FOI Request LEX1697

Date: 2022

FOI Request Summary

Purpose of the FOI Request

The Freedom of Information (FOI) request (LEX1697, an internal review of LEX1147) sought:
* All correspondence between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and major social media platforms (Meta, Twitter, Google, LinkedIn, ByteDance/TikTok) from May 18, 2019, to the date of the request.
* The correspondence specifically relates to compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.
* It also includes discussions regarding the upcoming Federal election to be held in 2022.

Documents Released

The released documents consist primarily of email correspondence and related attachments between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and:
* TikTok (ByteDance): Emails from May to November 2021.
* Google: One email dated June 2020.
* Twitter: Emails from June 2020 and December 2021.
* Facebook (Meta): Emails from June 2020 to December 2021, and April 2021.

Key attachments identified in the schedule and referenced in emails include "Electoral communications escalation scenarios" dated August 2021 and October 2021.

Main Content and Themes

The documents reveal ongoing efforts by the AEC's Electoral Integrity and Communications Branch (including the Electoral Interference Taskforce - EIAT) to collaborate with major social media platforms in preparation for the 2022 Federal Election and to ensure compliance with electoral integrity measures. The primary focus is on combating misinformation and disinformation, establishing clear communication channels, and developing protocols for content moderation and escalation.

General Collaboration & Electoral Integrity

The AEC engages with platforms to establish "cohesive working arrangements" for content referrals and to acknowledge efforts in identifying and addressing disinformation.
A key theme is the development and discussion of "Online Media – Elections Protocols" and "Electoral communications escalation scenarios" templates with various platforms to streamline responses to electoral interference.

TikTok

Escalation Scenarios: Discussions and feedback on "Electoral communications escalation scenarios" templates were ongoing in November 2021.
Electoral Integrity Declaration: TikTok proposed working with the AEC on a "declaration of electoral integrity" similar to one established in Canada (August 2021).
Public Service Announcements (PSA): TikTok offered an "on-platform Public Service Announcement (PSA)" to appear when users search election-related hashtags, with the AEC providing content and hashtags (July 2021).
Verified Account: The AEC considered but decided against creating a verified TikTok account for the 2022 election due to limited capacity for content creation, but remained open to it for future elections (July 2021).
Fact-Checking Partnership: TikTok confirmed its ongoing fact-checking partnership with Agence France-Presse (AFP) since 2020, which informs their moderation processes.
Transparency & Reporting: The AEC participated in a TikTok Virtual Transparency and Accountability Centre tour (June 2021) and established preferred email reporting pathways for escalating concerning content to TikTok (May 2021).

Google

One email is listed regarding the "Eden-Monaro by-election" in June 2020, indicating past engagement on specific electoral events.

Twitter

Correspondence from December 2021 references "EIAT and Twitter follow up," suggesting ongoing discussions about electoral integrity matters.
An email from June 2020 also relates to the "Eden-Monaro by-election," similar to Google.

Facebook (Meta)

Electoral Integrity Preparations: Correspondence in December 2021 focused on "Electoral integrity preparations."
Escalation Scenarios & Liaison: Discussions in October 2021 centered on "Electoral communications escalation scenarios" and general "FB/AEC/EIAT Liaison," with the AEC requesting a meeting to discuss scenarios.
Briefings: Facebook invited the AEC to selected briefing sessions on "misinformation / disinformation" in June and July 2021.
New Reporting Portal: A significant focus in June-July 2021 was on initiating a process for the AEC to gain "trusted access" to a new Facebook reporting portal. The AEC sought more information on the portal's functionality and specific requirements for processing requests to integrate it into their election preparation activities.
By-election & General Matters: An email from June 2020 concerned the "Eden-Monaro by-election and other matters," indicating broader engagement.
Ongoing Support: An initial call in April 2021 aimed to ensure Facebook was "providing the support the AEC needs" in electoral integrity.

AI Generated

The Freedom of Information (FOI) documents reveal extensive and close collaboration between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and major social media and technology companies (TikTok, Google, Twitter, Meta/Facebook) in the lead-up to the 2022 Federal election. The primary focus of this correspondence is electoral compliance, combating misinformation, and ensuring "electoral integrity."

