FOI Request LEX3070, Schedule of Released Documents [PDF 161KB] (pdf)
Download cached file | Download from AEC--- Page 1 --- Request for: LEX3070 FOI REQUEST all applications made to the Australian Electoral Commission under s 141 (2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 during the year 2022 prior to 21st June 2022. SCHEDULE OF PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS Page 1 of 2 --- Page 2 --- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Document No. Description Email re Notice under s 134(6)(c) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Electoral Act) - Australian Federation Party Letter re Request for Review of Decision. Letter re Request for Review of Decision to Deregister Flux Email re Request for review of the deregistration of VOTEFLUX.ORG Withheld pending exhaustion of third party review rights. Date 11/03/2022 7:17 PM 31/03/2022 14/04/2022 (date of receipt) 26/04/2022 12:03 AM Email re Please review your recent decision to deregister flux party. 06/05/2022 Email re Application under s 141(2) regarding Health Australia Party 05/05/2022 Email re Attention Mr Tom Rogers Email re request for internal review Letter re internal review of the AEC’s decision to deregister the Australian Progressives End 8/04/2022 10:50 AM 11/04/2022 16/03/2022 (date or receipt) Page 2 of 2
The document is a schedule of nine communications and applications released in response to FOI request LEX3070, dated between March and May 2022. It lists applications made to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) under s 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, primarily concerning requests for review of party deregistration decisions. Key entries include multiple requests for review regarding the deregistration of Flux/VOTEFLUX.ORG, an application concerning the Health Australia Party, and an internal review request regarding the deregistration of the Australian Progressives. It also lists a notice under s 134(6)(c) concerning the Australian Federation Party.
This document is directly relevant to FOI request LEX3070 as it serves as the official schedule of the documents being released. It directly confirms the existence and dates of applications made under s 141(2) and reviews of deregistration decisions, as sought by the FOI. It substantiates the FOI request's overview by identifying the specific parties (Flux, Health Australia Party, Australian Progressives, Australian Federation Party) that submitted such applications or communications challenging AEC decisions during the specified period, thereby directly supporting the theme of challenges to the AEC's administrative processes regarding party registration and deregistration.
LEX3070 documents [ZIP 7.93MB] (zip)
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- LEX3070 Released Document No. 1.pdf (pdf)
- LEX3070 Released Document No. 2.pdf (pdf)
- LEX3070 Released Document No. 3.pdf (pdf)
- LEX3070 Released Document No. 5.pdf (pdf)
- LEX3070 Released Document No. 6.pdf (pdf)
- LEX3070 Released Document No. 7.pdf (pdf)
- LEX3070 Released Document No. 8.pdf (pdf)
- LEX3070 Released Document No. 9.pdf (pdf)
LEX3070 Released Document No. 1.pdf (pdf)
Download file--- Page 1 --- From: Sent: To: Subject: Friday, 11 March 2022 7:17 PM Commission Secretariat Notice under s 134(6)(c) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Electoral Act) - Australian Federation Party CAUTION:This email originated from outside of the Australian Federal Government. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. I refer to your reply to my submission on the Australian Federation Party logo. Although only five have objected to the logo, we all appear to agree. Logos are placed next to the name or party on the voting slip. Voters could easily interpret the tick as the place to mark the box. If a tick is actually put in the box this would invalidate the vote Alternatively, the correct number could be placed in the box because the voter thought the tick indicated this was what should be done. I hope that this will be reconsidered. Mob: Tel: 1 LEX3070 Released Document No. 13991111Released under the Freedom of Information Act 19821 --- Page 2 --- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. REDACTION CODES Personal Information (name) redacted. Personal Information (date of birth) redacted. Personal Information (place of birth) redacted Personal Information (citizenship) redacted. Personal Information (racial or ethnic origin) redacted. Personal Information (photograph) redacted Personal Information (facsimile of signature) redacted. Personal Information (facsimile of manuscript initialling) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s address) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s email address) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s telephone number or mobile number) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s political opinion) redacted. Personal Information (opinion about individual) redacted. Personal Information (Individuals current or former occupation). Personal Information (employment history) redacted. Personal Information (qualifications) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a professional or trade association). Personal Information (membership of a trade union). Personal Information (health) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a political association) redacted Personal Information (religious beliefs or affiliations) redacted. Personal Information (sexual orientation or practices). Personal Information (criminal record). Personal Information (identifying individual) redacted. Personal Information (bank account details) redacted) Business information (bank account details) redacted. Business information (billing account details) redacted. Business information (ureasonably affect a person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs) redacted. Business Information (reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth or an agency for the purpose of the administration of a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or the administration of matters administered by an agency). 30. Business information (trade secret). --- Page 3 --- 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. Business information (information having a commercial value that would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed). Legal Professional Communication redacted. Deliberative material redacted. Electoral Roll material redacted. Tests, examinations or audits material redacted. Management or assessment of personnel material redacted. Proper and efficient conduct of the operations of AEC material redacted. Lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law redactged 39. Irrelevant material redacted.
Document Summary: Australian Federation Party Logo Objection (LEX3070, Doc 13991111)
This document is an email dated March 11, 2022, from a member of the public to the AEC's Commission Secretariat. It constitutes a follow-up notice under s 134(6)(c) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, reiterating and seeking reconsideration of an objection to the proposed logo of the Australian Federation Party. The sender, on behalf of five objectors, expresses concern that the party's logo, which includes a "tick" symbol, could confuse voters on a ballot paper. The primary concern is that voters might interpret the tick as the designated place to mark their vote, potentially leading to invalidated ballots or incorrect numbering, thus undermining the integrity of the voting process.
Relevance to FOI Request (LEX3070)
This document is directly relevant to the FOI request (LEX3070) as it falls under the scope of challenges to the AEC's administrative processes concerning party registration. The FOI request specifically notes "an objection to the Australian Federation Party's logo for potential voter confusion," which this document precisely addresses. It provides evidence of an application made during early 2022, raising concerns about a party's registration details (its logo) and its potential impact on voters, aligning with the FOI's theme of challenges and reviews relating to party registration decisions.
LEX3070 Released Document No. 2.pdf (pdf)
Download file--- Page 1 --- PO Box 678 Civic Square ACT 2608 31 March 2022 Mr Tom Rogers Australian Electoral Commissioner Locked Bag 4007 Canberra City ACT 2601 By email to: commission.secretariat@aec.gov.au Dear Mr Rogers REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF DECISION Pursuant to section 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, (the Electoral Act), we request a review of the decision on 4 March 2022 by the Delegate of the Commissioner, Joanne Reid, to deregister the Democratic Labour Party (the DLP) under section 137(6)(a) of the Act. In the first instance, it is of concern to us that amongst many small parties which have received Notices of Intent to Deregister, conservative Christian parties such as the DLP and the Christian Democrats appear to have been singled out for quick deregistration while left-leaning secular parties such as “Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party” which also received similar notices months before the DLP continue to be registered. It is also of great concern to us that we appear to have been denied natural justice in our efforts to comply with the minimum 1500 member requirement by being restricted to only providing 1650 names, by having only a tiny sample of these being contacted by the Electoral Commission and then finally by being denied the opportunity to provide any additional lists of members. --- Page 2 --- On 27 January 2022 we received a letter from the AEC delegate, Joanne Reid, advising us of the intention to deregister the DLP. We were given a month to supply “a statement, in writing, setting out the reasons why the party should not be deregistered.” Shortly after this notice I, as registered officer, had a conversation with a member of the AEC who rang me. I asked what we could include in the statement and was advised we could provide any statement that would explain why we should not be deregistered. I twice asked whether we “can we supply a new list of members” and was advised the statement can contain anything that demonstrates why we should not be deregistered. The person I spoke with did not refer to a new list or whether a new list could be supplied. On 26 February 2022, we submitted our statement setting out the reasons why we should not be deregistered including the fact that we did have over 1500 members, The email we sent with the statement specifically asked for permission to submit a new list of names and the statement itself also specifically asked for permission to submit a new list of names. We now find that parties who never asked for permission were permitted to lodge new lists along with their statement and those lists were accepted by the AEC. This despite no reference to supplying a new list being mentioned in the “intention to deregister” letter we received and no acknowledgment or suggestion that a new list could be lodged being mentioned in my phone conversation with the AEC, despite my specifically asking that question. At the very least the AEC, who are happy to call and advise us that we are being deregistered, could have called and said a new list would be accepted if supplied within 24 hours. I am seriously concerned about impartiality in the AEC when some parties were permitted to lodge a new list supposedly without permission while those who sought permission were ignored, to their detriment. Instead of acting on the request contained in the DLP’s statement and email, the statement seems to have been given priority for denial, because barely four business days later we received the notice of ‘Intention to Deregister.’ Meanwhile, the “Derryn Hinch Justice Party” which was listed for deregistration on 17 December 2021, the Health Australia Party which was listed on 18 January 2022 and the Australian Progressives which was listed on 11 January 2022 all remain on the list of registered parties. I would suggest the least the AEC could do is to immediately restore the DLP to the list of Registered Parties while examining the new list of members supplied with this appeal. --- Page 3 --- Attached to this statement is another list of 1650 members. As mentioned we request we be afforded the same treatment as other parties and our qualification for registration be immediately re-established then re-assessed based on this list. In the Notice of Decision on Party Registration dated 4 March 2022, the Delegate, Joanne Reid, simply asserts that she “rejects the reasons outlined by (the DLP) in its statement provided on 26 February 2022” including both the issue of the legal validity of the sampling process used to assess the membership number and the fact that the DLP advised that it has more membership names which it was prevented from providing, without explaining how or why this “rejection” is decided upon. The fact that the DLP requested permission to lodge another list of members in the very statement the Delegate rejects while other parties, whom the same delegate would presumably have dealt with for deregistration purposes, were permitted to lodge new lists apparently without permission seems to be unfair and suggests the Delegates reasons for rejection of our statement are inconsistent with her or the AEC’s actions. Ms Reid declares that she “remain(s) satisfied that the (DLP) does not have 1500 members” despite the fact that we have advised that we have more than the maximum 1650 sample we were permitted to provide, so it is not clear how the Delegate would arrive at this prejudicial conclusion when it appears to be at odds with all available facts. The use of a sample of only 42 members to draw conclusions regarding the membership status of 1572 members would appear to be questionable from the standpoints of both procedural fairness and legal validity. In the Notice, the Delegate declares that her faith in the validity of this approach derives from the fact that the Electoral Commission “has previously concluded that the methodology was appropriate for membership testing because it was rational, fair and practical in all the circumstances,” however her own organization’s endorsement of its own process is an entirely circular justification and provides no credibility whatsoever. In fact, from a statistical standpoint, a parametric estimate of valid membership numbers using such a tiny sample must have a huge standard error and so can only logically be regarded as indicative rather than definitive. Moreover, the Delegate’s statement that she considers that a statistical estimate “provide(s) a more robust method for ascertaining whether a party has satisfied the requirements of the Electoral Act than a statement by the party” appears disingenuous. We did not, nor obviously would anyone else, seriously suggest that an assertion of membership numbers had any weight in assessing eligibility for registration. We merely pointed --- Page 4 --- out that we had additional members which we could have provided if we had been told that we were allowed to do so. In fact, the key question that we raised was neither this nor whether the ABS provided estimation method was an effective indicative tool, but rather whether statistical extrapolation from a sample of only 42 members could be a fair and valid method to decide definitively that a party which supplied 1650 member names did not have 1500 members. The DLP would contend that the only way to definitively assess whether a party has the minimum 1500 members required by the amended Electoral Act is for the AEC to contact each and all of the members provided. While this may be a major task for the AEC, given that rejection of a party’s claim to the required membership denies it the right to participate in our nation’s democratic processes, we submit respectfully that the AEC’s convenience should not be the primary consideration. As set out in the Administrative Review Council’s Best Practice Guide to Decision Making, an important legal requirement in any administrative decision making is to conform to the principles of natural justice, to the extent that “natural justice generally applies whenever a statute gives power to make an administrative decision that might adversely effects the rights, interests or legitimate expectations of an individual or organization.”1 Moreover, as the guide makes clear, “the requirement of natural justice comes from general administrative law, not the particular statue being administered”2 and these obligations for administrative decision makers are reflected in the Australian Public Service Values and Code of Conduct set down in the Australian Public Service Commissioner’s Directions 2016 and the Public Service Act 1999. The wording of the Delegate’s written decision suggests to us that she may have been unfamiliar with these obligations. In conclusion, the grounds upon which we request review of the Delegate’s decision are 1. That in not being advised that we were allowed to submit additional names as part of our statement on 26 February 2022 as other parties did, we were denied natural justice in the decision making process; 1 Administrative Review Council Best Practice Guide 2, “Decision Making: Natural Justice”, 2007, p4 2 Ibid, p5 --- Page 5 --- 2. That in not responding to our request for permission to lodge a new list of names, as contained in both our email and statement of 26 February 2022, the DLP was denied the ability to demonstrate our eligibility to registration as was granted to numerous other parties; 3. That the means of statistical extrapolation by which the minimum membership is determined is neither “fair” nor “robust” but merely indicative and therefore does not comply with the AEC’s legal obligations to definitively determine eligibility for registration under the Electoral Act; 4. That because the AEC failed to contact 1530 of the 1650 members we supplied, the AEC denied us a just and equitable assessment of our membership; and 5. That wording of the Delegate’s written response suggests an apprehended bias against us and raises the possibility that we were not afforded an objective assessment. Accordingly we request that our registration be immediately re-established while our ongoing entitlement to registration is re-assessed by the Commission, including an assessment of the new list of 1650 member names which we attach. Yours sincerely Stephen Campbell Federal Secretary and Registered Officer Democratic Labour Party
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Document Type and Purpose: This document is a formal request from the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) to the Australian Electoral Commissioner, dated 31 March 2022, seeking a review of the decision to deregister the party under section 137(6)(a) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. This aligns directly with the FOI request for applications made under s 141(2) concerning review decisions.
