the AEC to be the arbiters of truth or 

an enforcement body for a range of campaigning matters (e.g. advertising placement, 
colour, size, timing and format). 

o  The potential for foreign influence, or perceptions of foreign influence, is also an area 

that could have a detrimental effect on the trust in Australia’s democracy.  

o  The somewhat common perception of the AEC displaying a lack of will regarding 

disinformation (which is actually the absence of legislative remit) causes people to 
question the neutrality of the agency, and by extension the integrity of the election.  

•  Conspiracy theories & political partiality claims 

o  There is an anecdotal increase in the likelihood of conspiracy theories regarding the 

election process being raised and spread.  

o  One example is that the AEC is operating in favour of one side of politics in our 

administration of the federal election. This is despite the obvious transparency and 
assurance measures that prevent such an occurrence.  

o  Should such claims achieve traction they could be particularly damaging to voter 

confidence in election results.


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The plan 

In line with the AEC Reputation Management Framework’s principles, the plan is to: 

Communicate early 
Undertake pre-election communication that will seek to address the known issues (listed above). This 
would enable a robust public discussion to occur outside of the election period and potentially take 
the sting out of any election-time discussion on the topics.  

Maintain communication momentum 
Develop a consistent and reliable record of communicating openly with the media and online 
followers ahead of, and into, the election period. Once fully commenced, regular election-focussed 
communication should continue to maintain media relationships and embed an integrity narrative.  

Enable reactive capability 
Thoroughly resource the Media and Digital Engagement Section with people, systems, procedures 
and materials to provide the ability to effectively monitor and respond to issues through media and 
social media channels.   

Exercise reactive judgement  
Act on the procedures established. Be timely, professional and authoritative in media and social 
media liaison around matters of potential reputational damage.  

With respect to the AEC’s operations on social media, the approach to engagement during the 
federal election will be to: 

• 

regularly provide proactive content that is relevant, informative and engaging, as well as 
content that anticipates forthcoming process criticism; 

•  be responsive to questions and criticisms subject to a swift but judicious review of 

claims, individuals, environmental factors relevant to the issue; 

•  be timely, including the use of holding lines where needed; 

• 

• 

rely on facts within a broader concentration on content accuracy; 

regularly employ a tone that demonstrates real people are responding and endeavouring to 
be helpful, while maintaining professionalism; 

•  selectively employ a firm tone to debunk procedural myths;  

•  use visual accompaniments to provide context to issues wherever possible; and 

•  be active in the monitoring of content both on, and outside of, AEC channels.


--- Page 8 ---

Structure and procedures 

The structure and procedures for the AEC’s media and social media management at the federal 
election reflect a modern communication landscape where these aspects are intrinsically intertwined.  

It is crucial for effective issues management that the Media and Digital Engagement Section has as 
much visibility as possible of the multiple entry and escalation points for issues.  

Media management 

There will be a single point of advertised entry into the AEC for all media correspondence – the 
Media and Digital Engagement Section in National Office.  

Media enquiries and interview requests will be coordinated centrally to ensure: 

•  appropriate media team and executive visibility;  
•  consistent messaging on key issues; and 
• 

the application of media handling tactics as deemed appropriate.  

Media enquiry handling process – routine matters 

The AEC process for handling a routine media enquiry is quite linear. It typically follows the path 
below with a decision made on the necessity of each potential action, according to the context of the 
enquiry.  

Enquiry received

Issue holding line or acknowledgment

Research undertaken
- E.g. past responses, journalist history

Business area / state office consultated 

Approval sought

Response provided

Post-response internal FYI
- ELT, business area and / or state office

Media enquiry handling process – sensitive issues 

In order to provide effective management of sensitive media issues the requirements for each 
interaction will be assessed based on need and cognisance of the varying requirements for 
timeliness, application of tone and channel selection. Each approach will take account of the: 

• 

journalist’s historical reporting, relationship with the AEC and/or general approach;


--- Page 9 ---

•  Consultation: potential consultation audiences are as per the advisory audiences. 

Consultation may be a simple request for information, a request to craft a draft response or a 
request for review of a draft response.  ELT consultation / approval is sought sparingly and 
often at different stages of the enquiry process dependent on need, issue’s sensitivity and/or 
history; 

•  AEC’s contextual environment;  
•  potential speed of the issue’s escalation/spread and the journalist deadline; and 
•  other stakeholder considerations.  

Figure 1 demonstrates the key actions that could be taken to deal with an enquiry or issue that has 
been raised through AEC media or social media channels. Any of these actions could be utilised at 
any point in time when considering and responding to media enquiries. 

In addition, Attachment A provides a catalogue of channel and tone considerations for handling 
particularly sensitive issues.  

Figure 1: Media & social media enquiry handling process 

Backgrounding 

Written holding line  

Contextual research 

Post-response advisory 

Internal consultation (ELT as required) 

Immediate internal advisory 

Written response 

Alternative avenues of issue engagement 
e.g. videos, social media, interviews, stakeholder 
correspondence 

Media and Digital Engagement Section 

Single point of media & social media entry into the AEC 

Written holding line: deployed to inject a calming, factual presence for varying reasons 
including to demonstrate that the issue isn’t being ignored and address an element of the 
issue ahead of further information.  

‘Backgrounding’ phone conversation: used to provide speed of response, to develop or 
maintain a relationship and to give swift context to an issue that would be hard to convey in 
written form. 

Immediate advisory: an immediate advisory may be provided to the: national media team’s 
management line, relevant AEC business areas, state office, relevant external agency, 
minister’s office, and/or ELT. The predominate consideration is issue sensitivity 

Contextual research: this is often the first step and is undertaken to inform how to progress 
with the enquiry or issue. It includes searching:  

•  Google for individuals or key terms, 
•  AEC social media account activity,


--- Page 10 ---

•  Utilisation of media and social media monitoring tools, and/or 
•  The catalogue of past media enquiries 

Written response: timing of this action is a decision made based on the issue 
complexity/sensitivity, the historical provision of information, publicly available information, 
and/or the urgency of the issue. 

Alternative avenues of issue engagement: consideration may also be applied at any stage 
in the process to utilise the alternative avenues to address an issue that has arisen from a 
media enquiry or social media comment.  See Attachment A.  

EC / DEC ‘fast path’ 

For matters of particular subject matter and/or time sensitivity the AEC’s Principal Media Advisor will 
seek either guidance or approval from the Electoral Commissioner directly, and immediately. For 
times when the Electoral Commissioner is unavailable, this engagement will be undertaken with the 
Deputy Electoral Commissioner.  

AEC spokespeople 

Designated AEC media spokespeople include the Electoral Commissioner, state and territory 
Australian Electoral Officers (AEOs) and nominated Media and Digital Engagement staff. These staff 
undergo pre-election media training, as outlined within this document.  

