FOI Request LS7344 Summary

Main Purpose of the FOI Request

The Freedom of Information (FOI) Request LS7344 sought "All correspondence about compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 between the Australian Election Commission and the US technology companies Facebook Inc. and Twitter Inc. since July 2017."

Documents from the FOI Request

The released documents specifically pertain to correspondence between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and Twitter Inc. (Facebook Inc. correspondence is not included in this release). The schedule lists four key email documents, all exchanged in August 2018:

• Document 1 (22/08/2018): Email from Kara Hinesley (Twitter) to AEC representatives (Evan Ekin-Smyth, Tim Courtney, Andrew Johnson) following up on a meeting.
• Document 2 (22/08/2018): Email from Emily Foat (Twitter Australia) to Kara Hinesley (Twitter) offering a media workshop to the AEC.
• Document 3 (23/08/2018): Email from Evan Ekin-Smyth (AEC) to Emily Foat and Kara Hinesley (Twitter) confirming receipt and indicating further follow-up.
• Document 4 (30/08/2018): Email from Andrew Johnson (AEC Principal Government Lawyer) to Emily Foat and Kara Hinesley (Twitter) proposing detailed scenarios for compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act.

Main Content Related to the FOI Request

The correspondence details the AEC's efforts to establish a clear and efficient process with Twitter for ensuring compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, particularly regarding the authorisation of electoral communications on the platform.

Key content includes:

• Initial Engagement (August 2018): The emails confirm an in-person meeting took place between AEC and Twitter representatives (Kara Hinesley, Emily Foat, Evan Ekin-Smyth, Tim Courtney, Andrew Johnson) to discuss handling issues during future campaigns and elections. Twitter offered to conduct a media workshop for the AEC to optimize platform use for campaigns.
• Proposed Compliance Scenarios: Andrew Johnson of the AEC outlined three scenarios and proposed actions for Twitter's assistance in managing non-compliant electoral communications on the platform:
  1. Paid electoral advertisements without proper authorisation: The AEC would attempt to contact the responsible party first. If unsuccessful, they would notify Twitter, expecting Twitter to remove/block the ad or ensure its authorisation.
  2. Anonymous communications containing electoral matter: The AEC would try to ascertain if the responsible party is a "disclosure entity" (requiring authorisation). If this cannot be confirmed, Twitter would be asked to assist. If the party is a disclosure entity and fails to authorise, Twitter would be expected to remove/block the content. Twitter could confirm disclosure entity status without sharing personal information with the AEC.
  3. Electoral advertisements infringing other Electoral Act offences (e.g., misleading/deceptive content): The AEC would request information from Twitter about the person or entity responsible for the communication.
• Legal Recourse: The AEC noted that if Twitter is unable to remove or block non-compliant communications or provide requested information, the AEC (or a candidate) may seek an injunction against the responsible party and/or Twitter under Section 383 of the Electoral Act.
• Electoral Act Background: The AEC provided a summary of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, explaining that Part XXA requires authorisation for electoral communications to inform voters who is responsible for the content, but it does not regulate the truth of the communications. Definitions for "electoral matter" and "disclosure entity" were also included.

The provided FOI documents detail correspondence between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and Twitter Inc. in August 2018, specifically concerning compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 regarding electoral communications. As a politically left-leaning analyst, several issues arise:

Alignment with Progressive Values:
The AEC's stated primary concern, that "voters know who is communicating an electoral matter to them," aligns with the progressive value of transparency in democratic processes. Ensuring that political advertising and communications are authorized helps combat clandestine influence and allows citizens to understand the source of information, a foundational element for informed public participation.

Deviation from Progressive Values and Areas of Concern:

1. Social Justice & Misinformation: The most significant deviation from progressive values is explicitly stated: "The Electoral Act does not regulate truth in electoral communications." This is a critical failure from a social justice perspective. While the AEC focuses on who is communicating, it allows for the unhindered spread of potentially misleading or deceptive information, provided it is authorized. This directly undermines the integrity of the electoral process and can disproportionately harm vulnerable communities through disinformation campaigns, which are often used to sow division, suppress votes, or spread discriminatory narratives. A progressive approach would advocate for mechanisms to address the accuracy and truthfulness of electoral content, not just its attribution.