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Key Challenges to AEC Processes: The DLP raises several substantial objections, strongly echoing themes identified in the FOI request overview:
- Procedural Unfairness & Denial of Natural Justice: The DLP alleges it was denied the opportunity to provide additional membership lists and that its explicit requests for permission to do so were ignored, while other parties were seemingly allowed to submit new lists without explicit permission. It contends that the AEC's actions, particularly those of Delegate Joanne Reid, demonstrate inconsistency and potential bias, leading to an unjust assessment.
- Flawed Membership Verification Methodology: The document extensively challenges the AEC's statistical sampling method for verifying party membership. The DLP argues that using a sample of only 42 members to conclude on 1572 members is "questionable from the standpoints of both procedural fairness and legal validity," not "fair" or "robust," and merely "indicative rather than definitive." It asserts that a definitive assessment requires contacting all provided members, and the AEC's convenience should not supersede democratic rights. This directly supports the FOI request's theme of challenges to the AEC's "statistically flawed, unfair" membership verification.
- Allegations of Discriminatory Treatment: The DLP expresses concern that "conservative Christian parties such as the DLP and the Christian Democrats appear to have been singled out for quick deregistration," while "left-leaning secular parties such as “Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party,” the Health Australia Party, and the Australian Progressives (all mentioned in the FOI overview) remained registered despite similar notices. This reinforces the broader FOI request theme of challenges to the AEC's administrative consistency and potential arbitrary outcomes.
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Requested Outcome: The DLP requests immediate re-establishment of its registration and a re-assessment of its entitlement based on a new list of 1650 members provided with the appeal.
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Relevance to FOI Request: This document is a prime example of an application made under s 141(2) and serves as significant evidence for the FOI request's overarching theme: the "strong theme of challenges to the AEC's administrative processes," particularly concerning party membership verification methodology and allegations of unfair or arbitrary deregistration outcomes.
LEX3070 Released Document No. 3.pdf (pdf)
Download file--- Page 1 --- Request for Review of Decision to Deregister Flux To: Mr Tom Rogers, Australian Electoral Commissioner CC: The other members of the Commission: Justice Kenny, Chairperson, and Dr Gruen, the Australian Statistician. This is a request for the Commission to review the decision, made on the 24th of March 2022, to deregister “VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy!” (Flux) under s137(6) of the Electoral Act. It is made under s141(2) of the Electoral Act. I am making this request because the AEC has been using and continues to use a faulty method to test party eligibility with regards to sufficient membership. Thus, I am dissatisfied with the decision to deregister Flux. Additionally, as an Australian elector, a fundamental oversight in the AEC’s policy could compromise the democracy that I am a constituent of, so I am affected, along with all other Australians. As part of this request, I provide statistical analysis as grounds that the AEC’s testing method is flawed. My Statement to the Commission I invite the Commission – Mr Rogers along with Justice Kenny and Dr Gruen – to consider the following hypothetical case regarding the AEC’s method for validating that a party meets the requirements of the Electoral Act. I assume that you all are familiar with the AEC’s testing methodology. Consider a party with 9,000 members, and let’s say that half of those members (4,500) are validatable as electors, and a further 60% of those members (2,700) will respond “yes” to an AEC request for membership confirmation. It is natural for a party to have members that can not be validated against the electoral roll (which can happen for a variety of reasons; a member’s status of silent elector is one). Thus, parties go to some substantial effort to submit only those members that can be validated against the roll – for reasons that I hope are obvious to you who comprise the Commission. That is, in our hypothetical case: 4,500 members are not validatable as electors, and a further 1,800 would deny membership if asked by the AEC. The remaining 2,700 are legitimate. Justice Kenny, as I’m sure you’re aware, the Electoral Act (EA) specifies that an eligible party requires at least 1,500 members. In your legal opinion, would a party with 2,700 members satisfy that clause of the EA? I hope that you agree that it would. I anticipate that you would also agree that, all else being equal, this hypothetical party appears eligible under the EA. At the very least, we do not have a reason to conclude that the party is ineligible, right? Dr Gruen, I wonder if you are a man dedicated to facts and truth or falsehoods and political agendas. I’m sure that, as an expert statistician, you hold mathematical facts above unsubstantiated claims. I’m also sure that you appreciate that if a statistical test has a predetermined outcome, then that test is neither reliable nor suitable for any real-world purpose. If you had a blood sample processed by a doctor, would you accept the results if that doctor gave them to you before the blood sample was taken? No, of course not, that would be crazy. So, Dr Gruen, please consider our hypothetical case. Given that this hypothetical party is eligible under the EA, what should we expect as the results of the AEC’s testing method as applied to this LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 2 --- party? Given that this party cannot determine which of the 4,500 validatable members will respond “yes” or “no”, and that this party can submit no more than 1,650 members due to AEC policy alone: the best that can be done is selecting a subset of those members, essentially at random. There may be some small optimizations the party could make, but in principle the limiting factors are those that we have already discussed. Thus each member on the submitted list is expected to respond to the AEC with a membership denial with a probability of 0.4 (40%). Of course, we know this because 1,800 / (2,700 + 1,800) = 0.4, and because there is no reason that the ratio of denying members to confirming members would change substantially (outside the statistical variance of the selection of 1,650 members, which is not very substantial anyway). Let us assume that this hypothetical party randomly selects 1,650 validatable members from its pool of 4,500. Dr Gruen, I hope that you find this a reasonable course of action for the party to take and have followed the logic thus far. Dr Gruen, would you agree that the accuracy of a statistical method is roughly: how often it results in true positives and true negatives? That is: if a method results in false positives and false negatives some of the time, it cannot have 100% accuracy. If, for some cases, it only produces false positives and false negatives, then it has 0% accuracy for those cases. If there exists some case where the method will always result in false negatives, then we can conclude that such a method is, at least sometimes, inaccurate, yes? I invite you, Dr Gruen, to please calculate the probability that this hypothetical party passes the AEC’s membership testing methodology – that the party passes the test that is endorsed by your bureau. You may assume that no members are filtered out, i.e., that during the AEC’s validation of the membership list no electors are excluded for being duplicates, or deceased, or unmatchable against the electoral roll, etc. All the information required for such a calculation is specified above. I assume that such a calculation is trivial for a statistician such as yourself, with the resources available to you. Surely, you agree that it is fairly straight forward to calculate, yes? Mr Rogers, while Dr Gruen is calculating that probability, let us discuss something that you wrote recently: The AEC’s values of electoral integrity through agility, professionalism and quality underpin everything we do […] I also believe that integrity is important. Integrity is necessary for a system (or a person) to remain robust. Integrity is a major difference between ‘stable and enduring’, and ‘compromised and corrupted’. When integrity fails, good systems become rotten. Do you not agree? It is to your integrity, and the integrity of Justice Kenny and Dr Gruen, too, that I make this appeal. I am fully aware that you are free to decide whatever you wish – the Electoral Act is written such that you are practically unconstrained in this matter. I ask you this: if the AEC and the ABS were wrong about the AEC’s testing methodology, how would you know? Surely you realize that it is possible that the AEC is mistaken somehow – that we are all fallible, and our ideas are fallible? Institutions like the AEC, and methods like the one the AEC use, are based on ideas that were thought-up by people, and are therefore fallible. Justice Kenny and Dr Gruen, do you also realize this? That there are no infallible humans, no infallible institutions, and no infallible ideas? Mr Rogers, if it is possible to be wrong, what does it mean to have integrity in the face of potentially being wrong, and thus potentially making progress? Should one take the path of honesty and truth- LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 3 --- seeking, or should one take the path of enforcing authority through baseless claims, evasion, and dismissal? If you have some other path to take, is it not one of honesty and truth-seeking? Surely you would not advocate a path that is dishonest and avoids the truth? Perhaps Justice Kenny has some insight on this; I understand that judges often have some experience in these matters. Now, let us return to the matter of the accuracy of the AEC’s testing methodology. Dr Gruen, are you done calculating those probabilities? Let us compare answers. Here are my results with 95% confidence intervals: the probability that the hypothetical party passes the AEC’s testing method is 0.0020% ± 0.0012%. The mean membership denials via the AEC’s test is = 23.998 ± 0.010 (out of 60 successful contacts). The standard deviation of that distribution is = 3.765 ± 0.007. The SEM for these results is = 0.005. Dr Gruen, would you consider a statistical method accurate if the probability of it producing a false negative is 99.9980% ± 0.0012%? Would you consider that, for all intents and purposes, such a statistical method is predetermined in its outcome? Justice Kenny, do you consider it appropriate for an important legal institution to use a method that, in some conditions, fails more than 99% of the time? What would our society be like if the courts had this kind of failure rate for certain types of cases? How do we know that they don’t? How does the AEC know that its method doesn’t? Why are the answers to those questions different? Mr Rogers, do you think that a test which, in some cases has a failure rate greater than 99%, should be used by a leader who values integrity and quality? Do you think that a test which, when applied to certain cases, succeeds only 0.002% of the time is “rational, fair and practical in all the circumstances”? [1] [1]: https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/Party Registration/Registration Decisions/2021 /notice-of-decision-with-reasons-SUPA.pdf Dr Gruen, do you think that a test which, for certain cases, is less than 1% accurate is “rational, fair and practical in all the circumstances”? After all, it is a fact that the AEC’s method performs this poorly some of the time. You have calculated so yourself. ( ou have done the calculations, haven’t you?) Justice Kenny, do you think that, when a citizen appeals to a judicial process of their country’s legal institutions, they deserve the right to be taken seriously? That they deserve the right to present their case and, if it is supported by the facts, to have an injustice undone? Is that not one of the primary values of judicial processes and the courts? To safeguard citizenry from injustices? To undo decisions that would otherwise be mistakes? Is that not something that the integrity of our legal institutions depend on? Is the AEC not part of the bedrock of our legal system? (Its foundational role being that it provides the system by which parliamentarians, who alone can create and modify legislation, are elected.) If a citizen petitions an institution via a judicial process, and proves their case with mathematics and evidence, what are they to do if that is not enough? If that institution is unconvinced by facts and evidence, how can a citizen have confidence in their legal system? How can they have confidence in that foundational component of our society? Moreover, if judicial processes ignore facts and evidence, are those processes serving one of their major purposes – error correction? Is that not a core goal of judicial processes: righting wrongs, undoing mistakes, preventing mistakes, promoting justice, and so on? What is a citizen to do when a judicial process ignores facts and evidence? LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 4 --- Mr Rogers, I cannot force you to change your mind about anything, that is solely up to you. I can present you with this case, though. Perhaps you (along with Justice Kenny and Dr Gruen) have guessed that the hypothetical party was not so hypothetical after all. The parameters of that case are spitting distance from those of Flux’s second membership test (conducted Feb/March 2022). There is at least one major difference – in the hypothetical case, the party selected members randomly; in Flux’s case, your delegate selected 1,650 members from the top of the list of 4,680 members that Flux submitted. That list was alphabetical, so the AEC only sampled from members whose first name started with one of A through G. Dr Gruen, in your expert opinion and in light of the above, and given that Flux failed this test, which of these should we believe true? That Flux has fewer than 1,500 members; or That Flux has fewer than 1,500 members whose first name starts with one of A through G. If a party has 1,000 (~1586 * 29/(17+29)) members whose first name starts with one of A through G, how many members whose name starts with one of H through Z do we expect that party to have? After all, what are the chances that a party only has members with first names that start with a letter between A and G inclusive. The point of this argument is not that Flux has sufficient members to satisfy the electoral act. The point of this argument is that the AEC’s method is flawed. It is inaccurate, it is unreliable, it is unfair, and it is unsuitable – at least in this case. The facts prove this. I am not asking that the Commission believe me, I am asking the