--- Page 1 ---
No: 22
Referendum: Funding arrangements for referendums
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Points
Funding arrangements for the delivery of referendums and YES/NO campaigns.
The funding for the conduct of referendums and YES/NO campaigns would be
provided via an appropriation from a government decision as part of the Budget
process
The funding would form part of the Annual Appropriation Bills.
Key facts and figures
•
•
•
As part of the October 2022-23 Budget, the Government provided various agencies
$75.1 million over two years from 2022–23 as part of the Delivery of a First Nations Voice to
Parliament Referendum – preparatory work measure to prepare for the delivery of a
referendum to enshrine a First Nations Voice to Parliament in the Constitution.
The AEC component of the measure funding is reflected in the Appropriation Bill 1 2022-23,
and includes:
o $50.2 million in 2022–23 to the Australian Electoral Commission to commence
preparations and support work to deliver the referendum.
o $16.1 million over two years from 2022–23 to the Australian Electoral Commission
to increase First Nations enrolment and participation in future electoral events
This measure is additional to $160.0 million in funding already provisioned in the
Contingency Reserve.
Branch
Contact
Finance and Corporate Performance
Sally So, Chief Financial Officer
Updated
Printed
06/02/2023
7/02/2023 10:09 AM
23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 2 ---
No: 22
Page 2 of 2
23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 3 ---
No: 24
FINANCIAL MATTERS
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
The AEC’s financial position and funding model.
Position
There are ongoing challenges with the AEC’s funding model.
Points
• The Australian National Audit Office has issued an unmodified audit opinion
for the AEC’s 2021–22 financial statements.
• For 2021-22, the AEC reported a loss on continuing operations of
$24.5 million compared to an operating surplus of $47.9 million in 2020-21.
• The AEC’s range of electoral activities is subject to external factors which
•
can impact the timing of our expenditure. Consequently, our operating result
can fluctuate significantly from year to year.
The AEC’s current funding model continues to present an ongoing challenge
and poses significant risk in managing increasingly complex electoral events
and the ongoing growth of the electoral roll.
Branch
Contact
Finance and Corporate Performance
Sally So, Chief Financial Officer
Updated
Printed
20/01/2023 8:56 AM
20/01/2023 8:56 AM
LEX3715 Released Document23
--- Page 4 ---
No: 24
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document23
--- Page 5 ---
No: 25
VENDORS, PROCUREMENTS AND MAJOR TENDERS
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Status and timing of major AEC procurements and tenders published on
AusTender over the 2022–23 financial year.
The AEC has undertaken extensive preparation and planning to have relevant
procurement processes and contracts in place for the next federal election or
referendum event.
The AEC engages a number of suppliers to deliver some key supporting elements
that assist in the AEC’s delivery of federal electoral events. AEC procurement
information is published on AusTender.
Points
• The AEC engages a number of suppliers in support of delivering federal
election events including a referendum.
• Procurements are undertaken in accordance with the AEC Procurement
guidelines and policies including the Commonwealth Procurement Rules
(CPRs).
• The AEC uses various procurement methods to approach the market and
engage suppliers, to ensure value for money is achieved.
• The AEC continues to manage procurements and potential risks associated
with the COVID-19 environment, sustainability in procurement, and political
neutrality.
Talking points
Question: If a referendum goes ahead in 2023, will the AEC have relevant contracts in place?
• Yes, planning for a referendum event in 2023 is well underway. We have a Referendum
Procurement Plan, based on the Referendum Road Ready Roadmap, tracking all critical
referendum procurements and contracts.
Branch
Contact
Finance and Corporate Performance Branch
Stuart Oreo, A/g Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
09/01/2023 05:00PM
20/01/2023 8:56 AM
LEX3715 Released Document 23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 6 ---
No: 25
Page 2 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document 23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 7 ---
No: 25
Page 3 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document 23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 8 ---
No: 25
Page 4 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document 23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 9 ---
No: 25
Page 5 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document 23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 10 ---
No: 25
Page 6 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document 23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 11 ---
No: 26
PERFORMANCE STATEMENTS
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
2021-22 Annual Performance Statements.
Position
Points
The 2021-22 Annual Performance Statements show the AEC met the majority of
performance targets. There is room for improvement on a minority of measures.
The AEC's performance is measured against the key activities as specified in the
Corporate Plan 2021-22 and the performance criteria in the Portfolio Budget
Statements.
•
•
•
14 of 19 (74%) performance measures rated 'met'
1 of 19 (5%) performance measure rated 'on track to be met'
4 of 19 (21%) performance measures rated 'partly met'
• No performance measures rated 'not met'.
Further details of performance measures that are ‘on track to be met’ and ‘partly
met’ can be found in the Annual Report 2021-22.
Talking points
Question: In the AEC’s 2021-22 Annual Report under the ‘Performance Report’ Chapter, the AEC
has assessed itself as ‘partly met’ against the performance measure relating to: ‘Percentage of
voters enrolled who turn out to vote at all federal electoral events (turnout rate)' Could you explain
this?
• The AEC will undertake further analysis to determine the causes of the slightly lower
turnout, with the COVID-19 environment and the larger enrolment base likely contributing
factors.
Question: In the AEC’s 2021-22 Annual Report under the ‘Performance Report’ Chapter, the AEC
has assessed itself as ‘partly met’ against the performance measure relating to: ‘Percentage of
identified APS and TEW staff that undertake specific training relevant to their role' Could you
explain this?
• The AEC adopts a blended learning approach in the training and development programs it
delivers to build the professional and operational capability of its workforce. The diverse
range of formal and informal learning activities staff engage with mean that data is more
difficult to produce as evidence performance is met. Examples of formal and informal
learning activities include: online training, demonstrations, walk-throughs and simulations,
rehearsals, virtual classrooms.
Learning completion rates for the TEW will be reported in the 2022 Electoral Pocketbook.
•
Branch
Contact
Finance and Corporate Performance
Sally So
Updated
Printed
20/01/2023 9:38 AM
20/01/2023 9:38 AM
LEX3715 Released DocumentReleased under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 12 ---
No: 27
TRAVEL
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Cost of travel.
Position
The AEC has offices across the country. There are ongoing requirements for our
staff to travel within the network for activities such as election preparation and
delivery.
Points
• Total travel expenditure:
o 2021-22: $5.393 million
o 2020-21: $1.579 million
o 2019-20: $1.699 million
o 2018-19: $6.535 million
•
2021-22 travel expenses increased compared to 2020-21 and 2019-20 due to
the 2022 federal election.
• Total travel expenditure includes all costs associated with domestic and
overseas travel – travel allowance, airfares, accommodation, vehicle hire, taxis
etc.
• Overseas travel is undertaken for a variety of reasons including networking
with international partners and supporting reform agendas in other countries,
particularly developing democracies. Support to other countries is funded by
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Talking points
Question: Does the AEC adhere to the Whole of Australian Government Travel Policy?
• Yes, including selection of the lowest practical fare unless a valid reason is identified,
documented and approved as part of the travel process.
• There are limited reasons for not selecting the Lowest Practical Fare, including:
o the most direct or shortest route to minimise traveller’s inconvenience;
o health and safety issues for officers requiring certain facilities;
o ability to ensure connections for further flights are met; and
o impact on personal responsibilities such as family (e.g. where flights would otherwise
be outside normal business hours).
Branch
Contact
Finance and Corporate Performance Branch
Sally So, Chief Financial Officer
Updated
Printed
20/01/2023 9:41 AM
20/01/2023 9:41 AM
LEX3715 Released Document Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 13 ---
No: 27
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document No. 2423Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 14 ---
INDIGENOUS VOTER SERVICES AND ENGAGEMENT
No: 28.2
Lead branch
Contact
Community and International Engagement
Rachel Allen, Director
Updated
Printed
09/02/2023
10/02/2023 8:52 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 2623Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 15 ---
No: 28.2
KEY ISSUE SUMMARIES
Overview – Key talking points
• The AEC is committed to the full electoral participation of all eligible Australians and is investing
in partnerships and activities that promote the full electoral participation of First Nations
Australians.
• The AEC recognises that for First Nations Australians living in remote communities, electoral
participation rates have been historically lower than for those in more populated areas.
• The AEC notes that this is a complex area and there is more work to be done, and the AEC
remains committed to this important work.
• Compared to previous elections, for the 2022 federal election there were:
- more First Nations people represented on the electoral roll
- more resources available on voting and elections in First Nations languages than before
- more partnerships established with organisations that are trusted by First Nations
communities
- more Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people employed as Temporary Election
Workforce staff.
• Indigenous enrolment rate estimates have been published by the AEC since June 2017. The
December 2022 estimate is a national Indigenous enrolment rate of 84.5 per cent.
• The Indigenous enrolment rate has grown consistently from 74.7 per cent in 2017 to
84.5 per cent in December 2022.
