FOI Request LEX1785

Date: 2022

This FOI request (No. LEX1785) sought the application made by Mr. Max Kaye under section 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 on 14 April 2022 to the Electoral Commission.

The single document released in response is "Application made under section 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 by Mr. Max Kaye", dated 14 April 2022.

The main content of the document, focusing on the FOI request, includes:

Purpose of the Application: Mr. Max Kaye (a founder and former officer of The Flux Party) requests the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to review its decision, made on 24 March 2022, to deregister "VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy!" (Flux) under s137(6) of the Electoral Act.
Core Argument for Review: Kaye contends that the AEC uses a "faulty method to test party eligibility with regards to sufficient membership" and provides detailed statistical analysis as grounds for this claim. He states he is "dissatisfied with the decision to deregister Flux" due to this flawed methodology.
Critique of AEC's Methodology:
- Hypothetical Scenario: Kaye presents a hypothetical eligible party (2,700 legitimate members out of 9,000 total, 4,500 validatable). Despite this eligibility, his calculations show that such a party would have an extremely low probability of passing the AEC's test (0.0020% ± 0.0012% chance of success), implying a false negative rate exceeding 99.99%.
- Application to Flux: He states that the parameters of the hypothetical case are "spitting distance" from Flux's second membership test (Feb/March 2022). For Flux specifically, the test results in a false negative probability of 0.999978 ± 0.000013.
- Sampling Bias: During Flux's second test, the AEC sampled only the "top 1,650 names" from Flux's alphabetically sorted list of 4,680 members. This meant only members whose first names started with A through G were sampled, which Kaye argues further biases the test if membership isn't evenly distributed alphabetically.
- Limited Sample Size: The AEC's policy limits submitted membership lists to 1,650 names (previously 550), regardless of a party's actual, larger membership. This artificial limit significantly compromises the accuracy of the test and means a party with thousands of eligible members can still fail.
- Definition of "Rigged" and "Farce": Kaye explicitly defines the AEC's method as "rigged" (outcome pre-arranged/fixed, unfair) and a "farce" (unfair, empty act, done for show with a known outcome) because of its high false negative rate for eligible parties.
Analysis of Flux's Tests:
- Flux failed its 2021 test, despite having "at least 4680 members whose details have been matched against the electoral roll." Kaye's analysis showed a 71.7% chance of a false negative for this test.
- He argues that the AEC's method can become less reliable as a party gains members, and in some extreme (yet realistic) scenarios, it can fail 100% of the time for an eligible party.
Critique of AEC's "Reasons" for Deregistration: Kaye asserts that the AEC's statement of reasons for deregistering Flux ignored his arguments, dismissed the statistical analysis, and contradictorily relied on the very method he criticized, stating it was "rational, fair and practical."
Systemic Implications: Kaye argues that the AEC's policies, particularly the limits on membership list submissions, have "systemically disadvantaged non-parliamentary parties" and made the AEC "complicit" in entrenching the power of political elites by making it harder for new or smaller parties to remain registered.
Supporting Data: The document includes detailed statistical graphs (Probability Mass Functions) and tables to illustrate the probabilities of false negatives under various conditions, alongside historical examples of other "suspected farces" (past deregistration/refusal cases with high false negative probabilities). It also highlights a persistent typo in historical AEC testing tables that was enforced.

AI Generated

The Freedom of Information documents detail Max Kaye's request for review of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)'s decision to deregister the "Flux" political party, arguing that the AEC's membership testing methodology is fundamentally flawed, "rigged," and constitutes a "farce." From a left-leaning perspective, the documents reveal government actions and policies that significantly deviate from core progressive values, particularly regarding social justice, civil liberties, and the equitable distribution of political power.

Key Issues and Deviation from Progressive Values:

Suppression of Democratic Participation and Civil Liberties: The central grievance is the AEC's use of a flawed statistical method for verifying party membership, which, according to Kaye's analysis, has an astronomically high false-negative rate (over 99.99% for Flux). This effectively means that even eligible parties, like Flux (which claims over 4,680 members against a 1,500 requirement), are almost guaranteed to fail the test.
- Deviation: This directly undermines the civil liberties of freedom of association and the right to participate in the democratic process. By creating a system where non-parliamentary parties are systematically deregistered through an inaccurate and predetermined process, the AEC acts as a gatekeeper, stifling political pluralism and reducing electoral choice for citizens. This contrasts sharply with progressive ideals of broad and equitable access to democracy.
Unfairness and Entrenchment of Political Elites: The documents highlight several policy choices that exacerbate this unfairness:
- Artificial Membership List Limits: The AEC restricts submitted membership lists to a maximum of 1,650 members, regardless of a party's actual size. This prevents smaller parties from demonstrating their true membership depth and punishes those, like Flux, who invest in building larger, verified member bases.
- Unrepresentative Sampling: In Flux's second test, the AEC sampled from an alphabetically sorted list, testing only members whose first names started with A through G, making the sample unrepresentative of the full membership.
- Lack of Transparency: The AEC does not inform parties which members were filtered out, preventing corrective action.
- Legislative Changes without Grace Periods: The sudden increase in required members from 500 to 1,500 in September 2021, with "little warning and no grace period," disproportionately impacts emerging parties while established "major parties" (who are exempt from membership tests) remain unaffected.
- Deviation: These practices create an uneven playing field, systematically disadvantaging grassroots movements and smaller parties. This aligns with progressive concerns about entrenched power structures and "political elites" exploiting bureaucratic mechanisms to "effectively eliminate competition" and solidify their control, implicitly reinforcing existing wealth and power distributions rather than challenging them.
Disregard for Integrity, Evidence, and Accountability: Kaye directly challenges the AEC's stated values of "electoral integrity through agility, professionalism and quality," demonstrating through statistical analysis that the methodology is "unreliable" and "unsuitable." The AEC's dismissal of these "facts and evidence" in their deregistration statement is presented as a fundamental failure of a "judicial process" to "right wrongs" and prevent "injustices."
- Deviation: Progressive values emphasize transparency, evidence-based policy, and institutional accountability. The AEC's alleged refusal to acknowledge and address fundamental flaws in its methodology, even when presented with robust statistical proof, signals a profound lack of accountability and undermines public trust in the integrity of democratic institutions.

In summary, the documents portray an electoral commission whose policies and practices, intentionally or otherwise, function as a barrier to entry for non-established political parties. This results in the suppression of civil liberties related to democratic participation and association, perpetuates an unfair political landscape, and reinforces the power of existing "political elites." These outcomes stand in stark opposition to progressive ideals of an inclusive, fair, and genuinely democratic society.

AI Generated

The FOI documents reveal a request by Max Kaye of the Flux Party challenging the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) party membership verification process, arguing it is fundamentally flawed and leads to unfair deregistration. From a politically right-leaning analytical perspective, the documents highlight significant deviations from core conservative principles:

Economic Efficiency:
The AEC's flawed membership testing methodology demonstrates a profound lack of economic efficiency. By imposing an arbitrary cap of 1,650 members for verification, even when parties (such as Flux, claiming 4,680 members) possess significantly more, the AEC creates a disincentive for political parties to invest in robust, organic membership growth beyond this artificial limit. This renders substantial effort and resources, like Flux's custom automation for member management and verification, economically wasteful if not directly aligned with the AEC's narrowly defined and demonstrably inaccurate test. The sudden tripling of membership requirements (from 500 to 1,500) with "little warning and no grace period" further imposed economically disruptive and burdensome demands on smaller parties, forcing them into a struggle for survival rather than fostering efficient, sustainable political organization.

Individual Liberty:
The AEC's actions appear to unduly constrain individual liberty and the freedom of political association. By employing a statistical test characterized as "rigged" and "inaccurate"—which, in certain cases, yields a "false negative" rate exceeding 99.99%—the government effectively raises a substantial barrier to entry for political participation. This makes it excessively difficult for citizens to form and sustain alternative political movements outside the established, major parties, thereby restricting the choices available to voters and limiting the liberty of individuals to meaningfully engage in the democratic process. The AEC's apparent refusal to acknowledge statistical evidence and engage in reasoned debate, as presented by Kaye, further undermines the liberty of citizens to challenge government processes through evidence-based arguments and seek redress for perceived injustices.

National Security (Democratic Integrity):
While not directly related to traditional military defense, the integrity and trustworthiness of democratic processes are foundational to national security and stability. The documents reveal a process characterized by Kaye as a "farce" and "rigged," which he argues "compromises the integrity of our political process." Such serious allegations, especially when coupled with claims that "political elites have exploited this" to "cull" smaller parties and "entrench the status quo," deeply erode public trust in key governmental and electoral institutions. A testing method that consistently produces erroneous outcomes for eligible parties fosters cynicism and disengagement, potentially making the democratic system vulnerable to internal distrust and instability.

Fiscal Responsibility:
Although the documents do not detail specific financial outlays, the revealed inefficiencies and the continued reliance on a demonstrably flawed testing methodology strongly suggest a lack of fiscal responsibility. Taxpayer funds are presumably expended on maintaining and executing a process that, by Kaye's statistical analysis, fails to accurately determine party eligibility in critical instances. The AEC's insistence on a "predetermined outcome" regardless of objective facts, and its resistance to improving its methods, reflects a bureaucratic approach that wastes public resources on unreliable results rather than pursuing genuine efficiency and accountability.

Limited Government:
The documents illustrate a clear deviation from the conservative principle of limited government. The AEC's imposition of an arbitrary upper limit (1,650 members) on submitted membership lists, even when a political party like Flux has significantly more members, represents an overreach beyond merely verifying minimal legal compliance. This action dictates how a private political association must structure and present its membership data, rather than simply confirming a threshold. The AEC's perceived "condescension and hubris" in "making decisions on behalf of parties" and refusing to adapt its policies, despite evidence of systemic disadvantage to non-parliamentary parties, exemplifies a bureaucracy exceeding its limited scope and actively impeding the natural functioning of civil society and free political competition. The unannounced and substantial increase in membership requirements further exemplifies government acting to burden private organizations unnecessarily.

AI Generated

These FOI documents reveal a critical challenge to the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) integrity and competence, brought forth by Max Kaye, requesting a review of Flux Party's deregistration. The core accusation is that the AEC's methodology for verifying political party membership is not merely flawed, but "rigged" and a "farce," leading to the unfair disenfranchisement of eligible parties and undermining democratic processes.

Key findings suggesting government inefficiency, overreach, and questionable decision-making include:

Statistically Flawed Methodology Leading to Predetermined Outcomes: Max Kaye, providing detailed statistical analysis, argues the AEC's membership testing method produces "false negatives" (deregistering eligible parties) with an alarmingly high probability, exceeding 99.99% in Flux's case. This suggests the test is effectively "predetermined" to fail certain parties, rendering it meaningless for assessing genuine membership.
Arbitrary Limits and Bias in Sampling: The AEC imposes an artificial limit of 1,650 members a party can submit for verification, even if the party has thousands more (Flux claimed over 4,680). Further, the AEC filters submitted lists (for duplicates, deceased members, etc.) without allowing parties to replace these names, compounding the disadvantage. In a particularly egregious example, for Flux's second test, the AEC specifically instructed to test only the "top 1,650 names" from an alphabetically sorted list by first name, effectively biasing the sample to only include members whose names started with A-G. This selective testing, divorced from actual membership, constitutes a severe lack of scientific rigor.
Counterproductive Incentives and Waste: The analysis indicates that if an eligible party gains members, the AEC's flawed method can paradoxically make it less likely to pass the test, thereby disincentivizing growth and wasting resources spent on membership drives.
Historical Pattern of Suspected Farces: The document identifies "at least 5 suspected incidents" and "at least 5 other possible farces" in the AEC's past deregistration decisions, where, based on the AEC's own reported figures, eligible parties were likely removed due to the method's inherent inaccuracies. This suggests a systemic problem, not isolated incidents.
AEC's Dismissal of Evidence and Lack of Accountability: Despite Max Kaye's detailed statistical arguments, the AEC's "Statement of Reasons" for deregistering Flux is characterized as "dishonest," "irrelevant," and demonstrating a "ludicrous non-sequitur." The AEC is accused of ignoring "reason, or logic, or statistical arguments," and merely reasserting the method's validity without addressing the factual criticisms. This indicates a concerning unwillingness by a key democratic institution to engage with independent scrutiny or acknowledge potential errors.
Internal Incompetence and Misleading Claims: The document highlights that a typo in the AEC's own membership testing table (specifically, the maximum denials allowed for a certain number of lodged members) was enforced for at least four years, leading to parties being "wrongly denied" registration even by the AEC's own (albeit flawed) standards. Furthermore, Kaye asserts that the AEC's previous claims of 90% accuracy for its tests are demonstrably false, with real-world scenarios showing accuracy as low as 15.1%.
Complicity in "Culling" Political Diversity: Kaye explicitly links the AEC's flawed method and policies to recent changes in the Electoral Act (e.g., increasing membership requirements from 500 to 1500 with "little warning"), suggesting these changes, coupled with the AEC's testing, were "designed to make life harder for anyone who wanted to be part of our democracy" and resulted in the "culling" of approximately 40% of parties, thereby "entrenching the status quo" and being exploited by "political elites."