Commission to believe facts and evidence. Justice Kenny, I will ask you again, does a citizen deserve the right to present their case via a judicial process and, if it is supported by the facts, to have an injustice undone? I hope that your answer is the same in this case as it would have been for all other cases that you have presided over as a Judge of the Court. The above is sufficient to conclude that Flux was wrongfully deregistered. It was wrongful because, regardless of whether Flux should be deregistered or not, the AEC’s method is not good enough to produce an accurate result in this case. From a truth-seeking point of view, the AEC’s test provides no meaningful information on whether Flux is eligible or not. Since we should not take my word for it, if our goal is to determine whether Flux is eligible with regards to sufficient membership, we are at square one. Scientifically, we can draw no conclusions based on the AEC’s testing. It is not my place to tell you what should be done instead of the current method, I can only demonstrate to you that the outcome is predetermined in Flux’s case, as the test results in a false negative with probability 0.999978 ± 0.000013. (These numbers differ slightly from those in the hypothetical case above because the calculations are based, specifically, on Flux’s second test.) Mr Rogers, Justice Kenny, and Dr Gruen: perhaps this is not enough to convince that there is a reasonable chance of some problems with the AEC’s methodology. The only other thing I can do is present you with a more in-depth statistical analysis of the method – covering this problem and others, both historical and on-going. I suppose that it is most relevant for Dr Gruen, since he is the only one I can reasonably expect to have the knowledge of statistics necessary to judge the analysis. To my knowledge, this is the first third party review of the AEC’s methodology. If there has been a third party review that is not public, I think that it is reasonable for the Commission to provide it (without an FOI request). After I sign off, you will find supporting graphs of the Probability Mass Functions comprising the statistical analysis from which my above results were drawn. Following that, the in-depth review of LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 5 --- LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 6 --- therefore constitutes a case where the AEC's method is completely inaccurate. Fig S.2: Modelling based on the AEC results from Flux's membership test in Feb/March 2022. Even if we assume that Flux is eligible, the AEC's method returns a false negative more than 99.99% of the time. Fig S.3: Modelling of an example where the AEC's method works. That is: it is accurate in this case. Statistical Review of the AEC’s Method Follows LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 7 --- AEC Party Membership Test Methodology is Rigged! A Statistical Analysis of AEC Methodology and Graphs (of PMFs) Website | Source Code Max Kaye 2022-02-15 to 2022-02-21 TOC 1. Background Context 2. Regular Membership Testing 3. Flux’s 2021 Membership Test: A Known Farce 4. Analysis Methodology 5. Major Findings 6. Suspected Farces 7. Flux’s 2021 Membership Test Assuming a Threshold (9.09%) Denial Rate (including worst-case) 8. Flux’s Second Membership Test (March 2022) 9. Feedback Loops Between AEC Policy and Party Behavior 10. Conclusion 11. Appendix: Definitions 12. Appendix: AEC Membership Testing Tables 13. Appendix: Errata Abstract / Executive Summary In Australia, to register a political party you need a minimum number of members. Federally, that’s usually 1500 (as of September 2021) – the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) will conduct membership tests to verify this minimum. Political parties with a parliamentarian have no minimum membership limit and are not tested. Political parties without a parliamentarian must go through a membership test when they register, and then once every election cycle thereafter. This document evaluates the AEC’s testing methodology for particular cases and finds that there are real-world situations where the testing methodology has a false negative (improper failure) rate over 50%, and often much higher. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, for those cases: the methodology is rigged and a farce. If something is rigged and a farce – based on the definitions included and cited in the appendix – then it is an unfair, empty act, done for show where the outcome is already known. This document proves that the current method has unfair and predetermined outcomes for many situations. Note: I am not accusing the AEC of doing the rigging; just proving that the method is rigged. To date, there is 1 known incident of a farce, at least 5 suspected incidents, at at least 5 other possible farces. This is based only on results that the AEC have published as part of a review (other LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 8 --- results are not available). The Flux Party’s recent 2021 membership test is analyzed in multiple ways: Measured case: a 17% membership denial rate – as measured by the AEC during this membership test. More extreme – but realistic – cases: These are more extreme cases than the measured case, but it is an assumption of all cases that the party is eligible under the Electoral Act. Threshold case: the case where 9.09% (150/1650) of any membership list submitted will deny membership. I suspect this is close to an AEC assumption used for calculating the maximum number of denials for the AEC’s testing table (given their advertised risk of false results). Experimental evidence shows that the measured true positive rate of The Flux Party’s 2021 membership test was just 28.3% ± 0.12%. This is despite the experimental assumption that Flux has more members than the legislatively required number. In Flux’s threshold case, where 150/1650 = 9.09% of the submitted membership list will deny membership and 24 members are filtered without replacement, experimental evidence shows that the AEC method’s true positive rate was 89.0%, which is less than the limit previously advertised (90% or better). The true positive rate is that high because Flux has gone to a great deal of effort to increase the quality of our membership lists to avoid members being filtered – we did this, in large part, to address inadequacies of the AEC’s methodology. As more members are filtered without replacement, the false negative rate increases dramatically. Experimental evidence proves that the AEC’s claim that their membership tests are 90% accurate is false. In actual fact, for a party that is capable of providing a list of 1,650 members wherein exactly 1,500 members will not deny membership (and 150 will): the worst-case accuracy of the AEC’s membership test is just 15.1%, indicating a false negative rate of 84.9%. In other cases, where a party is capable of providing 1,500 members that will not deny membership (with no limit on the number of members that will deny membership), the lower-bound on the accuracy of the AEC’s method is 0%. That is: it fails 100% of the time for certain eligible parties. This is not a theoretical problem. It has been happening and continues to happen. The AEC has been enforcing a policy that compromises the integrity of our political process. The ABS has been complicit. Political elites have exploited this. Additionally, the AEC mistakenly enforced a testing table with a typo for 4 years – it’s unknown if they ever noticed before the table was updated. (See Appendix: AEC Membership Testing Tables / Circa 2012 to 2016) Disclosure and context: My roles in The Flux Party (Flux) were: a founder, the deputy leader, the secretary, and the deputy registered officer. Change Log 2022-04-11 Update: Flux was deregistered on 2022-03-24. See 8. Flux’s Second Membership Test (March 2022). 1. Background Context Recently (leading up to September 2021), most parliamentarians (i.e., the 4 major parties) decided LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 9 --- that we had too many political parties and that this was a problem! It would not do. So, a bunch of changes were made to the Electoral Act. Changes designed to make life harder for anyone who wanted to be part of our democracy, but did not want to participate in the rotten, tribalist, political cults that run the show. Some of those changes resulted in (as of Feb 2022) the pending deregistration of 12 parties, and the very real deregistration of 9 parties. In practice that is ~40% of parties, gone before the next election. Political elites will claim (and have claimed in Parliament already) that these changes, the culling, and the subsequent entrenchment of the status quo, is a good thing. That it is making our democracy better. In September 2021, the legislatively required number of members for a political party was increased from 500 to 1500 with little warning and no grace period. The AEC’s policies – going back at least a decade – have encouraged parties not to bother going over 1.1x the legislative limit (i.e., previously 550, now 1650) with regards to their number of members that are verifiable against the roll. (Submitting more than this is pointless and makes registration harder.) 2. Regular Membership Testing Every few years, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) will check that each political party has enough members according to the legislative requirement. The party must provide a list of 1500 to 1650 names (inclusive) to use as evidence of their eligibility. The AEC will then filter out some names (duplicates, deceased members, etc). That produces a NEW list of ≤ 1650 names. Then, the AEC will do a statistical sampling of members and will use that to determine whether a party is eligible. Particularly, a small subset of members are selected and contacted, asking for a yes/no confirmation of membership. Non-responses are skipped. A “No” answer counts as a failure – this is a membership denial. In this document and associated code: “failure rate” refers to the rate at which members respond “No”. The AEC does not accept lists larger than 1650; there is no chance for a party to replace any of those filtered members; that filtering process increases the chance of false negatives (when list length is limited + excluding duplicates); parties are not told which members were filtered (even those which are deceased) so they cannot be proactively removed; and, finally, the standard of statistical evaluation is to assume that the list of 1650 members were the only members of the party. Zero consideration is given beyond this, outside the chance to respond – a tactic that has, historically, performed poorly except by the grace of the AEC. How many parties have been wrongly denied registration due to this artificial limit? Nobody knows. The method is detailed on pages 23 and 24 of “Guide for registering a party”. (mirror) 3. Flux’s 2021 Membership Test: A Known Farce Flux failed its recent membership test. The only problem? We have at least 4680 members whose details have been matched against the electoral roll. It is the AEC’s imposition of 1650 members maximum that is the problem. Note that Flux is only in a position to offer so many members because of our unique membership system: free for life. Additionally, significant automation has been developed to assist members in verifying their details against the electoral roll and keeping their details up to date. This is a task too involved, expensive, and specialized for it to be practical for most political parties. AEC’s Notice to Flux (with test results) Our Response From the AEC’s notice (note that the AEC refuses membership lists with more than 1650 members): LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 10 --- On 7 December 2021, the Party responded to the s 138A Notice by providing a list of between 1,500 and 1,650 members of the Party. I am notifying you under s 137(1)(b) of the Electoral Act that the Electoral Commission is considering deregistering the Party, as the Electoral Commission is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the Party does not have at least 1,500 members. A copy of the s 137(1)(b) Notice is enclosed. Here is an except from the first page of our response, to give you an idea of the gist: We have 3 arguments supporting our case. Each argument is individually sufficient to show that a decision (by the AEC) to deregister the Party would not be based on reasonable grounds; each argument is a decisive criticism of the current methodology. The statistical method used fails ~10% of the time for borderline cases. The statistical method uses an artificially limited sample size and thus does not estimate party membership, though does (roughly) measure membership attrition. We have sufficient membership and provide evidence. Attached is a list of 4680 members. Each entry was, at some point, verified against the electoral roll. Unless each of these criticisms can be addressed, we do not believe that a decision by the AEC to deregister the Party would be based in reality. (Note: there are at least two non-critical errors in our response – the AEC has already been informed. See the end of the doc for what was sent to the AEC re those errors.) I became curious about the actual statistical properties of the AEC’s process. How likely would it have been for us to succeed? (Given that we are in fact an eligible party.) Turns out there was a 71.7% chance that the AEC’s method would find a false negative. TL;DR: It’s rigged. In this document and the associated code and graphs: a farce is defined as any case where the chance of a false negative is ≥ 50%, i.e., statistical accuracy is ≤ 50%. The AEC’s membership test being rigged means that, in some relevant cases, the outcome is predetermined. Since there are cases where an eligible party will have ~0% chance of success, it is the case that there exist relevant cases where the outcome is predetermined. 