• While any gap between non-Indigenous and Indigenous enrolment rates is disappointing, it is
encouraging to see that estimated Indigenous enrolment rates have been increasing over time.
• The AEC is also undertaking considerable work to improve the effectiveness of its FDEU direct
enrolment program for First Nations people.
- Three trial activities were completed in the second half of 2022 which added an estimated
15,500 First Nations people to the roll. In light of trial outcomes, changes to the
mainstream FDEU program have been adopted and we expect this to lead to further
increases in the Indigenous enrolment rate.
- One further trial activity will commence in February 2023.
• As part of the Enhancing Indigenous Electoral Participation project, the AEC ran the first
phase of a targeted enrolment advertising campaign in November/December 2022, with a
further phase planned in the first half of 2023.
• The AEC’s Indigenous Electoral Participation Program is also working to support electoral
participation of First Nations peoples through establishing partnerships, working with State and
Territory agencies to undertake remote enrolment work, and delivering targeted and culturally
appropriate services and information.
• The AEC is currently expanding and enhancing its remote polling services to offer an improved
level of service in more locations.
Page 2 of 40
LEX3715 Released Document No. 26Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 16 ---
No: 28.2
Indigenous enrolment estimates
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Points
Despite steady increases, there is still a gap between the national enrolment rates
and the estimated Indigenous enrolment rate.
While any gap between non-Indigenous and Indigenous enrolment rates is
disappointing, it is encouraging to see that estimated enrolment rates for First
Nations Australians are increasing over time.
Headlines
• Updated AEC estimates show that an additional 21,000 Indigenous Australians
have enrolled to vote between the end of June 2022 to the end December 2022,
bringing the national estimated Indigenous enrolment rate up to 84.5% (up
2.8%).
• The rapid rise easily represents the largest increase since estimates were first
calculated in this manner by the AEC in 2017.
• We continue to work really hard in getting as many people to enrol as possible,
with a particular focus on young Australians and Indigenous Australians who
aren’t enrolled at as high a rate as others.
• The AEC’s recent direct enrolment trials are proving successful. Remote
engagement work through AEC staff and 80+ community partners is having an
impact and recent Indigenous enrolment communication campaigns are helping
to achieve the continued enrolment rise as well.
• The estimated number of ‘unenrolled’ Indigenous Australians has gone under
100,000 for the first time – to just under 87,000 – and that is significant.
Stats
• As at 31 December 2022, the estimated Indigenous enrolment rate is 84.5 per
cent.
• This is the highest level of estimated Indigenous enrolment ever achieved,
however there is more work required to achieve parity.
• The rate is increasing in every state and territory.
• Continuous growth has seen the estimated enrolment rate increase from 74.7
per cent in June 2017 to 84.5 per cent in December 2022.
• The estimated number of eligible Indigenous people not enrolled has decreased
by 30 per cent since June 2017.
• These enrolment gains have significantly outpaced the growth of the national
electoral roll.
Question: What advice has AEC provided to Government on Indigenous
enrolment?
• Answer: Annual rates at 30 June have been published since 2017.
Page 3 of 40
LEX3715 Released Document No. 26Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 17 ---
No: 28.2
Page 4 of 40
LEX3715 Released Document No. 2623Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 18 ---
No: 28.2
Page 5 of 40
LEX3715 Released Document No. 2623Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 19 ---
No: 28.2
Page 6 of 40
LEX3715 Released Document No. 2623Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 20 ---
No: 36.2
REFERENDUM PREPAREDNESS
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Preparedness for a referendum in 2023.
Position
The AEC is an independent statutory authority and is responsible for the
machinery of the referendum only. It has no involvement with the
campaigns for or against the proposed changes to the Constitution.
Timetables for the conduct of referendums are set out in legislation.
Points
• With appropriate lead time and funding, the AEC is ready to conduct a
referendum.
• A referendum delivered in a similar manner to a federal election will
have similar costs. The last federal election was budgeted at
approximately $420 million.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support
Natasha Scandrett
Updated
Printed
23/01/2023
23/01/2023
LEX3715 Released Document23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 21 ---
No: 36.2
Page 2 of 3
LEX3715 Released Document23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 22 ---
No: 36.2
Page 3 of 3
LEX3715 Released Document23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 23 ---
No: 37.2
COVID SAFETY MEASURES – 2022 FE
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Points
COVID safe measures to support the conduct of the 2022 federal election.
In the lead up to the 2022 federal election, the AEC was responsive to the
changing environment and was able to safely deliver a free, fair and safe event
without a spike in COVID-19 cases due to the federal election.
• Legislation does not allow for alternative voting models such as 100 per cent
postal voting, or use of electronic voting options. As such, planning was
undertaken on the basis of existing legislation, accounting for potential
changes in voting patterns. This included the Contingency Measures Act which
enabled the Electoral Commissioner to make limited operational modifications
by legislative instrument where an emergency declaration was in place under
a Commonwealth law and the COVID Enfranchisement Act 2022, which
expanded telephone voting to provide contingency for electors in mandatory
isolation or quarantine due to COVID-19.
• Risk: The AEC actively engaged with stakeholders and vendors to understand
the requirements to deliver an election with COVID-19 safety measures. This
included managing health risks and from a materials perspective, issues with
supplier procurement and lead times, product availability, and the resultant
cost impacts. The AEC had a dedicated response unit to actively monitor the
COVID-19 environment including the changing nature of the pandemic in each
jurisdiction and the impact on and response required for the election. We
developed contingency plans to respond to evolving conditions.
• Staff: Additional staff were engaged in polling places and counting centres to
manage voter queues, perform touch point cleaning, and undertake vote
issuing and counting to ensure physical distancing was maintained where
possible. All staff engaged for the federal election were required to be
vaccinated and wear masks.
Talking points
Question: Was the AEC prepared to deliver an election if there was a snap lockdown announced
during the polling period?
• Our planning and delivery models were designed to allow the AEC to be agile and respond to a
changing environment, particularly during this time.
• The AEC actively worked through additional contingency planning to maximise the availability
of voting services for all Australians.
• The AEC worked to the advice provided by federal and local health authorities.
• The AEC had contingencies in place to deliver an election should there be additional
restrictions in place during polling in one or more locations. This included deployment of
additional Personal Protective Equipment to polling places as necessary, as well as funds set
aside for additional cleaning of premises.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support Branch
Natasha Scandrett, Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
23/01/2023
23/01/2023 8:38 AM
LEX3715 Released DocumentReleased under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 24 ---
No: 37.2
Question: The vaccine rollout allowed for restrictions to be eased. Was the AEC concerned that
taxpayers’ money would be wasted on resources that were no longer needed?
• Advice from the Department of Health was that COVID-19 safety measures would likely need
to remain in place in some form for the foreseeable future.
• Given the AEC had been ready to deliver an election since August 2021, there were some
spent costs. If restrictions had been significantly reduced the AEC would have looked to
achieve savings where possible without jeopardising the safety of the public.
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 25 ---
No: 38
EARLY VOTING
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Points
The rise in early voting.
Early voting is important in ensuring fair and equitable access to voting services.
Under the Electoral Act, Australian voters have a range of voting options, and
more than ever before they are exercising the right to cast their ballot before
election day.
The Electoral Legislation Amendment (Counting, Scrutiny and Operational
Efficiencies) Act 2021 reduced the period by which early voting can occur, with
earliest days declared for early voting to not be earlier than 12 days before
election day.
•
In person early voting continues to rise. It now makes up more than 36 per
cent of all votes counted.
• Pre-poll ordinary voting was approximately 5.07 million votes, an increase of
around 18 per cent on 2019 (4.29 million votes).
• The increase between the 2016 and 2019 election was approximately 57 per
cent.
• Approximately 583,000 pre-poll declaration votes in envelopes were received,
down 10 per cent on 2019.
• Postal votes increased significantly with approximately 2.39 million returned,
compared to approximately 1.29 million at 2019.
• Due to the pandemic, and based on advice from health authorities, there was
a reduced mobile polling service for the 2022 federal election, with those
voters unable to be serviced by mobile polling voting either by postal vote, at
an early voting centre, or at a polling place on election day.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support Branch
Natasha Scandrett, A/g Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
23/01/2023
23/01/2023 8:40 AM
LEX3715 Released DocumentReleased under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 26 ---
LEX3715 Released Document No. 36
No: 38
Key statistics
Early voting - 2022 FE
• More than 7.9 million early votes at the 2022 federal election
•
51.34% of votes were early votes, up from 41.56% in 2019
•
Includes pre-eoll and eostal votes, teleehone votes and mobile eolling
Pre-�oll and �ostal voting
HoR votes counted
• Total earlv votes
• Percentaae of all votes cast
Vote type
• Pre-poll votes
• Postal votes
Tele�hone voting
• Secure telephone votes (HoR)
• Blind and Low Vision
• Antarctic
Mobile �olling (all mobile �olling)
• Mobile polling teams
•
Locations visited
• Votes taken
Remote Area Mobile Polling
• RAMP teams
7,836,528 (6,153,957 in 2019)
50.68% (40.79% in 2019)
4,906,787 in 2019 (32.52%)
5,626,120 (36.39% of total votes)
-
2,210,408 (14.30% of total votes)
-
1,247,170 in 2019 (8.27%)
75,366
2,747 (2,043 in 2019)
65
111
456
22,552 ordinary votes taken (HoR)
-
114,092 in 2019
38 teams visited 348 remote locations
Page 2 of 4
Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 27 ---
No: 38
Page 3 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 28 ---
No: 38
Page 4 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 29 ---
No: 39
POSTAL VOTING
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
The integrity and management of postal voting in Australia.
