FOI Request LEX3844

Date: 2023

The FOI request focuses on obtaining information related to the procurement and operational details of a "Senate Scanning Solution" for the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) in 2018.

Documents from the FOI Request:

The following documents were released in response to the FOI request:

RFQ Senate Scanning Solution 2018 - Statement of Requirements: This document outlines the detailed requirements and specifications for the Senate ballot paper scanning solution.
RFQ Senate Scanning Solution - Work Order: This document serves as the formal contractual agreement for the provision of Capture and Digital Information Services.
Standing Offer - Senate Scanning Solution – Schedule 7: While listed, the content of this document was not provided in the released pages, only its title and associated exemptions (s 47, s 47F).

Main Content from the FOI Request Documents:

The primary content is derived from the "Statement of Requirements" and the "Work Order."

Statement of Requirements (RFQ AEC17/149):

Core Purpose: To define the requirements for a solution capable of efficiently and accurately scanning Senate ballot papers for counting purposes, crucial for Australian democratic processes.
Testing Services: Mandates comprehensive testing activities, including system testing, system integration testing, User Acceptance Testing (UAT), capacity testing, and security and penetration testing, to ensure solution assurance.
Security Requirements:
- Requires the solution to protect all AEC data (at rest and in transit) in accordance with Australian Government security policies, specifically the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) and the Information Security Manual (ISM).
- Stresses securing the solution against internet-borne threats.
- Prohibits sharing of user login credentials.
- Mandates criminal history checks for all personnel working with the solution and requires them to undergo training on various policies, including Information Security, Acceptable Use, Privacy, and Anti-Fraud.
Ballot Paper Handling:
- Acknowledges that ballot papers can vary (multi-piece, taped, handwritten).
- Details stringent physical handling procedures:
  - Ballot papers are grouped into "Vote Collection Points" and further "Batched" (approx. 50 papers) with unique coversheets.
  - Transport occurs in "Ballot Paper Transport Containers" (BPTC), each holding around 500 papers.
  - AEC staff perform initial sorting (unfolding, flattening, orientation); the vendor is not expected to undertake specialized sorting.
  - Damaged papers are repaired by AEC staff prior to transport.
  - Strict protocols to minimize movement, ensure only authorised personnel access, and prevent mixing of papers from different collection points.
  - Vendor personnel are explicitly prohibited from marking, modifying, damaging, or destroying ballot papers.
Ballot Paper Secure Zones:
- Outlines rigorous security measures for "Ballot Paper Secure Work Zones" (where scanning occurs) and "Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zones."
- These zones must be physically segregated, with controls such as lockable rooms/cabinets, security guards, mandated signage, 24-hour CCTV monitoring, physical access controls (smart card/biometric), and back-to-base alarm systems when unattended.
- AEC staff supervision is required in Work Zones at all times during operation.
Data Capture and Workflow Software:
- Emphasizes the critical importance of accuracy, stating that captured preferences must exactly match the voter's recorded preferences.
- Requires electronic checking for ballot paper authenticity and formality, with informal or non-standard ballot images visually checked.
- Stipulates that the solution must comply with all relevant sections of the Electoral Act.
Electoral Event Support: The solution must maintain readiness to support electoral events on short notice, as the AEC operates on a continuous election readiness model.

Work Order:

This document confirms the formal engagement for "CAPTURE AND DIGITAL INFORMATION SERVICES" under a broader Deed of Standing Offer.
It explicitly states that the "Statement of Requirements" (RFQ AEC17/149) is an attached and integral part of the Work Order, highlighting its contractual significance.
It also notes the application of "Reserved Materials" and "Reserved and Contract Materials" security classifications to the Work Order, indicating the sensitive nature of the contained information.

AI Generated

The FOI documents – a "Statement of Requirements," a "Work Order," and a "Standing Offer Schedule" for a Senate Scanning Solution – reveal the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) procurement of services for scanning and processing Senate ballot papers. From a left-leaning perspective, these documents highlight a mixed alignment with progressive values, particularly raising concerns about corporate influence and transparency, while demonstrating a commitment to electoral integrity and voter privacy.

Social Justice:
The documents strongly emphasize the accuracy and integrity of the vote-counting process (Statement of Requirements, p. 47), stating that "the preferences captured from a Ballot Paper exactly matches the preferences recorded by the voter." This is a fundamental alignment with social justice, ensuring every citizen's voice is accurately reflected in the democratic outcome, regardless of their socioeconomic status or background. The detailed protocols for handling fragile, torn, or non-standard ballot papers (SoR, p. 35-36) also suggest a commitment to ensuring all valid votes are processed. Personnel involved are required to undergo criminal history checks and adhere to strict policies, including an "Anti-Fraud Policy" and "Code of Conduct" (SoR, p. 33-34), which are vital for maintaining public trust in the electoral system. However, the heavy redactions (s 47, s 47F) regarding the private entity contracted for this service limit public understanding of the full accountability framework, which can be a barrier to robust social justice oversight.

Environmental Impact:
The documents offer minimal insight into environmental considerations. The mention of "corflute or cardboard" for Ballot Paper Transport Containers (BPTC) (SoR, p. 36) is the only relevant detail. While cardboard is preferable environmentally, corflute is a type of plastic. There's no explicit commitment to sustainable practices in the operation of the scanning solution, energy efficiency requirements for equipment, or waste management policies for electoral materials. This lack of clear environmental clauses represents a missed opportunity for the government to embed progressive ecological values into its procurement processes.

Wealth Distribution and Corporate Influence:
This area presents the most significant deviation from progressive values. The core issue is the outsourcing of a vital democratic function – the scanning and processing of Senate ballot papers – to a private entity. Progressives typically advocate for essential public services to remain in public hands to ensure accountability, prevent profit motives from overriding public interest, and safeguard against wealth extraction from the public purse. This decision to privatize a core component of electoral infrastructure raises questions about the allocation of public funds.

Furthermore, the extensive redactions under s 47 (commercial-in-confidence, trade secrets, business affairs) across all documents, particularly in the "Work Order" and "Standing Offer – Schedule 7," create a significant transparency deficit. This opacity means the public cannot scrutinize the financial terms of the contract, the identity of the beneficiary (beyond a generic "Contractor"), or the full scope of services, hindering oversight of how taxpayer money is spent and whether it provides value for money or contributes to corporate profiteering. The existence of a "Deed of Standing Offer" (Work Order, p. 3) implies a pre-existing or ongoing contractual relationship, which can limit competition and potentially entrench a specific corporate vendor, further raising concerns about undue corporate influence and fair access to government contracts.