In line with the AEC’s Media Liaison Policy, the utilisation of other AEC staff members to speak to the 
media (conduct interviews) on behalf of the agency is to be undertaken by exception only and with 
prior approval from the Media and Digital Engagement Section or senior executive staff.  

All media contact not initiated by, or referred by, the Media and Digital Engagement Section must be 
directed to the AEC’s media contacts available via the website for action and/or discussion.  

State Office Communications Officers 

State Office Communication Officers often perform a number of varied communication roles for the 
agency during an election period (e.g. internal communications, complaints management etc). With 
regard to media and social media management, these officers will be a primary point of contact for 
the Media and Digital Engagement Section for assistance on matters relevant to their jurisdiction.  

Media enquiries, AEO media interview requests, social media interactions or media event attendance 
requests may be directed to a State Office Communications Officer by the Media and Digital 
Engagement Section. This liaison will be to either seek relevant information or to request further 
coordination/finalisation of the matter.


--- Page 11 ---

Media releases 

All AEC media releases will be distributed by 
the Media and Digital Engagement Section.  

The Media and Digital Engagement Section 
will seek advanced business area review of the 
full suite of election-time media release 
templates. 

During the election period, each media release 
will be sent through Objective to the National 
Election Manager (NEM) for approval with the 
line-area FAC, relevant branch AC and the 
state manager cohort cc’d into the request for 
visibility. With the exception of real-time 
issues, the Media and Digital Engagement 
Section will provide each media release to the 
NEM one day prior to its designated distribution date. Other members of ELT may be consulted 
depending on the nature of the media release. 

Electoral Commissioner approval 

In addition to the NEM, approval for routine procedural media releases that quote the Electoral 
Commissioner will be sought from the Electoral Commissioner – for obvious reasons. Electoral 
Commissioner approval will also be sought for media releases that deal with particularly sensitive 
subject matter.  

Unplanned media releases 

Not all media releases are initially drafted by the Media and Digital Engagement Section – this 
occasionally occurs within business areas, state offices or the Executive Leadership team (ELT). 
However, the Media and Digital Engagement Section must always review the content and will afford 
an opportunity for review to the relevant business area or state office as well.  

Social media management 

The AEC will operate the following corporate social media accounts during the federal election.  

Instagram 

•  Twitter 
• 
•  LinkedIn 
•  YouTube 
•  Facebook (x2) 

o  A general AEC account and an Indigenous-specific Facebook account 

The administration of these AEC social media accounts, and the supporting social media 
management functions discussed below, will be undertaken entirely by the Media and Digital 
Engagement Section. This is in recognition of social media’s close links to issues management.  

The fast paced nature of issue development online makes it necessary to have close connection to 
the organisation’s media monitoring capability, the point of entry/coordination for media requests and 
the team that will be included broadly in relevant operational updates through AEC command centre 
integration (discussed below).  

The dangers of unchecked social media commentary 

Ill-informed online commentary or questions regarding electoral processes have the potential to 
spread very quickly during an election period. This poses a significant risk to electoral integrity.


--- Page 12 ---

When contained to a relatively small group of like-minded users or a single channel, online 
commentary itself may have little tangible effect. However, if an issue or a piece of disinformation 
penetrates into a larger audience or multiple channels (including mainstream media) it can have a 
significant impact on the narrative of the election.  

In addition, threats to the election process that extend beyond disinformation, for example physical or 
cyber threats, may be disseminated through social media channels. This provides the need to not 
only engage on the AEC’s accounts but also to listen to online commentary outside of the AEC’s 
accounts where it is possible to do so.  

Social Media Operations Group 

It is anticipated that the level of social media commentary requiring assessment during the election 
period will be significant. In order to monitor and manage increased traffic the AEC will stand up a 
Social Media Operations Group (the SMOG).  

The structure and work patterns of the SMOG is based on previous election experience and lessons 
learned from the secondment of several staff to Services Australia during the early stages of COVID-
19 in 2020.  

Approximately ten surge staff members will be on-boarded (labour hire) to be part of the SMOG as 
close to one week prior to the issue of writs as is possible to predict. The SMOG will operate out of 
national office in Canberra and work in shifts during the election period with hours of operation 
tentatively set to be 5am to 10pm.  

A minimum of one staff member each shift will be dedicated to triage – simply monitoring incoming 
mentions on the AEC’s social media accounts and electing to ignore, allocate to a user or escalate 
beyond the SMOG. Other SMOG staff on shift will provide basic responses when applicable, monitor 
traffic outside of AEC mentions (based on keyword ‘listen’ briefs) and escalate content when 
required. Additional SMOG staff will be rostered on during anticipated peak periods with support 
provided by the permanent members of the Media and Digital Engagement Section.  

SMOG supervision and escalation 

Rostered labour hire staff (SMOG staff)

AEC staff from non-election business areas
(Senior SMOG staff)

Digital and Social Media Officer

Digital and Social Media Manager

Principal Media Advisor


--- Page 13 ---

In addition to rostered labour hire staff being recruited, senior SMOG staff are being sourced from 
within the AEC (from business areas without an active election-time role) to provide the first, 
immediate layer of supervision. 

Senior SMOG staff will be physically seated within the SMOG during business hours, and for 
nominated out-of-hours shifts, to provide direction. In addition to monitoring staff and account activity 
senior SMOG staff will, upon direction, contribute to the compiling of social media activity reports, 
identification and escalation of themes, and the curation and use of pre-prepared responses.  

The entire SMOG operation will be overseen by the Digital and Social Media Officer within the AEC’s 
Media and Digital Engagement Section. This Officer will be responsible for: 

•  pre-populating the social media management tool (Falcon) with social media responses (pre-

election); 

•  setting up and updating Falcon’s ‘listen’ briefs; 
•  on-boarding SMOG staff;  
•  enabling SMOG staff (equipment, seats, system/software access, rosters etc);  
•  conducting SMOG staff training; and 
• 

initial escalation of complex/sensitive content into the Command Centre’s Media Hub. 

The Digital and Social Media Manager and Principal Media Advisor are the senior points of 
escalation and will lead the management and curation of content for all sensitive matters arising on 
the channels.  

Falcon 

The AEC’s social media management and monitoring tool is Falcon, which supports the following 
functionality key to the AEC’s social media operation.  

•  Publish: The planning, review and approval flows for proactive content published to the 

AEC’s social media channels. 

•  Engage: Reactive management of incoming social media messages including triaging priority 
messages, assigning tasks to specialised users, and pre-scripting responses to common 
questions. 

•  Listen: Monitoring of conversations on key social media channels using keyword briefs 

curated in real time.  