In essence, these documents paint a picture of an electoral body that, whether through incompetence or design, operates with methods that are statistically indefensible, dismissive of factual evidence, prone to internal errors, and ultimately undermine the fairness and integrity of the democratic process, particularly for smaller, non-parliamentary parties.

AI Generated

The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) has demonstrated its unwavering commitment to electoral integrity and robust governance through its diligent application of party registration regulations, as evidenced by the FOI documents related to Max Kaye's request for review concerning the deregistration of the Flux party.

These documents highlight the AEC's rigorous and transparent processes for ensuring that political parties meet essential membership requirements, a cornerstone of maintaining a healthy democracy. Mr. Kaye's request for review, a valuable mechanism for public oversight, underscores the AEC's openness to scrutiny and its dedication to accountability.

The AEC's membership testing methodology, developed in close consultation with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), is a testament to effective inter-agency cooperation and the application of expert statistical principles. This methodology is designed to be "rational, fair, and practical in all the circumstances," ensuring a robust assessment of a party's genuine membership. While Mr. Kaye raises complex statistical points and hypothetical scenarios, these highlight the precise and demanding nature of the AEC's verification process, which is critical for upholding the integrity of the electoral roll and preventing the registration of parties that do not genuinely meet the legislative thresholds. The fact that the methodology can be perceived as "strict" for parties that do not meet the criteria reinforces its effectiveness in safeguarding the electoral system.

The recent increase in the minimum membership threshold from 500 to 1,500 members reflects a necessary regulatory update, proactively ensuring that registered political parties demonstrate a substantial and verifiable base of support. This measure strengthens the quality of political representation and streamlines the electoral landscape for voters, focusing on parties with broad community engagement. The AEC's policy of limiting the number of members submitted for testing (e.g., to 1650) is a pragmatic administrative measure that balances the need for thorough verification with efficient resource management, avoiding undue burden on both the AEC and the parties, while still maintaining statistically sound verification.

In the case of Flux, the AEC's decision to deregister, and its subsequent actions including conducting a second membership test, demonstrate its thoroughness and adherence to established legal frameworks. The AEC diligently applied its verified testing parameters to both lists submitted by Flux, concluding that the party did not meet the required membership numbers. This was not a punitive action, but a consistent application of regulations designed to ensure that all parties operate within the defined legislative requirements. Even the use of an alphabetical sampling method, as occurred with Flux, demonstrates a neutral and systematic approach to verification.

Historical cases of deregistration, described by Mr. Kaye as "farces," in fact illustrate the consistent and long-standing application of these rigorous standards. These instances demonstrate the AEC's effective oversight in ensuring that parties continually meet their obligations, contributing to a stable and reliable electoral system over time. Any minor administrative adjustments in testing tables, such as the described typo, are part of the AEC's continuous review and refinement of its operational guidelines, demonstrating a commitment to ongoing improvement and accuracy within a complex regulatory environment.

The AEC's policies, including membership limits, are designed to guide parties towards building a solid, verifiable membership base, promoting responsible party management and compliance. Far from being a hindrance, these policies encourage parties to operate with integrity and transparency, ultimately serving the public by fostering a strong and accountable political system. The government's electoral body consistently prioritizes integrity, professionalism, and quality in all its operations, ensuring a fair and robust democratic process for all Australians.

AI Generated

The provided documents expose a deeply flawed, potentially corrupt, and demonstrably incompetent administration of Australia's electoral integrity by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), with the complicity of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The core accusation, vehemently supported by statistical analysis, is that the AEC's party membership testing methodology is "rigged" and a "farce," designed or operating to produce predetermined outcomes that actively undermine legitimate political parties and entrench the power of "political elites."

The most damning revelation is the calculated 99.9980% false negative rate of the AEC's membership test for eligible parties like Flux. This staggering figure means that, under specific conditions where a party undeniably meets the membership threshold, the AEC's "scientific" method is virtually guaranteed to falsely conclude the opposite, failing 99.998% of the time. This is not mere inaccuracy; it is statistical sabotage, rendering the test an "empty act done for show" where the outcome is already known. The claim that such a test is "rational, fair and practical in all the circumstances" is exposed as an outright lie, demonstrating either profound ignorance or deliberate deception by AEC officials.

Further evidence of profound incompetence and malice includes:

Arbitrary and Obstructive Policies: The AEC imposes an arbitrary and counterproductive limit of 1,650 members on submitted lists, even when parties, like Flux, possess thousands more eligible members. This policy actively prevents parties from demonstrating their full strength and "makes registration harder." Furthermore, the AEC's refusal to allow replacement of filtered members (duplicates, deceased, etc.) and its failure to disclose which members were filtered forces parties to navigate an opaque, impossible process.
Biased Sampling Methodology: The AEC's delegate exacerbated the systemic flaw by sampling the "top 1,650 names" from an alphabetically sorted list, rather than truly randomizing the selection. This introduces a glaring bias, making the test a judgment on "members whose first name starts with one of A through G" rather than the party's overall membership, demonstrating a shocking lack of statistical rigor and fair process.
Willful Ignorance and Dismissal of Facts: Max Kaye explicitly and repeatedly challenges the AEC, including Commissioner Tom Rogers, Justice Kenny, and Dr. Gruen, to confront the mathematical and statistical evidence of their flawed methodology. The AEC's subsequent decision to conduct a second test, ignoring Flux's arguments about the method's invalidity and instead using the provided list for further testing, constitutes a contemptuous dismissal of reasoned critique. The AEC's "Statement of 'Reasons'" is ridiculed as "dishonest" and "largely irrelevant," openly contradicting itself and confirming that the AEC "does not care about reason, or logic, or statistical arguments." This suggests an institutional arrogance and a commitment to defending flawed processes over pursuing truth and justice.
Active Complicity in "Culling" Democracy: The document explicitly frames recent legislative changes—which dramatically increased membership requirements without warning or grace periods—as a deliberate act by "political elites" to "make life harder" for new entrants and "entrenchment of the status quo." The AEC is directly accused of "enforcing a policy that compromises the integrity of our political process" and, alongside the ABS, being "complicit" in this "culling" of opposition. The historical AEC policy of encouraging parties not to exceed 1.1 times the legislative limit is painted as a deliberate strategy that made non-parliamentary parties vulnerable targets for this legislative attack, showcasing a deep-seated institutional bias against new or smaller parties.
Gross Administrative Incompetence: Beyond the statistical failures, the AEC is revealed to have "mistakenly enforced a testing table with a typo for 4 years," leading to potentially wrongful deregistration decisions based on incorrect criteria. This staggering oversight points to a fundamental lack of quality control, accountability, and basic due diligence within the AEC, suggesting a complete disregard for accuracy in decisions that impact democratic participation. The inconsistency of "risk" values in their own published tables further underlines this administrative chaos.
Lack of Transparency: The AEC's failure to publish membership test results or record the actual number of members a party could offer deliberately obscures its own failures and makes independent oversight impossible, safeguarding its "farces" from public scrutiny.

In conclusion, these documents portray the AEC not as a neutral guardian of electoral integrity, but as a compromised, arrogant, and incompetent bureaucracy, potentially acting in concert with established political powers to suppress democratic competition. Its "scientific" methods are exposed as farcical instruments of exclusion, its policies as obstructive barriers, and its leadership as dismissive of facts and logic. The implications are dire for the health of Australian democracy, suggesting a system that is fundamentally "compromised and corrupted."

AI Generated

The provided documents reveal Max Kaye's impassioned and meticulously reasoned challenge to the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) arbitrary and demonstrably flawed methodology for validating political party membership. The core contention is that the AEC’s process, ostensibly designed to ensure party eligibility, is in fact "rigged" and a "farce," systematically leading to the deregistration of legitimate parties like "VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy!" (Flux).

From an Objectivist perspective, these documents expose a stark violation of fundamental individual rights, a contempt for reason, and the inherent dangers of unchecked government overreach and collectivist machinations.

Violation of Individual Rights and Suppression of Initiative:
The primacy of individual rights, particularly the right to free association and political participation, is fundamentally undermined by the AEC’s actions. Max Kaye, as an individual acting in his rational self-interest to participate in and improve the democratic process, meticulously details how the AEC’s membership testing method is engineered to produce "false negatives," leading to the wrongful deregistration of eligible parties. Flux, through prodigious productive achievement and a commitment to rational organization (maintaining over 4,680 verifiable members and developing automation for membership management), exemplifies the very initiative and competence that a free society should foster. Yet, this achievement is not only ignored but actively penalized by an arbitrary AEC policy limiting submitted member lists to 1,650. The fact that Flux's second test deliberately sampled only from members whose first names began with A-G, due to the alphabetical sorting of their submitted list, is a testament to the sheer bureaucratic irrationality and a direct suppression of personal initiative and the right to represent a broad, diverse membership.

Contempt for Reason and Bureaucratic Interference:
Kaye's statistical analysis, presenting irrefutable mathematical facts demonstrating the AEC's method has a greater than 99.99% failure rate for eligible parties in certain scenarios, is a profound appeal to reason. His challenge to Dr. Gruen, the statistician on the Commission, to perform the calculation themselves, highlights the expectation that a government body should operate on objective truth, not "baseless claims" or "predetermined outcomes." The AEC's subsequent dismissal of this evidence as "irrelevant" and its reliance on a "canned response" that merely reiterates its flawed methodology, embodies the bureaucratic arrogance and contempt for reason that characterize government overreach. This is not a system based on objective reality, but on arbitrary rules enforced by agents disconnected from facts. The very purpose of judicial review—to correct errors and ensure justice—is rendered meaningless when facts and evidence are summarily ignored.

Dangers of Collectivism and Government Overreach:
The documents explicitly connect the increase in membership requirements and the "culling" of parties to the actions of "parliamentarians (i.e., the 4 major parties)" and "political elites." This is a clear instance of collectivism in action: established political power groups using the force of the state (via legislative changes and a complicit electoral commission) to eliminate competition and "entrench the status quo." This stifles the emergence of new ideas and alternative political organizations, effectively creating a political cartel. The AEC's policy of discouraging parties from building large memberships (by limiting the number that can be submitted for verification) has created a feedback loop that further entrenched this collectivist control, making it easier for the established elite to suddenly raise membership thresholds and wipe out smaller parties. This is the political equivalent of a heavily regulated market where incumbent monopolies use government power to impose impossible barriers to entry for new, innovative businesses.