Position
The AEC has absolute confidence in the integrity of the postal voting processes
used in federal elections.
Points
• Postal Voting is governed by Part XV of the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918.
• The integrity of postal voting is achieved through managing which votes are
admitted to the count.
• Counting postal votes is resource intensive and takes more time than counting
•
ordinary votes.
Legislative changes passed by the Parliament in 2021 provide contingencies
and operational efficiencies to improve postal voting services and capacity.
These include:
o modernising the design of postal voting envelopes
o allowing postal envelopes to be opened from the Monday five days
before election day and the ballot papers extracted and placed in a
sealed ballot box ready for counting after polling day.
Talking points
Question: How many postal votes were cast in 2022, how did voters apply for a postal vote and
how many postal votes were returned?
•
The AEC issued 2,731,088 postal votes at the 2022 federal election, an increase from 1.5
million in 2019.
• Over 56% of voters applied for a vote online, an increase from 44% in 2019.
•
31.5% completed a paper postal vote application. These applications were processed by our
partner, Computershare in all states and territories.
The remaining 12.5% were sent to general postal voters, who automatically receive ballot
papers in the mail after an election has been announced.
The AEC received 2,382,267 completed postal votes before 13 day deadline after polling day.
This represents a return rate of 87%, higher than the 2019 return rate of 84.1%.
•
•
Question: How did the AEC engage with key stakeholders to successfully deliver postal voting in
2022?
•
•
The AEC recognised early in the preparation for the 2022 event that both the COVID-19
pandemic and international experience would likely have a significant effect on postal voting.
We expected significantly high volumes of applications, greater scrutiny and challenges with
production and lodgement.
The AEC leveraged strong relationships with the AEC’s postal vote provider Computershare
and with Australia Post to ensure success. These partners provided their expertise to co-
design materials and processes that mitigated risks and improved voter experience.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support Branch
Natasha Scandrett, A/g Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
23/01/2023
23/01/2023 8:46 AM
LEX3715 Released DocumentReleased under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 30 ---
No: 39
• This engagement was conducted at multiple levels of all three organisations and evolved into
governance and delivery activities during the event.
• The AEC knew that a proportion of the expected volume of applications would be attributed to
political party/candidate led PVA distribution. To ensure that the PVAs distributed would be
compliant and provided direct to Computershare, the AEC published the PVA Management
Guide on the Candidate Hub. This guide provided key information as well as QR artwork that
could be added to materials as needed. Specific guides were also created for each
Computershare or TIMG site, with specific opening times and access requirements.
• The AEC pursued legislative changes to the requirements for a Postal Vote Certificate in order
to be able to produce the higher volumes expected.
• The short period between the passing of legislative changes and the announcement of the
election did not allow for direct voter engagement. To ensure voter needs were met the AEC:
o Sourced an experienced, external form designer to provide specialist advice and
ensure voter needs and behaviours were catered for in the design of new materials
Inserted pictorial instructions on the inside of the new PVC
o
o Tested materials with AEC staff and their families
o Produced and published a video demonstration of how to complete a postal vote
which was viewed over 120,000 times
o Updated and added guidance on the AEC website
• The AEC is currently working on enhancing the postal vote design further to enhance the user
experience and maximise enfranchisement.
Question: What was the effect of legislative changes made in 2021?
Modernised design
The legislative change in 2021 allowed AEC the opportunity to rethink the design and function of
the postal voting materials sent to voters. During the redesign process AEC staff considered the
difficulties faced and complaints made by voters in previous elections, production efficiencies and
material durability.
To mitigate the voter concerns the AEC:
• Engaged an experienced form designer to provide specialist advice and ensure voter needs
and behaviours were catered for in the design
• Provided every voter with a return envelope in which both their ballot paper and personal
details were secure.
• Printed completion instructions with supporting images inside the certificate.
• Produced and published a video demonstration of how to complete a postal vote.
o This video was accessed via a QR code within the postal vote certificate (PVC).
o Captions for the video were translated and available in 19 different languages
o The video was viewed over 97,000 times over April and May 2022 and was also
published on our AEC TV YouTube channel which has also been viewed over
31,000 times.
The AEC worked with our partners, Computershare, to design a PVC that did not have to be glued
into an envelope. Whilst a seemingly small feature of the previous design, this change:
• Eliminated multiple risks including:
o Availability of sub-contracted services: during our preparations only one supplier in
Australia was able to provide folding and gluing services
o Ballot paper security and voter privacy: the new PVC was produced only by
Computershare and did not need to be transported to other suppliers.
• Significantly increased production and ensured that postal materials were dispatched to
applicants in the shortest timeframe possible.
Page 2 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document No. 37Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 31 ---
No: 39
• Provided greater control and allowed Computershare to organise additional shifts when
necessary.
To ensure the new materials, specifically the return envelope, were compliant with Australia Post
requirements the AEC also ran lodgement trials. These successful trials provided assurance that
not only did the materials meet the addressing requirements to ensure efficient sorting by Australia
Post, but also that the ballot papers could be securely returned to the AEC without damage.
Ballot paper extraction prior to election day
New legislation allowing votes from declaration envelopes to be extracted from the Monday prior to
election day enabled the AEC to process a large number of postal vote results faster after election
day. By the Tuesday after election day, results for over 750,000 House of Representatives postal
votes were known, in comparison to just over 200,000 at the same time for the 2019 federal
election.
Question: How were PVAs managed during the 2022 election?
PVA scanning and data capture services were provided by Computershare. The co-designed
solution provided the following improvements to PVA management:
• To increase use of the online option, a QR code was added to the approved PVA artwork.
• Where possible Computershare were provided with candidate/party PVA artwork prior to the
announcement of the election. This allowed Computershare to pre-program their systems to
recognise and capture completed forms without requiring manual input by AEC staff.
• Paper PVAs were sent directly to Computershare to reduce double handling and ensure data
was captured from PVAs as soon as possible.
• PVAs were sent to Computershare via a number of methods:
o Candidates and parties could deliver bulk PVAs to Computershare or TIMG sites in
each state and territory
o Voters could email, fax or post their completed PVA.
Question: How many PVAs were received from political parties in the 2022 election? What were
the challenges with these PVAs?
Overall the AEC received 893,243 paper PVAs of which 551, 274 (61%) can be directly attributed
to political parties. The single consequence of direct delivery of PVAs to Computershare was that,
due to a lack of information provided on packaging or made available to couriers, Computershare
could not accurately record the source of the remaining 39% of paper PVAs.
In addition, the following challenges arose:
•
some political parties chose to make significant changes to the approved PVA artwork,
including removing the QR code. Each significant change needed to be reviewed by the AEC
to ensure compliance and led to a delay in production.
•
• The AEC was not provided with all versions of the PVA artwork used by political parties and
candidates. This led to PVAs distributed in particular areas with an incorrect return address.
Whilst the address used was managed by the AEC, it was collected by a different supplier and
led to double handling and delays in processing.
Late engagement by both the ALP and Liberal Party with regard to their online applications did
not provide adequate time for the AEC to conduct full risk assessments and mitigations.
In line with the previous events, many queries and complaints were received from voters that
had not received their postal materials despite returning a paper PVA up to 2 weeks prior to
the complaint. Upon further enquiry it was found that the PVA in question had been returned to
the political party and not yet received by the AEC.
•
Page 3 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document No. 37Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 32 ---
No: 39
Question: In light of the negative comments regarding postal ballots at elections overseas, what
does the AEC do to ensure the integrity of postal voting in Federal Elections?
• Postal voting has been an integral part of Australian elections since before Federation and like
all AEC processes is strictly governed by legislation and AEC policies and procedures.
• The procedures for postal voting are governed by Part XV of the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918 (the Electoral Act).
• Every postal vote returned to the AEC must be matched to an elector before it is included in
the count.
• The matching process includes the following preliminary scrutiny:
▪ Name and address match
▪ Postal vote signed by elector
▪ Witness requirements
▪ Check that the elector and witness declarations are dated on or before polling day
▪ Checks of signatures if deemed necessary
▪
If the elector has already cast a declaration vote that has been counted (whether that be
by postal, absent or provisional) the vote is not included in the count.