4. Analysis Methodology The code associated with this document produces statistical graphs (of the Probability Mass Function, specifically) based on 500,000 simulations of the AEC’s method. For each simulation, the number of failures is recorded as the output. Subsequently, these results are normalized to give the probability of X failures for the given input parameters. These probabilities are then graphed, with the x-axis showing the number of failures, and the y-axis showing (membership denials). As the AEC has limits on the acceptable number of membership denials based – i.e., the probability of a membership test having a certain number of failures on the reduced membership list, the bars in these PMFs are colored blue or orange to indicate a pass or a failure. In cases where the party does meet legislative requirements, the blue bars ( P(success) ) should, according to AEC Policy, always sum to > 0.9 . Where P(success) < 0.5 , the case is deemed a farce and marked as such. LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 11 --- LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 12 --- LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 13 --- What happens if Flux gains more members? Moreover, say that Flux is gaining members faster than it is losing them. (‘Losing’ members means that they will now answer “No” but do not revoke their membership.) It turns out that this can make the AEC’s methodology less likely to succeed. Go figure: a party increases it’s membership and the AEC test get’s less accurate! See Fig 5.2, Example 5.2.1, Example 5.2.2 (Filtered=0), Example 5.2.3 (Filtered=24). The system is rigged. It’s a farce. Finally, there are cases where the AEC’s method fails even more spectacularly. Say 50% of Flux’s 4680 members submitted (as part of our objection to the AEC’s consideration of involuntary deregistration) respond “No” – the AEC’s method fails 100% of the time in this case, even though Flux would exceed the legislative requirement by 1.56x. See Fig 5.3, and related: Example 5.3.1. Update: additionally, see 8. Flux’s Second Membership Test (March 2022). Reading These Graphs N Members: The number of members that the party is capable of submitting, i.e., they are validated to the best of the party’s ability. Submitted: The number of members that the party submits to the AEC. Filtered Out: The number of members removed without replacement by the AEC – parties cannot preemptively remove these members as the AEC uses information that is unavailable to parties. Sample: The number of members after AEC filtering. P(denial): The probability that a member will deny membership when contacted. (Y: …, N: …): The number of members that, when contacted by the AEC, will respectively respond: “yes”, and “no”. Note: if a member does not respond to a request for contact, the AEC selects a new member to contact from the sample. Simulations: The number of times the AEC test was simulated while generating the distribution. Eligible?: whether the party is eligible under the Electoral Act. Exhaustive test: would the party pass a membership test if every member in the sample group were contacted? Note: this is limited by AEC policy to 1650 (or 550 prior to Sept 2021). “x bar” ( ): The mean of the distribution, i.e., the average number of denials. “sigma sub x” ( ): Standard deviation of the distribution. “sigma sub x bar” ( ): Standard error of the distribution. P(Conflict: AEC Method ↔ Exhaustive): The probability that the AEC’s method conflicts with the results of an exhaustive test. P(Conflict: AEC Method ↔ Reality): The probability AEC’s method fails (i.e., produces a false positive or false negative). ±: This indicates the 95% confidence interval. That is: the 95% confidence interval for a±b has a lower bound of a-b and an upper bound of a+b. Data in each chart has error bars in black. Analysis of Flux’s actual membership test LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 14 --- Fig 5.1: Even though an assumption of this simulation is that Flux is an eligible political party, the AEC's method fails 71.7% of the time. This is the real-world analysis of Flux's membership Note: Flux submitted 1649 members due to an off-by-one error (the spreadsheet had 1650 rows, including a row for the headings). test. Predictive analysis if Flux’s membership increases by 20% but members that will deny membership increases by 10% LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 15 --- Fig 5.2: This distribution shows that the AEC's validation method becomes less reliable as a party Improvement makes life harder! Strength is weakness! *gains* members. Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p=0.104) 80% 90% 95% 99% 15 21 28 42 Predictive analysis with a 50% denial rate Fig 5.3: If we assume that Flux provides 4680 members but only 50% of them will respond "Yes" or not respond -- indicating 2340 valid members and indicating that Flux is an eligible party -- the AEC's method fails 100% of the time. Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p<0.0005) 80% 90% 95% 99% at least 3,219 at least 4,605 at least 5,990 at least 9,209 6. Suspected Farces LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 16 --- Detecting previous farces is difficult because the AEC does not publish the results of membership tests and, too my knowledge, does not record or ask for the number of members a party could offer in support of their validity. Instead, we only know the number of members that were submitted, which is always <= 1650 (or the limit in effect at the time), and we only know this when the AEC has published a statement of reasons which is only done when there is a request for review. If a party just gives up, or otherwise misses the deadline, then we don’t hear about it and thus cannot evaluate whether a farce occurred. Note: these cases occurred prior to the September 2021 increase in required members. Therefore they are judged against the previous requirements – the test method was practically the same, the only difference being that it was calibrated for membership lists of 500-550 instead of 1500-1650. Since parties sometimes max out the number of members they may provide, the only reasonable conclusion is that they have more members they could provide if a more responsible method were used. Therefore, parties are assumed to have just enough excess capacity in additional members to be eligible, and that those extra members could have been provided. Excess Capacity Explanation Excess capacity here refers to additional members that, if not for the AEC’s limit, a party could provide – expressed as a percentage of the limit. If a party requires 10% excess capacity, and the limit of a membership list is 1650, then that party must be capable of providing a list of 1815 members that a list of 1650 members is randomly sampled from. For comparison: in Flux’s case, we had 3030 additional members (excess capacity of 184%) – excluding those that we could not validate. The AEC is sometimes able to validate members that we cannot, and we have at least 4285 additional members that we could contact with a request for them to update their details. What about cases where the member list submitted had a large number of duplicates? It is not safe to assume the absence of a farce in these cases: maintaining membership lists is difficult. In my case, I wrote thousands of lines of custom code to assist Flux in managing our member list – and the proportion of our list that is automatically matched against the electoral roll is proof of this. But, even with multiple checks for duplicates (matching phone numbers, emails, first and last names, etc), still we would occasionally get duplicates. These stragglers were usually found through a manual process before submission. At some point it just isn’t worth worrying about. However, due to the ambiguity of these cases, this document will exclude them from “suspected” farces. The Suspected Farces Since, in the following cases, the excess capacity of the party undergoing testing was not known, these are only suspected farces. 1. (Fig 6.1) 30 June 2021 – deregistration of Child Protection Party under s 137(6) (mirror) – excess capacity of 13.4% required 2. (Fig 6.2) 9 March 2021 – deregistration of Seniors United Party under s 137(6) (mirror) – excess capacity of 14.4% required 3. (Fig 6.3) 7 November 2013 – refusal to register of Cheaper Petrol Party (mirror) – excess capacity of 8.2% required 4. (Fig 6.4) 12 November 2010 – refusal to register of Seniors Action Movement (mirror) – excess capacity of 5.1% required LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 17 --- 5. (Fig 6.5) 1 March 2016 – deregistration of the Australian Democrats (mirror) – excess capacity of 6.5% required Note, the @Measured in the titles of the following graphs indicates that the failure rate is calculated directly from AEC reports of the ratio of membership denials to membership contacts. Fig 6.1: The deregistration of Child Protection Party on 30 June 2021 is suspected to have been a farce. Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p=0.176) 80% 90% 95% 99% 9 12 16 24 LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 18 --- Fig 6.2: The deregistration of SUP on 30 June 2021 is suspected to have been a farce. Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p=0.071) 80% 90% 95% 99% 22 32 41 63 LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 19 --- Fig 6.3: The refusal to register Cheaper Petrol Party on 7 November 2013 is suspected to have been a farce. Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p=0.435) 80% 90% 95% 99% 3 5 6 9 LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 20 --- Fig 6.4: The refusal to register SAM on 12 November 2010 is suspected to have been a farce. Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p=0.410) 80% 90% 95% 99% 4 5 6 9 LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 21 --- Fig 6.5: The affirmation of the decision to deregister of the Australian Democrats on 1 March 2016 is suspected to have been a farce. Note: this uses the AEC measured P(denial) , as with graphs including @Measured . Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p=0.237) 80% 90% 95% 99% 6 9 12 18 Possible Farces These are cases where the available information regarding the membership test is incomplete, so some assumptions have had to be made. Based on AEC measurements, if the party had some minimum number of members (such that it had at least 500 non-denying members), then these cases are farces. 1. 2017-08-09 Affirmation of refusal to register the Australian Affordable Housing Party – Figure 2. 2016-05-04 Set aside of decision to deregister Australian First Party – Figure Note: this is a farcical situation because, although the party was successful, the accuracy was only 48.8%. In essence, it was a 50/50 coin-flip. 3. 2017-08-09 Refusal to register The Communists – Figure 4. 2018-08-30 Refusal to register Voter Rights Party – Figure 5. 2016-08-24 Affirmation of deregistration of the Republican Party of Australia – Figure 7. Flux’s 2021 Membership Test Assuming a Threshold (9.09%) Denial Rate (including worst-case) LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 22 --- Flux is a party that has – with regards to membership lists – excess capacity; if filtered members could be replaced, we could provide them. Note that filtered members are never replaced in the AEC’s method. Given this, combined with the artificial limit on sample size, what are the true accuracy values for the AEC’s test? As it turns out, it depends on the quality of Flux’s membership list. We have a high-quality list – thanks to a lot of management code written to help with that – but many parties do not have the skills or resources to do that. Fig 7.1 shows that, for Flux’s recent membership test, the true accuracy of the AEC’s method – assuming that Flux’s members have P(denial) = 0.0909 – was 89.0%; which is lower than the 90% accuracy that’s been advertised in the past. That means that the results of the AEC’s test would incorrectly find Flux ineligible 11% of the time. Additionally, Fig 7.2 and 7.3 show that, as the number of members filtered out increases, accuracy drops – a lot. @Thresh in these titles indicates a 9.09% denial rate (which is not what was measured during Flux’s recent membership test). 9.09% = 150 / 1650. +F__ indicates that the number in place of __ is the number of members that were filtered out (e.g., duplicates, deceased members, etc). Fig 7.1: Assuming that 91.9% of the members (randomly sampled from the full list) on Flux's 2021 membership test will not deny membership when contacted (1500/1650): 500,000 simulations of Flux's membership test show that it has an accuracy of 89.0% (i.e., false negative rate of 11.0%), which is less than the AEC's previously advertised 90% accuracy. Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p=0.890) LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 23 --- 80% 90% 95% 99% 1 2 2 3 Fig 7.2: Assuming that 91.9% of the members on Flux's 2021 membership test members will not deny membership when contacted (1500/1650), and that 99 members were filtered out instead of 24: 500,000 simulations show that it is 49.2% accurate, which would constitute a farce. With a membership list of this quality, 4 membership tests would be required for a 90% chance of 1 success. Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p=0.492) 80% 90% 95% 99% 3 4 5 7 LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 24 --- Fig 7.3: Assuming that 91.9% of the members on Flux's 2021 membership test members will not deny membership when contacted (1500/1650), and that a worst-case 149 members were filtered out instead of 24: 500,000 simulations show that it is accurate just 15.1% of the time, which would constitute a farce. With a membership list of this quality, 15 membership tests would be required for a 90% chance of 1 success. Chance of 1 Success Tests Required (p=0.151) 80% 90% 95% 99% 10 15 19 29 8. Flux’s Second Membership Test (March 2022) After Flux’s response in February 2022, the AEC decided of its own accord to conduct another membership test. Flux did not request this. In fact, it makes no sense for Flux to request this because we were primarily concerned with the inability of the test to function as intended. The AEC ignored our criticisms. It appears that the AEC does not care about reason, or logic, or statistical arguments. As though to emphasize the fact that the AEC’s method is a joke, the AEC’s statement of reasons [mirror], authored by one Ms Reid, says: 22. The membership list submitted by the Party on 13 February 2022 contained 4,680 names of individuals that the Party considers to be current members (referred to as ‘members’ below). As a delegate of the Electoral Commission, I instructed that the top 1,650 names be tested to conform with the AEC’s membership testing parameters. […] LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 25 --- The membership list that we submitted was sorted alphabetically by first name. “Gloria” was the first member to miss out on the chance to be contacted. Every member whose first name came later than hers, alphabetically, was excluded. The Statement of “Reasons” Let me grace you with the AEC’s wisdom. First, consider that Flux did not ask for another membership test, and argued that the method was invalid; the list of 4680 members was not provided for the purpose of a membership test, it was provided as evidence that the AEC’s method was in conflict with reality. The “supporting statement” comprises: 25. I have considered the statement lodged by the Party on 13 February 2022, setting out reasons why the Party should not be deregistered. [Omitted: quotes of Flux’s February 2022 response] 26. I reject the reasons outlined by the Party in its statement provided on 13 February 2022 for the following reasons. 27. The Party failed membership testing for exceeding the maximum number of permitted denials according to the ABS methodology used by the AEC. It did not fail membership testing due to having an insufficient number of members being identified on the electoral roll. 28. The Electoral Act defines an elector as someone that is on the Commonwealth Electoral Roll. Section 123 of the Electoral Act prescribes that an eligible political party, not being a Parliamentary party, has ‘at least 1,500 members’. The requirement is not to be solely ‘an elector’ but to be a member of the party. 