Social Justice:
The AEC's stated aim to combat "electoral interference," "misinformation," and "disinformation" aligns with progressive values by seeking to ensure an informed electorate and preserve the integrity of democratic processes. The use of Public Service Announcements (PSAs) on platforms like TikTok and efforts to direct users to "official / reputable sources" (TikTok email, Page 7) could be viewed as positive steps toward civic education and equitable information access, particularly for younger demographics who rely heavily on these platforms. However, a progressive analysis must also consider the potential for such efforts, when outsourced to private corporations, to inadvertently or disproportionately impact marginalized voices or legitimate grassroots movements that may struggle to be categorized as "official" or "reputable." The AEC's admitted "limited capacity to run a verified account on TikTok" (TikTok email, Page 7) underscores a dependency that could limit genuine, independent public outreach.

Environmental Impact:
These documents do not contain information related to environmental impact.

Wealth Distribution:
These documents do not contain information related to wealth distribution.

Corporate Influence:
The documents starkly highlight the pervasive and concerning influence of powerful, privately owned tech corporations on core democratic functions. The routine "correspondence," "meetings," "Transparency and Accountability Centre tours" (TikTok emails, Pages 3-4), and "selected briefing sessions on misinformation / disinformation" (Facebook email, Page 3 of Schedule) illustrate a deep entanglement. The AEC is actively engaged in developing "electoral communications escalation scenarios" (Documents 10, 37, 47, 49, 50) with these platforms, formalizing a process where corporate entities are relied upon to identify and potentially act upon "concerning content" (TikTok email, Page 5). This collaboration, while framed as necessary, effectively delegates significant power over public discourse and information flow to profit-driven corporations, whose primary accountability is to shareholders, not citizens. The willingness of these tech giants to offer services like on-platform PSAs and fact-checking partnerships (TikTok email, Page 7-9) demonstrates their readiness to entrench their role as arbiters of information, further embedding their corporate influence within the democratic infrastructure. This reliance on a handful of powerful, unregulated corporations for the health of a nation's electoral process represents a significant deviation from progressive values of public control and democratic accountability.

Civil Liberties:
The collaborative efforts to identify and address "misinformation" and "disinformation" raise substantial civil liberties concerns from a left-leaning perspective, particularly regarding freedom of speech and the potential for censorship. While protecting electoral integrity is vital, the means employed – relying on private companies for content moderation at the government's behest – bypass traditional democratic safeguards. The "escalation scenarios" (Documents 10, 37, 47, 49, 50) and the AEC's desire for "trusted access to your new portal" (Facebook email, Page 9) imply a streamlined process for flagging and potentially removing content. This delegation of power to private entities means that decisions about what constitutes "misinformation" are made outside transparent public scrutiny, without judicial oversight, and potentially without robust appeal mechanisms. This carries the inherent risk of politically motivated censorship or algorithmic bias impacting legitimate dissent, critical viewpoints, or alternative media, which may be incorrectly flagged by a system prioritizing "official" narratives. The consistent "CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the Australian Federal Government" banner in the correspondence (e.g., TikTok email, Page 1) serves as a stark reminder that the AEC is relying on external, unaccountable corporate actors to manage fundamental aspects of civil discourse during an election, posing a direct threat to civil liberties and the democratic principle of public control over information.

AI Generated

The released FOI documents detail extensive and ongoing correspondence between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), particularly its Electoral Interference and Communications Branch (EIAT), and major social media platforms, including TikTok, Facebook (Meta), Google, and Twitter, concerning compliance with electoral law and, critically, "electoral integrity" and "misinformation/disinformation" in the lead-up to the 2022 Federal election.

From a right-leaning perspective, several key themes emerge that raise significant concerns regarding economic efficiency, individual liberty, fiscal responsibility, and limited government:

Individual Liberty: A Pervasive Threat to Free Speech
The most striking element across these documents is the AEC's deep engagement with private tech companies to combat "misinformation" and "disinformation" and to establish "electoral communications escalation scenarios." This collaboration directly impacts individual liberty, particularly freedom of speech.
* Content Control by Proxy: The AEC, a government body, is actively shaping the moderation policies of private platforms. By developing and sharing "escalation scenarios" and discussing "trusted access portals" for reporting "concerning content," the government is creating a formalized mechanism to influence what speech is permitted or amplified online. This blurs the lines between legitimate electoral regulation and de facto censorship, potentially stifling dissenting or critical political opinions under the broad guise of "misinformation."
* Bias Towards "Official Sources": TikTok's offer of Public Service Announcements (PSAs) to direct users to "official / reputable sources" when searching election-related hashtags, embraced by the AEC, suggests an inherent preference for government-approved narratives over independent discourse. This can undermine trust in non-establishment media and limit citizens' access to a wide range of viewpoints essential for informed decision-making.