• To ensure the secrecy of the ballot, there is a specific process whereby postal votes that are to
be included into the count have their ballot papers removed with the elector details facing
down, and the ballot papers are then placed in a ballot box and counted separately in batches.
Like all processes regarding the counting of ballot papers, these processes can be observed
by scrutineers.
•
Question: Did the increase in postal votes slow down the count and make it longer for seats to be
declared?
There are a number of factors that impact the speed of the count and the AECs ability to declare
the poll in each division. One of these factors is the requirement to wait until 13 days after election
day to receive returned postal votes, however the 2022 event saw other factors, including the
increase in the number of candidates and voters marking a first preference for candidates other
than the two-candidate preferred candidates, also affect the AEC’s ability to declare.
New legislation that allowed ballots to be extracted from PVCs from the Monday before polling day
did assist to increase the speed of the count, as did the changes to allow the unfolding and initial
sorting of ordinary votes taken at pre-poll voting centres from 4pm on polling day. Further
legislative change, such as beginning these processes earlier and streamlining declaration voting
may further allow the AEC to provide earlier indicative results in line with public expectations.
• While the Electoral Act requires electors to cast their postal vote before 6pm on polling day,
the AEC is required to wait until 13 days after election day to receive returned postal votes.
• A seat cannot be declared until the number of potential votes yet to be counted (which until the
13th day includes all postal votes issued) cannot change the outcome.
• This can mean that votes that may decide the election may not be received until almost
2 weeks after polling day. Therefore, if there is a greater percentage of postal votes, the
likelihood of these votes delaying declaration is higher (particularly in marginal or close seats).
• The AEC’s integrity process for the return of postal votes also means that there are more
checks and balances required than counting ordinary ballot papers cast in a physical polling
place. This too can slow down the count and is resource intensive. The AEC applies the same
integrity processes to all returned postal votes, regardless of whether the result of a seat or the
election is beyond doubt.
Page 4 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document No. 37Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 33 ---
No: 39
Postal voting talking points
• When electors apply online for a postal vote application the AEC has full digital visibility of
each individual application and its status. This is the way the majority (56% in 2022) of
applications are received. When electors apply using a paper postal vote application, they can
be received by the AEC through a number of channels including through third parties such as
political parties.
•
•
•
•
Paper forms by their nature require the data to be captured from the form and the information
recorded in order for the data to be included in the AEC’s postal voting system and the postal
vote sent. Previously this was done by manual data entry. However, developments in
technology have allowed for a digital data capture solution. The AEC has used this digital
solution to capture data from paper postal vote applications for the last three federal elections.
At no stage during previous elections has the AEC had any doubt that the data from paper
applications was being captured and postal votes actioned.
Computershare Communication Services provide both the scanning of paper applications and
the printing and mailing of postal voting packs.
Comments about postal voting processes for the 2020 US elections may have meant there
was more scrutiny of the Australian process. Due to the preparation and engagement activities
undertaken by AEC, the AEC did not experience a significantly higher level of scrutiny. Whilst
some questions and accusations were raised in social media forums, the AEC was able to
quickly demonstrate the integrity of our processes and resolve problems as required
• While the AEC attempts to match all postal vote applications to an elector on the electoral roll
before dispatching the postal vote, this is not always possible. In 2022, 1.5% of the 2,731,088
postal votes issued were not matched to an elector.
•
•
The AEC works very closely with Australia Post and Computershare to ensure postal votes are
delivered before the election and to facilitate their return to the AEC. These relationships were
critical to the successful delivery of postal voting services.
The AEC received some publicity at the 2019 federal election when it was raised in the media
that a postal vote for Mr Edward (Ned) Kelly was delivered to the Glenrowan Hotel. As the
AEC explained at the time, the legislation allows for any person to complete a PVA, however,
the processes upon return means the vote will only be counted if that name can be matched to
the address on the electoral roll.
2022 federal election postal voting statistics
o Number of Postal Votes Issued: 2,731,088
o Number of Postal Votes Returned: 2,389,751
o Number of Postal Votes Admitted to count: 2,212,301
o Number of Postal Votes Partially Admitted*: 1,256
o Number of Postal Votes Rejected**: 176,880
▪
▪
* Partially admitted means that only the Senate Ballot Paper was counted
** 140,124 (79.2%) of postal votes rejected were due to no elector or witness signature
Page 5 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document No. 37Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 34 ---
No: 39
Recent legislative changes
Electoral Legislation Amendment (Counting, Scrutiny and Operational Efficiencies) Act 2021
Royal Assent 2 September 2021
Measure
Details
Remove the requirement
for paper postal vote
applications (PVAs) to be
sent to the home division
Allow digital process for
overseas voters who
can't find an authorised
witness
Admitting postal vote
ballot papers outside
PVC envelope but within
an outer envelope
Allow extraction of ballot
papers from declaration
vote envelopes before
polling day
This removes the requirement to send paper PVAs in the declaration
vote exchange. The divisions where the paper PVA is received will
retain the paper form with other election records, to be destroyed in
accordance with statutory authorisation.
Under s 194(1A), an overseas voter who can't find a witness can
attach to their postal vote a signed and dated statement and a
photocopy of their passport. This change allows them to submit their
statement and an image of their passport electronically.
If a postal ballot paper is returned inside an outer envelope but
outside the postal vote certificate (PVC) it is currently not allowed to
be admitted to the count. This measure saves those votes. It enables
the AEC to supply a return outer envelope with the postal voting
pack, easing voters’ concerns about privacy.
The opening of the envelopes, extracting of ballot papers, unfolding
and reconciling, is shifted from just before further scrutiny, to just
after preliminary scrutiny, if it is up to five days before polling day.
The ballot papers will be placed in ballot boxes ready for sorting and
counting after the close of the poll. The AEC will extract postal votes
from the Monday before election day.
The process where postal votes received from electors who also
voted with a mobile team are removed will no longer be conducted.
Electoral Legislation Amendment (Contingency Measures) Act 2021
Royal Assent 13 December 2021
Measure
Details
Postal vote certificate
does not have to be
printed on an envelope
Changes and impacts:
The AEC can process a postal vote certificate placed inside an
envelope as if it were a postal vote certificate printed on an
envelope. This allows the AEC to provide postal vote certificates in
the approved form but not necessarily printed on an envelope.
• Postal envelopes may be opened from the Monday five days before election day and the ballot
papers extracted and placed in a sealed ballot box ready for counting after polling day.
• Changes have been made to postal voting requirements, allowing the AEC to modernise the
design of postal voting envelopes.
• The early extraction of postal votes and earlier sorting of pre-poll votes did provide some
efficiencies and help the AEC cope with increasing volumes of early votes.
• There will be some ability to count postal votes and provide results earlier in the period after
polling day than previously, however the AEC’s priority will remain to count ordinary votes first.
Page 6 of 6
LEX3715 Released Document No. 37Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 35 ---
No: 40
MOBILE POLLING – 2022 FEDERAL ELECTION
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Mobile polling service offering for the 2022 federal election.
Position
Mobile polling is an important component of election service delivery. The AEC
provided mobile polling to remote areas, homeless shelters, a limited number of
residential aged care facilities and some prisons.
Points
Residential aged care facilities
• Based on advice from health authorities and a detailed risk assessment, the
AEC offered mobile polling services to a limited number of residential aged
care facilities at the 2022 federal election. This decision was endorsed by all
Chief Health Officers nationally in late December 2021 and required facilities
to explicitly agree to a mobile team attending the facility.
• Specific arrangements were put in place to communicate with facilities about
voting options for their residents and to provide support to facilities who did
not receive mobile polling.
Other locations (e.g. homeless shelters)
• The AEC provided mobile polling services to homeless shelters and some
other community locations who agreed to the service.
• A mobile polling service was provided to a limited number of prisons that were
identified as having a high risk of electors being unable to vote by another
method.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support
Natasha Scandrett, A/g Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
23/01/2023
23/01/2023 8:42 AM
LEX3715 Released DocumentReleased under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 36 ---
No: 40
Talking points
Question: What mobile polling services were provided?
• Based on advice from the Department of Health and a detailed risk assessment, the AEC
offered mobile polling services to a limited number of residential aged care facilities at the 2022
federal election where certain criteria were met. This decision was endorsed by all Chief Health
Officers nationally in late December 2021.
• The AEC also conducted mobile polling at locations where there was a very high risk of
disenfranchisement, such as homeless shelters and some prisons.
• Mobile polling was not conducted at hospitals or independent living facilities.
• Voters at establishments that were not offered mobile polling were able to vote by visiting an
early voting centre, visiting a polling place on election day or applying for a postal vote.
• The AEC also established dedicated support staff in each state and territory to communicate
and facilitate voting options for voters in aged care facilities and other locations where mobile
polling was not offered.
Question: How did the AEC ensure the safety of voters in residential aged care facilities?