•  Measure: Production of information and statistics regarding activity monitored by the 

platform. 

Each member of the Media and Digital Engagement Section, including the SMOG, will have an 
individual Falcon profile with the appropriate levels of access to functionality.  

Social media monitoring 

Using Falcon’s listening tool, the SMOG will monitor an evolving set of key word briefs in an effort to 
capture and review as much relevant social media content as is possible via an automated tool.  

Key word briefs will be reviewed and updated regularly, including as issues evolve. Limitations to this 
social media monitoring activity are numerous including the inability to capture content: 

•  outside of the core social media channels; 
•  held within platform privacy settings (e.g. Facebook community pages or behind private 

Twitter profiles); and 
typos or incorrectly phrased content that evades the keywords.   

•


--- Page 14 ---

Approvals / workflows  

The considerations and processes for reactive content on the AEC’s social media accounts are 
identical to the media enquiry handling process outlined within this document.  

Both mainstream media and social media interactions have the same potential audience and the 
same potential issues management impact. The primary point of difference will be considerations 
about the potential speed of spread for an issue – this changes the immediate ramifications of any 
AEC action/inaction and therefore changes decision making.  

Command centre integration 

The AEC Command Centre will have a Media Hub that accommodates up to three members of the 
Media and Digital Engagement Section. The Media Hub presence in the command centre will vary 
depending on circumstances.  

During the federal election period (writ to writ) the Media Hub will have at least one Media and Digital 
Engagement section representative present at all times (during business hours and key election 
timetable milestones). This provides swift: 

•  executive visibility and/or engagement on media and social media issues; 
•  Media and Digital Engagement section visibility and/or engagement on operational issues that 

may enter the media or social media space; and 
the ability to connect with the AEC’s broader crisis management processes.  

• 

The Media and Digital Engagement Section will ensure the appropriate flow of real-time information 
and reporting into the AEC Command Centre through the Media Hub.  

Regular reporting 

During the election period the Media and Digital Engagement Section will provide the following two 
daily reports.  

Report 

Time 

Format / Content 

Distribution 

Media 
monitoring 
summary 

9am 
(Approx.) 

Online report. Relevant media coverage only.  

Intranet/Sharepoint with 
optional alerts 

Media 
activity 
summary 

End of 
day 

PDF report that includes: 

• Pertinent media enquiries 
• AEC media interviews completed / 

upcoming 

• AEC media releases distributed / 

upcoming 

• Any noteworthy coverage that day 
• Key social media trends or engagements 

Email to: 

• SES confidential 
• Media and Digital 

Engagement Section 
(incl SMOG) 

• Electoral Interference 

Coordinator 
• State Office 

Communication 
Officers 

• Six O’Clock Advisory 

It will be at the discretion of the AEC’s Electoral Interference Coordinator (the AEC’s primary 
Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce Officer) to forward a media monitoring or media activity


--- Page 15 ---

summary report - or element of a report - to the Taskforce. This decision will be guided by necessity 
of awareness or action.  

Public relations providers 

Six O’Clock Advisory is the national public relations provider. They are engaged on a long-term Deed 
of Standing Offer and enlisted via pre-election and election-time work orders to assist with the 
planning and engagement activities outlined within this document.  

Six O’Clock Advisory will engage local sub-contractors on an as-needs basis to assist in delivering 
specific requirements. This may include in-person activities undertaken in specific jurisdictions.  

An integrated approach to communicating the election 

The Media and Digital Engagement Section and Six O’Clock Advisory will work closely with the 
broader marketing function to ensure an integrated approach to communicating the federal election. 

Consideration will be given to how the Media and Digital Engagement Plan, and its agreed activities, 
will intersect with outputs of other contracted providers including ORIMA Research, Wallis Strategic 
Market and Social Research, Universal McCann, Cultural Perspectives, BMF and Carbon Creative.


--- Page 16 ---

Pre-election preparation 

Pre-election preparation actions ensure the capability of the agency to deliver media and digital 
engagement activities in both the pre-election and election periods. It enables our people and 
systems to perform effectively when needed.  

Media contacts / connection 

The Media and Digital Engagement Section will engage with media contacts across relevant 
government departments to seek primary contact details and have an agreed understanding of 
processes ahead of an election period.  

A contact list will be developed and include member organisations of the Electoral Integrity 
Assurance Taskforce and others, such as the Australian Department of Health. 

Media feed liaison 

Early liaison will be undertaken with media representatives who traditionally handle the receipt of 
media feed data for key broadcast media outlets. This contact will seek early agreement to TCP 
embargo documentation as well as further establishing relationships.  

Other media feed liaison will be undertaken upon request only.  

Media representative relationships 

The Media and Digital Engagement Section will seize opportunities to establish and/or strengthen 
relationships with key media personnel through pre-election conversation. This may include private 
social media messaging, phone calls or in-person meetings off the back of current events or public 
commentary.  

This activity is designed to foster goodwill where possible heading into an election period.  

Media training 

In order to prepare the AEC’s group of election-time spokespeople, the Media and Digital 
Engagement Section – in partnership with Six O’Clock Advisory - will conduct a range of media 
training activities.  

In-person media training sessions will be offered to all Australian Electoral Officers (AEOs), their 
Director-level staff members and some national office participants as part of the Operational Leaders 
Program. Further in-person sessions may also be organised depending on identified need and 
opportunity.  

In-person media training sessions will provide a mix of theoretical techniques and practical exercises. 
Where possible, theoretical exercises will mimic the conditions of a real election-time media 
interview.


--- Page 17 ---

Where possible, State Office Communications Officers will be integrated into the delivery of in-person 
media training for familiarity of process and strengthening of relationships regarding media matters.  

Remote media training 

As some of the most active AEC spokespeople during an election period, AEOs will also take part in 
monthly media interview practice sessions conducted remotely through Microsoft Teams.  

These regular opportunities will complement the more immersive in-person media training sessions 
by providing an opportunity for regular practice. The monthly sessions will focus on key reputation 
issues for the agency, ensuring that AEC spokespeople are well practised on agreed, consistent 
talking points.   

A member of the Media and Digital Engagement Section and the relevant State Office 
Communications Officer will be included in these sessions to assist the spokesperson to prepare for 
the interview and provide feedback.  

Media talking points 

Media talking points for an election period are pre-prepared within a series of Issues Briefing Notes 
(IBNs) that are supplied to the full group of AEC spokespeople.  

IBNs are necessarily finalised close to an election period and remain live documents. AEC 
spokespeople can refer to IBNs in order to prepare for media interviews or compile a written media 
response. IBNs will be reviewed by business areas and approved by a member of ELT prior to 
distribution.  