29. The Party challenges the validity of the AEC’s membership testing process. This process has been developed by the AEC to support the delegate’s consideration of whether a party has sufficient members. It is based on sampling methodology designed in consultation with the ABS and provides a valid methodology to satisfy a delegate of a party’s membership. The Electoral Commission has previously concluded that the methodology ‘was appropriate for membership 1 testing, including because it was rational, fair and practical in all the circumstances.’ 30. I consider that the membership testing results outlined above provide a more robust method for ascertaining whether a party has satisfied the requirements of the Electoral Act than a statement provided by the party. 31. In summary, I remain satisfied that the Party does not have at least 1,500 members based on the outcomes from membership testing both membership lists of 7 December 2021 and 13 February 2022. 32. Accordingly, in my capacity as a delegate of the Electoral Commission, I have deregistered VOTEFLUX.ORG | Upgrade Democracy! under s 137(6) of the Electoral Act and the particulars of the Party have been cancelled from the Register under s 138 of the Electoral Act. 1 https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/Party Registration/Registration Decisions/ 2021/notice-of-decision-with-reasons-SUPA.pdf Here is a brief analysis of the insanity of the above: Point 25 is dishonest – Flux’s arguments were ignored. Moreover, the exact thing that we criticized was the first thing that Ms Reid did. Point 27 is largely irrelevant, it doesn’t respond to anything that we said. It also contradicts point 29, which starts: “The Party challenges the validity of the AEC’s membership testing process.” If Ms Reid knows this, why did she make point 27? That the AEC method failed in spite of Flux LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 26 --- LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 27 --- Fig 8.1: Despite being eligible under the Electoral Act, Flux could never have passed the AEC's test. In this case, the AEC's method has a failure rate > 99.996%. In the AEC's words, this test is "rational, fair and practical in all the circumstances". What a joke. Rigged. There isn’t much more to say. 9. Feedback Loops Between AEC Policy and Party Behavior To my knowledge, parties typically don’t try to build membership to many thousands of members. That’s because it’s expensive, time consuming, and difficult to manage. Most importantly – there’s no point when it comes to registration. The fact that the AEC has imposed this flawed method for years means that non-parliamentary parties’ common practices are based around meeting the AEC’s policies. When the limit was 550 (and 500 members required), there literally was no point building beyond that because it would not help you in registering or maintaining registration – it was largely wasted effort. Additionally, the AEC’s policies have entrenched these common practices which enabled the political elite to change the legislative requirements suddenly and dramatically – effectively eliminate competition. The AEC is complicit. If the previous status quo was 550 members due to the AEC promulgating a culture of not going beyond this, and then parliament decides to radically change the limit (there is no reason they could not have done this gradually over, say, 10 years with a small bump each year), at what point do we acknowledge that something is rotten? The AEC is on record about why it imposes a limit on membership lists used for verification: 26. In respect of the assertion in the application for review that the AEC failed to test the lists provided by the Party on 12 June 2017 (which contained 650 members) and on 20 August 2017 (which contained 739 members), the Commission notes that the ‘Party Registration Guide’ requests that parties provide a list of between 500 to 550 members. This is considered to be to a party’s advantage, by minimizing the work required of the party in confirming the enrolment LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 28 --- status and contact details of additional other members. Source: https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/Party Registration/Registration Decisions/2018 /2018-commonwealth-of-australia-party-statement-of-reasons.pdf (mirror) Note: this case cannot be analyzed as the AEC neglected to include any results of membership tests. How about the AEC stop making decisions on behalf of parties? Especially when those decisions have been proven (by this document) to have systemically disadvantaged non-parliamentary parties, to have decreased the accuracy of the AEC membership test, to be based on falsehoods, and, ultimately, to be a reflection of a condescension and hubris that has no place running a democracy. 10. Conclusion With the AEC’s existing policies, and on the assumption that Flux is a valid party, it is only reasonable to conclude that Flux will find it increasingly difficult to remain registered and pass registration tests, even if it grows in membership. This applies to all nonparliamentary parties. That is to say: the process has a predetermined outcome, and is an empty act done for show. It is rigged, and a farce. With currently measured values (based on AEC results), it would take (on average) 7 repeated trials for Flux to have 1 successful membership test. So this is not a problem that can be solved by repeating the membership test. At least 5 past cases have been identified with farcical properties – they are suspected farces – and at least 5 additional cases have incomplete information but may be farcical. That is: in these cases the AEC’s test is less than 50% accurate, provided that those parties had additional members (which the party would have been prevented from submitting only due to AEC policy). All 5 suspected cases required less than 15% additional members – i.e., the membership test was a farce for all cases if N ≥ 630. Note that all 5 cases predate the September 2021 change to membership requirements; at the time the required number of members was 500. It has thus been found that the AEC’s method is rigged and a farce, and that there is sufficient evidence to back this up. Appendix: Definitions rigged adjective Wiktionary Pre-arranged and fixed so that the winner or outcome is decided in advance. Urban Dictionary The word rigged is used to describe situations where unfair advantages are given to one side of a conflict. Note: Urban Dictionary is included here as Cambridge and Merriam-Webster didn’t seem to have specific definitions for the adjective. rig verb LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 29 --- (Note: rigging is the gerundive of rig) Cambridge Dictionary to arrange an event or amount in a dishonest way to dishonestly influence or change something in order to get the result that you want Wiktionary To manipulate something dishonestly for personal gain or discriminatory purposes. farce noun Cambridge Dictionary a situation that is very badly organized or unfair a ridiculous situation or event, or something considered a waste of time Wiktionary A situation abounding with ludicrous incidents. A ridiculous or empty show. Merriam-Webster an empty or patently ridiculous act, proceeding, or situation Appendix: AEC Membership Testing Tables Note: the first column of these tables (“Members lodged”, “Eligible membership”) is the reduced membership list after filtering out e.g., duplicates, members supporting the registration of other parties, deceased members, etc. It is “AEC Policy” that lists are no more than 1.1x the legislative limit (e.g., a maximum of 550 prior to September 2021, and 1650 after September 2021). That is: lists with more members than this are rejected. September 2021 to February 2022 Source: Page 24 of https://web.archive.org/web/20220206003633/https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/ Party Registration/guide/files/party-registration-guide.pdf Members lodged Random sample size Maximum denials to pass 1,500 1,506 1,523 1,543 1,562 1,582 18 27 33 38 42 46 0 1 2 3 4 5 LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 30 --- 1,599 1,616 1,633 1,647 1,650 50 53 57 60 60 6 7 8 9 9 Experimental Eval (No Published Accuracy Values) Members lodged; N_reduced Measured risk of accepting 1200; P(denial) = (N- 1200)/N; N = N_reduced; 1,500 1,506 1,523 1,543 1,562 1,582 1,599 1,616 1,633 1,647 1,650 1.8% fig 1.6% fig 1.7% fig 1.8% fig 1.9% fig 1.9% fig 1.8% fig 2.0% fig 1.7% fig 1.8% fig 1.7% fig Measured risk Measured risk of rejecting ≥ of rejecting 1500; 1500; (Threshold P(denial) = (N- case); 1500)/N; P(denial) = N = N_reduced; 150/1650 = f = 0 (no members filtered); 9.09%; N = 3300; f = 1650 - N_reduced; Measured risk of rejecting ≥ 1500; P(denial) = 20%; N = 3300; f = 1650 - N_reduced; 0.0% fig 0.5% fig 1.2% fig 1.9% fig 2.3% fig 2.8% fig 3.1% fig 3.2% fig 3.7% fig 3.6% fig 4.0% fig 82.2% fig 98.2% fig 72.0% fig 98.2% fig 58.9% fig 97.3% fig 45.9% fig 96.2% fig 33.3% fig 94.4% fig 23.6% fig 92.2% fig 16.4% fig 89.9% fig 10.3% fig 85.9% fig 6.9% fig 4.1% fig 4.2% fig 83.3% fig 78.8% fig 78.9% fig Circa 2017 to September 2021 Sources: Page 26 of https://web.archive.org/web/20210409193623/https://aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/P arty Registration/guide/files/party-registration-guide.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20200320074933/https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representati ves/Party Registration/files/party-registration-guide.pdf Members lodged Random Sample Max Denials to Pass 500 18 0 LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 31 --- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7 503 511 519 526 534 541 548 550 26 32 37 41 44 47 50 50 Circa 2012 to 2016 Sources: Page 33 of https://web.archive.org/web/20160314113418/http://aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/Par ty Registration/files/party-registration-guide.pdf Page 32 of https://web.archive.org/web/20140212032435/http://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representativ es/Party Registration/files/party-registration-guide.pdf (Note: this source includes risk columns) https://web.archive.org/web/20130208013723/http://aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/par ty registration/guide/forms.htm#table (Note: this source includes risk columns) https://web.archive.org/web/20120425182026/http://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representativ es/party registration/guide/forms.htm (Note: this source includes risk columns) Members lodged Random Sample Max Denials to accepting only 400 rejecting 500 – Pass – risk % risk % 500 503 512 521 529 537 543 548 550 18 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 50 0 1 2 3 3 5 6 7 7 1.80 1.99 2.64 2.86 2.85 2.60 2.43 2.27 2.07 0.00 1.05 3.26 4.68 5.52 6.65 6.86 6.78 8.05 Note: It seems likely that max denials to pass =3 for the members lodged =529 row is a typo – it should probably be 4 , however, in all source documents it was 3 . In the 2016 RPA statement of reasons, a list of 530 lead to 38 contacts, and 4 or more denials was a fail (so max denials to pass =3). This typo has been enforced. (How many times? Only the AEC knows.) According to the sampling methodology, as applied to a list of 530 names, if four or more people denied membership then the AEC could conclude that the party did not have 500 members.4 LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 32 --- [Footnote 4:] According to the ABS, testing a sample of 38 from a list of 530 carried with it a 2.72% risk that the AEC could end up accepting a party that had only 400 members, and a 6.17% risk that the AEC could end up rejecting a party that had 500 members. So there was a typo at some point, but the AEC actually used the typo to judge party membership. So a party with between 529 and 536 members during this period, with 4 denials, would have been wrongly denied even by the AEC’s own methodology. Also, the footnote values don’t match the previously advertised values in the table… is that just because it’s calculated for 530 instead of 529? Or did the AEC get an updated table in 2016 and those risk values changed? If they did change, why? (It’s not like the maths changed, right?) The 2016 Australian Democrats statement of reasons confirms 34 contacts for a list of 526 with maximum 3 denials. According to the sampling methodology, as applied to a list of 526 names, if four or more people 3 denied membership then the AEC could conclude that the party did not have 500 members. [Footnote 3:] According to the ABS, testing a sample of 34 from a list of 526 carried with it a 2.30% risk that the AEC could end up accepting a party that had only 400 members, and a 8.53% risk that the AEC could end up rejecting a party that had 500 members. Experimental Eval Note: The row with members lodged = 529 (corrected) corrects the erroneous max denials to pass from 3 to 4 . The AEC did not pick up on this error for at least 4 years (if they ever did). Members lodged; N_reduced Claimed: accepting only 400 – risk % Measured risk of accepting 400; P(denial) = (N- 400)/N; Claimed: rejecting 500 – risk % Measured Measured risk of risk of rejecting ≥ rejecting 500; P(denial) 500; (Threshold case); = (N- P(denial) = 500)/N; 50/550 = f = 0 (no members 9.09%; N = 1100; filtered); f = 550 - N_reduced; Measured risk of rejecting ≥ 500; P(denial) = 20%; N = 1100; f = 550 - N_reduced 500 503 512 521 529 529 (corrected) 537 543 548 1.80% 1.7% fig 0.00% 0.0% fig 82.3% fig 98.2% fig 1.99% 1.8% fig 1.05% 0.8% fig 70.1% fig 97.8% fig 2.64% 2.3% fig 3.26% 2.8% fig 52.3% fig 95.8% fig 2.86% 2.5% fig 4.68% 4.1% fig 37.4% fig 93.3% fig 2.85% 0.7% fig 5.52% 14.6% fig 45.9% fig 96.3% fig 2.85% 2.4% fig 5.52% 4.8% fig 25.8% fig 90.6% fig 2.60% 2.2% fig 6.65% 5.9% fig 17.4% fig 87.6% fig 2.43% 2.0% fig 6.86% 6.0% fig 11.6% fig 84.6% fig 2.27% 1.8% fig 6.78% 5.8% fig 7.6% fig 81.5% fig LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 33 --- LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 34 --- meet requirements. The italicized part is not correct. The AEC's method is much better than this -- it only fails 10% to 20% of the time (the above quote implies that the method fails more than 50% of the time). The exact false negative rate depends on the number of members filtered by the AEC, similar to how our December 2021 list of 1649 names had 24 entries filtered. The AEC's method is more reliable when fewer names are filtered, with the 20% false negative rate corresponding to 25 members filtered out. (0 names filtered corresponds to a 10% false negative rate.) It is worth pointing out that there are similar (though slightly more extreme) parameters that do result in a >50% failure rate of the AEC's method. For example a party of 2000 members, 300 of which are malicious, and 15 names filtered has a failure rate of 50.4%. Note, there are some other errors too, like the method mentioned in the The AEC’s membership test methodology artificially reduces sample size section uses the random sampling size that was used in Flux’s test, but it probably should have been 60 instead of 53. Not really