Limited Government: Expanding Bureaucratic Overreach
The nature and scope of the AEC's engagement with these platforms signify a notable expansion of government's role beyond its traditional, limited function of administering free and fair elections.
* Beyond Electoral Administration: Historically, an electoral commission's role is to manage the mechanics of voting, registration, and campaign finance. These documents reveal the AEC is now deeply involved in policing online speech, a domain that, from a limited government perspective, should remain largely unregulated by the state to protect individual expression.
* Partnerships with Private Power: The creation of formal "liaison" relationships and reporting "channels" with powerful tech monopolies effectively deputizes these private companies into an adjunct of state information control. This fusion of government and corporate power to manage public discourse is deeply concerning for those who advocate for a smaller, less intrusive government.

National Security: Unaddressed Risks vs. Operational Control
While ensuring electoral integrity against foreign interference is a valid national security concern, the documents indicate a focus on operational content control rather than a deep assessment of inherent risks.
* TikTok's Foreign Ownership: The extensive engagement with TikTok, a platform owned by ByteDance (a Chinese company), highlights a potential national security blind spot. While TikTok offered a "Transparency and Accountability Centre tour" to the AEC, the documents do not provide evidence of a rigorous, independent assessment by the AEC or other Australian security agencies regarding the data security implications or potential foreign influence via this platform's ownership. The focus appears to be on functional cooperation for content moderation rather than a comprehensive risk analysis of the platform itself.

Economic Efficiency & Fiscal Responsibility: Bureaucracy Over Outputs
The documents do not detail significant direct financial expenditures beyond staff time, which points to a different kind of efficiency concern.
* Bureaucratic Focus: The numerous emails discussing meeting schedules, drafting "escalation scenarios," and setting up "trusted access portals" demonstrate considerable bureaucratic effort. While staff time is a cost, the concern for fiscal conservatives lies less in a direct monetary outlay and more in the diversion of government resources towards activities (speech policing) that are outside its core function and potentially counterproductive to a free society.
* AEC's Capacity Constraints: The AEC's decision not to establish its own verified TikTok account due to "limited capacity to run a verified account" and the need to "properly invest the time and effort" suggests a pragmatic, albeit minor, avoidance of a potentially unproductive investment. However, this small saving is overshadowed by the significant resources dedicated to managing and influencing content on external platforms.

In summary, the FOI documents reveal a concerning trend of government overreach, where the AEC actively collaborates with private tech giants to manage online political discourse. This deviation from limited government principles and its chilling effect on individual liberty and free speech represent a significant concern for politically right-leaning analysts, despite any stated goals of "electoral integrity" or "combating misinformation." The operational focus on content control also raises questions about whether deeper national security implications, particularly with platforms like TikTok, are being adequately addressed beyond superficial "transparency tours."

AI Generated

The released FOI documents expose a deep and proactive entanglement between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and major social media platforms (TikTok, Twitter, Google, Facebook) in the lead-up to the 2022 Federal election. While ostensibly aimed at "electoral integrity" and combating "misinformation/disinformation," a critical review reveals several concerning aspects:

Orchestrated Information Control and Potential Overreach: The AEC is actively developing and sharing "electoral communications escalation scenarios" with these private platforms. These are not mere guidelines; they are blueprints for identifying and addressing "concerning content" or "misinformation," effectively deputizing tech companies to enforce a government-approved narrative. The establishment of direct "government reporting channels" allows the AEC to flag content for review and potential removal, granting an alarming level of influence over public discourse without direct democratic oversight. This proactive shaping of the information environment prior to an election raises serious questions about freedom of expression and the potential for political bias in content moderation.
Lack of Transparency and Accountability: A significant number of communications are marked "SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive," despite pertaining to the fundamental democratic process of an election and interactions with public-facing platforms. The specific details of these "escalation scenarios" remain withheld, preventing public scrutiny of the criteria for content flagging or removal. The very need for an FOI request, following an internal review (LEX1697 of LEX1147), suggests an initial reluctance by the AEC to openly share information about these collaborations, fostering an environment of opacity.
Questionable Resource Allocation and Inefficiency: While the AEC claims "limited capacity" to run its own verified TikTok account and properly engage with the platform directly, citing the need to "properly invest the time and effort," it is simultaneously dedicating "three different teams with interest in utilising the portal" for content referrals to private companies. This suggests a dubious prioritization of resources towards external content policing rather than robust internal public communication strategies. Minor bureaucratic inefficiencies are also evident, with delays in simply setting up virtual meetings due to "weird limitations" or lacking "the right Teams corporate account," highlighting a lack of seamless integration despite the declared importance of these partnerships.
Blurring Lines and Delegated Authority: The reliance on social media platforms and their internal "Trust and Safety teams" (e.g., TikTok's partnership with Agence France-Presse for fact-checking) outsources a critical aspect of electoral integrity—the management of public information—to private entities. This arrangement effectively grants these corporations the power to act as arbiters of truth, influenced directly by government requests, without sufficient public accountability mechanisms.