Civil Liberties:
The documents demonstrate a robust commitment to protecting certain civil liberties, particularly data security and privacy. The "Senate Scanning Solution must protect all AEC data when it is at rest and when it is in transit" (SoR, p. 29) and adherence to the "Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF)" and "Information Security Manual (ISM)" are positive alignments. Personnel involved must undergo criminal history checks and comply with a "Privacy Policy" (SoR, p. 33-34), underscoring efforts to prevent misuse of sensitive voter data. Physical security measures for ballot papers, including "Ballot Paper Secure Zones," CCTV monitoring, and access controls (SoR, p. 38-39), are crucial for preventing tampering and upholding the integrity of the vote, which is fundamental to democratic rights. While stringent personnel security requirements (e.g., potential biometric readers) could theoretically raise minor civil liberty concerns if applied excessively, in the context of safeguarding highly sensitive electoral materials, they appear proportionate and necessary. The role of scrutineers in observing the counting process (SoR, p. 47) is also a crucial check and balance for civil liberties, ensuring transparency in the process, even if they are prohibited from directly handling ballot papers.

Conclusion:
While the documents demonstrate a strong commitment to electoral integrity, data security, and accurate vote counting – all crucial aspects for social justice and civil liberties – the decision to outsource such a critical function to a private entity, coupled with significant commercial confidentiality, runs counter to progressive ideals of public service provision and transparent government spending. The lack of detailed environmental considerations also highlights a gap in comprehensive progressive policy implementation within this procurement. The overall picture is one of necessary security and integrity measures being undertaken, but through a lens of privatization and commercial secrecy that limits public accountability and raises concerns about corporate influence on the democratic process.

AI Generated

These FOI documents detail the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) procurement of a "Senate Scanning Solution," encompassing the Statement of Requirements (RFQ AEC17/149) and a corresponding Work Order. The initiative aims to digitize Senate ballot paper counting, ostensibly to improve efficiency and accuracy in electoral administration.

Economic Efficiency: The adoption of a scanning solution for ballot papers suggests an intent to enhance economic efficiency by modernizing and streamlining the vote-counting process. Automation inherently promises faster, potentially more accurate, and less labor-intensive operations than manual methods. This aligns with conservative principles of seeking efficient governmental operations. However, the pervasive redactions of commercial-in-confidence information (s 47) in both the Statement of Requirements and the Work Order severely hinder any meaningful assessment of whether this solution represents a truly cost-effective or economically efficient expenditure of taxpayer funds. Without transparency on contract values, pricing, and specific deliverables that justify the investment, it is impossible to verify if the government is securing the best value for money. The detailed, 100-page Statement of Requirements also raises questions about potential over-specification or bureaucratic overhead, which can inflate costs and limit a contractor's ability to propose more innovative or efficient alternatives.

Individual Liberty: The core purpose of accurately counting votes is fundamental to upholding individual liberty and the democratic process. The documents emphasize the "critically important" accuracy of data capture (page 47, Statement of Requirements) to ensure that "preferences captured from a Ballot Paper exactly matches the preferences recorded by the voter." This direct commitment to the integrity of each citizen's vote aligns strongly with conservative values that prioritize the individual's right to participate in self-governance. Conversely, the extensive personnel security requirements, including criminal history checks and mandatory training in various policies (pages 33-34), while necessary for safeguarding sensitive electoral materials, represent a significant degree of government oversight over individuals involved in the process. While justifiable for electoral integrity, it underscores the state's reach into the personal vetting of its contractors and staff.

National Security: The documents demonstrate a robust and commendable commitment to national security, particularly regarding the integrity of the electoral process. Pages 29-39 detail stringent requirements for both physical and digital security of ballot papers and associated data. Measures include adherence to the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) and Information Security Manual (ISM), secure storage zones with CCTV, security guards, lockable premises, and advanced access controls (smart card, biometric readers). Internet security protocols are mandated to protect against "internet-borne threats" (page 31). This comprehensive approach to safeguarding the democratic foundation from tampering, fraud, or cyber-attacks directly aligns with conservative principles that prioritize national security and stability.

Fiscal Responsibility: This is the area of most significant concern. The heavy redactions under s 47 (commercial-in-confidence) across all financial and contractual details render a proper assessment of fiscal responsibility impossible. The public, and by extension, analysts focused on fiscal prudence, cannot scrutinize the cost of this solution, whether competitive tendering achieved optimal pricing, or if ongoing operational costs are justified. This lack of transparency undermines the principles of fiscal responsibility, preventing accountability for government spending on a critical public service.

Limited Government: The AEC's role in administering elections is a core, legitimate function of government, aligning with the concept of limited government focused on essential services. The decision to contract out the scanning solution to a private entity, rather than building in-house capacity, can be seen as an effort to leverage private sector efficiency and avoid expanding the direct government footprint. However, the sheer volume of highly detailed and prescriptive requirements (as seen in the 100-page Statement of Requirements) indicates an extensive degree of government control and oversight over the contracted service. While necessary for electoral integrity, this level of granularity can reflect a large administrative apparatus managing external providers, potentially hinting at a less "limited" approach to governance where even contracted services are deeply micro-managed.

Conclusion: The documents reveal a strong and appropriate commitment to national security and the integrity of the democratic process, particularly through rigorous security and accuracy requirements for vote counting. This aligns well with conservative values. However, the profound lack of transparency regarding financial details severely impedes any meaningful assessment of fiscal responsibility and economic efficiency. The extensive and prescriptive nature of the requirements, while understandable for a critical function, also suggests a significant administrative footprint, potentially deviating from a truly lean or limited government approach. Without greater financial transparency, it is challenging to confirm that this essential government function is being executed with optimal fiscal prudence.

AI Generated

The provided FOI documents, related to the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) "Senate Scanning Solution," are riddled with extensive redactions, effectively obscuring critical details about this government project. This pervasive lack of transparency, particularly the application of "commercial-in-confidence" exemptions (s47 and s47F), immediately signals a troubling commitment to secrecy, preventing public scrutiny of taxpayer funds and potentially hiding inefficiencies or questionable decisions.