• Strict COVID-19 safety measures were in place for all mobile polling teams to ensure the safety
of voters, facility staff, facility visitors and AEC staff. These measures included the requirement
for the AEC’s temporary election workforce to be fully vaccinated and to comply with relevant
facility requirements.
• Chief Health Officers and individual residential aged care facilities were able to decide up until
the mobile polling service was delivered whether to permit access, depending on the COVID-19
environment. Where facilities cancelled mobile polling services, these locations were provided
with information and assistance from support cells in each state and territory office.
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 37 ---
No: 43.2
OVERSEAS VOTING – 2022 FEDERAL ELECTION
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Points
Availability of voting for Australians overseas.
COVID-19 and other international security concerns necessitated a risk
assessment of overseas voting for the 2022 federal election. The AEC put
additional processes in place to maximise the availability of voting services for
Australians overseas.
• Australians overseas were able to vote in person at 19 overseas posts.
• Australians in other locations were able to vote by postal vote.
• All Australians overseas were encouraged to apply for a postal vote in case
their in-person location became unavailable at short notice.
• The AEC delivered overseas postal votes by courier to improve delivery time
and reliability.
• Australians were able to mail their completed postal vote to Australian
missions which were collected and returned to Australia by diplomatic mail.
• Voters were kept informed through the AEC and Smartraveller websites, as
well as social media.
• The AEC is working with DFAT and Austrade to review our overseas voting for
future events with the aim of returning to the level of service provided for the
2019 federal election.
Talking points
Question: Why couldn’t all Australians overseas access in-person voting services?
• Due to the pandemic and security concerns in some locations, not all Australian diplomatic
•
missions were able to offer in-person voting services.
In November 2021, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) requested advice from
overseas posts on the support they could provide for the 2022 federal election.
• After assessing responses and risk, the AEC in collaboration with DFAT and Austrade
determined 19 posts where in-person voting could take place.
• These 19 posts issued 46 per cent of all overseas in-person votes at the 2019 federal election.
• The AEC advised overseas voters on our website of the Australian diplomatic posts where they
could vote in person and kept this information up to date throughout the election period.
Question: What about Australians overseas who couldn’t access in-person voting services?
• The AEC and DFAT websites and social media advised all Australians overseas to apply for a
postal vote as soon as the election was announced, to give them the maximum amount of time
to receive their postal vote packs.
• For the first time, postal votes to overseas addresses were delivered from Australia by courier
to improve delivery time and reliability.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support Branch
Natasha Scandrett, Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
23/01/2023
23/01/2023 8:43 AM
LEX3715 Released Document Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 38 ---
• Australians overseas were able to mail their completed postal votes to Australian missions
where they were returned to Australia by diplomatic mail. This process was faster and more
reliable than international mail.
No: 43.2
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document 23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 39 ---
No: 44.2
SENATE COUNTING AND ASSURANCE
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
The scanning of Senate ballot papers, capture of preferences and the software
used for Senate elections.
After legislative change prior to the 2016 federal election, the AEC determined that
the scanning of ballot papers to capture preferences was the only method
available to ensure that the Senate scrutinies were completed within required
timeframes. The solution significantly reduces the human effort, time and cost of
capturing voter preferences in a full manual construct. There are robust controls
and validations to ensure the continued integrity of the elections.
Points
• Prior to every election the AEC undertakes extensive rigorous testing, security
assessments and assurance through internal and external specialists of the
software and processes.
• At the 2022 federal election more than 108 million preferences from over
15.5 million ballot papers were scanned, data entered, and verified in
approximately four weeks after polling day.
• To ensure accuracy, all preferences are data entered by at least one human
operator and compared to captured (scanned) preferences. All interpretation
discrepancies are escalated for further action.
• The AEC is has implemented, and complies with, all components of the
Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Act 2021.
• The AEC demonstrates the software used to support the scrutiny for each
Senate election is secure through security risk assessments which includes
AEC and provider systems.
• The AEC engaged an external company to complete the legislated on-site
assurance process during the Senate scrutiny (s273AC). This external
company oversaw the selection and inspection of ballot papers to demonstrate
the preferences have been correctly captured within AEC systems. This
process was open to inspection by scrutineers. Nationally, the identified
exception rate for the 2022 federal election was 0.45%.
• Scrutineers can monitor all processing of Senate ballot papers at Central
Senate Scrutiny centres in each state and territory.
• The AEC manages all aspects of the Senate count process, including
formality, in accordance with the legislation.
• Once all preferences from all ballot papers are captured, the AEC uses
EasyCount – Senate to run the distribution of preferences for Senate elections
in accordance with legislative requirements.
• The software enables reporting and auditing of the results.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support Branch
Natasha Scandrett, A/g Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
23/01/2023
23/01/2023 8:48 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 44Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 40 ---
No: 44.2
Talking points
Accuracy Assurance
Question: What controls are in place to give assurance of accuracy?
• Every preference captured is entered by human operators and overseen by scrutineers.
• The AEC conducts extensive rigorous testing and assurance processes for both the Senate
scanning and Senate count systems before they are accepted for use.
• Testing and assurance is done in conjunction with Australian Signals Directorate and other
relevant government agencies.
• There are numerous integrity checks inherent in the system during the scrutiny, including
interpretation discrepancy checks between scanned and data entered preferences, defined
workflow rules for different ballot paper scenarios, scrutineer challenges, and reconciliation
processes.
• A range of IT security measures are in place and systems are subject to extensive security
assessments in line with IRAP and Essential 8 criteria.
• An external provider ran an assurance process at the 2022 federal election to demonstrate the
preferences on the ballot papers are the preferences that are in the AEC system for that ballot
paper.
Supplementary question: What arrangements are in place for scrutineers at the scanning
centres?
• Scrutineers may observe the scanning, verification, and adjudication processes.
• Additional large monitors allow scrutineers to better view ballot paper preferences for more
contentious ballot papers.
• Scrutineer challenges may be escalated to the Australian Electoral Officer if they cannot be
resolved at the time.
• The scrutineer can request the physical ballot paper to assist in resolving a query.
• The scrutineers are able to observe the on-site assurance process, the results of which have
been published on the AEC website.
Question: Is the software used to run Senate elections secure from cyber-attacks?
• The software used for running Senate elections has undergone multiple independent audits,
including an independent assessment as part of the ASD’s Information Security Registered
Assessor Program (IRAP). There were no issues identified that would affect the integrity of the
count.
In addition, the AEC is supported by the Australian Cyber Security Centre in assessing internal
certification and risk mitigation relating to the Senate Scanning solution.
•
• The AEC continues to work with our partner security agencies to ensure our cyber security
arrangements are commensurate with the ever-increasing threat environment.
Page 2 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document No. 44Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 41 ---
No: 44.2
Supplementary question: What is an IRAP assessment?
• The Infosec Registered Assessors Program (IRAP) is maintained by the Australian Cyber
Security Centre (ACSC), within the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD). The program
endorses independent cyber security professionals as "IRAP Assessors", which demonstrates
that an assessor is suitably qualified and able to perform cyber security assessments in
alignment with Australian Government guidance and frameworks.
• Endorsed IRAP assessors assist in securing systems and data by independently assessing
applicable cyber security posture, identifying any security risks and suggesting associated
mitigation measures.
The Distribution of Preferences
Question: Does EasyCount – Senate accurately distribute the preferences in accordance with the
Commonwealth Electoral Act?
• Yes, EasyCount – Senate has been rigorously tested and assured through Government best
practise IT and security measures.
• AEC publishes the full set of preferences captured from Senate ballot papers during the
election and this is available in full after election completion. Multiple people use this data to
run the distribution of preferences on their own software and compare their results with AEC’s.
This has consistently shown the results published by AEC are correct.
• The AEC tested and implemented changes to the count process from legislative change in
2021, which was in use for the 2022 federal election.
• The AEC will implement the new legislative requirement prior to the 2024-25 federal election,
for an external assessor to verify the count system distributes preferences and elects
candidates in accordance with requirements in the Electoral Act.
Question: Has the AEC purchased software from Scytl? What was the software used for?
• As part of the response to the significant legislative changes to the Senate voting and counting
requirements prior to the 2016 federal election, the AEC worked concurrently with a range of
stakeholders on a suitable solution for counting the Senate under the new legislation. One of
the vendors engaged was Scytl and Scytl delivered a software count solution to the AEC.
• The AEC has not used Scytl software, nor any component of the software, for any federal
election. The updated version of AEC’s EasyCount software has been used exclusively for
counting for Senate elections.
Question: Will the AEC make the source code of the software used for Senate elections public?
• The code for EasyCount – Senate base software is used in a commercial capacity to assist the
AEC to run Commercial and Industrial Elections. At this stage the AEC has not released the
source code.
Page 3 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document No. 44Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 42 ---
No: 44.2
Assurance
• All scanning and data capture is open to scrutineers.
• All distribution of preference data is published after the event on results.aec.gov.au (AEC Tally
Room).