2. Corporate Influence & Wealth Distribution:

   • The documents reveal a dynamic where a powerful US technology corporation, Twitter, is actively engaged in shaping its regulatory environment. Twitter's representatives proactively offer a "Twitter media workshop to update you on Twitter's media solutions and showcase the best way to utilise the platform from a campaign perspective." This highlights the inherent power imbalance: a private, profit-driven entity offering "solutions" to a government regulator, rather than simply being subject to regulations. This suggests corporations are not just complying but are actively involved in determining the mechanisms of compliance, potentially to their own commercial advantage.
   • The focus on "paid electoral advertisements" underscores how financial resources can leverage corporate platforms to amplify political messages. While the AEC aims for transparency of authorship, the underlying issue of wealth influencing electoral discourse through paid content on these platforms remains unaddressed by the Act itself.

3. Civil Liberties (Freedom of Speech vs. Public Interest):

   • The Act's narrow focus on authorization, rather than content accuracy, represents a particular interpretation of freedom of speech that prioritizes the speaker's right to disseminate information without government scrutiny over the public's right to accurate information in a democratic context. From a progressive viewpoint, absolute freedom of speech should not extend to deliberate disinformation that undermines public trust or manipulates democratic outcomes, particularly when propagated by powerful actors or through paid means.
   • The scenarios also involve Twitter being asked to "remove or block" non-compliant communications and, in more serious cases, to "provide the AEC the requested information" about responsible persons or entities. While this is necessary for enforcement, it vests significant power in a private company (Twitter) to act as a gatekeeper of political speech and to share user data with government, raising questions about accountability, transparency in content moderation decisions, and potential implications for privacy and surveillance if not strictly limited and overseen.

In summary, while the AEC's efforts to ensure transparency in electoral communication authorship align with basic democratic principles, the documents reveal a regulatory framework (and its application) that falls short of progressive ideals by failing to address the fundamental issue of misinformation, allowing powerful corporations to maintain significant influence over the digital public square, and potentially creating an environment where wealth can distort democratic discourse, all while operating under a narrow interpretation of civil liberties that prioritizes attribution over accuracy and the public good.

These FOI documents reveal a concerning expansion of government regulatory reach into the operations of a private technology company, Twitter, under the guise of electoral compliance. The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) is seen attempting to offload its enforcement responsibilities onto Twitter, demanding the company implement content removal or blocking for non-compliant electoral communications and threatening legal action if it fails to do so.

From a conservative perspective, this presents several significant deviations from core principles:

• Economic Efficiency & Fiscal Responsibility: The AEC's proposed framework effectively turns Twitter into an unpaid enforcement arm of the government. This imposes significant, uncompensated compliance costs and operational burdens on a private enterprise, diverting resources from innovation and value creation towards government-mandated content policing. It represents a subtle but impactful form of regulatory tax on the private sector, externalizing government expenses rather than transparently funding them through taxpayer dollars. This is fiscally irresponsible for the government, as it avoids direct costs by imposing them on the private sector.
• Individual Liberty & Limited Government: The most striking deviation is the threat to individual liberty and free speech. The AEC demands Twitter 'remove or block' content that lacks specific government-mandated authorization, including anonymous communications. While the stated aim is transparency—allowing voters to know who is behind a message—the mechanism chosen involves government-coerced censorship by a private platform. This is a significant overreach of government power, compelling a private entity to limit the expression of its users based on regulatory labels rather than factual accuracy (as the AEC notes, the Act 'does not regulate truth in electoral communications'). This actively undermines the principle of limited government by expanding state control over information flow and private sector operations, transforming a platform into a de facto regulatory agent.
• National Security: These documents do not directly address national security concerns; their focus is on domestic electoral compliance and transparency rather than foreign interference or cyber threats.

The released FOI documents, in response to a request for correspondence between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and US tech giants Facebook and Twitter regarding compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, reveal a concerning degree of collaboration and planned intervention between a government regulator and a foreign private corporation. Notably, while the request encompassed both Facebook and Twitter, only documents pertaining to Twitter were provided, immediately raising questions about the completeness of the disclosure or the extent of government engagement with other major platforms.