a big deal. Use of “confidence” in prior versions In some prior versions of this document, the term “confidence” was used instead of “accuracy”. That is: it was used to describe how often the AEC’s test arrived at the correct result. LEX3070 Released Document No. 3Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 35 --- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. REDACTION CODES Personal Information (name) redacted. Personal Information (date of birth) redacted. Personal Information (place of birth) redacted Personal Information (citizenship) redacted. Personal Information (racial or ethnic origin) redacted. Personal Information (photograph) redacted Personal Information (facsimile of signature) redacted. Personal Information (facsimile of manuscript initialling) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s address) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s email address) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s telephone number or mobile number) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s political opinion) redacted. Personal Information (opinion about individual) redacted. Personal Information (Individuals current or former occupation). Personal Information (employment history) redacted. Personal Information (qualifications) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a professional or trade association). Personal Information (membership of a trade union). Personal Information (health) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a political association) redacted Personal Information (religious beliefs or affiliations) redacted. Personal Information (sexual orientation or practices). Personal Information (criminal record). Personal Information (identifying individual) redacted. Personal Information (bank account details) redacted) Business information (bank account details) redacted. Business information (billing account details) redacted. Business information (ureasonably affect a person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs) redacted. Business Information (reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth or an agency for the purpose of the administration of a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or the administration of matters administered by an agency). 30. Business information (trade secret). --- Page 36 --- 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. Business information (information having a commercial value that would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed). Legal Professional Communication redacted. Deliberative material redacted. Electoral Roll material redacted. Tests, examinations or audits material redacted. Management or assessment of personnel material redacted. Proper and efficient conduct of the operations of AEC material redacted. Lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law redactged 39. Irrelevant material redacted.
This document is a formal "Request for Review of Decision to Deregister Flux" (under s 141(2) of the Electoral Act), submitted to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) by Flux. Its relevance to FOI request LEX3070 is central, as it directly constitutes one of the applications sought by the request and provides the "extensive analysis" from Flux mentioned in the request overview.
The document details Flux's argument that the AEC's party membership verification methodology is "faulty," "flawed," "inaccurate," "unreliable," "unfair," "unsuitable," and ultimately "rigged," leading to arbitrary deregistration outcomes. Flux asserts it was wrongfully deregistered despite having sufficient members, claiming the AEC's method "provides no meaningful information on whether Flux is eligible or not."
Key points from the document's statistical analysis and arguments include:
* Demonstrated Flaws: Using a hypothetical party (mirroring Flux's situation), it calculates that an eligible party has an extremely low probability (0.0020% ± 0.0012%) of passing the AEC's test, implying a false negative rate greater than 99.99%.
* "Rigged" Methodology: It formally defines "rigged" and "farce" based on predetermined or unfair outcomes, asserting the AEC's method fits these definitions due to its high false negative rate.
* Bias in Sampling: Flux highlights that for its second membership test (March 2022), the AEC sampled only the top 1,650 members from an alphabetically sorted list, effectively limiting the sample to names starting with A-G, introducing bias.
* Challenge to AEC's Accuracy Claims: The accompanying statistical analysis report, "AEC Party Membership Test Methodology is Rigged! A Statistical Analysis of AEC Methodology and Graphs (of PMFs)," directly refutes the AEC's claim of 90% accuracy, demonstrating that the worst-case accuracy can be as low as 0% or 15.1% depending on the scenario.
* Systemic Issue: The document identifies 5 "suspected" and 5 "possible" historical instances where other parties may have been subject to similar "farcical" outcomes due to the AEC's flawed methodology and policies that discourage parties from maintaining larger membership lists.
* Policy Critique: It criticizes AEC policies, such as the imposition of a maximum limit on submitted membership lists, arguing these artificially restrict testing parameters and disadvantage non-parliamentary parties, especially in light of the sudden increase in legislative membership requirements.
In summary, this document is a prime example of the challenges to the AEC's administrative processes, specifically its membership verification methodology, as detailed in the FOI request overview. It provides the core statistical and fairness arguments made by Flux against its deregistration, arguing the method is fundamentally flawed and biased.
LEX3070 Released Document No. 5.pdf (pdf)
Download file--- Page 1 --- From: Sent: To: Subject: Friday, 6 May 2022 2:12 AM Commission Secretariat Please review your recent decision to deregister flux party. CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the Australian Federal Government. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. My name is , my current residence is I was linked to an article on the website of the flux party via one of their communication channels: https://www.voteflux.org/2022/04/20/wrongful-deregistration/ This article outlines reasons that the flux party believe their deregistration was unfair/unjust and I agree with their reasoning; that there is no reason not to poll the list of active memberships extensively to reach the firmest result. The flux party pose a plausible attempt at contesting the status quo and creating a better life for all Australians, so I ask that you please review your recent decision to deregister flux party. Thanks, 1 LEX3070 Released Document No. 51019Released under the Freedom of Information Act 19821
- Document Description: This is an email dated May 6, 2022, from a member of the public to the AEC's Commission Secretariat.
- Content: The sender requests that the AEC review its decision to deregister the Flux Party. They reference a Flux Party article outlining reasons for "wrongful-deregistration" and agree with the party's assertion that the AEC's membership verification methodology is flawed, specifically by not polling the list of active memberships extensively enough to achieve a "firmest result."
- Relevance to FOI Request (LEX3070): This document is directly relevant as it concerns a challenge to a party deregistration decision made by the AEC during early 2022, falling within the scope of applications sought under s 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. It specifically supports the Flux Party's arguments that the AEC's membership verification methodology is "statistically flawed, unfair, and results in arbitrary deregistration outcomes," a key theme identified in the FOI request overview.
LEX3070 Released Document No. 6.pdf (pdf)
Download file--- Page 1 --- From: Sent: To: Subject: Thursday, 5 May 2022 3:22 PM Commission Secretariat Application under s 141(2) regarding Health Australia Party CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the Australian Federal Government. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. To: Mr Tom Rogers via email: commission.secretariat@aec.gov.au Hi, This is an application under s 141(2) of the EA to review the decision to deregister Health Australia Party (HAP) [1]. I learned of HAP's deregistration on the 14th of April. As a voter I am affected by the wrongful deregistration of political parties and I am concerned that the AEC's processes are inadequate. Thus I am concerned that wrongful deregistrations have occurred many times and are continuing to occur -- HAP being just one example of more than a do en. Particularly: I do not believe the AEC's membership testing method is accurate enough to support the decision. This is because, based on the statistics gathered and published by the AEC in [1], the AEC's method had a false negative rate of 72.34% ± 0.12% if HAP has > 1769 members. That is, *if* HAP has > 1769 members, *then* it is expected that the AEC's method has that false negative rate. The number 1769 is important because, based on the data gathered by the AEC, *if* HAP could have submitted 1769 members then they would have passed this hypothetical membership test. (Note, there is no mathematical reason that the membership test methodology could not simply allow longer lists; the only restriction is *AEC policy alone*.) HAP's Nov 2021 membe ship test had a false negative rate of 72.40% ± 0.12% if HAP has > 1769 members. This means that, if HAP has more than 1769 members (which would imply they are an eligible party), that the probability that HAP passed either the first test or failed the first but passed the second was only 0.476 -- i.e., 47.6%. That's worse odds than a coin flip. S nce the AEC, *by the Commission's own policy,* does not allow a party to submit more than 1650 members as part of the test methodology, there is no way -- by the best known principles of statistics and the philosophy of science available to us -- that the AEC can be statistically confident in the results of the membership test methodology, and thus the Commission does not have statistical grounds for the decision to deregister. This is especially poignant considering that HAP claims to have ~4,000 members nationally [1]. Considering the AEC's measurements to-date, it is reasonable to expect that HAP could produce an additional 129 members unless evidence can be produced to contradict this. The membership testing method does not gather such evidence -- and parties are forbidden from submitting additional members -- so it is a mystery how the AEC would have such evidence. In fact, if the lists that HAP submitted to the AEC have fewer than 1521 overlapping members, HAP has 1 LEX3070 Released Document No. 6Released under the Freedom of Information Act 198210 --- Page 2 --- already proven to the AEC that it does have sufficient membership. How many members were on both lists submitted by HAP? Given the above, I request that the decision to deregister HAP be set aside. As evidence of my claims, please see [2] -- particularly Fig 6.6 which is the results of the statistical analysis of HAP's Feb 2022 membership test. (A link to the results of the analysis of HAP's Nov 2021 membership test are linked in Fig 6.6's description.) Additionally, I note that the AEC has made trivial mistakes in the documentation and execution of the method (see [3]), so I have no faith that those employees or delegates of the Commission that execute the method have any idea whatsoever about how to do it correctly, what the requirements for statistical validity are, or how to check that they are not making a mistake. Thus, the Commission should also reconsider their entire testing framework, setting aside all decisions to deregister or refuse registration on the basis of the results of the testing method until such a time when the Commission obtains the relevant skills necessary to develop a method that is not predetermined n some cases. I can't request that under s 141(2); it's just my opinion. Seems worth mentioning, though. Max Kaye [1]: https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties and Representatives/Party Registration/Deregistered parties/files/statement-of- reasons-health-australia-party.pdf [2]: https://xertrov.github.io/aec-membership-test-simulator/#6-suspected-farces [3]: https://xertrov.github.io/aec-membership-test-simulator/#circa-2012-to-2016 2 LEX3070 Released Document No. 6Released under the Freedom of Information Act 19829 --- Page 3 --- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. REDACTION CODES Personal Information (name) redacted. Personal Information (date of birth) redacted. Personal Information (place of birth) redacted Personal Information (citizenship) redacted. Personal Information (racial or ethnic origin) redacted. Personal Information (photograph) redacted Personal Information (facsimile of signature) redacted. Personal Information (facsimile of manuscript initialling) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s address) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s email address) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s telephone number or mobile number) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s political opinion) redacted. Personal Information (opinion about individual) redacted. Personal Information (Individuals current or former occupation). Personal Information (employment history) redacted. Personal Information (qualifications) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a professional or trade association). Personal Information (membership of a trade union). Personal Information (health) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a political association) redacted Personal Information (religious beliefs or affiliations) redacted. Personal Information (sexual orientation or practices). Personal Information (criminal record). Personal Information (identifying individual) redacted. Personal Information (bank account details) redacted) Business information (bank account details) redacted. Business information (billing account details) redacted. Business information (ureasonably affect a person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs) redacted. Business Information (reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth or an agency for the purpose of the administration of a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or the administration of matters administered by an agency). 30. Business information (trade secret). --- Page 4 --- 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. Business information (information having a commercial value that would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed). Legal Professional Communication redacted. Deliberative material redacted. Electoral Roll material redacted. Tests, examinations or audits material redacted. Management or assessment of personnel material redacted. Proper and efficient conduct of the operations of AEC material redacted. Lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law redactged 39. Irrelevant material redacted.