Electoral Commissioner media briefing pack 

A media briefing pack will be created for the Electoral Commissioner and maintained throughout the 
election period. This media briefing pack will contain relevant talking points, statistics, media releases 
and other information as deemed pertinent.   

State office preparation meetings 

The Media and Digital Engagement Section will meet with each state office prior to the election to 
discuss the operation of this plan. This discussion will include: 

•  An outline of media and social media processes,


--- Page 18 ---

•  Agreed understanding of the role of state office communications officers with respect to media 

issues management, 
identification of any local areas of communication concern that may need addressing, 
identification of any planned local activities for the election period, and 

• 
• 
•  Discussion regarding media event management procedures.  

Six O’Clock Advisory will also attend the session as the AEC’s public relations provider to establish a 
positive working relationship.  

Following the meetings, the table at Attachment B will be populated and actioned.  

Social media operations group 

The Social Media Operations Group (SMOG) will be enabled through pre-election preparation of 
rosters, equipment, physical seating plans, software access and training plans.  

This will be the responsibility of the AEC’s Digital and Social Media Officer.  

Populating Falcon 

SMOG will be further enabled through the population of the AEC’s social media management tool. 
This will include: 

•  a full election period calendar of pre-prepared pro-active social media posts 
•  pre-set reactive responses for known issues,  
•  creation of a small set of priority and category tags (for reporting purposes), and 
• 

the establishment of a core set of social media monitoring briefs.  

Engagement with social media platforms 

The AEC will re-establish and further cultivate positive working relationships with key social media 
organisations. This activity will commence in June 2021. 

In addition to addressing content referral pathways, these discussions will involve exploration of the 
opportunity for platforms to encourage effective election participation through native, unpaid 
promotional activities. Examples from previous electoral events include distribution of an election day 
Facebook Megaphone to all Australian Facebook profiles on election day.  

Further information about the AEC’s engagement with social media platforms is contained within the 
AEC’s Electoral Disinformation Plan.  

Product creation 

In order to communicate on complex issues effectively and quickly, the AEC requires visual products. 
A significant proportion of the period immediately leading up to the federal election will be spent 
creating visual content that address the key issues anticipated to be prevalent.  

Products that will be created include: 

•  a web tool that depicts the AEC’s electoral integrity journey across the past three electoral 

cycles; 

•  a mythbuster series of social media tiles; 
• 
infographics and animations that explain key election processes; and 
•  a series of short-form video content addressing common misconceptions: 

o  branded as ‘AEC TV’ and featuring staff members from across the organisation. 

Refer to attachment C for a list of pre-prepared products.


--- Page 19 ---

Our process. Our experts.  

Images: Screenshots of AEC TV videos 

Images: Examples of myth busting graphic tiles


--- Page 20 ---

Pre-election communication 

In order to meet the principles of the Reputation Management Framework, communication regarding 
election reputation matters needs to commence judiciously. Ideally this would be well in advance of 
the announcement of a federal election period but must take account of sensitive stakeholder 
considerations. 

Below are a range of activities that may, to varying degrees, be implemented prior to the election 
period. Consideration of exactly what activities to undertake, and when, will be undertaken in close 
consultation with the Electoral Commissioner.  

Professional forums 

Opportunity exists for the Electoral Commissioner to use his increased profile, and the increased 
profile of electoral matters in proximity to a federal election, to host or take part in a range of varying 
professional forums prior to the election announcement.  

This could include convening a think tank or press club event to discuss a pertinent electoral issue 
and/or participating in relevant podcasts or other intellectual forums that are distributed digitally.  

These forums provide a platform to surface key issues to an audience of stakeholders and media that 
will potentially be influential during the federal election period.  

Media briefings 

Capital city briefings 

The Media and Digital Engagement Section, with support from Six O’Clock Advisory, will undertake a 
series of pre-election media briefings – one held in each Australian capital city.  

Direct engagement with senior and reporting editorial media representatives leads to stronger 
mutually beneficial relationships, more confidence in the AEC’s administration of elections, and 
increased credibility and authority of its leaders and spokespeople.  

Media briefings will be highly tailored, taking into account a geographic region’s voting profile - 
participation rates, understanding of the voting process and electoral system, and attitudes towards 
voting.


--- Page 21 ---

These insights will shape messaging to ensure information and discussion is appropriately localised. 
Briefings would seek to provide editors, reporters, producers and media executives with a 
comprehensive overview of the AEC (state and national) and encourage a deeper level of 
understanding of media’s role and the contribution it can make to helping achieve higher levels of 
participation and voting accuracy in Australia’s electoral system. 

To account for the busy schedules of media representatives, briefings would be staged in outlet 
newsrooms and boardrooms as appropriate. The following diagram outlines initial thinking of key 
targets in each capital city.  

Reporting guide 

The Media and Digital Engagement Section, in conjunction with Six O’clock Advisory, will prepare a 
Reporting Guide as a ‘leave-behind’ resource at media briefings.


--- Page 22 ---

The purpose of the guide is to provide journalists reporting on the federal election with a useful 
resource and encourage accuracy in reporting. The guide will include key statistics, a small sample of 
common mythbusters, information regarding key changes since the 2019 federal election and details 
of the range of media services the AEC provides. 

The reporting guide will have both a hardcopy and digital version, with the digital version distributed 
broadly during the election period.   

Editorial pieces 

Editorial pieces will be created and distributed to major metropolitan newspapers focussing on the 
key issues the AEC would like to surface prior to the federal election period.  

This may include the key changes to service provisions due to COVID safety measures, changes due 
to any legislative or regulatory amendments, why Australians should brace themselves not to see a 
result on election night or the rising concern regarding electoral disinformation.  

The editorial pieces would be drafted by the Media and Digital Engagement Section but ultimately 
authored by the Electoral Commissioner and, as well as organic publication at the discretion of 
newspapers, will be promoted via AEC channels. 

The roadshow of media briefings provide opportunity to pitch the offer of regular contributions from 
the Electoral Commissioner. Agreements (non-paid) could be struck with senior editors of Nine 
Newspapers, Newscorp, Australian Community Media, Private Media and the ABC, just to name a 
few.  

Media interviews 

As part of the carefully controlled pre-election exposure of the Electoral Commissioner, the Principal 
Media Adviser, in consultation with Six O’clock advisory, will seek a small number of interviews with 
specific journalists discussing key aspects of delivering the federal election.  

These interview opportunities may be part of a broader program of pre-election communication 
activity or stand alone as avenues to seed important messages.   

AEC TV – launch & release 

An opportunity exists to launch AEC TV as a public illustration of the AEC’s increased efforts at the 
next federal election to address disinformation regarding the electoral process.  