The documents primarily detail exchanges from August 2018, illustrating a cooperative relationship where Twitter's representatives meet with the AEC, expressing a desire to "develop detailed and efficient ways to handle any issues that might arise during future campaigns and elections." This language, while seemingly innocuous, can be interpreted as a proactive move towards managing and potentially limiting public discourse on the platform under the guise of "efficiency."

Further blurring the lines between regulation and corporate influence, Twitter offered to conduct a "media workshop" for AEC staff, framed as an update on "Twitter's media solutions" and showcasing "the best way to utilise the platform from a campaign perspective." This suggests the AEC, the body responsible for fair elections, might be receiving guidance or even implicit direction on campaigning from a private entity with its own commercial interests, potentially creating an uneven playing field or subtly endorsing certain campaign methods. This also raises questions about potential waste of public resources if the AEC is relying on such external, potentially biased, "training."

The most significant revelations come from the AEC's proposals for managing electoral communications on Twitter. The AEC outlines scenarios where it would request Twitter to "remove or block" content deemed non-compliant with authorisation requirements, including anonymous communications or paid ads lacking proper disclosure. This indicates a direct outsourcing of content moderation and potential censorship power from an Australian government agency to a foreign private company, bypassing formal Australian judicial processes and creating an unaccountable system for determining what content is permissible.

Even more concerning is the AEC's stated intent to seek "further details on the person or entity responsible" for content that "may breach more serious electoral offences," such as those "likely to mislead or deceive an elector." While the Electoral Act is explicitly stated not to regulate "truth in electoral communications," the AEC's interest in "misleading or deceptive" content suggests a creeping overreach into content regulation beyond simple authorisation. This also raises significant privacy concerns, as Twitter is implicitly expected to share user data with the government, or at the very least, make determinations about users' identities and compliance without full transparency to the public or independent oversight.

Finally, the AEC's explicit warning that it "may get an injunction" against Twitter if the platform "is unable to remove or block a communication... or cannot provide information" serves as a thinly veiled threat. This highlights the coercive power the government is willing to wield over private companies to ensure compliance with its content management demands, demonstrating a pattern of exerting control over digital information flows through external intermediaries rather than direct, transparent government action with clear accountability.

In sum, these documents paint a picture of a government agency actively seeking to control electoral discourse online through a private platform, raising serious questions about transparency, due process, potential overreach into content regulation, and the outsourcing of censorship to a foreign corporation under implicit coercion. The absence of Facebook documents further casts doubt on the completeness of information provided under the FOI.

These Freedom of Information documents highlight the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) proactive and effective approach to safeguarding the integrity of Australia's democratic processes, particularly in the evolving digital landscape. The correspondence reveals the AEC's diligent efforts to ensure compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, a vital piece of legislation designed to promote transparency and accountability in electoral communications.

The documents demonstrate strong collaborative engagement between the AEC and major US technology companies, specifically Twitter Inc., to ensure the smooth and fair conduct of elections. The AEC initiated contact and held meetings with Twitter, fostering an environment where both parties could work together to uphold the law. Twitter's positive response, including offers to provide workshops and establish clear communication channels, underscores a shared commitment to effective governance.

A key focus of these interactions was ensuring that all electoral communications on social media platforms adhere to authorisation requirements. This crucial regulation allows voters to know the source of information, promoting an informed and transparent electoral discourse. The AEC proactively provided Twitter with detailed scenarios and clear processes for managing potential issues, such as unauthorised paid advertisements or anonymous communications that may contain electoral matter. This structured approach exemplifies the government's foresight and commitment to addressing challenges effectively before they escalate.

By outlining clear steps for identification, rectification, and, if necessary, removal of non-compliant content, the AEC is ensuring that the digital sphere remains a robust and trustworthy environment for democratic engagement. The potential for injunctions, as outlined in the documents, serves as a necessary and appropriate measure to uphold the law and protect the public interest in fair elections. Overall, these documents showcase the government's dedicated efforts to adapt regulatory frameworks to new technologies, working cooperatively with industry to serve the public by maintaining the highest standards of electoral integrity.