This document is an application submitted under s 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 on 5 May 2022 by Max Kaye, seeking a review of the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) decision to deregister the Health Australia Party (HAP). The core argument is that the AEC's party membership verification methodology is statistically flawed and inaccurate.
The applicant contends that the AEC's method exhibits a high false-negative rate (e.g., 72.34% ± 0.12% for HAP's Feb 2022 test if the party had over 1769 members), leading to an inability for the AEC to be statistically confident in its deregistration decisions. It highlights that AEC policy limits the number of members a party can submit for testing, preventing parties from demonstrating sufficient membership even if they possess it (HAP claims ~4,000 members). The application requests that HAP's deregistration decision be set aside and broadly suggests the AEC should reconsider its entire testing framework due to these methodological deficiencies.
Relevance to FOI Request: This document is highly relevant as it is an application made under s 141(2) during early 2022 concerning a party deregistration decision. It directly aligns with the FOI request's theme of challenges to the AEC's administrative processes, particularly the party membership verification methodology. The document explicitly details concerns regarding the statistical validity, fairness, and arbitrary outcomes of the AEC's method, mirroring the broader challenges raised by other parties like Flux (who described the method as "rigged") and the Democratic Labour Party.
LEX3070 Released Document No. 7.pdf (pdf)
Download file--- Page 1 --- From: Sent: To: Subject: Friday, 8 April 2022 10:50 AM Commission Secretariat RE: Attention Mr Tom Rogers [SEC=OFFICIAL] Follow Up Flag: Flag Status: Follow up Completed CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the Australian Federal Government. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Adam My address is Thank you Isaac Golden Dr Isaac Golden and CLINIC PHONE: 03 5427 0880 MOBILE (for PO Box 695, Gisborne, 3437 Email: Web: www.homstudy.net Protect the future of natural medicine in Australia Join the Health Australia Party www.healthaustraliaparty.com.au From: Commission Secretariat <Commission.Secretariat@aec.gov.au> Sent: Friday, 8 April 2022 10:12 AM To: Cc: Commission Secretariat <Commission.Secretariat@aec.gov.au> Subject: RE: Attention Mr Tom Rogers [SEC=OFFICIAL] Dear Dr Isaac Golden, I refer to your email of 7 April 2022 to the Electoral Commission, in which you have requested a review by the three- person Electoral Commission of the decision of 5 April 2022 to deregister the Health Australia Party and cancel the Party’s particulars from the Register of Political Parties. As per the review rights in the statement of reasons, and in accordance with ss 141(2) and 141(3) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, an application for review must: • • • • be in writing; specify the name of the applicant; specify an address of the applicant; and set out the reasons for making the application. I note that your application does not contain the address of the applicant. As this is a legislative requirement, I must ask if you intend to lodge an application to please provide the address of the applicant in response to this email. 1 10939391010LEX3070 Released Document No. 7Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 2 --- Yours sincerely, Adam Commission Secretariat Australian Electoral Commission From: Sent: Thursday, 7 April 2022 4:43 PM To: Commission Secretariat <Commission.Secretariat@aec.gov.au> Subject: Attention Mr Tom Rogers CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the Australian Federal Government. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Mr Tom Rogers AEC Commission.secretariat.aec.gov.au Dear Mr Rogers, RE: BDPXL8: Notice under 137(6) to deregister the Health Australia Party (HAP) dated 5/4/2022 I refer to the above noted decision by Joanne Reid to deregister HAP and I now formally request a review of the decision under S 141(2) of the Electoral Act. I have sought advice from a number of people, especially Mr Mark Aldridge in Adelaide. The three principal reasons for making this application are: 1. 1. The method used by the AEC to determine our eligibility is not legislated, and we have been advised would not withstand a legal challenge. We have been advised that the direction to submit a list of only 1,650 members is not legislated. We believe that we should have been allowed to submit our full member list of around 3,000 members and allow either the AEC to 2 10LEX3070 Released Document No. 7Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 3 --- demonstrate that we did not have 1,500 members or, conversely allow that list to demonstrate we did have more than 1,500 members. 2. 2. We understand that the 36 members you identified as supporting the registration of another Party were not contacted to inquire if they wished to be considered as members of the HAP, or the other Party, meaning that some probably should have been included in our audit. 3. 3. Unfairness: The AEC denied our request, as a nationally registered Party, to access the ELIAS database for every State and Territory to allow us to confirm that members were correctly enrolled on the electoral rolls. We were only given access to the Victorian database. This materially restricted our ability to correct our national roll (which we had, prior to the second submission, reduced from around 4,000 members to around 3,000 members). That would have meant that the 5 deceased members and the 16 members not able to be matched to the electoral roll would not have been included in our list, and we would have had the opportunity to supply you with a more accurate list. Mr Aldridge advised us that other issues could be raised, but we believe that the three above issues alone warrant a review and overturning of the decision that the HAP does not have 1,500 members. If, as part of your review, we are required to submit our complete list of members, we would first request that we be given access to the full ELIAS database so that we can prune any deceased or unenrolled people from our list of 3,000. We believe even a further severe pruning would demonstrate we have over 2,500 current members. We appreciate your consideration of our submission, including your advice as to our current status regarding the election which has not yet been called. Yours sincerely, Dr Isaac Golden National Secretary Health Australia Party 3 LEX3070 Released Document No. 7Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 4 --- Personal email: HAP email: executive@healthaustraliaparty.com.au 7th April, 2022 DISCLAIMER: If you have received this transmission in error please notify us immediately by return email and delete all copies. If this email or any attachments have been sent to you in error, that error does not constitute waiver of any confidentiality, privilege or copyright in respect of information in the email or attachments. 4 10LEX3070 Released Document No. 7Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 5 --- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. REDACTION CODES Personal Information (name) redacted. Personal Information (date of birth) redacted. Personal Information (place of birth) redacted Personal Information (citizenship) redacted. Personal Information (racial or ethnic origin) redacted. Personal Information (photograph) redacted Personal Information (facsimile of signature) redacted. Personal Information (facsimile of manuscript initialling) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s address) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s email address) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s telephone number or mobile number) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s political opinion) redacted. Personal Information (opinion about individual) redacted. Personal Information (Individuals current or former occupation). Personal Information (employment history) redacted. Personal Information (qualifications) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a professional or trade association). Personal Information (membership of a trade union). Personal Information (health) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a political association) redacted Personal Information (religious beliefs or affiliations) redacted. Personal Information (sexual orientation or practices). Personal Information (criminal record). Personal Information (identifying individual) redacted. Personal Information (bank account details) redacted) Business information (bank account details) redacted. Business information (billing account details) redacted. Business information (ureasonably affect a person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs) redacted. Business Information (reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth or an agency for the purpose of the administration of a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or the administration of matters administered by an agency). 30. Business information (trade secret). --- Page 6 --- 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. Business information (information having a commercial value that would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed). Legal Professional Communication redacted. Deliberative material redacted. Electoral Roll material redacted. Tests, examinations or audits material redacted. Management or assessment of personnel material redacted. Proper and efficient conduct of the operations of AEC material redacted. Lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law redactged 39. Irrelevant material redacted.
This document is a formal application from the Health Australia Party (HAP), submitted by Dr Isaac Golden (National Secretary) on April 7, 2022, for a review under s 141(2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. It seeks to overturn the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) decision of April 5, 2022, to deregister HAP. The application was supplemented on April 8, 2022, with the required applicant address.
The principal reasons provided for the review are:
* Challenged Membership Verification Methodology: HAP argues that the AEC's direction to submit a list of only 1,650 members is not legislated and that they should have been permitted to submit their full list of approximately 3,000 members for validation.
* Flawed Audit Process: HAP contends that 36 members identified by the AEC as supporting another party were not contacted to confirm their preference, potentially leading to their incorrect exclusion from HAP's membership audit.
* Unfair Access to Electoral Data: HAP claims that the AEC's denial of access to the full national ELIAS database (providing only the Victorian database) unfairly restricted their ability to verify and correct their national membership roll, hindering their capacity to demonstrate sufficient members.
This document is highly relevant to FOI request LEX3070, as it is a direct example of an application made under s 141(2) concerning a party deregistration decision, specifically from the Health Australia Party as noted in the request overview. It clearly demonstrates the overarching theme of challenges to the AEC's administrative processes, providing specific arguments related to perceived flaws, unfairness, and arbitrary outcomes in the AEC's party membership verification methodology.