Launching the concept would simply be the distribution of a media release and complementary social 
media posts outlining the activity. This would feature the Electoral Commissioner’s ‘Welcome to AEC 
TV’ video as well as commentary regarding other communication efforts being undertaken during the 
next federal election.  

In addition, a bank of cut-down episodes could be distributed via tailored pitches to marketing media 
(with the written release) for embedding in media outlets’ digital platforms.  

A launch would not necessarily attract media reporting but rather flag to media and others the AEC’s 
intention to be creative and active in our messaging in acknowledgment of the disinformation 
challenge.  

Stop & Consider video series 

Post-launch, there is the potential to create and release a slightly longer form of AEC TV video that 
concentrates on designated topics that are commonly misunderstood.


--- Page 23 ---

This series could be branded in line 
with the AEC’s disinformation 
campaign ‘Stop and Consider’ and 
feature an interview style piece that 
either reacts to recent social media 
commentary or anticipates an 
election-time issue.  

The videos would be hosted on the 
AEC TV YouTube channel and 
distributed via social media channels, 
including the AEC’s LinkedIn profile.  

Social media content 

In addition to the AEC TV series, the Media and Digital Engagement Section will focus pre-election 
social media content on preparing for a federal election, with a specific concentration on: 

•  Enrolment  

o  Focussing on overall completion rates, number of people who typically enrol/update in the 

final week, geographical areas of concern 

•  The voting system 

o  Educational content designed to inform voters about Australia’s preferential voting system 

ahead of a federal election.  

•  Planning for the election 

o  Content that provides an inside look behind certain facets of election planning 

This series will utilise relevant AEC TV videos, infographics, existing educational content from the 
AEC website and images from past federal elections.


--- Page 24 ---

Election-time communication 

Election-time communication will include a mix of planned, proactive activities designed around the 
election timetable as well as the capability to respond to the environment or issues of the day.  

Website homepage messaging 

The AEC’s website is visited millions of times throughout a federal election period, mostly for 
electoral transactions – this includes enrolment, finding a voting location and seeking results.  

The homepage is the landing spot for almost all of that user traffic. The website homepage will 
display the most pertinent messages throughout each phase of the election period, providing quick 
access to relevant information/tools and, where appropriate, displaying a contextual message on 
matters of reputation.  

The use of the website for reputational messaging is strongest in the counting period where updates 
and imagery will mimic other channel messaging. Videos and pictures will be used to explain the 
counting process and illustrate both the scale and complexity of the counting operation.  

Media releases 

A series of media releases will be distributed by the Media and Digital Engagement Section 
throughout the federal election period.


--- Page 25 ---

Media releases will always be complemented by posts from the AEC’s social media accounts. Not all 
content being announced or promoted by the AEC will be the subject of a media release – some 
messages will be via other avenues, including social media only.  

See a list of election-time media release templates at Attachment D.  

Proactive social media posts 

The AEC’s social media accounts will be highly active during the election period, both proactively and 
reactively. Proactive, unpaid AEC social media messages will include supporting: 

-  AEC media releases,  
- 
- 
- 
- 

the AECs election-time advertising campaign,  
varying elements of election participation, 
communication on sensitive issues, and 
the provision of early voting statistics (infrequently, not daily).  

Content will regularly include pre-prepared products (videos, infographics etc). Content will also 
feature visual products created in real-time.  

Video updates 

At pertinent stages of the count, short videos will be filmed to provide an update on election planning, 
voter services and counting activity.  

This will feature appropriate commentary and imagery that supports the messages of integrity, scale 
and complexity. The video talent and location will be selected based on the contextual environment.  

Interviewees may include the Principal Media Adviser, Electoral Commissioner, a relevant State 
Manager, polling staff or even voters. Locations may include count centres, the AEC’s Command 
Centre or the AEC TV studio.  

Content will be vetted by the Principal Media Adviser who may seek further approval depending on 
the nature of the video.  

Story of the voting period 

In the week immediately following the election, there’s opportunity to use AEC interviews, footage 
and data to reflect positively on how the election was administered.  

This is a video piece that could be created gradually throughout the election period and released 
soon after election day. It is an opportunity to tell the story of the election on our terms, in a timely 
manner.  

Media interviews 

During the federal election period AEC Spokespeople will conduct regular media interviews – a mix 
of proactively sought opportunities and facilitating requests. 

Following what is anticipated to be an active pre-election period of media exposure for the Electoral 
Commissioner, opportunities for Electoral Commissioner media exposure will be sought/accepted 
infrequently based on identified need.  

It is envisaged that AEOs will have an active presence both proactively and reactively, noting the 
principles of the Reputation Management Framework. An active presence establishes media 
relationships that can be called on if an issue arises and inserts an AEC voice into what otherwise 
may be a void of accurate procedural commentary.


--- Page 26 ---

Members of the Media and Digital Engagement Section will not seek proactive media interview 
opportunities outside of an exception. Requests for straightforward interviews will, for the most part, 
be accepted with a discussion regarding the appropriate spokesperson pending geographic location 
and availability. This is again in recognition of the value of having an active voice.  

Press gallery briefing 

In addition, a briefing, or series of briefings, will be held during the election period for press gallery 
journalists, preferably during the close of rolls period.  

This will be the same format as the pre-election capital city briefings with the Electoral Commissioner 
in attendance. It will complement other election-time media contact and further seek to seed pertinent 
messages about the conduct of both voter services and the counting period. 

The Media and Digital Engagement Section and Six O’Clock advisory will coordinate the briefing.    

Third-party engagement 

A range of third-party organisations will be identified that would be both appropriate and 
advantageous to communicate key AEC election messages.  

Organisations will include tertiary education institutions, targeted workplaces, sporting organisations 
and others. Six O’Clock Advisory will conduct an outreach activity where organisations will be asked 
to assist the AEC, without charge, to distribute our messages via their existing channels (e.g. 
intranet, social media, website etc) 

Messages will include temporary election workforce promotion, voter turnout, formality and 
disinformation. Pre-prepared products and wording will be supplied to make the request as easy as 
possible to facilitate.  

Not all messages will be pushed to all identified organisations, in recognition of both the 
appropriateness of some audiences to only some messages as well as the likelihood of having only 
one successful request.   

Direct approaches / pitches 

Identified media will be directly approached for certain issues or story opportunities if identified as 
advantageous. This may include participation opportunities to highlight certain aspects of the 
electoral process.  

Behind-the-scenes story 

An identified journalist – either print or television - will be approached for a potential piece going 
behind-the-scenes of delivering a federal election. The idea is to host this representative in the early 
stages of the election period in order for them to run a piece at the height of potential interest – just 
prior to election day.  