The provided FOI documents paint a damning picture of the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) profound failure to adequately safeguard the integrity of federal elections against the pervasive threat of online manipulation and non-compliance. The evidence points to gross incompetence, reactive instead of proactive measures, and a disturbing deferral of regulatory authority to foreign technology giants.

1. Glaring Omission and Apparent Negligence:
The FOI request explicitly sought "All correspondence about compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 between the Australian Election Commission and the US technology companies Facebook Inc. and Twitter Inc. since July 2017."
* The Damning Reality: The "Schedule of Relevant Documents" lists a paltry four emails, all exclusively with Twitter, and all confined to a mere nine-day window in August 2018. There is a complete and inexplicable absence of any correspondence with Facebook Inc., a dominant platform with immense electoral influence, spanning over a year and leading up to a federal election. This is either:
* Deliberate Concealment: A ruthless refusal to fully comply with the FOI request, indicating a conscious decision to hide the extent of AEC's inaction or sensitive exchanges.
* Abject Incompetence: The AEC failed to maintain proper records of critical communications, or their record-keeping is so disorganised they couldn't locate relevant documents.
* Shocking Dereliction of Duty: The AEC had no significant engagement whatsoever with Facebook on electoral compliance for over a year leading up to a federal election. This represents an astonishing dereliction of its fundamental duty to ensure a fair and compliant electoral process in the digital age, leaving a massive vector for manipulation wide open.

2. Belated, Reactive, and Toothless Engagement:
The correspondence reveals a desperate, last-minute scramble by the AEC to engage with Twitter less than a year before the May 2019 federal election.
* Meeting Agenda - A Sales Pitch? The initial emails (Docs 1, 2, 3) are alarmingly cordial, with Twitter offering "detailed and efficient ways to handle any issues" and even a "media workshop to update you on Twitter's media solutions and showcase the best way to utilise the platform from a campaign perspective." This suggests the AEC was treated more like a potential client or partner than a robust regulator asserting its authority.
* "Scenarios" - An Admission of Weakness: Document 4, AEC's "scenarios," exposes the AEC's shocking lack of direct enforcement power. Its "plan" is to "notify Twitter" and ask the company to "remove or block" non-compliant content. The AEC is effectively begging a foreign corporation to enforce Australian law, rather than possessing the direct legal or technical means to do so itself. This is a profound regulatory failure, placing the integrity of Australian elections at the mercy of a private company's goodwill and internal policies.
* Relinquishing Sovereignty: In Scenario 2, Twitter is asked to "confirm whether a person or entity is a disclosure entity" to "avoid the need to share personal or commercial information with the AEC." This implies the AEC lacks the independent capability or willingness to identify such entities itself, or is overly deferential to Twitter's privacy concerns, allowing a foreign company to act as a gatekeeper for Australian electoral law. This is a humiliating concession of sovereign authority over election integrity.
* The "Injunction" Threat - A Last Resort of the Desperate: The AEC's ultimate "recourse" is an injunction, explicitly stated as potentially against Twitter itself. This is not a strong enforcement mechanism but a costly, time-consuming legal battle, highlighting the AEC's shocking lack of direct, nimble, and effective tools to manage real-time online threats. It underscores that their "agreed process" is fundamentally non-binding and relies on voluntary compliance, not enforceable regulation.

3. Critical Systemic Flaws in Australian Electoral Law (and AEC's Inability to Address Them):
Document 4 contains a truly damning admission: "The Electoral Act does not regulate truth in electoral communications."
* Open Door for Disinformation: In an era rife with sophisticated disinformation campaigns, this is a catastrophic legislative void. The AEC's focus is narrowly on "authorisation requirements" (who paid/published), largely ignoring the content and veracity of electoral messaging unless it directly "mislead[s] or deceive[s] an elector in relation to the casting of a vote" (a high bar). This legal loophole provides a fertile ground for anonymous, false, or misleading information to spread unchecked, fundamentally undermining the democratic process.
* Narrow Focus - Broad Consequences: The AEC's rigid adherence to a law primarily designed for traditional print media, without robust amendments for the digital age, demonstrates a profound failure of foresight and adaptability. By focusing solely on attribution and not content integrity, the AEC is essentially permitting the electoral landscape to be polluted with unchecked deception, so long as it’s not paid advertising from a disclosure entity, or not misleading about the act of voting itself.