Critique of Forced Altruism and Bureaucratic Stifling:
While not an overt demand for altruistic sacrifice, the AEC's arbitrary and unfair methodology implicitly demands a form of forced altruism from new and smaller parties. They are expected to endure demonstrably rigged tests, sacrifice their efforts, and ultimately, their very existence, for the sake of a "system" whose integrity is openly compromised by those who manage it. The narrative portrays the AEC as embodying "condescension and hubris," making decisions "on behalf of parties" that systematically disadvantage them, rather than acting as an impartial, fact-based arbiter. This bureaucratic interference directly suppresses personal initiative and productive achievement, signaling that adherence to arbitrary, irrational procedures is valued over objective truth and genuine political engagement.

In essence, these documents serve as a damning indictment of a system where individual liberty is compromised, rational achievement is punished, and government power is wielded to protect the interests of the entrenched few, all under the guise of "electoral integrity." The pursuit of "truth-seeking" and the undoing of "injustices" are demonstrably absent when a state institution refuses to acknowledge the reality presented by facts and evidence.

AI Generated

Application made under section 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 by Mr Max Kaye dated 14 April 2022 (A1745654)_Redacted#2.pdf (pdf)

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Request	for	Review	of	Decision	to	Deregister
Flux

To:	Mr	Tom	Rogers,	Australian	Electoral	Commissioner

CC:	The	other	members	of	the	Commission:	Justice	Kenny,	Chairperson,	and	Dr	Gruen,	the	Australian

Statistician.

This	is	a	request	for	the	Commission	to	review	the	decision,	made	on	the	24th	of	March	2022,	to

deregister	“VOTEFLUX.ORG	|	Upgrade	Democracy!”	(Flux)	under	s137(6)	of	the	Electoral	Act.	It	is

made	under	s141(2)	of	the	Electoral	Act.

I	am	making	this	request	because	the	AEC	has	been	using	and	continues	to	use	a	faulty	method	to

test	party	eligibility	with	regards	to	sufficient	membership.	Thus,	I	am	dissatisfied	with	the	decision

to	deregister	Flux.	Additionally,	as	an	Australian	elector,	a	fundamental	oversight	in	the	AEC’s	policy

could	compromise	the	democracy	that	I	am	a	constituent	of,	so	I	am	affected,	along	with	all	other

Australians.	As	part	of	this	request,	I	provide	statistical	analysis	as	grounds	that	the	AEC’s	testing

method	is	flawed.

My	Statement	to	the	Commission

I	invite	the	Commission	–	Mr	Rogers	along	with	Justice	Kenny	and	Dr	Gruen	–	to	consider	the

following	hypothetical	case	regarding	the	AEC’s	method	for	validating	that	a	party	meets	the

requirements	of	the	Electoral	Act.	I	assume	that	you	all	are	familiar	with	the	AEC’s	testing

methodology.

Consider	a	party	with	9,000	members,	and	let’s	say	that	half	of	those	members	(4,500)	are

validatable	as	electors,	and	a	further	60%	of	those	members	(2,700)	will	respond	“yes”	to	an	AEC

request	for	membership	confirmation.	It	is	natural	for	a	party	to	have	members	that	can	not	be

validated	against	the	electoral	roll	(which	can	happen	for	a	variety	of	reasons;	a	member’s	status	of

silent	elector	is	one).	Thus,	parties	go	to	some	substantial	effort	to	submit	only	those	members	that

can	be	validated	against	the	roll	–	for	reasons	that	I	hope	are	obvious	to	you	who	comprise	the

Commission.

That	is,	in	our	hypothetical	case:	4,500	members	are	not	validatable	as	electors,	and	a	further	1,800

would	deny	membership	if	asked	by	the	AEC.	The	remaining	2,700	are	legitimate.

Justice	Kenny,	as	I’m	sure	you’re	aware,	the	Electoral	Act	(EA)	specifies	that	an	eligible	party

requires	at	least	1,500	members.	In	your	legal	opinion,	would	a	party	with	2,700	members	satisfy

that	clause	of	the	EA?

I	hope	that	you	agree	that	it	would.	I	anticipate	that	you	would	also	agree	that,	all	else	being	equal,
this	hypothetical	party	appears	eligible	under	the	EA.	At	the	very	least,	we	do	not	have	a	reason	to
conclude	that	the	party	is	ineligible,	right?

Dr	Gruen,	I	wonder	if	you	are	a	man	dedicated	to	facts	and	truth	or	falsehoods	and	political	agendas.
I’m	sure	that,	as	an	expert	statistician,	you	hold	mathematical	facts	above	unsubstantiated	claims.
I’m	also	sure	that	you	appreciate	that	if	a	statistical	test	has	a	predetermined	outcome,	then	that
test	is	neither	reliable	nor	suitable	for	any	real-world	purpose.	If	you	had	a	blood	sample	processed
by	a	doctor,	would	you	accept	the	results	if	that	doctor	gave	them	to	you	before	the	blood	sample

was	taken?	No,	of	course	not,	that	would	be	crazy.

So,	Dr	Gruen,	please	consider	our	hypothetical	case.	Given	that	this	hypothetical	party	is	eligible

under	the	EA,	what	should	we	expect	as	the	results	of	the	AEC’s	testing	method	as	applied	to	this


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party?	Given	that	this	party	cannot	determine	which	of	the	4,500	validatable	members	will	respond

“yes”	or	“no”,	and	that	this	party	can	submit	no	more	than	1,650	members	due	to	AEC	policy	alone:

the	best	that	can	be	done	is	selecting	a	subset	of	those	members,	essentially	at	random.	There	may

be	some	small	optimizations	the	party	could	make,	but	in	principle	the	limiting	factors	are	those	that

we	have	already	discussed.	Thus	each	member	on	the	submitted	list	is	expected	to	respond	to	the

AEC	with	a	membership	denial	with	a	probability	of	0.4	(40%).	Of	course,	we	know	this	because

1,800	/	(2,700	+	1,800)	=	0.4,	and	because	there	is	no	reason	that	the	ratio	of	denying	members	to

confirming	members	would	change	substantially	(outside	the	statistical	variance	of	the	selection	of

1,650	members,	which	is	not	very	substantial	anyway).

Let	us	assume	that	this	hypothetical	party	randomly	selects	1,650	validatable	members	from	its	pool

of	4,500.	Dr	Gruen,	I	hope	that	you	find	this	a	reasonable	course	of	action	for	the	party	to	take	and

have	followed	the	logic	thus	far.

Dr	Gruen,	would	you	agree	that	the	accuracy	of	a	statistical	method	is	roughly:	how	often	it	results	in

true	positives	and	true	negatives?	That	is:	if	a	method	results	in	false	positives	and	false	negatives

some	of	the	time,	it	cannot	have	100%	accuracy.	If,	for	some	cases,	it	only	produces	false	positives

and	false	negatives,	then	it	has	0%	accuracy	for	those	cases.	If	there	exists	some	case	where	the

method	will	always	result	in	false	negatives,	then	we	can	conclude	that	such	a	method	is,	at	least

sometimes,	inaccurate,	yes?

I	invite	you,	Dr	Gruen,	to	please	calculate	the	probability	that	this	hypothetical	party	passes	the
AEC’s	membership	testing	methodology	–	that	the	party	passes	the	test	that	is	endorsed	by	your

bureau.	You	may	assume	that	no	members	are	filtered	out,	i.e.,	that	during	the	AEC’s	validation	of

the	membership	list	no	electors	are	excluded	for	being	duplicates,	or	deceased,	or	unmatchable

against	the	electoral	roll,	etc.

All	the	information	required	for	such	a	calculation	is	specified	above.	I	assume	that	such	a	calculation

is	trivial	for	a	statistician	such	as	yourself,	with	the	resources	available	to	you.	Surely,	you	agree	that

it	is	fairly	straight	forward	to	calculate,	yes?

Mr	Rogers,	while	Dr	Gruen	is	calculating	that	probability,	let	us	discuss	something	that	you	wrote

recently:

The	AEC’s	values	of	electoral	integrity	through	agility,	professionalism	and	quality	underpin

everything	we	do	[…]

I	also	believe	that	integrity	is	important.	Integrity	is	necessary	for	a	system	(or	a	person)	to	remain

robust.	Integrity	is	a	major	difference	between	‘stable	and	enduring’,	and	‘compromised	and

corrupted’.	When	integrity	fails,	good	systems	become	rotten.	Do	you	not	agree?

It	is	to	your	integrity,	and	the	integrity	of	Justice	Kenny	and	Dr	Gruen,	too,	that	I	make	this	appeal.	I
am	fully	aware	that	you	are	free	to	decide	whatever	you	wish	–	the	Electoral	Act	is	written	such	that
you	are	practically	unconstrained	in	this	matter.

I	ask	you	this:	if	the	AEC	and	the	ABS	were	wrong	about	the	AEC’s	testing	methodology,	how	would
you	know?	Surely	you	realize	that	it	is	possible	that	the	AEC	is	mistaken	somehow	–	that	we	are	all
fallible,	and	our	ideas	are	fallible?	Institutions	like	the	AEC,	and	methods	like	the	one	the	AEC	use,
are	based	on	ideas	that	were	thought-up	by	people,	and	are	therefore	fallible.

Justice	Kenny	and	Dr	Gruen,	do	you	also	realize	this?	That	there	are	no	infallible	humans,	no	infallible

institutions,	and	no	infallible	ideas?

Mr	Rogers,	if	it	is	possible	to	be	wrong,	what	does	it	mean	to	have	integrity	in	the	face	of	potentially

being	wrong,	and	thus	potentially	making	progress?	Should	one	take	the	path	of	honesty	and	truth-


--- Page 3 ---

seeking,	or	should	one	take	the	path	of	enforcing	authority	through	baseless	claims,	evasion,	and

dismissal?	If	you	have	some	other	path	to	take,	is	it	not	one	of	honesty	and	truth-seeking?	Surely

you	would	not	advocate	a	path	that	is	dishonest	and	avoids	the	truth?	Perhaps	Justice	Kenny	has

some	insight	on	this;	I	understand	that	judges	often	have	some	experience	in	these	matters.

Now,	let	us	return	to	the	matter	of	the	accuracy	of	the	AEC’s	testing	methodology.	Dr	Gruen,	are	you

done	calculating	those	probabilities?	Let	us	compare	answers.

Here	are	my	results	with	95%	confidence	intervals:	the	probability	that	the	hypothetical	party	passes

the	AEC’s	testing	method	is	0.0020%	±	0.0012%.	The	mean	membership	denials	via	the	AEC’s	test	is

	=	23.998	±	0.010	(out	of	60	successful	contacts).	The	standard	deviation	of	that	distribution	is	

=	3.765	±	0.007.	The	SEM	for	these	results	is	

	=	0.005.

Dr	Gruen,	would	you	consider	a	statistical	method	accurate	if	the	probability	of	it	producing	a	false

negative	is	99.9980%	±	0.0012%?	Would	you	consider	that,	for	all	intents	and	purposes,	such	a

statistical	method	is	predetermined	in	its	outcome?

Justice	Kenny,	do	you	consider	it	appropriate	for	an	important	legal	institution	to	use	a	method	that,

in	some	conditions,	fails	more	than	99%	of	the	time?	What	would	our	society	be	like	if	the	courts	had

this	kind	of	failure	rate	for	certain	types	of	cases?	How	do	we	know	that	they	don’t?	How	does	the
AEC	know	that	its	method	doesn’t?	Why	are	the	answers	to	those	questions	different?

Mr	Rogers,	do	you	think	that	a	test	which,	in	some	cases	has	a	failure	rate	greater	than	99%,	should

be	used	by	a	leader	who	values	integrity	and	quality?	Do	you	think	that	a	test	which,	when	applied	to

certain	cases,	succeeds	only	0.002%	of	the	time	is	“rational,	fair	and	practical	in	all	the

circumstances”?	[1]

[1]:

https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/Party Registration/Registration Decisions/2021

/notice-of-decision-with-reasons-SUPA.pdf

Dr	Gruen,	do	you	think	that	a	test	which,	for	certain	cases,	is	less	than	1%	accurate	is	“rational,	fair

and	practical	in	all	the	circumstances”?	After	all,	it	is	a	fact	that	the	AEC’s	method	performs	this

poorly	some	of	the	time.	You	have	calculated	so	yourself.	( ou	have	done	the	calculations,	haven’t

you?)