• For the 2022 federal election, the AEC conducted extensive testing and assurance of the
Senate scanning process, including the data capture and validity of images compared to the
physical ballot papers. These processes confirmed the accuracy of the Senate scanning
process.
• A ballot paper assurance process was conducted at each Senate counting centre throughout
the scrutiny which was observed by scrutineers.
Formality
• The AEC follows the legislative framework of the Electoral Act and relevant case law, which
defines the formality rules the AEC must implement.
Page 4 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document No. 4423Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 43 ---
No: 45
EASYCOUNT – SENATE
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
EasyCount – Senate.
Position
EasyCount – Senate (ECS) is the software the AEC uses to run, and report
on, the distribution of preferences for federal Senate elections.
Points
• The AEC uses EasyCount – Senate to run the distribution of
preferences for Senate elections in accordance with legislative
requirements.
• The software is secure.
• The software enables reporting and auditing of the results.
Talking points
Question: Does EasyCount – Senate accurately distribute the preferences in accordance with the
Commonwealth Electoral Act?
• Yes, EasyCount – Senate has been rigorously tested and assured through Government best
practise IT and security measures.
• AEC publishes the full set of preferences captured from Senate ballot papers after election
completion. Multiple people use this data to run the distribution of preferences on their own
software and compare their results with AEC’s. This has consistently shown the results
published by AEC are correct.
•
In accordance with new legislation, prior to the next federal election, the AEC will have an
external assessor verify that EasyCount – Senate distributes preferences and elects
candidates in accordance with the Electoral Act.
Question: Has the AEC purchased software from Scytl? What was the software used for?
• As part of the response to the significant legislative changes to the Senate voting and counting
requirements prior to the 2016 federal election, the AEC worked concurrently with a range of
stakeholders on a suitable solution for counting the Senate under the new legislation. One of
the vendors engaged was Scytl and Scytl delivered a software count solution to the AEC.
• The AEC has not used Scytl software, nor any component of the software, for any federal
election. The updated version of AEC’s EasyCount software has been used exclusively for
counting for Senate elections.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support
Natasha Scandrett A/g Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
23/01/2023
23/01/2023 8:55 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 45Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 44 ---
No: 45
Question: Is the software used to run Senate elections secure from cyber attacks?
• The software used for running Senate elections has undergone multiple independent audits,
including an independent assessment as part of the ASD’s Information Security Registered
Assessor Program (IRAP). There were no issues identified that would affect the integrity of the
count.
•
In addition, the AEC is supported by the Australian Cyber Security Centre in assessing internal
certification and risk mitigation relating to the AEC systems and applications that support the
Senate elections.
• The AEC continues to work with our partner security agencies to ensure our cyber security
arrangements are commensurate with the ever-increasing threat environment.
Question: Will the AEC make the source code of the software used for Senate elections public?
• The code for EasyCount – Senate base software is used in a commercial capacity to assist the
AEC to run Commercial and Industrial Elections. At this stage the AEC has not released the
source code.
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document No. 4523Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 45 ---
No: 46
POLLING PLACE TECHNOLOGY – ECLs
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Points
The Polling Place Technology MYEFO measure and the benefits it will provide.
This investment will see the number of Electronic Certified Lists significantly
increase from 5,500 to 10,000 for the next federal election, as well as the
development and implementation of a new digital tool for polling place Officers in
Charge. The tool will integrate with the AEC Command Centre and other systems,
enhancing polling place connectedness and improving issues resolution.
• Polling Place Technology measure announced through MYEFO 2020-21.
$24.4 million over four years from 2020-21 to increase the use of ECLs.
•
• Over 5,500 ECLs were used at the 2022 election to issue over 5.6 million
votes.
• The AEC plans to increase this to 10,000 at the next election.
Talking points
• This investment will deliver enhanced digital solutions that improve the scalability of the
electronic certified list (ECL) to assist voter franchise and voter compliance, as well as user
experience and operational effectiveness.
• Polling Place Technology (PPT) is an integral part of delivering efficient polling services and
includes:
o Modern, portable devices
o An application that interacts with AEC enterprise solutions
o A secure network
• ECLs are portable devices, being used by issuing officers in all pre-poll voting centres, mobile
polling teams, including remote area mobile polling, and selected high volume polling locations
on election day.
• ECLs allow polling officials to efficiently search the approved list of eligible voters and
electronically record that a person has been handed a ballot paper in accordance with the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.
• The AEC deployed over 5,500 devices for the 2022 federal election, using enhanced ECL
application capability to address scalability issues, and is planning to deploy approximately
10,000 devices for the 2024/25 federal election.
• The MYEFO measure also includes funding for the development and implementation of a new
digital tool for polling place Officers in Charge. The Officers in Charge will be able to connect to
AEC systems which will support more efficient and connected polling place management
activities and resolution of operational issues.
• This digital polling place management tool will replace paper OIC Returns that are currently in
use. Paper Returns do not support real time communication with decision makers or efficient
polling place management.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support
Natasha Scandrett, A/g Assistant Commissioner Printed
Updated
23/01/2023
23/01/2023 8:56 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 46Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 46 ---
• The digital tool will be used by 1,300 Officers in Charge at polling places where ECLs are in
use for the 2024/25 federal election. Taking this approach will enable the AEC to evaluate
operability and sustainability before a decision on a wider rollout is made.
• The expanded use of polling place technology for future events will improve operational
capabilities and effectiveness and contribute to the prevention of multiple voting.
No: 46
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document No. 4623Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 47 ---
No: 47
VOTER VERIFICATION
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
The impact of voter verification.
Position
Voter verification is entirely a matter for the Parliament.
Points
•
Identification is required when enrolling to vote.
• Under the Electoral Act, voter verification when casting a vote is not required.
Any introduction of this would require legislative change.
•
Introducing voter verification would have an impact on the efficiency of vote
issuing and counting. It may also impact voter enfranchisement.
• A previous JSCEM report has recommended the Electoral Act be amended
to require voters to present a form of acceptable identification to be issued
with an ordinary pre-poll or election day vote.
• We are aware of previous bills that proposed changes to the Electoral Act to
include voter identification provisions. From the 46th Parliament:
o Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Integrity of Elections) Bill 2021
[Malcolm Roberts]
o Electoral Legislation Amendment (Voter Integrity) Bill 2021 [Ben Morton]
• Any consideration of proposed legislative amendments is a matter for the
Parliament.
Talking points
Question: What would be the operational and other impacts of introducing voter verification?
•
Impacts could include:
- increased time to issue votes, including queue times
- increased costs of technology, materials, training and staff
- higher number of declaration votes, which are more time-consuming to process and
count resulting in less votes able to be counted on election night
- a large communication and education campaign required
- significant changes to business processes and training.
• Careful design and management would be required to ensure that groups of eligible voters are
•
not disenfranchised.
Legislative change would be required to enforce voter verification processes and to provide
clarity of requirements for the AEC, voters and other stakeholders.
• The introduction of voter verification does not eliminate the possibility of administrative errors
resulting in multiple marks, or electors attempting to vote more than once.
Branch
Delivery and Support Branch
Updated
Contact
Natasha Scandrett, A/g Assistant Commissioner
Printed
23/01/202323/01/2023
8:58 AM
23/01/2023 8:58 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 47Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 48 ---
No: 47
Page 2 of 3
LEX3715 Released Document No. 4723Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 49 ---
No: 47
Page 3 of 3
LEX3715 Released Document No. 4723Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 50 ---
No: 48
Candidate qualification checklist
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
The requirements to review and publish qualification checklists and supporting
documents at the 2022 federal election. The eligibility of electoral candidates
under section 44 of the Constitution.
The AEC is required to check that all mandatory questions on the qualification
checklist are answered. It does not determine the accuracy of the answers or the
potential impact on a candidate’s eligibility. The eligibility of a person to be chosen
as a Senator or member of the House of Representatives under the Constitution is
a matter for the High Court sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns.
The mandatory qualification checklist was in place for all candidates seeking to
nominate for the 2022 federal election. 1,624 checklists totalling 17,117 pages
were published.
Points
• The AEC was not required to check the accuracy of the information provided
on the checklist, nor determine whether it impacted on eligibility.
• The checklist is a self-assessment tool which puts the onus on candidates to
satisfy themselves, and the Australian people, that they are eligible to be
elected under section 44 of the Constitution. It contains a mix of mandatory
and voluntary questions.
• The wording of the questions in the checklist is dictated by the legislation.
• The Electoral Act requires the Electoral Commissioner to publish the
qualification checklist and any additional documents provided by a candidate
as soon as practicable after nominations for an election are declared.
• At the 2022 federal election, declaration of nominations occurred on 22 April
2022.
• The AEC published qualification checklists and any supporting documents for
all 1,624 candidates on our website on 25 April 2022 and they were removed
on 2 August 2022 and copies of the qualification checklists for elected
candidates provided to parliament.