In essence, these documents paint a picture of an Australian electoral body increasingly enmeshed with global tech giants, ostensibly to safeguard elections, but in a manner that hints at a centralized, state-influenced control over online speech, shrouded in questionable transparency and potentially misdirected public funds.

AI Generated

The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), demonstrating its unwavering commitment to upholding the integrity of our democratic processes, has engaged in robust and proactive collaborations with major social media platforms, including TikTok, Meta (Facebook), Google, and Twitter. These vital partnerships underscore the government's dedication to effective governance and ensuring a well-informed electorate.

In the lead-up to the 2022 Federal Election, the AEC's Electoral Interference Taskforce (EIAT) has taken decisive steps to proactively manage the online information landscape. This includes developing comprehensive "Electoral communications escalation scenarios" to swiftly address potential issues and ensure timely responses to any concerning content. This forward-thinking approach is a testament to the government's commitment to safeguarding electoral transparency.

Key initiatives born from these constructive dialogues include:
* Enhanced Information Dissemination: Platforms like TikTok have offered to display Public Service Announcements (PSAs) when users search election-related terms, directly guiding citizens to official and reliable information. This proactive measure ensures the public is equipped with accurate facts, combating misinformation effectively.
* Dedicated Reporting Pathways: The AEC has established and utilised secure and efficient reporting channels with these platforms, including a new trusted portal with Meta. These direct lines of communication allow for rapid identification and review of content that may pose a risk to electoral integrity, ensuring prompt and necessary action for the public good.
* Fostering Transparency and Understanding: Through engagements such as TikTok's "Transparency and Accountability Centre tour," the AEC gained valuable insights into content moderation and data security practices. This open dialogue reinforces mutual understanding and ensures that government oversight is informed and collaborative, not adversarial.
* Combating Misinformation: The partnerships acknowledge and leverage platforms' existing efforts, such as TikTok's fact-checking collaboration with Agence France-Presse (AFP), which directly contributes to a healthier information environment.

While exploring innovative outreach, such as a verified AEC TikTok account, the AEC prioritises strategic capacity, demonstrating responsible resource allocation. Furthermore, the AEC's engagement reflects a commitment to continuous improvement, observing international best practices to evolve its "Online Media – Elections Protocol."

The careful redactions in these documents, typical of Freedom of Information releases, serve to protect sensitive operational details and personal information, ensuring the ongoing effectiveness of these crucial collaborations and upholding privacy standards.

These documents collectively showcase a government that is dynamic, diligent, and deeply invested in protecting the democratic rights of Australians, proactively addressing challenges in the digital age to ensure a fair and informed electoral process.

AI Generated

The Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) FOI release regarding its engagement with major social media platforms unveils a disturbing picture of systemic failure, crippling incompetence, and a concerning lack of transparency in safeguarding electoral integrity for the 2022 Federal election. Far from demonstrating robust oversight, these documents paint the AEC as a reactive, under-resourced, and fundamentally dependent entity, seemingly outmatched and outmanoeuvred by the very tech giants it purports to regulate.

Key Failures and Damning Implications:

Abject Failure to Proactively Engage and Utilise Critical Channels:
- TikTok Debacle: The most damning revelation is the AEC's explicit rejection of a verified TikTok account in July 2021, just months before the 2022 election. The stated reason – "limited capacity" and inability to "properly invest the time and effort" – is an astonishing admission of profound strategic incompetence or severe under-resourcing. By forsaking a direct communication channel to a vast, impressionable youth demographic, the AEC willfully ceded vital ground to mis/disinformation, demonstrating a catastrophic failure to adapt to modern electoral landscapes. They even punted the idea to "the federal election after this one," indicating a shocking lack of urgency and foresight.
- Refusal to Invest in Fact-Checking: The AEC explicitly states it "won’t be able to invest into something similar" to TikTok’s fact-checking partnership with Agence France-Presse (AFP). This is a dereliction of duty, abandoning direct, independent verification in favour of vague "cohesive working arrangements" with platforms whose primary incentive is engagement, not truth.
Alarming Lack of Transparency and Public Accountability:
- Rejection of Public Declaration: Unlike the Canadian government, which partnered with TikTok and other platforms on a public "Declaration on Electoral Integrity," the AEC "is not necessarily a public statement." This preference for an opaque, private "Online Media – Elections Protocol" indicates a deliberate avoidance of public accountability, fostering an environment where critical agreements remain hidden from public scrutiny and trust is eroded.
Reactive, Last-Minute, and Disorganised Planning:
- Late Engagement on Core Issues: Critical activities such as developing and finalising "electoral communications escalation scenarios" with TikTok and Facebook only occur in August-November 2021 – mere months before the election. This signifies a chaotic, reactive approach rather than a well-planned, proactive strategy to counter electoral interference.
- Ignorance of Platform Mechanisms: The AEC's requests to Facebook in June-July 2021 for information on "specific requirements for processing each request" on their new reporting portal, and asking if "more than one mailbox with portal access" is possible, demonstrate a shocking lack of preparedness and internal coordination. They are playing catch-up, needing basic education on how to use the very mechanisms meant to protect electoral integrity, highlighting a fundamental failure in establishing essential operational channels in advance.
- Reliance on Platform Education: Emails show Facebook offering "selected briefing session from Facebook on misinformation / disinformation" and a "virtual tour of the Transparency and Accountability Centre." The AEC's acceptance of these indicates a disturbing dependence on the platforms themselves to educate the regulator, rather than the AEC possessing its own independent expertise or demanding specific, enforceable actions.
Grossly Insufficient Engagement with Key Platforms:
- Google and LinkedIn Neglect: The FOI response reveals a shocking paucity of correspondence with Google (a single, generic email from June 2020) and no documents whatsoever for LinkedIn. Given the pervasive influence of these platforms in information dissemination and professional discourse, this glaring omission suggests either profound incompetence in engagement or a deliberate redaction/concealment of more substantive, potentially embarrassing, interactions. The scope of the FOI request explicitly included these platforms, yet the output is minimal, implying the AEC is not comprehensively addressing risks across the digital landscape.
Vague Outcomes and Obfuscated Detail:
- The pervasive use of generic subject lines like "EIAT and Twitter follow up," "Follow up from last meeting," and "Electoral integrity preparations" throughout the documents offers no concrete insight into specific threats, discussions, or resolved issues. This deliberate vagueness, compounded by heavy redactions (e.g., s 22, s 47G(1), s 37(1)), suggests a calculated effort to conceal the true extent of vulnerabilities or the inadequacy of the AEC's responses. The government's actions appear designed more for optics than for effective electoral security.

In summary, these documents provide a damning indictment of the AEC's approach to digital electoral integrity. They reveal an agency that is unprepared, under-resourced, technologically behind, and overly reliant on the goodwill and reactive measures of powerful, self-interested tech corporations. The deliberate choices to avoid public accountability and neglect crucial communication channels point to a systemic failure that significantly undermines public confidence in the integrity of Australian elections.

AI Generated

These documents reveal a troubling pattern of collaboration between the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and major online platforms (TikTok, Twitter, Facebook, Google) under the guise of "electoral integrity" and combating "misinformation/disinformation" for the 2022 Federal election.

Content Summary:

The FOI request sought correspondence between the AEC and these tech giants from 2019 to 2022, focusing on compliance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. The released documents detail proactive efforts by the AEC to shape the online information environment surrounding elections. Key themes include:

Public Service Announcements (PSAs): The AEC worked with TikTok to implement PSAs that would appear when users searched election-related hashtags, directing them to "official / reputable sources." The AEC considered establishing its own verified TikTok account but decided against it due to perceived resource constraints.
Fact-Checking Partnerships: TikTok explicitly mentioned an ongoing fact-checking partnership with Agence France-Presse (AFP) that informs its moderation processes to combat misinformation, which they view as part of broader "Trust and Safety efforts" and engagement with official bodies like the AEC.
"Electoral Communications Escalation Scenarios": This recurring theme across all platforms (TikTok, Twitter, Facebook) indicates the development of pre-defined protocols for handling problematic content. While the specific scenarios are redacted, their existence suggests a formalized process for flagging and potentially removing or suppressing information.
Dedicated Reporting Channels/Portals: Discussions between the AEC and TikTok, as well as Facebook, highlight the establishment of direct reporting pathways for the AEC to escalate "concerning content" for review. The AEC sought detailed information on Facebook's "portal functionality" to determine how various internal teams could access and utilize this reporting mechanism.
Focus on "Electoral Interference": The AEC's "Electoral Integrity and Communications Branch" and "Electoral Interference Officer" roles underscore a mandate to actively manage and control online discourse related to elections.