Justice	Kenny,	do	you	think	that,	when	a	citizen	appeals	to	a	judicial	process	of	their	country’s	legal

institutions,	they	deserve	the	right	to	be	taken	seriously?	That	they	deserve	the	right	to	present	their

case	and,	if	it	is	supported	by	the	facts,	to	have	an	injustice	undone?	Is	that	not	one	of	the	primary

values	of	judicial	processes	and	the	courts?	To	safeguard	citizenry	from	injustices?	To	undo	decisions
that	would	otherwise	be	mistakes?	Is	that	not	something	that	the	integrity	of	our	legal	institutions
depend	on?	Is	the	AEC	not	part	of	the	bedrock	of	our	legal	system?	(Its	foundational	role	being	that	it
provides	the	system	by	which	parliamentarians,	who	alone	can	create	and	modify	legislation,	are
elected.)

If	a	citizen	petitions	an	institution	via	a	judicial	process,	and	proves	their	case	with	mathematics	and
evidence,	what	are	they	to	do	if	that	is	not	enough?	If	that	institution	is	unconvinced	by	facts	and
evidence,	how	can	a	citizen	have	confidence	in	their	legal	system?	How	can	they	have	confidence	in
that	foundational	component	of	our	society?

Moreover,	if	judicial	processes	ignore	facts	and	evidence,	are	those	processes	serving	one	of	their

major	purposes	–	error	correction?	Is	that	not	a	core	goal	of	judicial	processes:	righting	wrongs,

undoing	mistakes,	preventing	mistakes,	promoting	justice,	and	so	on?	What	is	a	citizen	to	do	when	a
judicial	process	ignores	facts	and	evidence?


--- Page 4 ---

Mr	Rogers,	I	cannot	force	you	to	change	your	mind	about	anything,	that	is	solely	up	to	you.

I	can	present	you	with	this	case,	though.	Perhaps	you	(along	with	Justice	Kenny	and	Dr	Gruen)	have

guessed	that	the	hypothetical	party	was	not	so	hypothetical	after	all.	The	parameters	of	that	case

are	spitting	distance	from	those	of	Flux’s	second	membership	test	(conducted	Feb/March	2022).

There	is	at	least	one	major	difference	–	in	the	hypothetical	case,	the	party	selected	members

randomly;	in	Flux’s	case,	your	delegate	selected	1,650	members	from	the	top	of	the	list	of	4,680

members	that	Flux	submitted.	That	list	was	alphabetical,	so	the	AEC	only	sampled	from	members

whose	first	name	started	with	one	of	A	through	G.

Dr	Gruen,	in	your	expert	opinion	and	in	light	of	the	above,	and	given	that	Flux	failed	this	test,	which

of	these	should	we	believe	true?

That	Flux	has	fewer	than	1,500	members;	or

That	Flux	has	fewer	than	1,500	members	whose	first	name	starts	with	one	of	A	through	G.

If	a	party	has	1,000	(~1586	*	29/(17+29))	members	whose	first	name	starts	with	one	of	A	through	G,

how	many	members	whose	name	starts	with	one	of	H	through	Z	do	we	expect	that	party	to	have?

After	all,	what	are	the	chances	that	a	party	only	has	members	with	first	names	that	start	with	a	letter

between	A	and	G	inclusive.

The	point	of	this	argument	is	not	that	Flux	has	sufficient	members	to	satisfy	the	electoral	act.	The

point	of	this	argument	is	that	the	AEC’s	method	is	flawed.	It	is	inaccurate,	it	is	unreliable,	it	is	unfair,

and	it	is	unsuitable	–	at	least	in	this	case.	The	facts	prove	this.

I	am	not	asking	that	the	Commission	believe	me,	I	am	asking	the	Commission	to	believe	facts	and

evidence.

Justice	Kenny,	I	will	ask	you	again,	does	a	citizen	deserve	the	right	to	present	their	case	via	a	judicial

process	and,	if	it	is	supported	by	the	facts,	to	have	an	injustice	undone?	I	hope	that	your	answer	is

the	same	in	this	case	as	it	would	have	been	for	all	other	cases	that	you	have	presided	over	as	a

Judge	of	the	Court.

The	above	is	sufficient	to	conclude	that	Flux	was	wrongfully	deregistered.	It	was	wrongful	because,

regardless	of	whether	Flux	should	be	deregistered	or	not,	the	AEC’s	method	is	not	good	enough	to

produce	an	accurate	result	in	this	case.	From	a	truth-seeking	point	of	view,	the	AEC’s	test	provides

no	meaningful	information	on	whether	Flux	is	eligible	or	not.	Since	we	should	not	take	my	word	for	it,

if	our	goal	is	to	determine	whether	Flux	is	eligible	with	regards	to	sufficient	membership,	we	are	at

square	one.	Scientifically,	we	can	draw	no	conclusions	based	on	the	AEC’s	testing.	It	is	not	my	place
to	tell	you	what	should	be	done	instead	of	the	current	method,	I	can	only	demonstrate	to	you	that

the	outcome	is	predetermined	in	Flux’s	case,	as	the	test	results	in	a	false	negative	with	probability
0.999978	±	0.000013.	(These	numbers	differ	slightly	from	those	in	the	hypothetical	case	above
because	the	calculations	are	based,	specifically,	on	Flux’s	second	test.)

Mr	Rogers,	Justice	Kenny,	and	Dr	Gruen:	perhaps	this	is	not	enough	to	convince	that	there	is	a
reasonable	chance	of	some	problems	with	the	AEC’s	methodology.	The	only	other	thing	I	can	do	is
present	you	with	a	more	in-depth	statistical	analysis	of	the	method	–	covering	this	problem	and
others,	both	historical	and	on-going.	I	suppose	that	it	is	most	relevant	for	Dr	Gruen,	since	he	is	the
only	one	I	can	reasonably	expect	to	have	the	knowledge	of	statistics	necessary	to	judge	the	analysis.
To	my	knowledge,	this	is	the	first	third	party	review	of	the	AEC’s	methodology.	If	there	has	been	a
third	party	review	that	is	not	public,	I	think	that	it	is	reasonable	for	the	Commission	to	provide	it

(without	an	FOI	request).

After	I	sign	off,	you	will	find	supporting	graphs	of	the	Probability	Mass	Functions	comprising	the

statistical	analysis	from	which	my	above	results	were	drawn.	Following	that,	the	in-depth	review	of


--- Page 5 ---




--- Page 6 ---

therefore	constitutes	a	case	where	the	AEC's	method	is	completely	inaccurate.

Fig	S.2:	Modelling	based	on	the	AEC	results	from	Flux's	membership	test	in	Feb/March	2022.	Even	if

we	assume	that	Flux	is	eligible,	the	AEC's	method	returns	a	false	negative	more	than

99.99%	of	the	time.

Fig	S.3:	Modelling	of	an	example	where	the	AEC's	method	works.
That	is:	it	is	accurate	in	this	case.

Statistical	Review	of	the	AEC’s	Method	Follows


--- Page 7 ---

AEC	Party	Membership	Test	Methodology	is
Rigged!	A	Statistical	Analysis	of	AEC
Methodology	and	Graphs	(of	PMFs)

Website	|	Source	Code	

Max	Kaye	

2022-02-15	to	2022-02-21

TOC

1.	 Background	Context

2.	 Regular	Membership	Testing

3.	 Flux’s	2021	Membership	Test:	A	Known	Farce

4.	 Analysis	Methodology

5.	 Major	Findings

6.	 Suspected	Farces

7.	 Flux’s	2021	Membership	Test	Assuming	a	Threshold	(9.09%)	Denial	Rate	(including	worst-case)

8.	 Flux’s	Second	Membership	Test	(March	2022)

9.	 Feedback	Loops	Between	AEC	Policy	and	Party	Behavior

10.	 Conclusion

11.	 Appendix:	Definitions

12.	 Appendix:	AEC	Membership	Testing	Tables

13.	 Appendix:	Errata

Abstract	/	Executive	Summary

In	Australia,	to	register	a	political	party	you	need	a	minimum	number	of	members.	Federally,	that’s

usually	1500	(as	of	September	2021)	–	the	Australian	Electoral	Commission	(AEC)	will	conduct

membership	tests	to	verify	this	minimum.	Political	parties	with	a	parliamentarian	have	no	minimum

membership	limit	and	are	not	tested.	Political	parties	without	a	parliamentarian	must	go	through	a

membership	test	when	they	register,	and	then	once	every	election	cycle	thereafter.

This	document	evaluates	the	AEC’s	testing	methodology	for	particular	cases	and	finds	that	there	are
real-world	situations	where	the	testing	methodology	has	a	false	negative	(improper	failure)	rate	over
50%,	and	often	much	higher.

Therefore,	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude,	for	those	cases:	the	methodology	is	rigged	and	a	farce.

If	something	is	rigged	and	a	farce	–	based	on	the	definitions	included	and	cited	in	the	appendix	–
then	it	is	an	unfair,	empty	act,	done	for	show	where	the	outcome	is	already	known.	This	document
proves	that	the	current	method	has	unfair	and	predetermined	outcomes	for	many	situations.

Note:	I	am	not	accusing	the	AEC	of	doing	the	rigging;	just	proving	that	the	method	is
rigged.

To	date,	there	is	1	known	incident	of	a	farce,	at	least	5	suspected	incidents,	at	at	least	5	other

possible	farces.	This	is	based	only	on	results	that	the	AEC	have	published	as	part	of	a	review	(other


--- Page 8 ---

results	are	not	available).

The	Flux	Party’s	recent	2021	membership	test	is	analyzed	in	multiple	ways:

Measured	case:	a	17%	membership	denial	rate	–	as	measured	by	the	AEC	during	this

membership	test.

More	extreme	–	but	realistic	–	cases:	These	are	more	extreme	cases	than	the	measured

case,	but	it	is	an	assumption	of	all	cases	that	the	party	is	eligible	under	the	Electoral	Act.

Threshold	case:	the	case	where	9.09%	(150/1650)	of	any	membership	list	submitted	will	deny

membership.	I	suspect	this	is	close	to	an	AEC	assumption	used	for	calculating	the	maximum

number	of	denials	for	the	AEC’s	testing	table	(given	their	advertised	risk	of	false	results).

Experimental	evidence	shows	that	the	measured	true	positive	rate	of	The	Flux	Party’s	2021

membership	test	was	just	28.3%	±	0.12%.	This	is	despite	the	experimental	assumption	that	Flux

has	more	members	than	the	legislatively	required	number.

In	Flux’s	threshold	case,	where	150/1650	=	9.09%	of	the	submitted	membership	list	will	deny

membership	and	24	members	are	filtered	without	replacement,	experimental	evidence	shows	that

the	AEC	method’s	true	positive	rate	was	89.0%,	which	is	less	than	the	limit	previously	advertised

(90%	or	better).	The	true	positive	rate	is	that	high	because	Flux	has	gone	to	a	great	deal	of	effort	to

increase	the	quality	of	our	membership	lists	to	avoid	members	being	filtered	–	we	did	this,	in	large

part,	to	address	inadequacies	of	the	AEC’s	methodology.	As	more	members	are	filtered

without	replacement,	the	false	negative	rate	increases	dramatically.

Experimental	evidence	proves	that	the	AEC’s	claim	that	their	membership	tests	are	90%

accurate	is	false.	In	actual	fact,	for	a	party	that	is	capable	of	providing	a	list	of	1,650	members

wherein	exactly	1,500	members	will	not	deny	membership	(and	150	will):	the	worst-case

accuracy	of	the	AEC’s	membership	test	is	just	15.1%,	indicating	a	false	negative	rate	of

84.9%.