If the pitch is successful, this would involve a small series of AEC staff member interviews and on-
location visits (e.g. OPCs, ballot paper printing, pre-poll setup and a pre-polling centre in operation). 
The Principal Media Adviser would coordinate the opportunity with assistance from Six O’Clock 
Advisory and the relevant state office/s, including the State Office Communications Officer.  

A media piece that described the AEC’s efforts to run a federal election would provide an increased 
understanding of the scale and complexity of an event, fostering increased goodwill at a crucial time.


--- Page 27 ---

Remote mobile polling opportunity 

As has been traditional across numerous federal elections, the AEC will offer a media opportunity to 
local journalists to cover the first remote mobile polling votes cast in the election.  

A location will be selected carefully with all cultural sensitives the subject of prior consultation to 
ensure a media visit to the selected rural location is appropriate.  An AEC spokesperson and 
appropriate media representative would accompany the media to the selected location.  

The aim of this activity would be for coverage of the effort the AEC goes to in order to deliver the 
election to be syndicated to national media outlets.  

Media event management 

The AEC has a small number of events during a federal election where media representatives are 
able to, or likely to, be in attendance. It is important to not only be aware of these activities but to also 
appropriate manage them to varying degrees.  

Declaration of nominations 

The declaration of nominations includes a series of public events that can attract candidates 
themselves and/or members of the media.  

A single media release will be issued for the declaration of nominations outlining both the 
nominations / ballot draw process and the availability of media attendance – this will be supported by 
posts on the AEC’s social media accounts. 

Each State Office Communications Officer is responsible for inputting content for their jurisdiction into 
a dedicated Sharepoint site that will automatically populate a webpage that the media release and 
social media posts hyperlinks to. This process makes it a nationally consistent and administratively 
easy task to deliver information across 159 electoral contests. 

Managing media attendance 

Each state office communications officer will identify declaration of nominations events that are more 
likely to draw media attendance. Through consultation with their state manager and the Media and 
Digital Engagement Section it will be determined which events will require a person to attend to 
perform a media management role.  

The State Office Communications Officer, a Six o’clock Advisory staff member or a subcontracted 
local public relations staff member may attend identified events to greet and, if necessary, curtail 
media at an identified declaration of nominations event.  

It is possible that media will attend a declaration of nominations event that does not have a media 
officer present. Local staff will manage this attendance and are able to liaise with state office if 
required.  

Voting/count centre media attendance 

A media alert will be distributed advising that any media representative wishing to visit a voting 
location must advise AEC Media of their intent.  

Pending an appropriate notice period, all requests received by the Media and Digital Engagement 
Section to simply attend a voting location to take photographs or b-roll footage will be provisionally 
accepted, with guidelines for behaviour provided to the media representative (including COVID safety 
measures). It will be noted that we may get back into contact with them if there is an issue visiting a 
desired location – something that will be carefully communicated.


--- Page 28 ---

Note: This approach of providing provisional approval will be re-assessed if the COVID 
situation in a particular jurisdiction is heightened.  

Any request for a more involved media opportunity at a polling location, or for access to a counting 
location, will be assessed on merit and according to the contextual environment.  

All requests will be logged in a central list categorised by state and territory. Each request will also be 
communicated with the relevant state office communications officer who will be responsible for 
undertaking necessary consultation and identifying any issues to the Media and Digital Engagement 
Section in a timely manner.  

The local consultation will not only identify any potential issues with media attendance at a specified 
location but will also provide the relevant Officer-in-Charge at an identified voting venue with 
advanced notice.  

In-person media management 

The State Office Communications Officer, a Six o’clock Advisory staff member or a subcontracted 
local public relations staff member may attend identified voting or count centre locations to greet and, 
if necessary, curtail media.  

The need for this level of engagement will be identified based on the profile of a candidate being 
photographed, the number of media attending, the type of activity being captured and/or the history 
of the media representative in relation to AEC coverage.  

Close counts or recounts 

The media management of close counts or recounts will be carefully considered in consultation with 
the relevant state office executive and the Executive Leadership Team. It may involve any of the 
following. 

the distribution of media releases outlining the process and progress 
social media posts advising updates to the process 

-  pitched or reactive media interviews 
- 
- 
-  distribution of short-form videos that advise on count process or progress 
-  Collective picture and interview opportunities at an identified count centre.  

Declaration of results 

For declaration of results events, a small series of posts will be distributed via the AEC’s social media 
accounts as a means of demonstrating count progress/finalisation and alerting media to the 
opportunity to attend.   

As per the declaration of nominations process it will be the responsibility of the state office 
communications officer to input data into a dedicated Sharepoint site that will populate a webpage 
that lists the event details. For the declaration of results, this data input will occur as declaration 
events are locked in.  

The State Office Communications Officer, a Six O’Clock Advisory staff member or a subcontracted 
local public relations staff member may attend identified declaration of results events to greet and, if 
necessary, curtail media at an identified declaration of nominations event.


--- Page 29 ---

Evaluation 

The below are indicators which will determine the success of the Electoral Integrity: Reputation 
Management Strategy mapped against the AEC’s six reputation management principles: 

Principle 1: Be proactive in building a positive reputation for the Australian electoral system 

Measure of success: AEC communication on reputational matters provides an evidence 
base of consistent effort to educate Australians on the election process and address potential 
disinformation.  

Media and digital engagement specific: Key audiences are provided with information 
about the key issues impacting electoral integrity, including election processes and potential 
disinformation.  

Principle 2: Undertake open and regular communication with voters and stakeholders 

Measure of success: Electors and stakeholders have timely access to relevant information 
about topical aspects of electoral delivery at each point in the electoral cycle.  

Media and digital engagement specific: Media and social media engagement is timely and 
impacts positively on individual and collective understanding of electoral processes.  

Principle 3: Position the AEC as the foremost subject matter expert on federal electoral 
processes in Australia 

Measure of success: The AEC is actively sought out, and thought of, as electoral experts 
and is therefore positioned to diffuse disinformation about electoral processes. 

Media and digital engagement specific: AEC advice regarding procedural matters is well 
received or at least clearly assists in steering conversations towards factual accuracy.  

Principle 4: Judicious use of language, tone and timing in political, media and social media 
environments 

Measure of success: AEC communication regarding reputational matters resonates with 
consumers as a reflection of an authority that professionally acts within its legislative remit, 
strengthening positive perceptions of electoral integrity.  

Principle 5: Back-up public statements with operational delivery 

Measure of success: Historical statements regarding operational delivery errors are unable 
to be used as the catalyst for criticism in the current environment.  

Media and digital engagement specific: Public statements made are realistic and in line 
with executive direction.


--- Page 30 ---

Principle 6: Actively monitor issues, manage risks, and plan for crisis situations 

Measure of success: The AEC has a robust crisis management plan in place before the 
federal election. When issues are not known, the AEC becomes aware and is able to act 
quickly. 