Objectivist Critique:

From an Objectivist perspective, these documents expose a dangerous and illegitimate expansion of government power, violating fundamental principles of reason, individual liberty, and laissez-faire capitalism.

Violation of Individual Rights and Liberty: The most egregious aspect is the systematic effort by a government body to regulate and control information. Freedom of speech is not merely the absence of direct censorship, but the right to express oneself without fear of state reprisal or manipulation. When the AEC collaborates with private platforms to define "misinformation" and establish "escalation scenarios" for its suppression, it becomes an arbiter of truth, effectively imposing a state-sanctioned narrative. This is a direct assault on the individual's right to independent thought and expression, reducing citizens to recipients of government-approved information. The concept of "electoral interference" by citizens through speech is a pretense for thought control.
Government Overreach and Bureaucratic Interference: The AEC's role is to administer elections, not to police public discourse. Its proactive engagement with private companies to monitor, flag, and influence content constitutes a severe government overreach. The establishment of an "Electoral Integrity and Communications Branch" and "Electoral Interference Officers" dedicated to managing online content demonstrates a bureaucracy actively engaged in controlling the marketplace of ideas. The development of "Online Media – Elections Protocols" signifies a collectivistic attempt to standardize information control across platforms, turning private companies into de facto arms of state censorship.
Perversion of Rational Self-Interest: The tech platforms' cooperation, while perhaps driven by a form of "rational self-interest" to avoid harsher government regulation or public backlash, is not a voluntary interaction in a free market. It is compliance under duress, sacrificing the platforms' foundational principles of open exchange for bureaucratic appeasement. True productive achievement lies in creating value and fostering free interaction; when forced to become instruments of state control, their very purpose is subverted. Their "fact-checking partnerships" and "reporting channels" become tools of bureaucratic interference, not genuine efforts to foster rational discourse.
Suppression of Personal Initiative: The emphasis on guiding citizens to "official / reputable sources" and combating "misinformation" inherently suppresses the personal initiative of individuals to independently seek, evaluate, and critically analyze information. It implies that citizens are incapable of discerning truth for themselves and require paternalistic guidance from the state. This stifles intellectual independence and reinforces a collectivist mentality where collective "truth" (as defined by the state) is prioritized over individual reason.

In conclusion, these documents reveal a deeply concerning trend towards collectivist control of information by the Australian government. The collaboration between the AEC and private tech companies, disguised as "electoral integrity," undermines individual liberty, stifles free expression, and transforms innovative platforms into instruments of bureaucratic censorship. It is a stark warning against the dangers of government overreach and the erosion of laissez-faire principles that protect a truly free society.

AI Generated

AEC FOI Disclosure Log Archive

FOI Request LEX1697

FOI Request Summary

Purpose of the FOI Request

Documents Released

Main Content and Themes

General Collaboration & Electoral Integrity

TikTok

Google

Twitter

Facebook (Meta)

FOI Request LEX1697, Schedule of Released Documents [PDF 288KB] (pdf)

LEX1697 documents [ZIP 47MB] (zip)

ZIP Contents

Document 02.pdf (pdf)

Document Summary

Relevance to FOI Request LEX1697

Document 08.pdf (pdf)

Document Summary

Relevance to FOI Request LEX1697

Document 09.pdf (pdf)

Document 10.pdf (pdf)

Document 14.pdf (pdf)

Document 19.pdf (pdf)

Document 29.pdf (pdf)

Document 32.pdf (pdf)

Document 37.pdf (pdf)

Document 39.pdf (pdf)

Document 42.pdf (pdf)

Document 43.pdf (pdf)

Document 44.pdf (pdf)

Document Summary

Relevance to FOI Request LEX1697

Document 47.pdf (pdf)

Document 49.pdf (pdf)

Document 50.pdf (pdf)

Document 51.pdf (pdf)

Document 55.pdf (pdf)

Document 56.pdf (pdf)