In	other	cases,	where	a	party	is	capable	of	providing	1,500	members	that	will	not	deny	membership

(with	no	limit	on	the	number	of	members	that	will	deny	membership),	the	lower-bound	on	the

accuracy	of	the	AEC’s	method	is	0%.	That	is:	it	fails	100%	of	the	time	for	certain	eligible	parties.

This	is	not	a	theoretical	problem.	It	has	been	happening	and	continues	to	happen.	The	AEC	has	been

enforcing	a	policy	that	compromises	the	integrity	of	our	political	process.	The	ABS	has	been

complicit.	Political	elites	have	exploited	this.

Additionally,	the	AEC	mistakenly	enforced	a	testing	table	with	a	typo	for	4	years	–	it’s	unknown	if

they	ever	noticed	before	the	table	was	updated.	(See	Appendix:	AEC	Membership	Testing	Tables	/
Circa	2012	to	2016)

Disclosure	and	context:	My	roles	in	The	Flux	Party	(Flux)	were:	a	founder,	the	deputy	leader,	the
secretary,	and	the	deputy	registered	officer.

Change	Log

2022-04-11

Update:	Flux	was	deregistered	on	2022-03-24.	See	8.	Flux’s	Second	Membership	Test	(March	2022).

1.	Background	Context

Recently	(leading	up	to	September	2021),	most	parliamentarians	(i.e.,	the	4	major	parties)	decided


--- Page 9 ---

that	we	had	too	many	political	parties	and	that	this	was	a	problem!	It	would	not	do.	So,	a	bunch	of

changes	were	made	to	the	Electoral	Act.	Changes	designed	to	make	life	harder	for	anyone	who

wanted	to	be	part	of	our	democracy,	but	did	not	want	to	participate	in	the	rotten,	tribalist,	political

cults	that	run	the	show.	Some	of	those	changes	resulted	in	(as	of	Feb	2022)	the	pending

deregistration	of	12	parties,	and	the	very	real	deregistration	of	9	parties.	In	practice	that	is	~40%	of

parties,	gone	before	the	next	election.	Political	elites	will	claim	(and	have	claimed	in	Parliament

already)	that	these	changes,	the	culling,	and	the	subsequent	entrenchment	of	the	status	quo,	is	a

good	thing.	That	it	is	making	our	democracy	better.

In	September	2021,	the	legislatively	required	number	of	members	for	a	political	party	was	increased

from	500	to	1500	with	little	warning	and	no	grace	period.	The	AEC’s	policies	–	going	back	at	least	a

decade	–	have	encouraged	parties	not	to	bother	going	over	1.1x	the	legislative	limit	(i.e.,	previously

550,	now	1650)	with	regards	to	their	number	of	members	that	are	verifiable	against	the	roll.

(Submitting	more	than	this	is	pointless	and	makes	registration	harder.)

2.	Regular	Membership	Testing

Every	few	years,	the	Australian	Electoral	Commission	(AEC)	will	check	that	each	political	party	has

enough	members	according	to	the	legislative	requirement.	The	party	must	provide	a	list	of	1500	to
1650	names	(inclusive)	to	use	as	evidence	of	their	eligibility.	The	AEC	will	then	filter	out	some	names

(duplicates,	deceased	members,	etc).	That	produces	a	NEW	list	of	≤	1650	names.	Then,	the	AEC	will

do	a	statistical	sampling	of	members	and	will	use	that	to	determine	whether	a	party	is	eligible.

Particularly,	a	small	subset	of	members	are	selected	and	contacted,	asking	for	a	yes/no	confirmation

of	membership.	Non-responses	are	skipped.	A	“No”	answer	counts	as	a	failure	–	this	is	a	membership

denial.	In	this	document	and	associated	code:	“failure	rate”	refers	to	the	rate	at	which	members

respond	“No”.

The	AEC	does	not	accept	lists	larger	than	1650;	there	is	no	chance	for	a	party	to	replace	any	of	those
filtered	members;	that	filtering	process	increases	the	chance	of	false	negatives	(when	list	length	is

limited	+	excluding	duplicates);	parties	are	not	told	which	members	were	filtered	(even	those	which

are	deceased)	so	they	cannot	be	proactively	removed;	and,	finally,	the	standard	of	statistical

evaluation	is	to	assume	that	the	list	of	1650	members	were	the	only	members	of	the	party.	Zero

consideration	is	given	beyond	this,	outside	the	chance	to	respond	–	a	tactic	that	has,	historically,

performed	poorly	except	by	the	grace	of	the	AEC.	How	many	parties	have	been	wrongly	denied

registration	due	to	this	artificial	limit?	Nobody	knows.

The	method	is	detailed	on	pages	23	and	24	of	“Guide	for	registering	a	party”.	(mirror)

3.	Flux’s	2021	Membership	Test:	A	Known	Farce

Flux	failed	its	recent	membership	test.	The	only	problem?	We	have	at	least	4680	members	whose
details	have	been	matched	against	the	electoral	roll.	It	is	the	AEC’s	imposition	of	1650	members
maximum	that	is	the	problem.

Note	that	Flux	is	only	in	a	position	to	offer	so	many	members	because	of	our	unique	membership
system:	free	for	life.	Additionally,	significant	automation	has	been	developed	to	assist	members	in
verifying	their	details	against	the	electoral	roll	and	keeping	their	details	up	to	date.	This	is	a	task	too
involved,	expensive,	and	specialized	for	it	to	be	practical	for	most	political	parties.

AEC’s	Notice	to	Flux	(with	test	results)

Our	Response

From	the	AEC’s	notice	(note	that	the	AEC	refuses	membership	lists	with	more	than	1650	members):


--- Page 10 ---

On	7	December	2021,	the	Party	responded	to	the	s	138A	Notice	by	providing	a	list	of	between

1,500	and	1,650	members	of	the	Party.

I	am	notifying	you	under	s	137(1)(b)	of	the	Electoral	Act	that	the	Electoral	Commission	is

considering	deregistering	the	Party,	as	the	Electoral	Commission	is	satisfied	on	reasonable

grounds	that	the	Party	does	not	have	at	least	1,500	members.	A	copy	of	the	s	137(1)(b)	Notice

is	enclosed.

Here	is	an	except	from	the	first	page	of	our	response,	to	give	you	an	idea	of	the	gist:

We	have	3	arguments	supporting	our	case.	Each	argument	is	individually	sufficient	to	show	that

a	decision	(by	the	AEC)	to	deregister	the	Party	would	not	be	based	on	reasonable	grounds;	each

argument	is	a	decisive	criticism	of	the	current	methodology.

The	statistical	method	used	fails	~10%	of	the	time	for	borderline	cases.

The	statistical	method	uses	an	artificially	limited	sample	size	and	thus	does	not	estimate

party	membership,	though	does	(roughly)	measure	membership	attrition.

We	have	sufficient	membership	and	provide	evidence.	Attached	is	a	list	of	4680

members.	Each	entry	was,	at	some	point,	verified	against	the	electoral	roll.

Unless	each	of	these	criticisms	can	be	addressed,	we	do	not	believe	that	a	decision	by	the	AEC

to	deregister	the	Party	would	be	based	in	reality.

(Note:	there	are	at	least	two	non-critical	errors	in	our	response	–	the	AEC	has	already	been	informed.

See	the	end	of	the	doc	for	what	was	sent	to	the	AEC	re	those	errors.)

I	became	curious	about	the	actual	statistical	properties	of	the	AEC’s	process.	How	likely	would	it

have	been	for	us	to	succeed?	(Given	that	we	are	in	fact	an	eligible	party.)

Turns	out	there	was	a	71.7%	chance	that	the	AEC’s	method	would	find	a	false	negative.

TL;DR:	It’s	rigged.

In	this	document	and	the	associated	code	and	graphs:	a	farce	is	defined	as	any	case	where	the

chance	of	a	false	negative	is	≥	50%,	i.e.,	statistical	accuracy	is	≤	50%.

The	AEC’s	membership	test	being	rigged	means	that,	in	some	relevant	cases,	the	outcome	is

predetermined.	Since	there	are	cases	where	an	eligible	party	will	have	~0%	chance	of	success,	it	is

the	case	that	there	exist	relevant	cases	where	the	outcome	is	predetermined.

4.	Analysis	Methodology

The	code	associated	with	this	document	produces	statistical	graphs	(of	the	Probability	Mass
Function,	specifically)	based	on	500,000	simulations	of	the	AEC’s	method.

For	each	simulation,	the	number	of	failures	is	recorded	as	the	output.	Subsequently,	these	results
are	normalized	to	give	the	probability	of	X	failures	for	the	given	input	parameters.	These
probabilities	are	then	graphed,	with	the	x-axis	showing	the	number	of	failures,	and	the	y-axis
showing	
(membership	denials).	As	the	AEC	has	limits	on	the	acceptable	number	of	membership	denials	based

	–	i.e.,	the	probability	of	a	membership	test	having	a	certain	number	of	failures

on	the	reduced	membership	list,	the	bars	in	these	PMFs	are	colored	blue	or	orange	to	indicate	a	pass
or	a	failure.	In	cases	where	the	party	does	meet	legislative	requirements,	the	blue	bars	( P(success) )
should,	according	to	AEC	Policy,	always	sum	to	 >	0.9 .	Where	 P(success)	<	0.5 ,	the	case	is	deemed
a	farce	and	marked	as	such.


--- Page 11 ---




--- Page 12 ---




--- Page 13 ---

What	happens	if	Flux	gains	more	members?

Moreover,	say	that	Flux	is	gaining	members	faster	than	it	is	losing	them.	(‘Losing’	members	means

that	they	will	now	answer	“No”	but	do	not	revoke	their	membership.)	It	turns	out	that	this	can	make

the	AEC’s	methodology	less	likely	to	succeed.	Go	figure:	a	party	increases	it’s	membership	and	the

AEC	test	get’s	less	accurate!	See	Fig	5.2,	Example	5.2.1,	Example	5.2.2	(Filtered=0),	Example	5.2.3

(Filtered=24).

The	system	is	rigged.	It’s	a	farce.

Finally,	there	are	cases	where	the	AEC’s	method	fails	even	more	spectacularly.

Say	50%	of	Flux’s	4680	members	submitted	(as	part	of	our	objection	to	the	AEC’s	consideration	of

involuntary	deregistration)	respond	“No”	–	the	AEC’s	method	fails	100%	of	the	time	in	this	case,

even	though	Flux	would	exceed	the	legislative	requirement	by	1.56x.	See	Fig	5.3,	and	related:

Example	5.3.1.

Update:	additionally,	see	8.	Flux’s	Second	Membership	Test	(March	2022).

Reading	These	Graphs

N	Members:	The	number	of	members	that	the	party	is	capable	of	submitting,	i.e.,	they	are
validated	to	the	best	of	the	party’s	ability.

Submitted:	The	number	of	members	that	the	party	submits	to	the	AEC.

Filtered	Out:	The	number	of	members	removed	without	replacement	by	the	AEC	–	parties	cannot

preemptively	remove	these	members	as	the	AEC	uses	information	that	is	unavailable	to	parties.

Sample:	The	number	of	members	after	AEC	filtering.

P(denial):	The	probability	that	a	member	will	deny	membership	when	contacted.

(Y:	…,	N:	…):	The	number	of	members	that,	when	contacted	by	the	AEC,	will	respectively

respond:	“yes”,	and	“no”.	Note:	if	a	member	does	not	respond	to	a	request	for	contact,	the	AEC
selects	a	new	member	to	contact	from	the	sample.

Simulations:	The	number	of	times	the	AEC	test	was	simulated	while	generating	the	distribution.

Eligible?:	whether	the	party	is	eligible	under	the	Electoral	Act.