Media and digital engagement specific: Media and social media monitoring/management 
activities contribute effectively to the identification and management of issues.


--- Page 31 ---

Attachment A: Issues management tactics 
There are a range of both proactive and reactive tactics that can be employed by the AEC to manage 
an issue in the media, should one arise during the tight timeframes of the federal election.  

The table below outlines channels that may be utilised in relation to election related issues. The 
communication approach will be selected in consultation with the Executive Leadership Team and 
relevant state office executive as required.  

Channels 

Channel 

Purpose 

Considerations 

Holding 
statement 

To address a breaking issue and frame the 
AEC as an agency that is agile and ready to 
respond.  

Media statement  To insert AEC commentary into a developing 

or continuing issue.  

Timeliness – a holding 
statement issued regarding an 
already developed story is 
often seen as a negative.  

Scale – should be used for 
significant issues only. 

The scale of the issue is a key 
consideration as remaining 
silent can, at times, be more 
beneficial. 

Fact sheet / 
Q&As 

To provide appropriate background to an 
issue or body of work, potentially correcting 
incorrect assumptions.  

Most effective as an 
accompaniment to more 
succinct communication.  

AEC website, 
social media 

To provide regularly updated context to an 
issue and to demonstrate progress.  

Spokesperson 
interview 

To insert AEC commentary into a developing 
or continuing issue, or to set appropriate 
expectations for a potential issue. 

State manager 
or Electoral 
Commissioner 
interview 

To insert AEC commentary into a developing 
or continuing issue, or to set appropriate 
expectations for a potential issue.  

The AEC Twitter account 
effectively acts as a direct 
channel with media.  

Important to identify the 
appropriateness of providing a 
generic spokesperson in 
response to the specific issue. 

Often appropriate to use in 
response to requests until an 
issue develops into a more 
serious matter and is 
continuing despite AEC 
commentary.   

Outlet selection and interview 
preparation is crucial.  

Especially important to 
undertake for more serious 
issues to get cut through.  

Proactive 
interview pitch 

To assist in controlling the narrative of a 
potential future issue. 

Outlet/journalist selection is 
crucial.  

Particularly effective in setting 
expectations for an upcoming 
process.


--- Page 32 ---

Channel 

Purpose 

Considerations 

‘On location’ 
filming/interview 
opportunity 

To assist in controlling the narrative of a 
potential issue or to facilitate positive 
procedural reportage of a process receiving 
criticism.  

Careful controls must be in 
place to facilitate a smooth 
event, including appropriate 
on-site staff briefing.   

Editor’s letter 

To respond to criticism and turn the 
narrative. 

Stakeholder 
letters 

To advise key stakeholders of the AEC’s 
actions in response to an issue to minimise 
the potential for third party media criticism.  

Elector letters 

To communicate directly with the people 
affected by an issue, demonstrating 
commitment to an issue’s resolution and 
genuine concern for the impact.  

Advertising 

To gain the attention of both electors and 
stakeholders regarding an issue, 
demonstrating commitment to an issue’s 
resolution and genuine concern for the 
impact.  

AEC TV video 

To outline the AEC’s approach to a process 
and/or respond to an emerging issue.  

Effective when blatant 
unfounded criticism is 
published by a high-profile 
individual or outlet. Danger of 
being seen as an over-reaction 
if used incautiously.  

Potential to also notify a 
journalist of impending 
publication to achieve 
coverage of the response.  

Distribution timing could be an 
issue.  

Distribution timing could be an 
issue.  

Provides the ability to note the 
direct communication in 
complementary contact with 
stakeholders or the media.  

Careful selection of 
publications required to ensure 
appropriate coverage.  

This is below the line 
advertising, not connected to 
the AEC’s participation 
focussed campaign 
advertising. 

Requirements around 
government advertising limit 
the ability for a fast response.   

Can be produced quickly and 
hosted on a number of 
channels, including AEC 
website and social media 
accounts.  

Using this approach for a well-
developed issue could draw 
criticism for not being open to 
questions.


--- Page 33 ---

Tactic 

The table below outlines the tone and style of messaging that may be utilised in the channels 
identified above.  

Tactic 

Purpose 

Considerations 

Expectation 
management 

To address a potential issue before 
incorrect expectations, draw negative 
commentary.  

Timing – Must be close enough 
to the event to be noteworthy 
for the audience.  

Process  

Falling back on procedures and 
legislative requirements can deflect an 
issue’s focus away from the AEC to the 
broader system. 

Context 

Providing a detailed narrative around an 
issue can help interested parties 
understand how an issue has occurred 
and identify with the AEC. 

Diversion 

Imagery 

The promotion of related positive stories 
to illustrate a rounded view of AEC 
business in a particular field of interest.  

The provision of visual evidence of 
positive work related to an issue can 
engender either sympathy for the AEC or 
support for the agency’s response to an 
issue.  

Regularity 

For long running issues, regular updates 
can be used to avoid commentary 
straying into negativity – the aim is to 

Channels – potential use of 
direct communication with 
stakeholders if potential effect 
of the issue is serious.  

Justification – using process as 
a reason for an issue may 
appear to be a ‘poor excuse’ if 
no prior action on the issue has 
been taken.  

Stakeholders – using process 
in the messaging can also be 
seen as ‘pointing the finger’. 

Accuracy – providing details 
can lead to further investigation 
or questions, so it is crucial that 
facts are verified before they 
are used.  

Questions or allegations based 
on mis- or disinformation may 
not be easy to dismiss with 
context, as they often relate to 
emotive issues or language.  

Scale – should only be used for 
smaller or developing issues so 
as not to appear as an obvious 
distraction technique.  

Channels – powerful imagery 
should be used in as many 
channels as possible to gain 
exposure.  

State office communication 
officers and executive staff will 
be encouraged to take behind-
the-scenes photos as a matter 
of course, to mitigate the risk of 
an appropriate photo not 
available in a usable 
timeframe.  

Channels – Twitter is fantastic 
for these smaller, regular


--- Page 34 ---

Tactic 

Purpose 

Considerations 

input into the 24/7 news cycle with AEC 
information.  

updates that can act as 
complimentary to other tactics.  

International 
comparisons 

Comparisons to other democracies can 
remind the audience that the system run 
by the AEC is among the best in the 
world and criticisms can be trivial or 
unfounded.  

Apologetic 

Being apologetic can demonstrate 
genuine concern for the impact while also 
displaying commitment to an issue’s 
resolution. 

It can assist in providing a turning point 
for an issue if needed.  

COVI-19 updates demonstrate 
the merit of pairing these 
updates with useful graphics 
such as graphs or tables.  