Several key areas highlight potential waste, overreach, and questionable decision-making:

Exorbitant Security Requirements vs. Low-Tech Realities: The Statement of Requirements details an extremely high level of physical security for ballot papers, mandating "Ballot Paper Secure Zones" with features like 24-hour CCTV, biometric readers, back-to-base alarm systems, B and C class cabinets, and even shipping containers, supplemented by security guards. While ballot security is paramount, these elaborate and costly physical measures seem disproportionate for a scanning operation. This suggests a potential over-engineering of security protocols, leading to excessive expenditure that may not be commensurate with the actual risk, or indicates existing infrastructure is so inadequate it requires highly expensive augmentation.
Inefficient Hybrid Workflow: The project outlines a high-tech "Senate Scanning Solution" yet simultaneously reveals a reliance on rudimentary manual processes for ballot paper preparation. AEC staff are required to manually unfold, flatten, correctly orient, and even repair torn ballot papers with "transparent sticky tape" before they are transported in "corflute or cardboard" containers for scanning. This disconnect is glaring: why invest in a sophisticated digital scanning solution if the preceding workflow requires such intensive, low-tech human intervention? It suggests the "solution" is not truly end-to-end, pushing significant labour costs back onto the AEC and negating the potential efficiency gains from automation. It hints at a failure to procure a truly robust system capable of handling real-world ballot conditions, or a system that is simply too delicate for its intended purpose.
Perpetual Readiness Costs: The requirement for the "Senate Scanning Solution" to maintain "election readiness at all times" and support an "Electoral Event at short notice" implies continuous operational and maintenance costs, even during prolonged periods between elections. This "always-on" model for a sporadic event represents a significant drain on public funds, as highly specialized infrastructure and personnel are maintained at peak readiness unnecessarily, rather than adopting a more agile, scalable, and cost-effective approach.
Opacified Contractual and Financial Details: The extreme redactions in the "Work Order" and "Standing Offer" documents make it impossible to ascertain the contract's total value, specific deliverables, performance metrics, or accountability mechanisms. This complete lack of transparency over key financial and operational terms means the public cannot assess whether the government is receiving value for money, if the contractor is being held to account, or whether there are any problematic clauses within the agreement. This opacity is a classic hallmark of potential mismanagement and allows for unquestioned spending.

In essence, these FOI documents paint a picture of a government agency investing in a high-tech solution with seemingly excessive security and ongoing costs, while simultaneously revealing a reliance on outdated manual preparatory processes, all shrouded in a veil of non-transparency that prevents meaningful public oversight. This combination raises serious concerns about inefficiency, overspending, and a lack of accountability in the management of public funds.

AI Generated

The FOI documents provide a clear testament to the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) unwavering commitment to robust and secure democratic processes. They highlight the proactive steps taken to modernize electoral administration while upholding the highest standards of integrity and public trust.

The Statement of Requirements for the Senate Scanning Solution outlines a meticulously planned approach to enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of vote counting. Key elements underscore effective governance:

Technological Advancement for Accuracy: The adoption of a scanning solution is a strategic move to streamline the counting process, ensuring that voter preferences are captured with utmost precision. The requirement for the solution to exactly match voter preferences demonstrates an absolute dedication to the integrity of every single ballot.
Rigorous Quality Assurance: The extensive testing protocols, including system, integration, user acceptance, capacity, security, and penetration testing, are vital for delivering a resilient and reliable system. This layered approach to assurance minimizes risks and ensures the solution's operational excellence, safeguarding the electoral outcome.
Comprehensive Security and Integrity Safeguards: The AEC's commitment to security is paramount. The solution must comply with the Australian Government's Protective Security Policy Framework and Information Security Manual, ensuring all electoral data is protected both at rest and in transit. Personnel security is also a high priority, with mandatory criminal history checks and training in critical areas like privacy and anti-fraud policies.
Uncompromising Ballot Paper Handling: Detailed protocols for managing physical ballot papers, including strict secure zones, access controls, CCTV monitoring, and the "two-person rule" for handling, ensure the physical integrity of every vote. Critically, these procedures prevent any unauthorized marking, modification, or damage to ballot papers, fostering an environment of absolute trust and accountability. The defined role of scrutineers, focused solely on observation without physical interaction with ballots, maintains transparency while preserving the integrity of the counting process.
Readiness for Public Service: The requirement for the solution to be election-ready at short notice reflects the AEC's dedication to its mandate, ensuring the democratic process can proceed smoothly and efficiently whenever an electoral event is called.

The Work Order and Standing Offer documents further illustrate the structured and diligent approach to procurement. While certain commercial or personal details are redacted as per standard FOI exemptions (s47 and s47F), these redactions are necessary to protect legitimate commercial-in-confidence information and personal privacy, both essential aspects of responsible government contracting and privacy protection. These documents confirm a proper, contractual framework is in place to deliver the vital services.

In essence, these FOI documents demonstrate the government's forward-thinking investment in technology and robust processes to underpin the foundational democratic right of casting a vote. They highlight a diligent effort to serve the public through effective governance, necessary regulations, and an unwavering commitment to the integrity and accuracy of the electoral system, ensuring positive and reliable outcomes for all Australians.

AI Generated

This FOI release represents a masterclass in obfuscation, systematically stripping away virtually all substantive detail from documents pertaining to a critical component of Australia's democratic process. The pervasive and often blanket redactions, citing broad exemptions like "s 47" (commercial-in-confidence) and "s 47F" (personal privacy/business affairs), raise profound concerns about government transparency, accountability, and competence in managing public funds and electoral integrity.

Damning Implications:

Systemic Incompetence and Lack of Governance:
- Shoddy Documentation: The "Statement of Requirements" begins with a glaringly blank "Version Control" table (Page ii), devoid of author, distribution, or change descriptions. This is an immediate and damning indictment of fundamental project management incompetence, indicating a chaotic and unprofessional approach to defining requirements for a system vital to national elections. How can accountability be traced or errors mitigated when core project documentation lacks basic version control?
- Vague and Insufficient Testing: While "Capacity testing" and "Security and penetration testing" are listed (Page 27), their details, methodologies, and expected outcomes are entirely redacted. This implies either a woefully inadequate testing regime or a deliberate attempt to conceal the full extent of the system's vulnerabilities. Merely listing these critical tests without substance is performative, not reassuring.
- Reactive Security Measures: The explicit instruction that "Personnel and AEC Staff are not to share their log in credentials" (Page 31) points to a concerning lack of basic security hygiene or a history of past failures within the organization or its contractors. This fundamental requirement, often seen in basic IT policies, is alarming for a sensitive electoral system.
- Reliance on Manual Fixes for Fundamental Flaws: The admission that "Ballot Papers may be printed on multiple pieces of paper and taped together or hand written" (Page 35) and that AEC staff repair "ripped or torn Ballot Papers... using transparent sticky tape" (Page 36) reveals a shocking lack of quality control at the source of electoral data. The scanning solution is designed to accommodate inherently flawed and potentially compromised inputs, not to demand robust source material. This manual, ad-hoc "repair" process introduces significant risk of human error, inconsistency, or even deliberate tampering, undermining the integrity of the primary records before they even enter the system.
- Deep Distrust in Contractors and Processes: The extensive and hyper-specific rules for ballot handling (Page 37), including explicit prohibitions against single-person access, marking ballots, or mixing batches, coupled with the requirement for "AEC staff member[s] at all times whilst it is in operation" (Page 39), paints a picture of profound mistrust. This suggests a history of or high anticipation of mishandling, negligence, or potential malfeasance by personnel, forcing the AEC into an inefficient, costly, and inherently fragile babysitting role.
Suspicions of Corruption, Cronyism, or Waste:
- Extreme Commercial Secrecy: The wholesale redaction of the "Work Order" and "Standing Offer – Schedule 7" (which typically contains pricing and service levels) under "commercial-in-confidence" is a gross abuse of FOI principles. This absolute secrecy prevents any public assessment of whether taxpayer money is being spent wisely, whether the contract was competitively tendered, or if favorable terms were granted to a specific, undisclosed vendor. It creates an undeniable appearance of impropriety, implying something significant is being hidden from public scrutiny.
- Black Box Contracting: The almost entirely blank "APPENDIX A: DELIVERABLES" (Pages 70-92) is perhaps the most egregious redaction. It means the public is denied any knowledge of what tangible products, services, or outcomes the contractor is actually being paid to deliver. Without clear, verifiable deliverables, there is no public accountability for performance, value for money, or project success, creating a perfect environment for scope creep, budget blowouts, and under-delivery.
Deliberate Obfuscation Undermining Public Trust:
- Systematic Withholding of Information: The sheer volume and consistency of redactions across all core documents—from high-level requirements and security protocols to detailed deliverables and contractual specifics—demonstrates a deliberate strategy to render these records meaningless for public oversight. This is not accidental but a calculated effort to prevent any meaningful analysis of the "Senate Scanning Solution."
- Concealing System Flaws and Risks: The heavily redacted "APPENDIX C: ASSUMPTIONS, DEPENDENCIES AND EXCLUSIONS" (Pages 94-99) implies that the project is riddled with known vulnerabilities and limitations. By withholding these details, the government actively prevents the public from understanding the inherent fragility or potential failure points of a system fundamental to the democratic process.
- Eroding Confidence in Elections: By operating with such extreme opacity on a system that directly impacts vote counting and electoral outcomes, the government fosters an environment of suspicion and distrust. The public is left to assume the worst: that the system is either technically flawed, financially mismanaged, or susceptible to manipulation, and that the government prefers secrecy over public assurance in the integrity of its own elections.

In summary, these FOI documents do not provide transparency; they meticulously construct a wall of secrecy. They paint a picture of an electoral administration that is either fundamentally incompetent in managing critical projects and contracts or deliberately using secrecy to conceal potentially damaging information about its operations, financial dealings, or the very integrity of the democratic process. This wholesale suppression of detail is a profound disservice to the Australian public and severely undermines confidence in the mechanisms of government accountability.

AI Generated

The provided FOI documents detail a Request for Quote (RFQ), a Work Order, and a Standing Offer related to a "Senate Scanning Solution" for the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). The core document, the "Statement of Requirements," outlines a highly prescriptive framework for a private entity to scan and process Australian Senate ballot papers.

Content Summary:
The documents outline the procurement of a system and associated services for the digital capture and processing of Senate ballot papers. The "Statement of Requirements" mandates an exhaustive list of technical specifications, operational procedures, and security protocols. This includes minute details on ballot paper handling (e.g., batching methods, container types, unfolding procedures), physical security zones (secure storage, work zones with specific access controls, CCTV, guards), digital security compliance (Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework, Information Security Manual), extensive testing requirements, and personnel mandates (criminal history checks, mandatory training in various AEC policies like privacy, anti-fraud, social media, and a "Code of Conduct"). The objective stated is the accurate capture of voter preferences, framed as "critically important to the Australian democratic process, the Australian public and the AEC."

Objectivist Critique:

This suite of documents, while ostensibly a contractual agreement for services, fundamentally violates the principles of reason, individual liberty, and laissez-faire capitalism through its pervasive bureaucratic overreach and suppression of personal initiative.

Primacy of Individual Rights: The stated goal of accurate vote counting could, in principle, be aligned with protecting the individual right to a fair and accurate representation of their political choices. However, the means prescribed—an elaborate system of government-mandated controls—transgresses individual liberty in practice. The extensive personnel security checks and mandatory training in broad government policies (such as "Social Media Policy" or "Code of Conduct" for private employees) represent an unwarranted intrusion into the lives and moral frameworks of individuals working for the contractor, extending government control far beyond the legitimate scope of ensuring competence for a specific task.

Rational Self-Interest and the Virtue of Productive Achievement: While the contract itself represents a voluntary exchange for mutual gain, the AEC's approach stifles the rational self-interest of the private entity to achieve maximum efficiency and profit through its own ingenuity. The "Statement of Requirements" is not merely a definition of a desired outcome (accurate ballot counting) but an oppressive dictate on the process. The contractor is not empowered to devise the most rational and efficient methods for achieving the goal; instead, it is reduced to a mere implementer of the government's pre-conceived, minutely detailed, and often inefficient procedures. This suppresses the very virtue of productive achievement, replacing it with a demand for bureaucratic compliance. Innovation is stifled when every aspect, from ballot paper orientation to container weight and security zone demarcation, is dictated by a government entity rather than being optimized by those who stand to gain from superior performance.

Dangers of Collectivism and Government Overreach: The documents are a stark illustration of collectivism and government overreach:

Bureaucratic Interference: The astonishing level of detail in ballot paper handling, storage, and processing, down to the requirement for two staff members to unseal a container, demonstrates an egregious level of bureaucratic interference. This micromanagement removes the responsibility and incentive for the private contractor to apply their expertise and judgment. It implies an inherent distrust of the private sector's ability to act competently in its own rational self-interest without constant government supervision and diktat.
Suppression of Personal Initiative: The numerous clauses beginning with "must ensure" and the mandatory adherence to a plethora of AEC policies and principles strip the contractor of personal initiative. Employees are mandated to undergo training in internal government policies, effectively forcing them to conform to a state-defined behavioral code rather than operating under their own moral compass and professional ethics, so long as they fulfill their contractual obligations. This prioritizes conformity to arbitrary rules over independent thought and action.
Implicit Forced Altruism: The repeated framing of the service as "critically important to the Australian democratic process" subtly implies a moral duty to serve a collective "public good" that transcends the direct, commercial value of the service. This rhetoric underpins the justification for the extensive control, suggesting that the contractor's self-interest must be subordinated to this amorphous collective ideal. This is a subtle but potent form of forced altruism, demanding a sacrifice of the contractor's independent judgment and efficiency for the sake of the "collective."
Violation of Laissez-Faire Capitalism: This entire arrangement is a direct affront to laissez-faire capitalism. A free market dictates that government's role is to protect individual rights, not to dictate the methods by which private enterprises operate, even when contracting for services. The AEC acts as a central planner, imposing its will on the internal operations of a private company, stifling competition and innovation by prescribing uniformity and process-compliance over results achieved through individual initiative and entrepreneurial discovery. The pervasive control over every facet of the operation represents a government that does not understand or respect the fundamental principles of a free economy or the liberty of those who operate within it.