LEX3070 Released Document No. 8.pdf (pdf)
Download file--- Page 1 --- From: Sent: To: Subject: Monday, 11 April 2022 8:04 AM Commission Secretariat; FAD request for internal review Follow Up Flag: Flag Status: Follow up Completed CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the Australian Federal Government. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. TO Mr Tom Rogers Australian Electoral Commissioner Dear Mr Rogers Thank you for the email notifying me of the decision dated 18 March 2022 to register the David Pocock party. I of seek internal review of the decision. I note that I have made an FOI request for all documents relating to consideration of my objection to the decision to register the David Pock Party. I believe those documents may inform my internal review request. I am conscious of the public interest in resolving this matter quickly and I have requested expeditious processing of my FOI application. I had hoped that the AEC would recognise the public interest in speedy resolution of internal review requests and would process the related FOI request speedily. I am therefore disappointed that my FOI request has still not been determined. I seek your agreement to my supplementing this internal review request when the response to my FOI application is received. It is apparent from reading the decision to register the David Pocock Party that the decision-maker has taken an extraordinarily narrow approach to statutory interpretation. The decision-maker has followed a ‘ticking boxes’ approach without consideration of the scheme of the legislation or its purpose. Also, notwithstanding a heading ‘Findings of Fact and Consideration’ the decision-maker has failed to make a finding of fact in relation to a key factual issue raised in the objections. It follows that the decision is fundamentally flawed. Two key issues were raised in the objections to the application to register the David Pocock Party. Issue (1)-that at the time of the application for registration it was clear from interviews published in the media including in the major ACT daily newspaper the Canberra Times that Mr David Pocock has publicly admitted that he was a citizen of a foreign country, Zimbabwe, and therefore ineligible for the Senate. This public admission is a serious question of fact. 1 LEX3070 Released Document No. 81019Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 2 --- 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. Business information (information having a commercial value that would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed). Legal Professional Communication redacted. Deliberative material redacted. Electoral Roll material redacted. Tests, examinations or audits material redacted. Management or assessment of personnel material redacted. Proper and efficient conduct of the operations of AEC material redacted. Lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law redactged 39. Irrelevant material redacted. --- Page 3 --- The decision-maker has failed to make a relevant finding of fact. It was necessary for the decision-maker first to make a relevant finding of fact relating to matters raised in the objections then to set out reasons in relation to the legal significance of that finding of fact. The purpose of registration is to enable ‘above the line’ voting. Registration that would facilitate ‘election’ of a candidate not lawfully eligible would clearly be contrary to the scheme of the Act. The AEC will be aware that before the last election the AEC failed to establish proper eligibility procedures, as a result of this procedural failure on the part of the AEC persons who were ineligible nominated, election of a number of persons were subsequently overturned by the High Court on the foreign citizenship issue. Some regard the AEC as having failed properly to perform its functions eg properly drawing attention to the legal requirements to be eligible to nominate. The AEC should not in effect mislead the Australian public by registering as a party the name of a person who at the time of the application for registration on his own admission was not eligible for election. I emphasise that my submission is not that the AEC should itself determine eligibility. That is not the AEC’s function. My submission is that, Mr Pocock having publicly admitted that he was a citizen of Zimbabwe, the AEC should not have ignored the consequences when determining the registration application. As a minimum, having regard to Mr Pocock’s public admission that he was a citizen of Zimbabwe, and having regard to objections raising this issue, certain consequences should have been followed. The AEC and the decision-maker should have found as a fact that Mr Pocock had publicly admitted that he was a citizen of Zimbabwe. The AEC and the decision-maker should also have found as a fact that objections had been made on this ground. The AEC should then have considered the implications of its findings of fact, in particular, the AEC should have drawn Mr Pocock’s attention to the eligibility requirements and drawn his attention to the standard qualification check list for candidates. Also, as the fact of Mr Pocock’s public admission that he was a citizen of Zimbabwe was raised in the objections, this should not have been ignored in the decision-maker’s finding of facts. The decision-maker simply failed to make a relevant finding of fact. The AEC should not register as a party the name of a person who on his own admission is a citizen of foreign country and therefore ineligible. The significance of registration of a name of a person who is inedible cannot just be ignored. The application can easily be cured by the applicant himself by lodging a fresh application if and when Mr Pocock has terminated citizenship of a foreign country and become eligible for election. This issue is not to be resolved not by ‘ticking boxes’ but by proper consideration of the scheme of the Act and the purposes and consequences of registration. On this correct approach to statutory interpretation, it is abundantly clear that registration of the name of a person who, on his own admission, and as drawn to attention in the objections to registration, is a citizen of a foreign country and therefore is ineligible, is contrary to the scheme of the Act and the consequences of registration. It follows that the application must be rejected. 2 LEX3070 Released Document No. 8Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 4 --- Issue (2) The proposed name ‘David Pocock’ is not consistent with the concept of a party. The reasons for this objection are set out in more detail in the decision-maker’s summary of objections from Ernst, Neil and Lis. I adopt all those reasons in this objection-I think it is unnecessary to set them out in detail again but I ask that the AEC reviewer take account of all those reasons as summarised in the decision. Again the decision-maker has adopted a ‘ticking boxes’ approach without understanding the scheme and purpose of the Act. It must surely be obvious that an application to be registered as a party must satisfy the legal concept of ‘party’. To explain this by analogy, if seeking to register a motor vehicle it is not possible to register a cat, because a cat is not a motor vehicle. Similarly, to register a party there must be something that satisfies the legal concept of a party. As a matter of common sense, a single person or the name of a person does not constitute a party. A party simply put is a body of persons united in some sort of cause or opinion or otherwise engaged together. These matters have been set out in greater length in the objections from Ernst, Neil and Lis set out in the decision. A party may incorporate the name of a person, so, for example, ‘David Pocock for Canberra’ would satisfy the party concept. The error in the decision can be illustrated by drawing attention to the consequences for the ballot paper. If the application were allowed to stand the ballot paper would have David Pocock above the line, as a name. Electors wishing to vote ‘below the line’ would also find the name David Pocock below the line. Surely this outcome would be perverse. Surely the scheme object and purpose of the Act envisage that the identification ‘above the line’ must be different from the name that appears below the line. The consequential confusion and uncertainty is obvious. Some electors may tick David Pocock boxes both above and below the line, some may be confused about how to allocate preferences and so on. In short, what appears above the line and what appears below the line must surely be different. A party must be different from and more than just a name. I add that it is arguable that this outcome would give Mr Pocock an unfair advantage over other candidates, his name and his name on its own would appear twice on the ballot paper. The decision-maker has failed to have regard to the scheme of the Act and the consequences for the ballot paper. This difficulty can readily be rectified. It is not for objectors to assist the applicant on how to rectify the defect but just to show how easy the defect could be remedied I suggest that a party name along the lines of the proposed logo would suffice. It follows that the application must be rejected. The applicant should be invited to submit a fresh application with an appropriate party name. Yours sincerely 3 LEX3070 Released Document No. 8Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 5 --- 11 April 2022 4 LEX3070 Released Document No. 81Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 6 --- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. REDACTION CODES Personal Information (name) redacted. Personal Information (date of birth) redacted. Personal Information (place of birth) redacted Personal Information (citizenship) redacted. Personal Information (racial or ethnic origin) redacted. Personal Information (photograph) redacted Personal Information (facsimile of signature) redacted. Personal Information (facsimile of manuscript initialling) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s address) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s email address) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s telephone number or mobile number) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s political opinion) redacted. Personal Information (opinion about individual) redacted. Personal Information (Individuals current or former occupation). Personal Information (employment history) redacted. Personal Information (qualifications) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a professional or trade association). Personal Information (membership of a trade union). Personal Information (health) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a political association) redacted Personal Information (religious beliefs or affiliations) redacted. Personal Information (sexual orientation or practices). Personal Information (criminal record). Personal Information (identifying individual) redacted. Personal Information (bank account details) redacted) Business information (bank account details) redacted. Business information (billing account details) redacted. Business information (ureasonably affect a person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs) redacted. Business Information (reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth or an agency for the purpose of the administration of a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or the administration of matters administered by an agency). 30. Business information (trade secret).
This document is an internal review request, dated April 11, 2022, challenging the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) decision to register the "David Pocock party." The request raises two primary objections:
* Candidate Eligibility: The objector contends that David Pocock had publicly admitted to being a citizen of Zimbabwe, making him ineligible for the Senate. It is argued that the AEC's decision-maker failed to make a factual finding on this critical issue and that registering a party named after an ineligible individual is contrary to the Commonwealth Electoral Act's scheme and could mislead the public.
* Party Name Consistency: The objector asserts that "David Pocock" as a party name is inconsistent with the legal concept of a "party," which typically represents a body of persons rather than an individual. Concerns are raised about potential voter confusion on the ballot paper, where "David Pocock" would appear both above the line (as a party) and below the line (as a candidate), potentially creating an unfair advantage.
The objector claims the AEC adopted an "extraordinarily narrow approach to statutory interpretation" and a "ticking boxes" methodology, failing to consider the Act's broader scheme and purpose.
This document is highly relevant to the FOI request (LEX3070) as it directly concerns a specific challenge to an AEC party registration decision, aligning with the request's focus on applications made under s 141(2) during early 2022 regarding party registration and deregistration reviews. It specifically addresses the "objection to the registration of the David Pocock party based on candidate eligibility and name consistency," as highlighted in the request overview. Furthermore, the document explicitly mentions the objector's related FOI request for documents concerning their initial objection to the David Pocock party's registration, reinforcing the interconnectedness of these administrative challenges to AEC processes.
LEX3070 Released Document No. 9.pdf (pdf)
Download file--- Page 1 --- Mr Tom Rogers Australian Electoral Commissioner Locked Bag 4007, Canberra City ACT 2601 commission.secretariat@aec.gov.au Dear Mr Rogers, I am writing to request an urgent internal review of the AEC’s decision to deregister the Australian Progressives, as notified in the letter received on the 16th of March. When reading through the reasoning given for deregistration, it became clear that some sort of clerical error has occurred with the validation of the second member list that was submitted on February 11th 2022. In the Breakdown of the first member list submitted on December 8th, the AEC was able to match 1475 members. The second member list submitted on February 11, was an amended version of that same list - with insufficient amendments to justify a 1290 person drop in match rate - from 96% on the December 8 list, to 12% on the February 11 list. We also note that there is a more substantial breakdown of the December 8 list, with members being manually matched, as well as the identification of 13 deceased members. The lack of a similar breakdown in the response to our February 11 submission suggests that the process has not been followed with the same level of rigour. It is apparent that some form of clerical error has occurred in the AEC’s assessment of our membership list which was submitted on the 11th of February - there is no other reasonable explanation for such a significant drop in the number of members matched to the electoral roll. We request that this matter is addressed urgently as the Federal election is due to be called within weeks - and this error has put our ability to contest the election at risk. In addition, the Party risks reputational damage as a result of this error, so we would appreciate prompt action to resolve it. We are confident that we have over the 1500 required members to remain registered, as a reflection of our team’s dedication to cleaning the list and verifying information, and believe that investigation of this clerical error will support this confidence. Regards, Edward Carroll Registered Officer Australian Progressives 42 Messara Circuit DURACK QLD 4077 edward.carroll@progressives.org.au www.progressives.org.au LEX3070 Released Document No. 911Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 --- Page 2 --- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. REDACTION CODES Personal Information (name) redacted. Personal Information (date of birth) redacted. Personal Information (place of birth) redacted Personal Information (citizenship) redacted. Personal Information (racial or ethnic origin) redacted. Personal Information (photograph) redacted Personal Information (facsimile of signature) redacted. Personal Information (facsimile of manuscript initialling) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s address) redacted. Personal Information (Individual’s email address) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s telephone number or mobile number) redacted. Personal Information (individual’s political opinion) redacted. Personal Information (opinion about individual) redacted. Personal Information (Individuals current or former occupation). Personal Information (employment history) redacted. Personal Information (qualifications) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a professional or trade association). Personal Information (membership of a trade union). Personal Information (health) redacted. Personal Information (membership of a political association) redacted Personal Information (religious beliefs or affiliations) redacted. Personal Information (sexual orientation or practices). Personal Information (criminal record). Personal Information (identifying individual) redacted. Personal Information (bank account details) redacted) Business information (bank account details) redacted. Business information (billing account details) redacted. Business information (ureasonably affect a person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs) redacted. Business Information (reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth or an agency for the purpose of the administration of a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or the administration of matters administered by an agency). 30. Business information (trade secret). --- Page 3 --- 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. Business information (information having a commercial value that would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed). Legal Professional Communication redacted. Deliberative material redacted. Electoral Roll material redacted. Tests, examinations or audits material redacted. Management or assessment of personnel material redacted. Proper and efficient conduct of the operations of AEC material redacted. Lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law redactged 39. Irrelevant material redacted.
This document is an urgent request from the Australian Progressives to the Australian Electoral Commissioner for an internal review of their deregistration. The party alleges a significant clerical error in the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) validation of their membership list submitted on February 11, 2022. They state that an earlier list submitted on December 8, 2021, resulted in 1475 matched members (96%), whereas the amended February 11 list inexplicably led to a "1290 person drop in match rate" to only 12%. The party contends this drastic reduction is illogical without a clerical error and notes a lack of detailed breakdown for the second list's assessment, suggesting a less rigorous process. The Australian Progressives assert they have over the 1500 required members and seek urgent resolution due to the impending Federal election and potential reputational damage.
Relevance to FOI Request LEX3070: This document directly addresses a core theme of the FOI request, which sought applications concerning reviews of party registration and deregistration decisions. It specifically details the challenge by the Australian Progressives, alleging a "clerical error" in the AEC's administrative processes concerning their membership verification and subsequent deregistration, precisely as outlined in the FOI request overview.