Exhaustive	test:	would	the	party	pass	a	membership	test	if	every	member	in	the	sample	group
were	contacted?	Note:	this	is	limited	by	AEC	policy	to	1650	(or	550	prior	to	Sept	2021).

“x	bar”	( ):	The	mean	of	the	distribution,	i.e.,	the	average	number	of	denials.

“sigma	sub	x”	(

):	Standard	deviation	of	the	distribution.

“sigma	sub	x	bar”	(

):	Standard	error	of	the	distribution.

P(Conflict:	AEC	Method	↔	Exhaustive):	The	probability	that	the	AEC’s	method	conflicts	with	the

results	of	an	exhaustive	test.

P(Conflict:	AEC	Method	↔	Reality):	The	probability	AEC’s	method	fails	(i.e.,	produces	a	false

positive	or	false	negative).

±:	This	indicates	the	95%	confidence	interval.	That	is:	the	95%	confidence	interval	for	a±b	has	a

lower	bound	of	a-b	and	an	upper	bound	of	a+b.

Data	in	each	chart	has	error	bars	in	black.

Analysis	of	Flux’s	actual	membership	test


--- Page 14 ---

Fig	5.1:	Even	though	an	assumption	of	this	simulation	is	that	Flux	is	an	eligible	political	party,	the

AEC's	method	fails	71.7%	of	the	time.	This	is	the	real-world	analysis	of	Flux's	membership

Note:	Flux	submitted	1649	members	due	to	an	off-by-one	error	(the	spreadsheet	had	1650	rows,

including	a	row	for	the	headings).

test.

Predictive	analysis	if	Flux’s	membership	increases	by	20%	but
members	that	will	deny	membership	increases	by	10%


--- Page 15 ---

Fig	5.2:	This	distribution	shows	that	the	AEC's	validation	method	becomes	less	reliable	as	a	party

Improvement	makes	life	harder!	Strength	is	weakness!

*gains*	members.

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p=0.104)

80%

90%

95%

99%

15

21

28

42

Predictive	analysis	with	a	50%	denial	rate

Fig	5.3:	If	we	assume	that	Flux	provides	4680	members	but	only	50%	of	them	will	respond	"Yes"	or

not	respond	--	indicating	2340	valid	members	and	indicating	that	Flux	is	an	eligible	party	--	the	AEC's
method	fails	100%	of	the	time.

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p<0.0005)

80%

90%

95%

99%

at	least	3,219

at	least	4,605

at	least	5,990

at	least	9,209

6.	Suspected	Farces


--- Page 16 ---

Detecting	previous	farces	is	difficult	because	the	AEC	does	not	publish	the	results	of	membership

tests	and,	too	my	knowledge,	does	not	record	or	ask	for	the	number	of	members	a	party	could	offer

in	support	of	their	validity.	Instead,	we	only	know	the	number	of	members	that	were	submitted,

which	is	always	<=	1650	(or	the	limit	in	effect	at	the	time),	and	we	only	know	this	when	the	AEC	has

published	a	statement	of	reasons	which	is	only	done	when	there	is	a	request	for	review.	If	a	party

just	gives	up,	or	otherwise	misses	the	deadline,	then	we	don’t	hear	about	it	and	thus	cannot

evaluate	whether	a	farce	occurred.

Note:	these	cases	occurred	prior	to	the	September	2021	increase	in	required	members.	Therefore

they	are	judged	against	the	previous	requirements	–	the	test	method	was	practically	the	same,	the

only	difference	being	that	it	was	calibrated	for	membership	lists	of	500-550	instead	of	1500-1650.

Since	parties	sometimes	max	out	the	number	of	members	they	may	provide,	the	only	reasonable

conclusion	is	that	they	have	more	members	they	could	provide	if	a	more	responsible	method	were

used.

Therefore,	parties	are	assumed	to	have	just	enough	excess	capacity	in	additional	members	to	be

eligible,	and	that	those	extra	members	could	have	been	provided.

Excess	Capacity	Explanation

Excess	capacity	here	refers	to	additional	members	that,	if	not	for	the	AEC’s	limit,	a	party	could

provide	–	expressed	as	a	percentage	of	the	limit.	If	a	party	requires	10%	excess	capacity,	and	the

limit	of	a	membership	list	is	1650,	then	that	party	must	be	capable	of	providing	a	list	of	1815

members	that	a	list	of	1650	members	is	randomly	sampled	from.

For	comparison:	in	Flux’s	case,	we	had	3030	additional	members	(excess	capacity	of	184%)	–

excluding	those	that	we	could	not	validate.	The	AEC	is	sometimes	able	to	validate	members	that	we

cannot,	and	we	have	at	least	4285	additional	members	that	we	could	contact	with	a	request	for

them	to	update	their	details.

What	about	cases	where	the	member	list	submitted	had	a	large	number	of	duplicates?	It	is	not	safe

to	assume	the	absence	of	a	farce	in	these	cases:	maintaining	membership	lists	is	difficult.	In	my

case,	I	wrote	thousands	of	lines	of	custom	code	to	assist	Flux	in	managing	our	member	list	–	and

the	proportion	of	our	list	that	is	automatically	matched	against	the	electoral	roll	is	proof	of	this.	But,

even	with	multiple	checks	for	duplicates	(matching	phone	numbers,	emails,	first	and	last	names,

etc),	still	we	would	occasionally	get	duplicates.	These	stragglers	were	usually	found	through	a

manual	process	before	submission.	At	some	point	it	just	isn’t	worth	worrying	about.	However,	due	to

the	ambiguity	of	these	cases,	this	document	will	exclude	them	from	“suspected”	farces.

The	Suspected	Farces

Since,	in	the	following	cases,	the	excess	capacity	of	the	party	undergoing	testing	was	not	known,
these	are	only	suspected	farces.

1.	 (Fig	6.1)	30	June	2021	–	deregistration	of	Child	Protection	Party	under	s	137(6)	(mirror)	–	excess

capacity	of	13.4%	required

2.	 (Fig	6.2)	9	March	2021	–	deregistration	of	Seniors	United	Party	under	s	137(6)	(mirror)	–	excess

capacity	of	14.4%	required

3.	 (Fig	6.3)	7	November	2013	–	refusal	to	register	of	Cheaper	Petrol	Party	(mirror)	–	excess	capacity

of	8.2%	required

4.	 (Fig	6.4)	12	November	2010	–	refusal	to	register	of	Seniors	Action	Movement	(mirror)	–	excess

capacity	of	5.1%	required


--- Page 17 ---

5.	 (Fig	6.5)	1	March	2016	–	deregistration	of	the	Australian	Democrats	(mirror)	–	excess	capacity	of

6.5%	required

Note,	the	 @Measured 	in	the	titles	of	the	following	graphs	indicates	that	the	failure	rate	is	calculated
directly	from	AEC	reports	of	the	ratio	of	membership	denials	to	membership	contacts.

Fig	6.1:	The	deregistration	of	Child	Protection	Party	on	30	June	2021	is	suspected	to	have	been	a

farce.

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p=0.176)

80%

90%

95%

99%

9

12

16

24


--- Page 18 ---

Fig	6.2:	The	deregistration	of	SUP	on	30	June	2021	is	suspected	to	have	been	a	farce.

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p=0.071)

80%

90%

95%

99%

22

32

41

63


--- Page 19 ---

Fig	6.3:	The	refusal	to	register	Cheaper	Petrol	Party	on	7	November	2013	is	suspected	to	have	been

a	farce.

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p=0.435)

80%

90%

95%

99%

3

5

6

9


--- Page 20 ---

Fig	6.4:	The	refusal	to	register	SAM	on	12	November	2010	is	suspected	to	have	been	a	farce.

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p=0.410)

80%

90%

95%

99%

4

5

6

9


--- Page 21 ---

Fig	6.5:	The	affirmation	of	the	decision	to	deregister	of	the	Australian	Democrats	on	1	March	2016	is
suspected	to	have	been	a	farce.	Note:	this	uses	the	AEC	measured	 P(denial) ,	as	with	graphs
including	 @Measured .

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p=0.237)

80%

90%

95%

99%

6

9

12

18

Possible	Farces

These	are	cases	where	the	available	information	regarding	the	membership	test	is	incomplete,	so

some	assumptions	have	had	to	be	made.	Based	on	AEC	measurements,	if	the	party	had	some
minimum	number	of	members	(such	that	it	had	at	least	500	non-denying	members),	then	these

cases	are	farces.

1.	 2017-08-09	Affirmation	of	refusal	to	register	the	Australian	Affordable	Housing	Party	–	Figure

2.	 2016-05-04	Set	aside	of	decision	to	deregister	Australian	First	Party	–	Figure	Note:	this	is	a

farcical	situation	because,	although	the	party	was	successful,	the	accuracy	was	only	48.8%.	In

essence,	it	was	a	50/50	coin-flip.

3.	 2017-08-09	Refusal	to	register	The	Communists	–	Figure

4.	 2018-08-30	Refusal	to	register	Voter	Rights	Party	–	Figure

5.	 2016-08-24	Affirmation	of	deregistration	of	the	Republican	Party	of	Australia	–	Figure

7.	Flux’s	2021	Membership	Test	Assuming	a	Threshold
(9.09%)	Denial	Rate	(including	worst-case)


--- Page 22 ---

Flux	is	a	party	that	has	–	with	regards	to	membership	lists	–	excess	capacity;	if	filtered	members

could	be	replaced,	we	could	provide	them.	Note	that	filtered	members	are	never	replaced	in	the

AEC’s	method.

Given	this,	combined	with	the	artificial	limit	on	sample	size,	what	are	the	true	accuracy	values	for

the	AEC’s	test?

As	it	turns	out,	it	depends	on	the	quality	of	Flux’s	membership	list.	We	have	a	high-quality	list	–

thanks	to	a	lot	of	management	code	written	to	help	with	that	–	but	many	parties	do	not	have	the

skills	or	resources	to	do	that.

Fig	7.1	shows	that,	for	Flux’s	recent	membership	test,	the	true	accuracy	of	the	AEC’s	method	–
assuming	that	Flux’s	members	have	 P(denial)	=	0.0909 	–	was	89.0%;	which	is	lower	than	the	90%
accuracy	that’s	been	advertised	in	the	past.	That	means	that	the	results	of	the	AEC’s	test	would

incorrectly	find	Flux	ineligible	11%	of	the	time.

Additionally,	Fig	7.2	and	7.3	show	that,	as	the	number	of	members	filtered	out	increases,	accuracy

drops	–	a	lot.

@Thresh 	in	these	titles	indicates	a	9.09%	denial	rate	(which	is	not	what	was	measured	during	Flux’s
recent	membership	test).	9.09%	=	150	/	1650.

+F__ 	indicates	that	the	number	in	place	of	 __ 	is	the	number	of	members	that	were	filtered	out
(e.g.,	duplicates,	deceased	members,	etc).

Fig	7.1:	Assuming	that	91.9%	of	the	members	(randomly	sampled	from	the	full	list)	on	Flux's	2021
membership	test	will	not	deny	membership	when	contacted	(1500/1650):	500,000	simulations	of

Flux's	membership	test	show	that	it	has	an	accuracy	of	89.0%	(i.e.,	false	negative	rate	of	11.0%),

which	is	less	than	the	AEC's	previously	advertised	90%	accuracy.

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p=0.890)


--- Page 23 ---

80%

90%

95%

99%

1

2

2

3

Fig	7.2:	Assuming	that	91.9%	of	the	members	on	Flux's	2021	membership	test	members	will	not

deny	membership	when	contacted	(1500/1650),	and	that	99	members	were	filtered	out	instead	of

24:	500,000	simulations	show	that	it	is	49.2%	accurate,	which	would	constitute	a	farce.	With	a

membership	list	of	this	quality,	4	membership	tests	would	be	required	for	a	90%	chance	of	1

success.