AI Generated

Files

1. RFQ AEC 17 149 Statement of Requirements v1_Redacted (A2901309).pdf (pdf)

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Document Control 

Version Control 

Version 

Date 

Author 

Distribution 

Change Description 

Document Location 

File Name 

 Statement of Requirements.docx 

Page ii 

Counting the Senate | 

 Senate Scanning Solution | Statement of Requirement 2018


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18 

ELECTORAL EVENT SUPPORT ........................................................................ 66 

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APPENDIX A: DELIVERABLES .......................................................................... 70 

APPENDIX B: AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 

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PRINCIPLES ..................................................................................................................... 93 

21 

APPENDIX C : ASSUMPTIONS, DEPENDENCIES AND EXCLUSIONS .......... 94 

21.1  EXCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................... 94 
21.2  ASSUMPTIONS AND DEPENDENCIES ......................................................................... 96 

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8  Testing Services 

a. 

must facilitate solution assurance activities for the Senate Scanning 

Solution, including: 

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Senate Scanning Solution | Statement of Requirement 2018


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8.3  System testing 

8.4  System integration testing 

8.5  User Acceptance testing 

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8.6  Capacity testing 

8.7  Security and penetration testing 

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9  Security 

9.1  Australian Government security policy 
a. 

The Senate Scanning Solution must protect all AEC data when it is at rest and 
when it is in transit in accordance with the requirements agreed with the AEC, 
informed by the Australian Government security policy, as defined in the 
Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) and the Information Security 
Manual (ISM).  

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9.3  User authorisation 

f. 

Personnel and AEC Staff are not to share their log in credentials or access with 
any other person  

9.4 
a. 

Internet security 
The Senate Scanning Solution must be secured against internet-borne threats to 
AEC data and system confidentiality, integrity and availability. 

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9.6  Personnel security 
a  

Role 

Clearance level 

Status 

c. 

All employees, contractors, Personnel and labour hire staff working with
must have a satisfactory criminal history clearance check prior to commencing 
work 

d. 

All permanent 

 courses: 

i. 

ii. 

Information Security Policy; 

Acceptable Use Policy;


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iii. 

iv. 

v. 

vi. 

vii. 

viii. 

Privacy Policy; 

Anti-Fraud Policy; 

Social Media Policy; 

Work Health Safety Policy; 

 Policies & Procedures; and 

 Code of Conduct. 

10  Ballot Papers 

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c. 

Some Ballot Papers may be printed on multiple pieces of paper and taped 
together or hand written.  

11  Ballot Paper handling 

11.1  Election material details 

 must use the following election material details in relation to Ballot 

Paper handling: 

i. 

All Ballot Papers received at an individual polling place, or processed 
during a declaration vote count at an out-posted centre will be grouped


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ii. 

iii. 

iv. 

v. 

vi. 

vii. 

viii. 

ix. 

x. 

xi. 

together. This grouping of Ballot Papers will be referred to as a Vote 
Collection Point; 

A Vote Collection Point may contain as few as a handful or as many as 
thirty thousand Ballot Papers; 

The Ballot Papers within a Vote Collection Point will be Batched (the 
method of physically Batching is yet to be finalised, however possible 
alternatives may include bulldog clips or plastic document clips) into 
subgroups of 50 to facilitate efficient handling, counting and scanning. 
This subgrouping of Ballot Papers will be referred to as a Batch. Each 
Batch will have a unique batch cover sheet that will contain identification 
data for that Batch; 

A Vote Collection Point will be transported and stored in one or more 
Ballot Paper Transport Containers (BPTC) which will be constructed of 
corflute or cardboard; 

A BPTC will only contain Ballot Papers/Batches from a single Vote 
Collection Point; 

A BPTC will hold up to 10 Batches (i.e. approximately 500 Ballot Papers) 
and will weigh up to approximately 12kg when fully loaded; 

All BPTC within a Vote Collection Point will be dispatched together; 

AEC Staff will conduct an initial sort of the Ballot Papers prior to 
transport, which will ensure: 

a. 

b. 

c. 

d. 

each Ballot Paper is unfolded; 

each Ballot Paper is flattened as much as possible; 

each Ballot Paper has the correct side facing up; 

each Ballot Paper is oriented so the text is left-aligned; 

As such the AEC does not expect 
document sorting activities prior to scanning; 

 to undertake specialised 

Ballot Papers do not contain staples; 

Ripped or torn Ballot Papers will be repaired by AEC Staff prior to 
transport using transparent sticky tape. Excess tape will be trimmed 
where possible to reduce the risk of jamming within the scanning 
equipment; 

where possible, torn/repaired Ballot Papers and manually printed Ballot 
Papers (i.e. Ballot Papers printed on A4 and manually joined) will be 
Batched together so special arrangements for scanning can be 
undertaken if required; 

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xii. 

xiii. 

xiv. 

The outside of every BPTC will be labelled with identification metadata 
and a scannable identifier (e.g. a bar code); 

Inside every BPTC will be a manifest that lists the same information as is 
on the outside of the BPTC; and 

Every Batch within a BPTC will have a coversheet with identification 
metadata and a scannable identifier (e.g. a bar code). 

11.2  Ballot Paper handling principles 
a. 

 agrees and acknowledges to handle Ballot Papers in accordance with 

the AEC Ballot Paper Handling Principles, as described in Section 2.1 (d). 

b. 

c. 

d. 

e. 

f. 

g. 

h. 

i. 

j. 

k. 

l. 

 must ensure that the proposed business process minimises the 

movement and handling of physical Ballot Papers. 

 must ensure that only authorised personnel have access to Ballot 

Papers and their assigned BPTC 

 must ensure that Ballot Papers are always stored in their assigned, 

sealed, BPTC within a designated Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone when not 
being processed. 

 must ensure that a BPTC is only unsealed/opened within a designated 

Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone. 

 must ensure that all BPTCs are never unsealed/opened when only a 

single member of staff is present, when the AEC is not onsite or outside of 
authorised work hours. 

 must ensure that all the Ballot Papers within a Ballot Paper Transport 

Container are scanned as a single unit of work (except in the case of a rescan of 
a batch). 

 must ensure that during processing only one BPTC is unsealed/opened 

within the Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone around an individual scanner at any 
one point in time. 

 must ensure that the Ballot Papers from one Vote Collection Point, 

BPTC or Batch are not mixed with another at any time or under any 
circumstances.  