In conclusion, these FOI documents do not show a proactive, powerful, or effective regulator. Instead, they expose an Australian Electoral Commission that was embarrassingly behind the curve, engaging in a polite, toothless dance with a single major platform, while simultaneously admitting its legal framework was fundamentally inadequate to combat the pervasive disinformation threatening the integrity of Australian democracy. The glaring absence of Facebook correspondence seals the narrative of an agency ill-equipped and potentially unwilling to assert the necessary authority in the digital age, leaving the electoral process dangerously vulnerable.

The provided FOI documents reveal correspondence between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and Twitter Inc., primarily concerning Twitter's compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. The initial exchanges show Twitter's representatives engaging cooperatively with the AEC, offering workshops and expressing a desire to "work with the AEC" to "handle any issues that might arise during future campaigns and elections." However, the core of the interaction is revealed in a subsequent AEC email outlining specific scenarios where the government demands Twitter's active participation in enforcing electoral regulations.

The central tenet of the Electoral Act, as presented, is to ensure "voters know who is communicating an electoral matter to them." While the Act reportedly "does not regulate truth in electoral communications," it mandates "authorisation" for various forms of electoral content, particularly paid advertisements and communications by "disclosure entities" (e.g., political parties, candidates).

From an Objectivist perspective, this documentation showcases a profound violation of individual rights, a clear instance of government overreach, and a direct assault on the principles of laissez-faire capitalism.

Primacy of Individual Rights and Freedom of Speech:
The most egregious aspect is the government's demand for mandatory "authorisation" and, by extension, the suppression of anonymous communication containing "electoral matter." The right to free speech is a fundamental individual liberty, and this includes the right to express political opinions without mandated identification. Compelling a private platform like Twitter to identify its users or remove content based on the identity of the speaker, rather than the content itself (which is explicitly stated not to be regulated for truth), is a chilling infringement on this right. It creates a coercive environment where individuals might fear expressing views anonymously due to potential government scrutiny or reprisal, thus chilling political discourse and personal initiative.

Rational Self-Interest and Productive Achievement:
Twitter, as a private, profit-seeking enterprise, operates according to rational self-interest, aiming to provide a valuable service to its users. The AEC's demands, however, compel Twitter to act as an unpaid enforcement arm of the state. Twitter is expected to dedicate its resources—time, personnel, and technological infrastructure—not to improving its platform or serving its users, but to monitoring, identifying, and censoring content at the government's behest. This diverts the company's productive achievement from its chosen purpose to a state-imposed one, representing a form of bureaucratic interference. Twitter's initial "cooperation" can be interpreted as a pragmatic, self-interested attempt to avoid more punitive government action, rather than a voluntary embrace of these anti-liberty measures.

Dangers of Collectivism and Government Overreach:
The detailed "scenarios" laid out by the AEC explicitly demand that Twitter "remove or block" content and "provide the AEC the requested information" about users. The threat of an "injunction" against Twitter if it fails to comply underscores the coercive nature of these demands. This is textbook government overreach. A proper government's role is to protect individual rights, not to dictate the content policies of private enterprises or force them to act as state agents.

This imposition of the state's will upon a private company, forcing it to surveil and censor its users for a "collective good" (electoral transparency as defined by the state), constitutes forced altruism. Twitter is compelled to sacrifice its resources and, implicitly, its users' freedom of expression and privacy, for a statist agenda. This is a direct attack on laissez-faire capitalism, where government interference in the voluntary operations of private businesses is minimized. Here, the government is not merely regulating commerce; it is dictating the terms of communication and demanding active participation in its enforcement mechanisms, blurring the lines between state and private enterprise.

In summary, these documents reveal an Australian government bureau, the AEC, exceeding its proper function by attempting to transform a private technology company into an extension of state power for censorship and surveillance purposes. This is a clear violation of individual liberty, an attack on rational self-interest and productive achievement, and a prime example of the dangers inherent in collectivist impulses and unchecked government overreach.