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p=0.492)

80%

90%

95%

99%

3

4

5

7


--- Page 24 ---

Fig	7.3:	Assuming	that	91.9%	of	the	members	on	Flux's	2021	membership	test	members	will	not

deny	membership	when	contacted	(1500/1650),	and	that	a	worst-case	149	members	were	filtered

out	instead	of	24:	500,000	simulations	show	that	it	is	accurate	just	15.1%	of	the	time,	which	would

constitute	a	farce.	With	a	membership	list	of	this	quality,	15	membership	tests	would	be

required	for	a	90%	chance	of	1	success.

Chance	of	1	Success

Tests	Required	(p=0.151)

80%

90%

95%

99%

10

15

19

29

8.	Flux’s	Second	Membership	Test	(March	2022)

After	Flux’s	response	in	February	2022,	the	AEC	decided	of	its	own	accord	to	conduct	another

membership	test.	Flux	did	not	request	this.	In	fact,	it	makes	no	sense	for	Flux	to	request	this

because	we	were	primarily	concerned	with	the	inability	of	the	test	to	function	as	intended.	The	AEC

ignored	our	criticisms.	It	appears	that	the	AEC	does	not	care	about	reason,	or	logic,	or	statistical

arguments.

As	though	to	emphasize	the	fact	that	the	AEC’s	method	is	a	joke,	the	AEC’s	statement	of	reasons

[mirror],	authored	by	one	Ms	Reid,	says:

 	22.	The	membership	list	submitted	by	the	Party	on	13	February	2022	contained	4,680	names

of	individuals	that	the	Party	considers	to	be	current	members	(referred	to	as	‘members’	below).

As	a	delegate	of	the	Electoral	Commission,	I	instructed	that	the	top	1,650	names	be	tested	to

conform	with	the	AEC’s	membership	testing	parameters.	[…]


--- Page 25 ---

The	membership	list	that	we	submitted	was	sorted	alphabetically	by	first	name.	“Gloria”	was	the	first

member	to	miss	out	on	the	chance	to	be	contacted.	Every	member	whose	first	name	came	later	than

hers,	alphabetically,	was	excluded.

The	Statement	of	“Reasons”

Let	me	grace	you	with	the	AEC’s	wisdom.

First,	consider	that	Flux	did	not	ask	for	another	membership	test,	and	argued	that	the	method	was

invalid;	the	list	of	4680	members	was	not	provided	for	the	purpose	of	a	membership	test,	it	was

provided	as	evidence	that	the	AEC’s	method	was	in	conflict	with	reality.

The	“supporting	statement”	comprises:

 	25.	I	have	considered	the	statement	lodged	by	the	Party	on	13	February	2022,	setting	out

reasons	why	the	Party	should	not	be	deregistered.

[Omitted:	quotes	of	Flux’s	February	2022	response]	

 	26.	I	reject	the	reasons	outlined	by	the	Party	in	its	statement	provided	on	13	February	2022

for	the	following	reasons.	

 	27.	The	Party	failed	membership	testing	for	exceeding	the	maximum	number	of	permitted

denials	according	to	the	ABS	methodology	used	by	the	AEC.	It	did	not	fail	membership	testing

due	to	having	an	insufficient	number	of	members	being	identified	on	the	electoral	roll.	

 	28.	The	Electoral	Act	defines	an	elector	as	someone	that	is	on	the	Commonwealth	Electoral

Roll.	Section	123	of	the	Electoral	Act	prescribes	that	an	eligible	political	party,	not	being	a

Parliamentary	party,	has	‘at	least	1,500	members’.	The	requirement	is	not	to	be	solely	‘an

elector’	but	to	be	a	member	of	the	party.	

 	29.	The	Party	challenges	the	validity	of	the	AEC’s	membership	testing	process.	This	process

has	been	developed	by	the	AEC	to	support	the	delegate’s	consideration	of	whether	a	party	has

sufficient	members.	It	is	based	on	sampling	methodology	designed	in	consultation	with	the	ABS

and	provides	a	valid	methodology	to	satisfy	a	delegate	of	a	party’s	membership.	The	Electoral

Commission	has	previously	concluded	that	the	methodology	‘was	appropriate	for	membership

1
testing,	including	because	it	was	rational,	fair	and	practical	in	all	the	circumstances.’ 	

 	30.	I	consider	that	the	membership	testing	results	outlined	above	provide	a	more	robust

method	for	ascertaining	whether	a	party	has	satisfied	the	requirements	of	the	Electoral	Act	than

a	statement	provided	by	the	party.	

 	31.	In	summary,	I	remain	satisfied	that	the	Party	does	not	have	at	least	1,500	members

based	on	the	outcomes	from	membership	testing	both	membership	lists	of	7	December	2021

and	13	February	2022.	

 	32.	Accordingly,	in	my	capacity	as	a	delegate	of	the	Electoral	Commission,	I	have
deregistered	VOTEFLUX.ORG	|	Upgrade	Democracy!	under	s	137(6)	of	the	Electoral	Act	and	the
particulars	of	the	Party	have	been	cancelled	from	the	Register	under	s	138	of	the	Electoral	Act.

1

https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/Party Registration/Registration Decisions/
2021/notice-of-decision-with-reasons-SUPA.pdf

Here	is	a	brief	analysis	of	the	insanity	of	the	above:

Point	25	is	dishonest	–	Flux’s	arguments	were	ignored.	Moreover,	the	exact	thing	that	we
criticized	was	the	first	thing	that	Ms	Reid	did.

Point	27	is	largely	irrelevant,	it	doesn’t	respond	to	anything	that	we	said.	It	also	contradicts	point
29,	which	starts:	“The	Party	challenges	the	validity	of	the	AEC’s	membership	testing	process.”	If

Ms	Reid	knows	this,	why	did	she	make	point	27?	That	the	AEC	method	failed	in	spite	of	Flux


--- Page 26 ---




--- Page 27 ---

Fig	8.1:	Despite	being	eligible	under	the	Electoral	Act,	Flux	could	never	have	passed	the	AEC's	test.

In	this	case,	the	AEC's	method	has	a	failure	rate	>	99.996%.	In	the	AEC's	words,	this	test	is	"rational,

fair	and	practical	in	all	the	circumstances".	What	a	joke.

Rigged.	There	isn’t	much	more	to	say.

9.	Feedback	Loops	Between	AEC	Policy	and	Party	Behavior

To	my	knowledge,	parties	typically	don’t	try	to	build	membership	to	many	thousands	of	members.

That’s	because	it’s	expensive,	time	consuming,	and	difficult	to	manage.	Most	importantly	–	there’s

no	point	when	it	comes	to	registration.

The	fact	that	the	AEC	has	imposed	this	flawed	method	for	years	means	that	non-parliamentary

parties’	common	practices	are	based	around	meeting	the	AEC’s	policies.	When	the	limit	was	550
(and	500	members	required),	there	literally	was	no	point	building	beyond	that	because	it	would	not

help	you	in	registering	or	maintaining	registration	–	it	was	largely	wasted	effort.

Additionally,	the	AEC’s	policies	have	entrenched	these	common	practices	which	enabled	the	political

elite	to	change	the	legislative	requirements	suddenly	and	dramatically	–	effectively	eliminate
competition.	The	AEC	is	complicit.

If	the	previous	status	quo	was	550	members	due	to	the	AEC	promulgating	a	culture	of	not	going
beyond	this,	and	then	parliament	decides	to	radically	change	the	limit	(there	is	no	reason	they	could
not	have	done	this	gradually	over,	say,	10	years	with	a	small	bump	each	year),	at	what	point	do	we
acknowledge	that	something	is	rotten?

The	AEC	is	on	record	about	why	it	imposes	a	limit	on	membership	lists	used	for	verification:

 	26.	In	respect	of	the	assertion	in	the	application	for	review	that	the	AEC	failed	to	test	the	lists

provided	by	the	Party	on	12	June	2017	(which	contained	650	members)	and	on	20	August	2017

(which	contained	739	members),	the	Commission	notes	that	the	‘Party	Registration	Guide’

requests	that	parties	provide	a	list	of	between	500	to	550	members.	This	is	considered	to	be	to

a	party’s	advantage,	by	minimizing	the	work	required	of	the	party	in	confirming	the	enrolment


--- Page 28 ---

status	and	contact	details	of	additional	other	members.

Source:

https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/Party Registration/Registration Decisions/2018

/2018-commonwealth-of-australia-party-statement-of-reasons.pdf	(mirror)

Note:	this	case	cannot	be	analyzed	as	the	AEC	neglected	to	include	any	results	of	membership	tests.

How	about	the	AEC	stop	making	decisions	on	behalf	of	parties?	Especially	when	those	decisions	have

been	proven	(by	this	document)	to	have	systemically	disadvantaged	non-parliamentary	parties,	to

have	decreased	the	accuracy	of	the	AEC	membership	test,	to	be	based	on	falsehoods,	and,

ultimately,	to	be	a	reflection	of	a	condescension	and	hubris	that	has	no	place	running	a	democracy.

10.	Conclusion

With	the	AEC’s	existing	policies,	and	on	the	assumption	that	Flux	is	a	valid	party,	it	is	only

reasonable	to	conclude	that	Flux	will	find	it	increasingly	difficult	to	remain	registered	and	pass

registration	tests,	even	if	it	grows	in	membership.	This	applies	to	all	nonparliamentary	parties.	That

is	to	say:	the	process	has	a	predetermined	outcome,	and	is	an	empty	act	done	for	show.	It	is	rigged,

and	a	farce.

With	currently	measured	values	(based	on	AEC	results),	it	would	take	(on	average)	7	repeated	trials

for	Flux	to	have	1	successful	membership	test.	So	this	is	not	a	problem	that	can	be	solved	by

repeating	the	membership	test.

At	least	5	past	cases	have	been	identified	with	farcical	properties	–	they	are	suspected	farces	–	and

at	least	5	additional	cases	have	incomplete	information	but	may	be	farcical.

That	is:	in	these	cases	the	AEC’s	test	is	less	than	50%	accurate,	provided	that	those	parties	had

additional	members	(which	the	party	would	have	been	prevented	from	submitting	only	due	to	AEC

policy).	All	5	suspected	cases	required	less	than	15%	additional	members	–	i.e.,	the	membership	test
was	a	farce	for	all	cases	if	N	≥	630.	Note	that	all	5	cases	predate	the	September	2021	change	to

membership	requirements;	at	the	time	the	required	number	of	members	was	500.

It	has	thus	been	found	that	the	AEC’s	method	is	rigged	and	a	farce,	and	that	there	is

sufficient	evidence	to	back	this	up.

Appendix:	Definitions

rigged	adjective

Wiktionary

Pre-arranged	and	fixed	so	that	the	winner	or	outcome	is	decided	in	advance.

Urban	Dictionary

The	word	rigged	is	used	to	describe	situations	where	unfair	advantages	are	given	to	one

side	of	a	conflict.

Note:	Urban	Dictionary	is	included	here	as	Cambridge	and	Merriam-Webster	didn’t	seem	to	have

specific	definitions	for	the	adjective.

rig	verb


--- Page 29 ---

(Note:	rigging	is	the	gerundive	of	rig)

Cambridge	Dictionary

to	arrange	an	event	or	amount	in	a	dishonest	way

to	dishonestly	influence	or	change	something	in	order	to	get	the	result	that	you	want

Wiktionary

To	manipulate	something	dishonestly	for	personal	gain	or	discriminatory	purposes.

farce	noun

Cambridge	Dictionary

a	situation	that	is	very	badly	organized	or	unfair

a	ridiculous	situation	or	event,	or	something	considered	a	waste	of	time

Wiktionary

A	situation	abounding	with	ludicrous	incidents.

A	ridiculous	or	empty	show.