• Future publishing: The AEC will publish qualification checklists as soon as
practicable following the declaration of nominations but cannot put a timeframe
on this due to the rigorous quality assurance processes to be undertaken first.
Statistics
Number of checklists published 2022 FE
Pages published 2022 FE
1,624
17,117
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support
Natasha Scandrett, A/g Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
23/01/2023
23/01/2023 9:00 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 48Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 51 ---
No: 48
Talking points
Question: Why doesn’t the AEC check the eligibility of candidates to stand for election?
• The qualification checklist puts the onus on candidates to satisfy themselves, and the
Australian people, that they are eligible to be elected under section 44 of the Constitution.
• The AEC has no legal authority to check the eligibility of candidates.
• The Electoral Act only requires and permits the AEC to check that all mandatory questions on
the checklist have been answered, and that additional documents have been provided if
necessary.
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document No. 4823Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 52 ---
No: 49
COMMONWEALTH PROCUREMENT RULES –
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Recent amendment to the Commonwealth Procurement Rules have now included
an explicit requirement to include climate change impacts in relevant financial and
non-financial considerations when making a value for money assessment.
The AEC procures goods and services consistent with the Public Governance
Performance and Accountability Act and Commonwealth Procurement Rules.
The AEC applies these rules through its accountable authority instructions,
supporting operational guidelines, and by developing procurement skills and
processes to improve efficiency and value-for-money outcomes.
Points
• Assessment of Environmental considerations in determining value for money
already exists. However, they have now been amended to include specific
reference to climate change impacts.
• The AEC maintains contemporary knowledge of, and applies, Commonwealth
Policy regarding Procurement activities. This includes assessment of
environmental sustainability of the proposed goods and services as applicable
to each procurement.
• Specifically addressing climate change within AEC procurement activities may
require a more coordinated policy led approach to maintain a simple yet
effective method of applying and measuring.
Talking points
Question: Can outline how you meet these requirements within your procurement framework?
The AEC procures goods and services in accordance with the Commonwealth Resource
Framework.
The AEC has centralised expertise to manage its procurement and contracting framework,
including panel arrangements. Tenders are evaluated for:
•
•
•
•
value for money;
energy and consumption demand;
unnecessary consumption;
end-of-life disposal arrangements.
The value for money assessment includes climate changes impacts as a result of the changes
made to the CPRs effective 1 July 2022.
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support Branch
Natasha Scandrett, A/g Assistant Commissioner Printed
Updated
23/01/2022
23/01/2023 9:05 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 49Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 53 ---
No: 49
Question: Can you nominate some of the practicable ways you have lowered the environmental
impacts of your procurements and contracts?
Each activity has its own unique requirements. For example:
• Evaluating suppliers’ environmental credentials during tenders;
• Use of recycled content for cardboard polling equipment;
•
Leveraging the WoAG arrangement for office supplies which strengthens the
Commonwealth’s overall position to effect supplier behaviour;
• Application of the Australian Packaging Covenant;
• Recycling or donating end of life products rather than send to landfill
(the AEC is currently holding donations following FE2022 while planning for a referendum is
underway)
Question: Can you advise how the AEC might specifically consider climate change impacts in
future procurement activities?
Specifically addressing climate change within AEC procurement activities may require a more
coordinated and policy led approach at the Commonwealth level. The AEC has engaged with the
APS Net Zero Unit at the Department of Finance to ensure the AEC’s approach is consistent with
whole of government future direction on managing environmental impacts.
For example, it is difficult to identify the specific impact that supplying pencils for the use of voters
has on climate change in a way that does not have a significant administrative impact on suppliers.
The AEC will have to review its current practices to see if we can identify a simple yet effective
method of applying and measuring climate change impacts. Importantly this must balance
Commonwealth policy as well as impacts to potential suppliers, which range from very small to
large suppliers.
Additionally, elections have to be undertaken in a particular way under the requirements of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act which tend to be more resource intensive (i.e. voting in person).
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document No. 49Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 54 ---
No: 50
COWPER COUNT – 2022 FEDERAL ELECTION
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Variance in House of Representatives results for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation
(PHON) candidate Faye Aspiotis in the Port Macquarie West Cowper PPVC for
the 2022 federal election.
We are aware in the counting centre in Cowper, some House of Representatives
ballot papers were combined across different pre-poll voting centre counts on
polling night. This did not impact overall results for any candidates in the division.
Points
• PHON Secretary Damian Huxham wrote to the AEC on 5 September 2022
seeking an explanation of the variance of One Nation’s House of
Representatives results between the Port Macquarie West Cowper PPVC and
the Port Macquarie West polling place.
• The AEC responded that variances in candidate results between polling
locations are common, however we are aware of an issue in the Cowper
counting centre where some House of Representatives ballot papers were
combined across different pre-poll voting centre counts on polling night, which
may have contributed.
• This administrative error has no impact on the results of the election for the
division as all votes were counted, but results were reported against different
polling places.
• An investigation at the time established that all ballot papers could be
accounted for. A re-examination of the data shows the same outcome.
Background
Branch
Contact
Delivery and Support
Natasha Scandrett, Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
17/01/2023
23/01/2023 9:05 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 50Released u Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 55 ---
No: 51
Call Centre worker recordings – Senate ATL/Dickson
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Election call centre workers were allegedly providing false voting information to
electors regarding electoral processes (Senate ballot paper ATL / Dickson).
The AEC employs 105,000 temporary staff, many for a single day, who provide
guidance to voters. A small number of individual accounts are not a representative
of instructions provided across an operation of more than 8,000 voting venues and
millions of individual interactions, including hundreds of thousands of public
enquiries.
Points
During the election, the AEC became aware of video posts on social media,
depicting alleged recordings of call centre staff providing information about
electoral processes.
• The AEC is unable to verify the authenticity of allegations without revisiting
hundreds of thousands of public enquiries.
• The structure of the Senate ballot paper is determined by the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918.
• Under the Act, candidates who are not endorsed by a political party, but have
chosen to be grouped on the ballot, are entitled to a box above the line.
However, they are not entitled to have any name or logo placed against their
box.
• Mr Dickson lodged a submission (Submission 279) with JSCEM in relation to
this matter and the AEC provided a response to the Chair of JSCEM in
November 2022
Talking points
Question: Did AEC election call centre workers providing false voting information to electors
regarding the Senate ballot paper?
• The AEC employs 105,000 temporary staff in an election, who provide guidance to voters.
• A small number of individual accounts are not a representative of instructions provided across
an operation of more than 8,000 voting venues and millions of individual interactions, including
hundreds of thousands of public enquiries.
• The AEC is unable to verify this claim without revisiting hundreds of thousands of public
enquiries.
• Call centre staff are trained and required to complete an assessment to confirm their level of
understanding of training content. Training is a mix of face to face and online.
• Call centre scripts are used by staff to ensure they are providing accurate information to the
public. They are also supported by the first-tier escalation team. If the escalation team are
unable to resolve the enquiry, it gets escalated to more senior AEC staff.
Branch
Contact
Service Delivery Group
Kath Gleeson, A/g First Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
18/01/2023
25/01/2023 11:07 AM
LEX3715 Released DocumentReleased under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 56 ---
No: 51
Question: What action did the AEC take in response to seeing videos on social media depicting
alleged recordings of call centre staff?
• The AEC does not have verified evidence to suggest that call centre staff provided false voting
information to electors regarding electoral processes.
• The AEC is unable to verify this claim without revisiting hundreds of thousands of public
enquiries.
• The AEC ensured there was a specific script and messaging on the issue, ensuring all call
centre staff were aware that un-named boxes above-the-line on the Senate ballot paper can be
numbered by voters just like any other box.
• A small number of individual accounts are not representative of instructions provided across an
operation 8000 voting venues and millions of individual interactions, including hundreds of
thousands of public enquiries.
• The AEC consulted the relevant police jurisdictions regarding potential avenues for further
investigation or referral.
Question: Why is there a blank column on the Senate Ballot Paper, is this considered
discriminatory toward independent candidates?
• The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 determines the structure of the Senate ballot paper.
• Under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, candidates who are not endorsed by a political
party, but have chosen to be grouped on the ballot, are entitled to a box above the line.
However, they are not entitled to have any name or logo placed against their box.
If candidates or electors take issue with the structure of the Senate ballot paper, that is a matter
for Parliament.
•
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document23Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 57 ---
Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 58 ---
No: 61
Page 2 of 7
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6123Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 59 ---
No: 61
Page 3 of 7
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6123Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 60 ---
No: 61
Page 4 of 7
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6123Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 61 ---
No: 61
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6123Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 62 ---
No: 61
Page 6 of 7
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6123Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 63 ---
No: 61
Page 7 of 7
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6123Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 64 ---
No: 62
ELECTION TIME PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Points
Federal election participation information campaign.
The AEC conducted a large-scale communication campaign at the 2022 federal
election to inform and encourage Australian voters to effectively participate.