During processing 
Batch, BPTC and Vote Collection Point and report the outcomes and variations to 
the AEC. 

 must reconcile the number of Ballot Papers in each 

 must ensure that their Personnel do not mark or modify a Ballot Paper. 

 must ensure that no Ballot Papers are damaged or destroyed under any 

circumstance by any Personnel or associated person/entity.  

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11.3  Ballot Paper Secure Zones 
a. 

Ballot Paper Secure Zones are AEC defined segregated locations within a facility 
that have been specifically designed for the handling and/or storage of Ballot 
Papers, and may be either a Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone or a Ballot Paper 
Secure Storage Zone. It must have sufficient security measures in place, as 
approved by the AEC, to ensure no Ballot Papers will be tampered with, 
destroyed or removed.  

b. 

c. 

Ballot Papers must only be outside a Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone or Ballot 
Paper Secure Work Zone in a sealed BPTC. 
 must ensure that any time 
Ballot Papers are not in a Ballot Paper Secure Zone, there are sufficient security 
measures in place, as approved by the AEC, to ensure no Ballot Papers will be 
tampered with, destroyed or removed.  

The workflow of Ballot papers from receipt to processing to temporary storage to 
long term storage must ensure that BPTCs are always under secure conditions 
either via CCTV or security guard/s 

11.4  Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zones 
a. 

 must ensure that Ballot Papers are always stored in their BPTC within a 

designated Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone under the following conditions: 

i. 

ii. 

storage of Ballot Papers not in use; and 

overnight storage of Ballot Papers (this may be achieved by turning a 
Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone into a Ballot Paper Secure Storage 
Zone overnight, there will no requirement to change the signs as long as 
all other characteristics of the Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone are 
met). 

b. 

c. 

 must ensure that the Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone is physically 

separated from zones that store non-AEC materials. 

 must establish Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zones that must have an 

agreed combination of the following security controls: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

lockable internal room within lockable premises to hold the Ballot Paper 
Transport Containers. If that is not available, containers that are sturdy, 
fully enclosed and fitted with a high security lock may be used. 
Examples include B and C class cabinets, site safes and shipping 
containers; 

security guards must be used to supplement an inadequate Ballot Paper 
Secure Storage Zone (as approved by the AEC in writing); 

a mandated sign must be visible at all points of entry, these will be 
supplied by AEC; 

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iv. 

v. 

vi. 

24 hour CCTV monitoring; 

physical security controls that can identify the ingress and egress of an 
individual using smart card, biometric reader or similar; and 

back-to-base alarm system coverage when the Ballot Paper Secure 
Storage Zone is unattended. 

d. 

 must facilitate the following access and supervision requirements: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

 must ensure that only authorised personnel have access to the 

Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone; 

 Personnel and AEC personnel accessing the Ballot Paper 

Secure Storage Zone must display the appropriate visual identification 
which indicates they are authorised to access the zone (refer to the 
Election Personnel Identification in Section 11.11); and 

the contents of the Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone must not be 
visible to unauthorised personnel. 

11.5  Ballot Paper Secure Work Zones 
a. 

must define one or more Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone for the interim 
placement of Ballot Papers while they are in use and where it is not practicable to 
undertake the work in a Storage Zone (e.g. the scanning of Ballot Papers). 

b. 

 must ensure that a Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone is a clearly 
designated and segregated area using any of the following techniques: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

iv. 

bollards and tape; 

temporary partitions and/or dividers; 

floor marking and/or lines; 

any other suitable technique proposed by 
AEC. 

 and approved by the 

c. 

d. 

e. 

A mandated sign must be visible in the Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone, 

must ensure that the Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone is separated from 

zones processing non-AEC materials. 

 must facilitate the following access and supervision requirements: 

i. 

the Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone must be supervised by an AEC staff 
member at all times whilst it is in operation; 

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iv. 

v. 

A scrutineer must NOT handle Ballot Papers at any time. 

A scrutineer must not unreasonably delay or interfere with the counting 
of votes. 

13  Data capture and workflow software. 

13.1  Accuracy 
a. 

The accuracy of the data capture provided by the Senate Scanning Solution is 
critically important to the Australian democratic process, the Australian public and 
the AEC. 

b. 

 must develop and implement a data capture strategy in line with AEC  

requirements that has the following objectives: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

the preferences captured from a Ballot Paper exactly matches the 
preferences recorded by the voter for every Ballot Paper processed 
within an Electoral Event; 

all Ballot Papers are electronically checked for authenticity and formality; 

every Ballot Paper deemed to be informal or non-standard must have its 
image visually checked as part of the data capture process; 

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13.4  Data capture requirements 

13.4.1  Legislative compliance 
a. 

The information in this section has been incorporated to provide additional clarity 
on the different aspects of Ballot Paper formality checking. However to be 
accepted the Senate Scanning Solution must comply with all relevant sections of 
the Electoral Act irrespective of the information provided below.  The AEC will 
ensure this as part of the UAT process.


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No. 

Deliverable 

Delivery date 

Form of Deliverable 

1    

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No. 

Deliverable 

Delivery date 

Form of Deliverable 

16  Post-event Services 

a. 

17  Service delivery and management 

17.1  Contract management 
The AEC expects its relationship 
a. 
focused on meeting critical timeframes 
must be a clear emphasis on agreed actions being followed through to 
completion. 

 There 

 to be positive, action oriented and 

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17.2  FX DMS team 

17.3  Contract management meetings 

17.4  Executive review meetings 

17.5  Administrative responsibilities 

17.6  Service Level Specification 

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18  Electoral Event Support 

18.1  Electoral Event Support 
a. 

The AEC maintains election readiness at all times, and requires a Senate 
Scanning Solution that is capable of supporting an Electoral Event at short notice 
 must be ready 
 as of this date and maintain that readiness until 

 Once the AEC defines an election ready date

to run an election 
an election is called. 

18.2  Federal Election Support


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18.4  Electoral Event Planning and Support


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20  Appendix B: Australian Government 
Enterprise Architecture Principles 

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WORK ORDER FOR CAPTURE AND DIGITAL INFORMATION SERVICES UNDER  
DEED OF STANDING OFFER 13.10-1-1 BETWEEN THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 

Security Classification 

Reserved Materials 

Reserved and Contract Materials listed in Clause 22 of Schedule 5 of the Deed apply to this Work Order.  