Merriam-Webster

an	empty	or	patently	ridiculous	act,	proceeding,	or	situation

Appendix:	AEC	Membership	Testing	Tables

Note:	the	first	column	of	these	tables	(“Members	lodged”,	“Eligible	membership”)	is	the	reduced

membership	list	after	filtering	out	e.g.,	duplicates,	members	supporting	the	registration	of	other

parties,	deceased	members,	etc.

It	is	“AEC	Policy”	that	lists	are	no	more	than	1.1x	the	legislative	limit	(e.g.,	a	maximum	of	550	prior

to	September	2021,	and	1650	after	September	2021).	That	is:	lists	with	more	members	than	this	are
rejected.

September	2021	to	February	2022

Source:	Page	24	of

https://web.archive.org/web/20220206003633/https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/

Party Registration/guide/files/party-registration-guide.pdf

Members	lodged

Random	sample	size Maximum	denials	to	pass

1,500

1,506

1,523

1,543

1,562

1,582

18

27

33

38

42

46

0

1

2

3

4

5


--- Page 30 ---

1,599

1,616

1,633

1,647

1,650

50

53

57

60

60

6

7

8

9

9

Experimental	Eval	(No	Published	Accuracy	Values)

Members

lodged;	

N_reduced

Measured	risk

of	accepting

1200;	

P(denial)	=	(N-

1200)/N;	

N	=	N_reduced;

1,500

1,506

1,523

1,543

1,562

1,582

1,599

1,616

1,633

1,647

1,650

1.8%	fig

1.6%	fig

1.7%	fig

1.8%	fig

1.9%	fig

1.9%	fig

1.8%	fig

2.0%	fig

1.7%	fig

1.8%	fig

1.7%	fig

Measured	risk

Measured	risk

of	rejecting	≥

of	rejecting

1500;

1500;	

(Threshold

P(denial)	=	(N-

case);	

1500)/N;	

P(denial)	=

N	=	N_reduced;

150/1650	=

f	=	0	(no

members

filtered);

9.09%;	

N	=	3300;	

f	=	1650	-

N_reduced;

Measured	risk

of	rejecting	≥

1500;	

P(denial)	=

20%;	

N	=	3300;	

f	=	1650	-

N_reduced;

0.0%	fig

0.5%	fig

1.2%	fig

1.9%	fig

2.3%	fig

2.8%	fig

3.1%	fig

3.2%	fig

3.7%	fig

3.6%	fig

4.0%	fig

82.2%	fig

98.2%	fig

72.0%	fig

98.2%	fig

58.9%	fig

97.3%	fig

45.9%	fig

96.2%	fig

33.3%	fig

94.4%	fig

23.6%	fig

92.2%	fig

16.4%	fig

89.9%	fig

10.3%	fig

85.9%	fig

6.9%	fig

4.1%	fig

4.2%	fig

83.3%	fig

78.8%	fig

78.9%	fig

Circa	2017	to	September	2021

Sources:

Page	26	of

https://web.archive.org/web/20210409193623/https://aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/P

arty Registration/guide/files/party-registration-guide.pdf

https://web.archive.org/web/20200320074933/https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representati
ves/Party Registration/files/party-registration-guide.pdf

Members	lodged

Random	Sample Max	Denials	to	Pass

500

18

0


--- Page 31 ---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7

503

511

519

526

534

541

548

550

26

32

37

41

44

47

50

50

Circa	2012	to	2016

Sources:

Page	33	of

https://web.archive.org/web/20160314113418/http://aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/Par

ty Registration/files/party-registration-guide.pdf

Page	32	of
https://web.archive.org/web/20140212032435/http://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representativ

es/Party Registration/files/party-registration-guide.pdf	(Note:	this	source	includes	risk	columns)

https://web.archive.org/web/20130208013723/http://aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/par
ty registration/guide/forms.htm#table	(Note:	this	source	includes	risk	columns)

https://web.archive.org/web/20120425182026/http://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representativ
es/party registration/guide/forms.htm	(Note:	this	source	includes	risk	columns)

Members

lodged

Random

Sample

Max	Denials	to

accepting	only	400

rejecting	500	–

Pass

–	risk	%

risk	%

500

503

512

521

529

537

543

548

550

18

26

30

34

38

42

46

50

50

0

1

2

3

3

5

6

7

7

1.80

1.99

2.64

2.86

2.85

2.60

2.43

2.27

2.07

0.00

1.05

3.26

4.68

5.52

6.65

6.86

6.78

8.05

Note:	It	seems	likely	that	 max	denials	to	pass =3	for	the	 members	lodged =529	row	is	a	typo	–	it
should	probably	be	 4 ,	however,	in	all	source	documents	it	was	 3 .	In	the	2016	RPA	statement	of
reasons,	a	list	of	530	lead	to	38	contacts,	and	4	or	more	denials	was	a	fail	(so	 max	denials	to
pass =3).	This	typo	has	been	enforced.	(How	many	times?	Only	the	AEC	knows.)

According	to	the	sampling	methodology,	as	applied	to	a	list	of	530	names,	if	four	or	more	people
denied	membership	then	the	AEC	could	conclude	that	the	party	did	not	have	500	members.4


--- Page 32 ---

[Footnote	4:]	According	to	the	ABS,	testing	a	sample	of	38	from	a	list	of	530	carried	with	it	a

2.72%	risk	that	the	AEC	could	end	up	accepting	a	party	that	had	only	400	members,	and	a

6.17%	risk	that	the	AEC	could	end	up	rejecting	a	party	that	had	500	members.

So	there	was	a	typo	at	some	point,	but	the	AEC	actually	used	the	typo	to	judge	party	membership.

So	a	party	with	between	529	and	536	members	during	this	period,	with	4	denials,	would	have	been

wrongly	denied	even	by	the	AEC’s	own	methodology.	Also,	the	footnote	values	don’t	match	the

previously	advertised	values	in	the	table…	is	that	just	because	it’s	calculated	for	530	instead	of	529?

Or	did	the	AEC	get	an	updated	table	in	2016	and	those	risk	values	changed?	If	they	did	change,	why?

(It’s	not	like	the	maths	changed,	right?)

The	2016	Australian	Democrats	statement	of	reasons	confirms	34	contacts	for	a	list	of	526	with

maximum	3	denials.

According	to	the	sampling	methodology,	as	applied	to	a	list	of	526	names,	if	four	or	more	people

3
denied	membership	then	the	AEC	could	conclude	that	the	party	did	not	have	500	members.

[Footnote	3:]	According	to	the	ABS,	testing	a	sample	of	34	from	a	list	of	526	carried	with	it	a

2.30%	risk	that	the	AEC	could	end	up	accepting	a	party	that	had	only	400	members,	and	a

8.53%	risk	that	the	AEC	could	end	up	rejecting	a	party	that	had	500	members.

Experimental	Eval

Note:	The	row	with	 members	lodged = 529	(corrected) 	corrects	the	erroneous	 max	denials	to	pass
from	 3 	to	 4 .	The	AEC	did	not	pick	up	on	this	error	for	at	least	4	years	(if	they	ever	did).

Members

lodged;	
N_reduced

Claimed:
accepting

only	400

– risk	%

Measured
risk	of

accepting

400;	
P(denial)

=	(N-

400)/N;

Claimed:
rejecting

500	–

risk	%

Measured

Measured
risk	of

risk	of

rejecting	≥

rejecting

500;	
P(denial)

500;

(Threshold
case);	

=	(N-

P(denial)	=

500)/N;	

50/550	=

f	=	0	(no
members

9.09%;	
N	=	1100;	

filtered);

f	=	550	-

N_reduced;

Measured

risk	of
rejecting

≥	500;	

P(denial)
=	20%;	

N	=	1100;	

f	=	550	-

N_reduced

500

503

512

521

529

529

(corrected)

537

543

548

1.80%

1.7%	fig

0.00%

0.0%	fig

82.3%	fig

98.2%	fig

1.99%

1.8%	fig

1.05%

0.8%	fig

70.1%	fig

97.8%	fig

2.64%

2.3%	fig

3.26%

2.8%	fig

52.3%	fig

95.8%	fig

2.86%

2.5%	fig

4.68%

4.1%	fig

37.4%	fig

93.3%	fig

2.85%

0.7%	fig

5.52%

14.6%	fig

45.9%	fig

96.3%	fig

2.85%

2.4%	fig

5.52%

4.8%	fig

25.8%	fig

90.6%	fig

2.60%

2.2%	fig

6.65%

5.9%	fig

17.4%	fig

87.6%	fig

2.43%

2.0%	fig

6.86%

6.0%	fig

11.6%	fig

84.6%	fig

2.27%

1.8%	fig

6.78%

5.8%	fig

7.6%	fig

81.5%	fig


--- Page 33 ---




--- Page 34 ---

meet	requirements.

The	italicized	part	is	not	correct.	The	AEC's	method	is	much	better	than	this	--	it	only	fails	10%	to

20%	of	the	time	(the	above	quote	implies	that	the	method	fails	more	than	50%	of	the	time).	The

exact	false	negative	rate	depends	on	the	number	of	members	filtered	by	the	AEC,	similar	to	how

our	December	2021	list	of	1649	names	had	24	entries	filtered.	The	AEC's	method	is	more

reliable	when	fewer	names	are	filtered,	with	the	20%	false	negative	rate	corresponding	to	25

members	filtered	out.	(0	names	filtered	corresponds	to	a	10%	false	negative	rate.)

It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	there	are	similar	(though	slightly	more	extreme)	parameters	that	do

result	in	a	>50%	failure	rate	of	the	AEC's	method.	For	example	a	party	of	2000	members,	300	of

which	are	malicious,	and	15	names	filtered	has	a	failure	rate	of	50.4%.

Note,	there	are	some	other	errors	too,	like	the	method	mentioned	in	the	The	AEC’s	membership	test

methodology	artificially	reduces	sample	size	section	uses	the	random	sampling	size	that	was	used	in

Flux’s	test,	but	it	probably	should	have	been	60	instead	of	53.	Not	really	a	big	deal.

Use	of	“confidence”	in	prior	versions

In	some	prior	versions	of	this	document,	the	term	“confidence”	was	used	instead	of	“accuracy”.	That

is:	it	was	used	to	describe	how	often	the	AEC’s	test	arrived	at	the	correct	result.

This document is Max Kaye's 14 April 2022 request to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) under s141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, seeking a review of the decision to deregister "VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy!" (Flux).

The document's relevance to FOI request LEX1785 is that it constitutes the core application and detailed argument for review described in the request overview.

Kaye contends that the AEC's methodology for testing party membership eligibility is fundamentally flawed. He argues that the method is inaccurate, unreliable, unfair, and unsuitable, asserting it leads to predetermined outcomes, making it "rigged" and a "farce."

Key flaws highlighted, supported by statistical analysis, include:
* High False Negative Rate: Kaye calculates that for a hypothetical eligible party (with 2,700 genuine members and submitting 1,650 names, mirroring Flux's situation), the probability of passing the AEC's test is a mere 0.0020%, resulting in a false negative rate of over 99.99%.
* Artificially Limited Sample Size: AEC policy restricts submissions to a maximum of 1,650 members, regardless of a party's actual membership, which Kaye argues makes the test less reliable and systematically disadvantages parties with larger memberships.
* Sampling Bias: In Flux's second membership test (Feb/March 2022), the AEC's delegate sampled only the first 1,650 names from Flux's alphabetically sorted list of 4,680 members, effectively limiting the sample to members whose first names started with A through G.
* Decreased Reliability with Growth: The analysis suggests the AEC's method can become less reliable as a party gains more members.

Kaye asserts that the AEC's policies and flawed testing systematically disadvantage non-parliamentary parties, contributing to the entrenchment of existing political power. He provides historical examples of "suspected farces" where other parties may have been wrongly deregistered due to the method's inherent inaccuracies.

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Application made under section 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 by Mr Max Kaye dated 14 April 2022 (A1745654)_Redacted#2.pdf (pdf)