• The AEC’s 2022 election campaign was run to help voters to effectively
participate and to support electoral integrity.
• Targeted at all eligible voters (all Australian citizens 18 years and over), it
included specific and translated information to reach voters from culturally and
linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds, voters with a disability and First
Nations voters.
• The campaign ran over three phases from Sunday 10 April (election
announcement) to Saturday 21 May (election day).
• The three participation phases were: i) close of rolls (encouraging people to
enrol before the deadline); ii) voter services (early voting options); and iii)
formality (how to complete your ballot papers correctly).
• This was supported by Stop and Consider (disinformation) messaging
•
throughout the election period, and COVID-19 safety measures information.
It was a multi-channel campaign using advertising, social media, website,
community and media outreach, polling place products and household delivery
of an official guide. The campaign included partnerships with NITV, Snapchat
and SBS.
• Over 1,000+ advertisements across TV, radio, press, cinema, out of home,
digital and social media.
• Advertising translated into 52 languages (32 CALD and 20 First Nations).
• The media placement spend for the 2022 federal election was $19 million
(GST inclusive).
• The campaign performed well and achieved reach and frequency of its
messaging among the target audience.
• The AEC implements an internal certification process on its advertising
campaign, which is externally published on campaign launch. It has a long-
standing exemption from the review and approval processes of government
advertising campaigns.
Branch
Contact
Electoral Integrity and Communications
Matt Haigh, Assistant Commissioner
Updated
Printed
16/01/2023
24/01/2023 8:57 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 62Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 65 ---
No: 62
Talking points
Question: What did the AEC do to inform voters of the COVID-19 safety measures at the 2022
election?
• The AEC provided information on the range of COVID-19 safety measures as a key part of the
campaign.
• This included specific advertising, and messaging across other channels such as the official
guide delivered to all households, social media and detailed information on the AEC website.
Question: How did the AEC’s election-time campaign promote early voting?
• Given the compulsory nature of voting, the campaign provided voters with information on how
they can participate if they cannot vote on election day.
• This information was prefaced by messages regarding eligibility for early voting, indicating that
early voting is available for people who are unable to make it to a polling place on election day.
Page 2 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6223Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 66 ---
No: 62
Page 3 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6223Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 67 ---
No: 62
Page 4 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6223Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 68 ---
No: 68
GILMORE COUNT
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
Position
Points
Count for the division of Gilmore at the 2022 federal election.
Recount requests made by the Liberal Party candidate were considered and not
granted in accordance with the Electoral Act and AEC policy.
• Section 279 of the Act provides that a candidate can request a recount of
ballot papers at any time before the declaration of the result of a House of
Representatives election.
• The AEC was satisfied that the scrutiny process was properly conducted and
that scrutineers had the opportunity to observe all relevant steps of the
scrutiny process as required under the Electoral Act.
• Fiona Phillips was declared elected as Member of the House of
Representatives for the Division of Gilmore with a margin of 373 votes
following distribution of preferences.
Talking points
Question: When does a recount of House of Representatives ballot papers occur?
• Section 279 of the Electoral Act makes provision for the recount of House of Representatives
ballot papers.
• A candidate may make a request for a recount. The candidate must set out reasons for
request.
• The Divisional Returning Officer (DRO), Australian Electoral Officer (AEO), or the Electoral
Commissioner (EC) may determine that a recount is to occur.
• As a matter of procedure, an automatic recount will occur if the margin between the two leading
candidates, after distribution of preferences, is less than 100 votes.
Question: Was a request for a recount received for the Division of Gilmore? If so what was the
outcome?
• A request for a recount for the Division of Gilmore was made by the Liberal Party candidate, Mr
Andrew Constance to the DRO for Gilmore.
• The request was considered and decision made to deny the request in accordance with s279
of the Electoral Act by the DRO.
• A further request was made to the EC which was also considered and denied, based on the
conclusion that the scrutiny process for the election for the Division of Gilmore was properly
conducted in accordance with the Electoral Act.
Branch
NSW State Office
Updated
Contact
Rebecca Main, State Manager and AEO NSW Printed
18/10/2022 (Remains
correct at 19/01/2023)
23/01/2023 7:50 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 68Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 69 ---
No: 68
Question: What is the process for considering a candidate’s request for a recount?
• Section 279 of the Electoral Act makes provision for the recount of House of Representatives
ballot papers including that a candidate can make a request for a recount to the DRO at any
time before the declaration of the result.
• The AEC’s House of Representatives Recount Policy and standard operating procedure
provides guidance to staff on the management and evaluation of recount requests made in
accordance with s279.
•
Information regarding recounts including how to make a request and guidelines on how a
request will be evaluated is also provided to candidates in the Candidates Handbook.
Question: What issues were raised by the candidate in the request for a recount? What was the
AEC’s response to these issues?
• The reasons provided in the request for recount included that scrutineers had not had the
opportunity to inspect and challenge votes which had been declared as informal and that votes
declared as informal should again be reviewed for formality.
•
In declining the request for a recount, the DRO was satisfied that there were no errors or
irregularities that may have materially affected the election result and noting the margin of 373
votes, concluded that there was not sufficient reasons to support that a recount might change
the result.
• Furthermore, the DRO was satisfied that the scrutiny process was properly conducted and that
scrutineers had the opportunity to observe all relevant steps of the scrutiny process as required
under the Electoral Act.
Question: Was a request made to the Count of Disputed Returns?
• There was no request to the Court of Disputed Returns for a review in the division of Gilmore or
any other division nationally.
Attachments:
• Recount request from candidate to Electoral Commissioner – 13 June 2022
• Response letter from Electoral Commissioner – 15 June 2022
Page 2 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document No. 68Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 70 ---
No: 68
Page 3 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6823Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 71 ---
No: 68
Page 4 of 4
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6823Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 72 ---
No: 69
2GB DISCARDED BALLOT PAPERS
FOUND – PORT MACQUARIE
Commissioner’s summary
Issue
2GB Ben Fordham Breakfast Show aired/published a story on 22 June 2022
suggesting a listener had found completed ballot papers in a bin in Port
Macquarie.
Position
The AEC upholds electoral integrity and public trust in electoral processes and
has strong ballot paper handling policies that all staff are trained to adhere to.
Points
• The AEC’s investigation into the discarded ballot papers is ongoing.
• At this stage the finding is that the completed ballot papers are likely to have
been discarded declaration ballot papers (that is, an out-of-area voter should
have returned their completed ballot paper to be placed inside a completed
declaration envelope, but in these instances, they have likely not been
returned as per the instruction).
•
Initial indications are that the ballot papers are likely informal, and due to the
small number, there is no impact on the result of any electoral division.
• There is no evidence regarding their origin that points to an operational issue
impacting the election.
Talking points
Question: Why were completed ballot papers found in a bin in Port Macquarie?
• The AEC’s investigation into the discarded ballot papers is ongoing and a report will be written
once finalised.
• At this stage the finding is that the completed ballot papers are likely to have been discarded
declaration ballot papers (that is, an out-of-area voter should have returned their completed
ballot paper to be placed inside a completed declaration envelope, but in these instances they
have likely not been returned as per the instruction).
• Ballot papers in the AEC’s possession (prior to issuing to a voter in-person or via post, or after
receipt of completed ballots from a voter) are tracked from point to point with a range of
security measures in place.
• Ballot papers in a voter’s possession (e.g. when voting via post or in-person) are the
responsibility of the voter themselves to return to the AEC in the required timeframe in order to
be counted.
Branch
New South Wales
Contact
Rebecca Main, AEO NSW
Updated
Printed
31/10/2022 (Remains
correct at 19/01/2023)
23/01/2023 7:56 AM
LEX3715 Released Document No. 69Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 73 ---
No: 69
Page 2 of 2
LEX3715 Released Document No. 6923Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
--- Page 74 ---
REDACTION CODES
Personal Information (name) redacted.
Personal Information (date of birth) redacted.
Personal Information (photograph) redacted
Personal Information (facsimile of signature) redacted.
Personal Information (facsimile of manuscript initialling) redacted.
Personal Information (Individual’s address) redacted.
Personal Information (individual’s telephone number) redacted.
Personal Information (individual’s opinion) redacted.
Personal Information (opinion about individual) redacted.
Personal Information (employment history) redacted.
Personal Information (qualifications) redacted.
Personal Information (health) redacted.
Personal Information (identifying individual) redacted.
Business information (Bank Account details) redacted.
Business information (Billing Account details) redacted.
Business information (internal operations) redacted.
Legal Professional Communication redacted.
Deliberative material redacted.
Irrelevant material redacted.
Electoral Roll material redacted.
Tests, examinations or audits material redacted.
Management or assessment of personnel material redacted.
Proper and efficient conduct of the operations of AEC material redacted.
Lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or
dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law.
Trade Secrets.
Commercial valuable information.
Financial interests of the Commonwealth.
Property interests of the Commonwealth.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28