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WORK ORDER FOR CAPTURE AND DIGITAL INFORMATION SERVICES UNDER  
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Attachment A – Statement of Requirements 

Attached as separate document. 

RFQ AEC17/149 

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Version Control 

Version 

Date 

Author 

Distribution 

Change Description 

Document Location 

File Name 

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18 

ELECTORAL EVENT SUPPORT ........................................................................ 66 

19 

APPENDIX A: DELIVERABLES .......................................................................... 70 

APPENDIX B: AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 

20 
PRINCIPLES ..................................................................................................................... 93 

21 

APPENDIX C : ASSUMPTIONS, DEPENDENCIES AND EXCLUSIONS .......... 94 

21.1  EXCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................... 94 
21.2  ASSUMPTIONS AND DEPENDENCIES ......................................................................... 96 

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8  Testing Services 

a. 

must facilitate solution assurance activities for the Senate Scanning 

Solution, including: 

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8.3  System testing 

8.4  System integration testing 

8.5  User Acceptance testing 

P


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8.6  Capacity testing 

8.7  Security and penetration testing 

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9  Security 

9.1  Australian Government security policy 
a. 

The Senate Scanning Solution must protect all AEC data when it is at rest and 
when it is in transit in accordance with the requirements agreed with the AEC, 
informed by the Australian Government security policy, as defined in the 
Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) and the Information Security 
Manual (ISM).  

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9.3  User authorisation 

f. 

Personnel and AEC Staff are not to share their log in credentials or access with 
any other person  

9.4 
a. 

Internet security 
The Senate Scanning Solution must be secured against internet-borne threats to 
AEC data and system confidentiality, integrity and availability. 

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9.6  Personnel security 
a  

Role 

Clearance level 

Status 

c. 

All employees, contractors, Personnel and labour hire staff working with
must have a satisfactory criminal history clearance check prior to commencing 
work 

d. 

All permanent 

 courses: 

i. 

ii. 

Information Security Policy; 

Acceptable Use Policy;


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iii. 

iv. 

v. 

vi. 

vii. 

viii. 

Privacy Policy; 

Anti-Fraud Policy; 

Social Media Policy; 

Work Health Safety Policy; 

 Policies & Procedures; and 

 Code of Conduct. 

10  Ballot Papers 

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c. 

Some Ballot Papers may be printed on multiple pieces of paper and taped 
together or hand written.  

11  Ballot Paper handling 

11.1  Election material details 

 must use the following election material details in relation to Ballot 

Paper handling: 

i. 

All Ballot Papers received at an individual polling place, or processed 
during a declaration vote count at an out-posted centre will be grouped


--- Page 36 ---

ii. 

iii. 

iv. 

v. 

vi. 

vii. 

viii. 

ix. 

x. 

xi. 

together. This grouping of Ballot Papers will be referred to as a Vote 
Collection Point; 

A Vote Collection Point may contain as few as a handful or as many as 
thirty thousand Ballot Papers; 

The Ballot Papers within a Vote Collection Point will be Batched (the 
method of physically Batching is yet to be finalised, however possible 
alternatives may include bulldog clips or plastic document clips) into 
subgroups of 50 to facilitate efficient handling, counting and scanning. 
This subgrouping of Ballot Papers will be referred to as a Batch. Each 
Batch will have a unique batch cover sheet that will contain identification 
data for that Batch; 

A Vote Collection Point will be transported and stored in one or more 
Ballot Paper Transport Containers (BPTC) which will be constructed of 
corflute or cardboard; 

A BPTC will only contain Ballot Papers/Batches from a single Vote 
Collection Point; 

A BPTC will hold up to 10 Batches (i.e. approximately 500 Ballot Papers) 
and will weigh up to approximately 12kg when fully loaded; 

All BPTC within a Vote Collection Point will be dispatched together; 

AEC Staff will conduct an initial sort of the Ballot Papers prior to 
transport, which will ensure: 

a. 

b. 

c. 

d. 

each Ballot Paper is unfolded; 

each Ballot Paper is flattened as much as possible; 

each Ballot Paper has the correct side facing up; 

each Ballot Paper is oriented so the text is left-aligned; 

As such the AEC does not expect 
document sorting activities prior to scanning; 

 to undertake specialised 

Ballot Papers do not contain staples; 

Ripped or torn Ballot Papers will be repaired by AEC Staff prior to 
transport using transparent sticky tape. Excess tape will be trimmed 
where possible to reduce the risk of jamming within the scanning 
equipment; 

where possible, torn/repaired Ballot Papers and manually printed Ballot 
Papers (i.e. Ballot Papers printed on A4 and manually joined) will be 
Batched together so special arrangements for scanning can be 
undertaken if required; 

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xii. 

xiii. 

xiv. 

The outside of every BPTC will be labelled with identification metadata 
and a scannable identifier (e.g. a bar code); 

Inside every BPTC will be a manifest that lists the same information as is 
on the outside of the BPTC; and 

Every Batch within a BPTC will have a coversheet with identification 
metadata and a scannable identifier (e.g. a bar code). 

11.2  Ballot Paper handling principles 
a. 

 agrees and acknowledges to handle Ballot Papers in accordance with 

the AEC Ballot Paper Handling Principles, as described in Section 2.1 (d). 

b. 

c. 

d. 

e. 

f. 

g. 

h. 

i. 

j. 

k. 

l. 

 must ensure that the proposed business process minimises the 

movement and handling of physical Ballot Papers. 

 must ensure that only authorised personnel have access to Ballot 

Papers and their assigned BPTC 

 must ensure that Ballot Papers are always stored in their assigned, 

sealed, BPTC within a designated Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone when not 
being processed. 

 must ensure that a BPTC is only unsealed/opened within a designated 

Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone. 

 must ensure that all BPTCs are never unsealed/opened when only a 

single member of staff is present, when the AEC is not onsite or outside of 
authorised work hours. 

 must ensure that all the Ballot Papers within a Ballot Paper Transport 

Container are scanned as a single unit of work (except in the case of a rescan of 
a batch). 

 must ensure that during processing only one BPTC is unsealed/opened 

within the Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone around an individual scanner at any 
one point in time. 

 must ensure that the Ballot Papers from one Vote Collection Point, 

BPTC or Batch are not mixed with another at any time or under any 
circumstances.  