Scale – to address issues such 
as counting speed rather than 
any errors, so as not to 
downplay a serious issue. 

Reputation – international ECs 
may not thank us for the 
comparison if it is too direct.   

Scale – any form of public 
apology should be used in 
quite serious matters.  

Tone – one or two words can 
create an apology that looks 
insincere or sarcastic.  

Unapologetic 

This can be used to address irrational or 
unfounded criticism by displaying the 
seriousness of the work the AEC is doing.  

Tone – it is important to be 
appropriately forceful but not 
disrespectful.


--- Page 35 ---

Attachment B: State office activities 

The table below will be populated following state office engagement prior to the federal election period.  

Activity 

Details 

Timing 

Responsibility  Notes 

E.g. VIC weekly radio 
interviews 

Pitch to ABC and 3AW mornings – to establish 
relationships and a voice.  

October 2021 

Six O’Clock 
Advisory 

Media and Digital Engagement Plan 

Page 35


--- Page 36 ---

Attachment C: Pre-prepared digital content list 

The below tables reflect digital products to be created in advance of the election period.  

Short-form AEC TV videos 

Products 

Welcome to AEC TV 

Postal voting: Protecting your privacy 

The facts on election timing 

Postal voting: Delivery efforts 

Ensuring the accuracy of the electoral roll 

Polling place selection 

Postal voting security  

The enormous logistical challenge of delivering 
the election 

The count: Declaring results 

Security in our transport 

The count: What’s happening on Sunday? 

COVID-19 materials 

The count: Getting the votes home 

It’s on: We’re ready, are you? 

Check, re-check and check again: Conducting 
the Senate count 

Securing our processes & systems 

The polling day experience 

What is candidate disendorsement? 

How is Government formed 

Multiple voting: The facts 

Disinformation: The role of the voter 

The role of scrutineers 

Party registration: The process  

Queues: Our work to reduce them 

Senate voting: The reduced impact of a 1-only 
vote 

Party postal vote applications 

Political neutrality: At the heart of everything 
we do 

Communicating with all Australians 

Funding and disclosure 

Media and Digital Engagement Plan 

Page 36


--- Page 37 ---

Infographics 

Products 

Mythbuster series: This series will include a range of the key issues captured within the above 
AEC TV video list but focus in on specific areas of misunderstanding rather than addressing the full 
contextual environment surrounding an issue.   

The count 

Voting options 

Voting systems around the world 

Election planning 

Postal voting 

Electoral communication 

Voting is compulsory 

Need to vote early? 

The electoral roll 

Away from home? 

Formality 

The nominations process 

Animations 

The count 

Products 

Voting options 

Voting systems around the world 

Election planning 

Postal voting 

Electoral communication 

Voting is compulsory 

Need to vote early? 

The electoral roll 

Away from home? 

Formality 

The nominations process 

Media and Digital Engagement Plan 

Page 37


--- Page 38 ---

Attachment D: Media release templates 

The below list of media releases reflects a lessened need to communicate via this format. The more straightforward reminders or procedural 
communication will occur via social media channels instead.  

Media release template 

Purpose 

Welcome to AEC TV 

To provide a tangible pre-election illustration of the AEC’s efforts to address 
disinformation regarding the electoral process.  

Distribution timing 

Pre-election 

AEC recruiting polling staff in 
{location} for the 202X federal 
election 

People heading to {event} must 
think ahead for their vote 

The election is on! We’re ready, 
are you? 

AEC encouraging voters to ‘stop 
and consider’ this federal 
election 

Targeted engagement for local media pickup and interview. National releases for 
TEW have had little impact in the past.  

As determined necessary 

For use if there is an election day clash with a major event or COVID outbreak.  

As determined necessary 

The announcement media release for acknowledgement & record.  

On announcement 

This release will have a nod to enrolment messaging but will focus on the scale 
and complexity messaging as well as COVID safety measures.  

Essential publication and record of the AEC’s attempts to forewarn/forearm voters.   Day 1 

Overseas voting arrangements 
for the 202X federal election  

Despite a low ability to distribute media releases internationally, this picks up local 
media on what will be a change in service provision this election.  

Day 2 

Options different for some voters 
this election 

This release is designed to address the issue of changed services for people 
traditionally served by mobile teams.  

Day 2 

It will include COVID messaging and reference to the coordinated postal voting 
efforts the AEC is implementing.  

Media and Digital Engagement Plan 

Page 38


--- Page 39 ---

The best electoral roll in history 

Dependent on figures but will be another crack at a good news story regardless of 
where exactly it lands.  

Day 9/10 

There is also scope to address positive growth in Indigenous and youth enrolment 
if we want to front-foot those messages.  

Deadline to nominate as a 
candidate 

This will be an alert about the deadline as well as a national invite to declaration of 
nomination events that will be listed on the website 

Day 9 

{Number} candidates contesting 
the 2019 federal election 

Must have a media release with the candidate figures for acknowledgment, to meet 
demand and to create a record. 

Day 10 

A large portion of this release will discuss the scale narrative of the work now being 
undertaken.  

Early voting to begin: Expect 
some queues 

This release will link to early voting centre locations. Dependent on the length of 
the early voting period, it will either note a change or the traditional staggered start.  

Day XX 

It will also link to content about how we select voting locations, how to vote 
formally, the early voting eligibility requirements and COVID safety measures in 
place.  

A note about media attendance at voting venues will be included.  

Remote voting starts 

Perhaps in line with a PR opportunity.  

Postal voters: Don’t delay 

An early reminder to complete and return your postal vote ASAP once received. 
This will also include calls for patience for people who have applied but are yet to 
receive them.  

Day 20 

Day 23 

Media access to polling places 

A dedicated note to media representatives to provide notice of polling place visits 

Day 30 

The count: Election night result 
no guarantee 

A media alert designed to inform media representatives about the count process in 
advance of Saturday night 

Day 31 

Sunday count release 

Content entirely dependent on what has happened the previous day 

Day 34 

Media and Digital Engagement Plan 

Page 39


--- Page 40 ---

Further count-specific releases 

Timing and content entirely dependent on the environment 

Days 35, 36 etc 

Media and Digital Engagement Plan 

Page 40

AI Generated

AEC FOI Disclosure Log Archive

FOI Request LEX1060

FOI Request Summary: AEC Twitter Policy and Identity

Main Purpose of the FOI Request

Documents from the FOI Request

Main Content from the Documents (relating to the FOI Request)

FOI Request LEX1060, Schedule of Released Documents [PDF 172KB] (pdf)

LEX1060 documents [ZIP 1.23MB] (zip)

ZIP Contents

Media and Digital Engagement Plan - 2021-2022 federal election.pdf (pdf)