During processing 
Batch, BPTC and Vote Collection Point and report the outcomes and variations to 
the AEC. 

 must reconcile the number of Ballot Papers in each 

 must ensure that their Personnel do not mark or modify a Ballot Paper. 

 must ensure that no Ballot Papers are damaged or destroyed under any 

circumstance by any Personnel or associated person/entity.  

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11.3  Ballot Paper Secure Zones 
a. 

Ballot Paper Secure Zones are AEC defined segregated locations within a facility 
that have been specifically designed for the handling and/or storage of Ballot 
Papers, and may be either a Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone or a Ballot Paper 
Secure Storage Zone. It must have sufficient security measures in place, as 
approved by the AEC, to ensure no Ballot Papers will be tampered with, 
destroyed or removed.  

b. 

c. 

Ballot Papers must only be outside a Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone or Ballot 
Paper Secure Work Zone in a sealed BPTC. 
 must ensure that any time 
Ballot Papers are not in a Ballot Paper Secure Zone, there are sufficient security 
measures in place, as approved by the AEC, to ensure no Ballot Papers will be 
tampered with, destroyed or removed.  

The workflow of Ballot papers from receipt to processing to temporary storage to 
long term storage must ensure that BPTCs are always under secure conditions 
either via CCTV or security guard/s 

11.4  Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zones 
a. 

 must ensure that Ballot Papers are always stored in their BPTC within a 

designated Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone under the following conditions: 

i. 

ii. 

storage of Ballot Papers not in use; and 

overnight storage of Ballot Papers (this may be achieved by turning a 
Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone into a Ballot Paper Secure Storage 
Zone overnight, there will no requirement to change the signs as long as 
all other characteristics of the Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone are 
met). 

b. 

c. 

 must ensure that the Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone is physically 

separated from zones that store non-AEC materials. 

 must establish Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zones that must have an 

agreed combination of the following security controls: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

lockable internal room within lockable premises to hold the Ballot Paper 
Transport Containers. If that is not available, containers that are sturdy, 
fully enclosed and fitted with a high security lock may be used. 
Examples include B and C class cabinets, site safes and shipping 
containers; 

security guards must be used to supplement an inadequate Ballot Paper 
Secure Storage Zone (as approved by the AEC in writing); 

a mandated sign must be visible at all points of entry, these will be 
supplied by AEC; 

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iv. 

v. 

vi. 

24 hour CCTV monitoring; 

physical security controls that can identify the ingress and egress of an 
individual using smart card, biometric reader or similar; and 

back-to-base alarm system coverage when the Ballot Paper Secure 
Storage Zone is unattended. 

d. 

 must facilitate the following access and supervision requirements: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

 must ensure that only authorised personnel have access to the 

Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone; 

 Personnel and AEC personnel accessing the Ballot Paper 

Secure Storage Zone must display the appropriate visual identification 
which indicates they are authorised to access the zone (refer to the 
Election Personnel Identification in Section 11.11); and 

the contents of the Ballot Paper Secure Storage Zone must not be 
visible to unauthorised personnel. 

11.5  Ballot Paper Secure Work Zones 
a. 

must define one or more Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone for the interim 
placement of Ballot Papers while they are in use and where it is not practicable to 
undertake the work in a Storage Zone (e.g. the scanning of Ballot Papers). 

b. 

 must ensure that a Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone is a clearly 
designated and segregated area using any of the following techniques: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

iv. 

bollards and tape; 

temporary partitions and/or dividers; 

floor marking and/or lines; 

any other suitable technique proposed by 
AEC. 

 and approved by the 

c. 

d. 

e. 

A mandated sign must be visible in the Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone, 

must ensure that the Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone is separated from 

zones processing non-AEC materials. 

 must facilitate the following access and supervision requirements: 

i. 

the Ballot Paper Secure Work Zone must be supervised by an AEC staff 
member at all times whilst it is in operation; 

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iv. 

v. 

A scrutineer must NOT handle Ballot Papers at any time. 

A scrutineer must not unreasonably delay or interfere with the counting 
of votes. 

13  Data capture and workflow software. 

13.1  Accuracy 
a. 

The accuracy of the data capture provided by the Senate Scanning Solution is 
critically important to the Australian democratic process, the Australian public and 
the AEC. 

b. 

 must develop and implement a data capture strategy in line with AEC  

requirements that has the following objectives: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

the preferences captured from a Ballot Paper exactly matches the 
preferences recorded by the voter for every Ballot Paper processed 
within an Electoral Event; 

all Ballot Papers are electronically checked for authenticity and formality; 

every Ballot Paper deemed to be informal or non-standard must have its 
image visually checked as part of the data capture process; 

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13.4  Data capture requirements 

13.4.1  Legislative compliance 
a. 

The information in this section has been incorporated to provide additional clarity 
on the different aspects of Ballot Paper formality checking. However to be 
accepted the Senate Scanning Solution must comply with all relevant sections of 
the Electoral Act irrespective of the information provided below.  The AEC will 
ensure this as part of the UAT process.


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No. 

Deliverable 

Delivery date 

Form of Deliverable 

1    

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No. 

Deliverable 

Delivery date 

Form of Deliverable 

16  Post-event Services 

a. 

17  Service delivery and management 

17.1  Contract management 
The AEC expects its relationship 
a. 
focused on meeting critical timeframes 
must be a clear emphasis on agreed actions being followed through to 
completion. 

 There 

 to be positive, action oriented and 

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17.2  FX DMS team 

17.3  Contract management meetings 

17.4  Executive review meetings 

17.5  Administrative responsibilities 

17.6  Service Level Specification 

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 2018


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18  Electoral Event Support 

18.1  Electoral Event Support 
a. 

The AEC maintains election readiness at all times, and requires a Senate 
Scanning Solution that is capable of supporting an Electoral Event at short notice 
 must be ready 
 as of this date and maintain that readiness until 

 Once the AEC defines an election ready date

to run an election 
an election is called. 

18.2  Federal Election Support


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18.4  Electoral Event Planning and Support


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20  Appendix B: Australian Government 
Enterprise Architecture Principles 

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AG-EA-Principles.pdf


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WORK ORDER FOR CAPTURE AND DIGITAL INFORMATION SERVICES UNDER  
DEED OF STANDING OFFER 13.10-1-1 BETWEEN THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 

Security Classification 

Reserved Materials 

Reserved and Contract Materials listed in Clause 22 of Schedule 5 of the Deed apply to this Work Order.  

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WORK ORDER FOR CAPTURE AND DIGITAL INFORMATION SERVICES UNDER  
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Attachment A – Statement of Requirements 

Attached as separate document. 

RFQ AEC17/149 

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AI Generated

AEC FOI Disclosure Log Archive

FOI Request LEX3844